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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 30

JAN-JUNE 1962

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXX

JANUARY TO JUNE 1932

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119 Sir P. Loraine No. 74. Conf.	Jan. 20	Syrian throne ... Refers to No. 114. Transmits copies of notes exchanged between Turkish Chargé d'Affaires and Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Discusses reasons for which Turkish Government may be favouring candidature of ex-Khedive	160
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122 To Secretary-General, League of Nations	Feb. 27	Syria-Iraq frontier ... Refers to No. 117. Transmits memorandum containing proposals for revision of frontier as defined in the 1930 convention	164
123 Consul Holo No. 17. Conf.	Feb. 11	Situation at Damascus ... Refers to No. 118. Military dispositions now relaxed, but elections not yet held. Question of revision has been prominent. Discusses High Commissioner's negotiations with Nationalists	172
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125 Consul Holo No. 36. Conf.	Apr. 8	Syrian elections ... Reports on negotiations with Nationalists leading up to holding of elections and on their results. Transmits notes on candidates	201
126 Consul-General Sir H. Sadow No. 48	May 10	Lebanese Constitution ... Reports steps leading up to suspension of Lebanese Constitution on the 9th May. M. Debbas becomes Chief of the State and will govern through a Council of Directors. High Commissioner's action generally approved	200
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131 Sir G. Clerk No. 45	1932 Jan. 8	Turco-Iraqi relations ... Refers to No. 130. Progress of discussions between Nuri Pasha and Turkish Government. Questions relating to extradition treaty.	209
132 Sir G. Clerk No. 1. Tel. Sa- ring	Jan. 11	Turco-Iraqi relations ... Residence Convention and Treaty of Commerce and Extradition were signed at Angora on the 10th January.	210
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138 Colonial Office (Communicated)	Mar. 21	Turco-Iraqi relations ... Note from secretary to the Council of Ministers, Bagdad, to High Commissioner for Iraq enclosing copies of letters exchanged between Nuri Pasha and the Turkish Government regarding certain matters which were discussed at Angora in January 1932.	236
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150 Lord Tyrrell No. 686	May 19	Proposed termination of mandatory régime in Iraq Refers to No. 149. Reports notes exchanged on the 18th May. Encloses French note in original and certified copy of reply. French Government would be grateful for assurance regarding attitude of His Majesty's Government should French Government propose emancipation of any Near Eastern territories under French mandate. Gave oral assurance in general terms	287
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PART XXX.

CHAPTER I. ARABIA

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No. 1

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 4, 1932.)

(No. 482)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 13, 1931

IN my despatch No. 444 of the 17th November, I had the honour to report on the financial situation as affected by the issue of Ibn Saud's proclamation announcing budgetary reform. In my printed letter No. 460 of the 30th November was transmitted a series of announcements which resulted from the proclamation and which were published in the "Umm al Qura" of the 20th. They conveyed the King's commands to reduce expenditure, select a Reorganisation Committee, create a Treasury Department, and appoint a treasurer, and meanwhile to employ the Director General of Finance and the Vice-President of the Hejazi Legislative Assembly in an inspectional tour of the other side of Nejd.

2. I now have the honour to enclose a translation of a leading article from the "Umm al Qura" of the 4th December entitled "Between Two Epochs, Memorable Deeds of His Majesty," (*) as well as a more restrained but not very illuminating announcement on "The New Budget." (")

3. The two epochs are, of course, the evil past, relieved only by the King's good deeds, and the radiant future in both this world and the next. The memorable deeds of His Majesty are five in number. First and foremost is his constitution of a council of four under-secretaries of State, having collective and individual responsibility under the presidency of his Viceroy, the second is his establishment of a central Treasury, the third, the concentration of all Government assets and liabilities, the fourth, the concentration of all revenue in a central Treasury and its allotment to various defined objects, and, fifthly, measures of economy in the personnel and expenditure of Government departments. These are not the first proofs which His Majesty has given of his Islamic sincerity, his Arabic zeal, and his devotion to his people, but they have effectively discharged his obligations of his obligations towards Allah and the country. In another extract which is also enclosed, from the "Umm al Qura" of the 27th November, the editor deems it worthy of glorification and praise that His Majesty has also commanded the reduction of his personal expenses to an exceeding degree as a further proof of his democratic principles.

4. All this has meant a lot of work for the only Under-Secretary of State in action, Fuad Bey Hamza, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin having returned to Riyadh. He is naturally elated by the success of his efforts to break the Abdullah Suleiman régime, create a budget, and constitute a central organ of responsibility and

(*) Not printed

2 237 164 261

No. 2.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 15, 1932.)

1943

1

Jedda, December 10, 1931

WITH reference to my telegram No. 251 of the 14th December, I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of the Hejazi Government's communiqué of the 14th December relative to the negotiations between Hejaz-Nejd and Yemen regarding the Asir frontier, with special reference to the recognition by Ibn Saud of the Emir's right to Mount Ararat. A copy of this communiqué was forwarded to the Legation on the 14th December, the date of issue, under cover of an unnumbered memorandum of a purely formal nature.

2. Mount Arwa has been mentioned on previous occasions in connexion with the frontier dispute. The name would appear to apply to the position or positions occupied by the Imam last August or early in September, when according to Fudh Bey, his troops advanced at Jabal Razih. The locality may possibly be identified with the Arwa shown on the 1890 and 1901 maps of South West Arabia, "Saada" section, as a village lying 12 miles up the valley in which Saada is situated, and definitely on the southerly side of a watershed, which may well mark a *de facto* boundary between Yemen and Asir. Razih, which is shown on some maps as a mountain, here appears as a village near the crest of Khawlan-ash Sham and on what would appear to be the Yemeni side of it. The map shows the crest of as standing 60 miles from the sea and 100 miles of Jizan.

representative at Rome, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, and the Political Resident at Aden, with copies of my telegram under reference and an explanation of the reference.

I have &c

ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure in No. 2

Official Proclamation

1. *For the first 100 years, the*

The representatives of the Government of His Majesty the King met those of the Imam Yahya on the 25th Jumada-ath-Thani, 1350 (the 6th November, 1931), at a place called an-Nadhir, near Mount Arw, which was the point in dispute between the two sides. The representatives negotiated regarding the withdrawal of the Yamani troops from Mount Arw, which the latter had occupied as far as the original *(sic)* frontier line, but they could not arrive at a settlement acceptable to both parties owing to insistence of the Yamani representatives on remaining in the places captured by the Yamani troops at Arw and to the

Dated, Sha'ban 4, 1350

(December 14, 1931.)

[B 165, 165, 25]

No. 2.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon—(Received January 11, 1932.)

(No. 492.)

515

Jedda, December 23, 1991

SINCE my return to Jeddah on the 17th December, I have endeavoured to obtain a general view of the economic and social situation in this country. Although I intend to do this more fully in a report to your possession, I think it worth while to sketch briefly the general picture of what I find after an absence of five months. I have not had the advantage of my contact with the Government and the various departments of the Ministry of Finance and most of its officials have been absent since my departure. I have met only one of them, Mr. Hamza, who left Mecca for Nejd and returned immediately with my arrival in Jeddah. The only Hamza personage of any consequence whom I have seen is the rich old Governor of Jeddah who hardly counts as an official any longer. Though still to some extent employed as a consultant on general questions of law and order, he is more a servant than of a merchant. It is in fact not possible to find a Government servant in Jeddah who is not also a business man and an important member of the community. The Government has no function in the country with any other than a nominal one and the people are not interested in it.

[illegible]

3 I am assured that among the tribes, and especially those in the north of the U. S. the utmost interest prevails. It is impossible to sift the information, but it is said that, what with the reaction of world conditions, manifested more

[7797]

particularly in the greatly reduced pilgrimages, and the demands of the Government for heavy payments have caused a great depression in the country. I hear of a reduction in the number of camels and of sheep and goats being sold off at ludicrously small prices. Attention is drawn to the influx of half starved Bedouin into the larger towns, especially, perhaps, Medina, and to the frequent spectacle of hungry tribesmen collecting at the halts on the main road from Jeddah to that place. In August I was inclined to doubt the tales of actual starvation, which, it will be remembered, were related by the Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London, among others. Early in September the Mecca newspaper "Umm al-Qura," a Government-inspired organ, thought it worth while to contradict a report of famine in the Hejaz which had been circulated in London. In view of what I now hear, I can no longer disregard the reiterated statements made to me regarding hunger and increased mortality. To give one example, possibly exaggerated, I am told of Bedouin dying in Medina at the rate of thirty-five a day.

some importance in Soviet circles. This gentleman, M. Horace Salkind, is very much interested in the oil business and is a person to whom the Minister would do well to pay attention. My interest is in the Russian market for the coup of selling benzine and petroleum on credit and although there are other Russian interests in the matter, I think there is little to be gained from the relations between the Soviets and the Hejazi Government.

10. I can best complete this account of the currency situation by giving a string of isolated facts, not all of which I can interpret, as follows:—

- (a) As already stated gold has tended to disappear from the market. This is in part attributed to hoarding. It is possible that some has been sent to Riyadh, where the King is believed by some to be accumulating a reserve of treasure. Gold has also been taken off the market by the Dutch Bank, which for several weeks past has been buying. This bank normally sends a shipment of gold to Europe after the pilgrimage. Its present policy of buying may be due to a desire on the part of the head office to hold part of their gold reserve in Jeddah. Fluid gold is required for various local purposes and the depletion has been sufficiently marked to produce a recent enquiry by a firm here for a quotation for gold sovereigns from abroad delivered in Jeddah.
- (b) The Soviet Legation here has been selling sterling notes in considerable quantities. The origin of the notes and the object of the Legation are obscure. The notes are genuine, but I have not heard it seriously suggested so far that any of the notes here have been forged.
- (c) When the announcement on monetary policy sent home in my above-mentioned despatch No. 286 of the 14th July was made, it was the policy of the Hejazi Government to bolster up the rial by generalising its use in other parts of Ibn Saud's dominions, like Nejd and Asir, though it was not hoped to oust the Maria Theresa dollar at a stroke. This policy has been pursued by introducing riyals into Nejd for use in out payments, e.g., it was said that Ibn Saud intended to give his largesse to the tribes this year in Hejazi silver, and a plan was apparently devised for creating in Nejd a network of stalls to retail goods bought or borrowed in the Hejazi towns, the transactions to be effected in riyals only. The latter part of the plan is said to have been abandoned, as the goods had to be stored or sold wholesale. Riyals, though put into circulation in Nejd, are very unpopular there, partly because the merchants complain that they are no use to them in Koweit and Bahrein. Their gold value in Nejd is consequently much lower than in the Hejaz, though information as to the actual rates are conflicting. One informant, the pessimist, says that they went some little time ago as low as 10 riyals to £1, but he adds that the King in his anger confiscated the goods of twelve Riyadh merchants and closed down their shops.
- (d) The Government have stultified their previous policy of trying to keep riyals at 10 to the £ gold, by accepting them only at their market value in gold. This is perhaps reasonable in the case of the graph of the rial, but it is not so in the case of the rial for external settlements. The same rule is, however, applied in other cases, notably that of customs duty. Unfortunately for the financial authorities they have not been able to carry to its logical conclusion their plan of having it both ways, i.e., paying at 10 and collecting at gold rate. In order to clear off debts to certain commercial houses, they have had to agree to take only a portion of the duty on new imports in cash and to allow the remainder to be written off against the debts. Some, at least, of the commercial houses, e.g., Messrs. Giollati, Hankey and Company, have successfully asserted the principle that, for this purpose, the writing off should be on the basis of £ gold to £ gold, instead of at the customs rate for riyals, which fluctuates round the fluctuating market rate.
- (e) A curious transaction came to my notice accidentally at Port Sudan. I found that the Hejazi postal authorities had cleared off their debt to the Eastern Telegraph Company up to last May and had subsequently made a single payment which was understood to be on account of the June account. This took the form of a cheque in sterling drawn by Crédit Lyonnais, Paris, on Crédit Lyonnais,

London, on the 26th October last to the order of the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs and endorsed by the latter at Mecca on the 26th October to the Eastern Telegraph Company. I am at a loss to understand how this cheque was bought and can only surmise that it may have something to do with Abdurrahman Qusaibi's activities in Europe.

11. I ought perhaps to apologise for treating so many diverse subjects in a single paper. I cannot but observe, however, that the present depression and disorganisation which prevail, both for the sake of their intrinsic interest and because of their bearing on the political future. I shall, in later despatches, again deal with the individual subjects separately. In view of the more general character of the present paper, I am sending copies of this to the Department of Overseas Trade, the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign and Political Department, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan and Iraq, and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN

[E 166 52 25]

No. 4.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 11, 1932)

(No. 493)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 29, 1931

I HAVE at length to my despatch No. 492 of the 28th December to give a general view of the currency situation in the Hejaz. I have now the honour to inform you that the proposed despatch and the conclusions to which it has led are in accordance with the views of the Hejazi Government. I have also to inform you that the sum up of the currency situation in the Hejaz is as follows:—The Hejazi Government have decided to issue a new rial, the value of which is to be fixed at 10 riyals to the £. The rial is to be issued in the form of a new rial, the value of which is to be fixed at 10 riyals to the £. The rial is to be issued in the form of a new rial, the value of which is to be fixed at 10 riyals to the £.

2. When Ibn Saud went to Riyadh about the beginning of July he was completely "fed up" with the Hejaz and its problems. He doubtless felt more acutely than others the effects of Nejd's economic depression. It was significant that before going there he had been seen in the Hejaz, in placate extreme Wahhabi opinion by referring to the question of the removal of Nejd on the improbability of their doing so, and his accession to the Throne. At the same time he gave another indication of a swing towards the extreme view of the authority of the caliphate of the Khalifa. He did not mention the name of the Khalifa, but he did mention the name of the Khalifa. He did not mention the name of the Khalifa, but he did mention the name of the Khalifa. He did not mention the name of the Khalifa, but he did mention the name of the Khalifa.

3. While the King, on the eve of his departure for Nejd, was thus swinging himself round to a good Muslim, a good Wahabi, he was also swinging himself round to a good European. He has been in contact with the British, and he has been in contact with the British. He has been in contact with the British, and he has been in contact with the British. He has been in contact with the British, and he has been in contact with the British. He has been in contact with the British, and he has been in contact with the British.

4. The situation in the Hejaz has grown much worse since then. The towns have every reason for discontent, the tribes for disaffection.

(7797)

troops as there were in Jedda would appear to have been moved to Mecca almost in their entirety. I see in a report from the American Agent at Baku dated the 23rd November that the army there was reduced to 10,000 men and that many of these were without arms. I think it would be reasonable to suppose that they might be intended for an attack on Yezid. I see in a report from the American Agent at Baku dated the 23rd November that the army there was reduced to 10,000 men and that many of these were without arms. I think it would be reasonable to suppose that they might be intended for an attack on Yezid.

24,000 rifles have been repaired in the Mecca workshops, that there were recently 4,000 in hand which the mechanics were being pressed to repair without delay, and that further rifles were expected to be brought from the interior for the same purpose. It is also stated that the Government has been offering rifles with 1200 cartridges for sale to the public at a low price. It was also stated that the Government has been offering rifles with 1200 cartridges for sale to the public at a low price. It was also stated that the Government has been offering rifles with 1200 cartridges for sale to the public at a low price.

10. The third question need not be dealt with at length. My Russian charge here has always struck me as a thoroughgoing opportunist in politics, and I see nothing in his burst of activity last summer or its results up to date to make me alter that opinion. I can see the Soviets selling rifles or anything else to Ibn Saud, and any time but not at the present time backing him in a foreign adventure otherwise than by perhaps looking on generally at any attempt he might make to fish in troubled waters. I discard as fantastic a further suggestion by my principal informant that Russia might, in an endeavour to compass the destruction of the British position in the Middle East, draw Ibn Saud into a general alliance comprising Turkey and Persia. I feel that if Ibn Saud contemplated further adventure, he would work, as he has always done, in a very practical, but a rather of the grand *condottiere* manner. There is no doubt that he has sought to gain Islamic approval for his adventures, but he has not sought to gain Islamic approval for his adventures, but he has not sought to gain Islamic approval for his adventures.

[illegible]

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, His Majesty's High Commissioners for Transjordan and Iraq, and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

[E 314 314/25]

No 3

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Hyatt (Jeddah)

(No. 4)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, January 20, 1932

representatives reporting that the two men were II. Mustafa's bodyguards to so called head case was a statement from one of two fugitives from house of Abdullah Suleiman and to have been presented to King by the Musaid

Please report briefly by telegraph:

9. As regards the extent of the King's military preparations, I can again rely only on distorted rumors and a few bits of fact. He has, of course, his garrisons on the frontier and in certain places not far from it, and he could obtain men from Nejd for a definite enterprise promising warfare and loot. Such

E 365 314 85]

No. 6

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 22)

(No. 10)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, January 22, 1932

YOUR telegram No. 4. See my despatch No. 187 1930, and minutes I wrote at home; also Clayton's conversation with Ibn Saud on 17th May, 1927, of which I was present.

Man now in question claims to have been brought here on pilgrimage as a child many years ago. He was sent with a Muslim woman to the King. He fled to Legation after living eighteen months in house of Abdullah Suleiman, whom he believed to be his master. Minister for Foreign Affairs explains that Abdullah Suleiman procures slaves for King and houses his surplus stock. He has conveyed to me King's assurance that slave is his property. I have accepted this. It is a matter of fact, not of law, and is decided by His Majesty's Government. I am in communication with Fund regarding records of conversations in 1927.

I have hitherto recognised the probability of the existence of some understanding with the King and that it would only apply to slaves in actual possession of King or immediately related to princes. Ibn Saud contends that it applies to any slave who is his property.

Fuller report follows by saving telegram.

Please see my immediately following telegram.

E 366 314 25

No. 7

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 22)

(No. 11)

(Telegraphic.) P

Jedda, January 22, 1932

MY telegram No. 10 of the 22nd January. Alleged Royal slave.

Short of creating an incident, I am unable to repatriate this slave without Ibn Saud's consent. The matter is therefore delicate.

To surrender him would mean an enlargement of the permanent scope of the dubious agreement. Moreover, I am unable to guarantee that the slave will not be punished, or even perhaps put to death. All my efforts to bluff the King have failed.

E 474 123 91]

No. 8

M. Fleuriat to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 27)

PAR note en date du 23 décembre dernier, le Gouvernement britannique avait exprimé le désir de connaître le point de vue du Gouvernement français sur la suggestion faite par le Foreign Office et relative à la ratification de la Convention de Londres sur les phares de la mer Rouge.

En effet, par une note en date du 26 novembre 1931, le Foreign Office faisait savoir qu'il ne lui était pas possible d'engager des négociations avec l'Administration générale des Phares de l'ex Empire ottoman, au sujet du paiement en or de la rémunération stipulée à l'article 3 de la convention, avant que celle-ci n'eût été ratifiée par au moins quatre Puissances.

Le Gouvernement français a examiné avec grand soin la teneur de cette note. Il ne lui paraît malheureusement pas possible de modifier le point de vue exprimé antérieurement dans sa note du 20 novembre 1931.

L'Administration générale des Phares de l'ex Empire ottoman, en effet, n'est pas en mesure d'assurer l'exécution de la Convention de Londres, qui a prévu la couverture des dépenses d'exploitation et celle de la rémunération convenue, avant que ne lui ait été confirmée la garantie de change prévue dans l'accord.

Dans ces conditions, l'Ambassadeur de France a l'honneur d'attirer l'attention de son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté britannique aux Affaires étrangères sur les démarches que l'Administration des Phares de l'ex Empire ottoman se propose de faire auprès du Board of Trade, en vue d'aboutir à un arrangement qui, tout en assurant la garantie de change, permettra une prochaine mise en œuvre de la Convention de Londres.

M. de Fleuriat saisit, &c

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 25 janvier 1932

[E 366/314/25]

No. 9

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 7)

(Telegraphic.) P

Foreign Office, January 27, 1932

YOUR telegrams Nos. 10 and 11 of the 22nd January. Alleged Royal slave. Although I appreciate your difficulty, the question is of very great importance and His Majesty's Government are unable to yield.

I do not ignore the assurance contained in the second paragraph of your telegram No. 10. It is, however, a matter of fact, not of law, and is decided by His Majesty's Government. I am in communication with Fund regarding records of conversations in 1927. I do not ignore the assurance contained in the second paragraph of your telegram No. 10. It is, however, a matter of fact, not of law, and is decided by His Majesty's Government. I am in communication with Fund regarding records of conversations in 1927.

The Hejazi Government should therefore be informed of the view which His Majesty's Government are obliged to take.

The matter is so important in the eyes of His Majesty's Government that had the senior naval officer not been at present at Jedda, I should have asked the Admiralty to despatch a vessel to embark the slave. As it is, arrangements should at once be made with the senior naval officer for the man to be embarked in His Majesty's ship on your departure for Palestine. Although I realise that practical difficulties may be involved in the man's transfer, I give you the fullest discretion.

The course of action which I have indicated regarding paragraph 11 will presumably not be notified to the Hejaz Nejd Government, but I leave this point also to your discretion.

[E 463 463/25]

No. 10.

Sir John Simon to Sir G. Clerk (Angora).

(No. 41.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 28, 1932

FERIT BEY called this afternoon to tell me that the Turkish Government had been asked by the Government of the Hejaz to lend pilots and mechanics for the development of their air service, and to send a military mission to give similar help to the Hejazi army. Before replying to this request the Turkish Government having regard to the very friendly relations existing between themselves and us, desired to inform us of the request and to consult us about it. The Ambassador indicated that Turkey would not wish to act in the matter otherwise than in accordance with our suggestion, though he made no promise to this effect. He observed that his Government, like ours, was sincerely anxious to promote peace in that part of the world in which we were both so closely interested.

I thanked the Ambassador for his communication, and promised that he should hear from me on the subject very shortly.

I am, &c

JOHN SIMON

[illegible]

to Medina. When Medina fell to Ibn Saud he was made prisoner, and King's son sent him to Ibn Musaid of Hail, who is related not very closely to King. After six years with Ibn Musaid, latter sent him as present to Abdullah Suleiman about eighteen months before he fled to Legation. Since then he had been slave of Abdullah Suleiman and had nothing to do with King, to whom Abdullah Suleiman sent direct any slaves acquired for King's account. He had fled because

1. The following is a summary of the information provided to the Committee regarding the activities of the Communist Party, U.S.A., in the United States, as reported by the informant, [redacted], who is a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., and who has been active in the Party since 1927. The informant has provided information regarding the activities of the Party in the United States, and has also provided information regarding the activities of the Party in the United States, and has also provided information regarding the activities of the Party in the United States.

[illegible]

I replied to official note yesterday, accepting without hesitation King's assurance that Bakht Khan's servant was Mahomed Sultan, belonged to His Majesty, but saying that more difficult question remained as to how Bakht's case was affected by arrangement between King and Eastern Government of slave trade and manumission, and that I must consult His Majesty's Government as to what would be the arrangement to be made but not embodied in texts of treaty and attached letter. I said that, as Enad had wished to deal with this unofficially, I was in communication with him with view to elucidating questions to be submitted to His Majesty's Government.

I made careful statement to Fund this morning in course of long conversation. I said that I had accepted King's statement unreservedly on question of ownership which was matter of his domestic concern. Question of arrangement which he believed to have been made with Clayton was international and King was in position of party to a negotiation as to results of which there was room for doubt. When question first engaged my attention in 1930 I had gone into it fully. His Majesty ~~Clayton~~ had never formally instructed me to recognize existence of monarchy, and I said not a word then, but I had been in a position to assume its existence as a working hypothesis. I had since had it well in mind that I should not give asylum to slaves who actually formed part of the King's household or (though I was now uncertain whether this was

not too great an extension) of households of princes immediately related to him. I did not admit that term "private servants" included slaves not in King's actual service, but held in a reserve stock by Abdullah Suleiman. We agreed that I must await your views. I tried to tie Fuad down to closer definition of terms of understanding and date, but he was rather elusive in regard to details.

I regret that affair should have assumed these proportions. I feel personally that Clayton must have made some reassuring statement to King on afternoon of 16th May, 1927, but I am most reluctant to accept position that I must hand over slaves to a country which is at present at war with King's own territories to be his property. If you think it desirable on grounds of policy to concede point, I might arrange to surrender Bakhit and ask King then to place him at my disposal. He is so keen on establishing his own principle that he might agree to this. Something of sort was apparently arranged in 1929, when a slave belonging to a man in retinue of Emir Faisal took refuge and was left to Mr Bond to dispose of after formal surrender to Emir. I can trace no other case of surrender by agency of a Royal slave, though Fuad says that Mr Bird refused asylum in one case.

[B 725 314/25]

No 16

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 23.)

Lehrer, R.

Artem. Phil. 18 1982

SIR A. RYAN'S despatch No 62 of 1st February Slaves.

Fuad is no ordinary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. All sources of information agree that he gave standing order to kill Rakbit on sight outside Legation, but whether on his own authority or Ibn Saud's orders is not known.

Other slaves mentioned were embarked without difficulty on 6th February

Another Sudanese recently sold in Jeddah for £18 gold has taken refuge in Legation and will be repatriated on 20th February

E 793 314 25)

No. 17.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 17)

(No. 52)

Jedda, January 20, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 13 of the 26th January, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of the following correspondence relative to the slava Polknt

- (1) Translation of Minister for Foreign Affairs' note of the 26th December, written after I had telephoned a message to the Ministry on the 24th December regarding the refusal of the local authorities here to consent to the departure of the two men in question.
- (2) Copy of my note of the 31st December with its enclosure.
- (3) Translation of Minister for Foreign Affairs' note of the 18th January.
- (4) Translation of Fuad Bey's personal letter to me of the 19th January.
- (5) Copy of my note of the 2nd January after writing which I had the further conversation with Fuad Bey recorded in the penultimate paragraph of my Savigram No. 1 of the 22nd January.
- (6) Copy of note which I sent to Mevaz by post on the 28th January immediately on receipt of your telegram No. 7 of the 27th January, Fuad Bey having left Jeddah earlier in the week.
- (7) Translation of telegram from Minister for Foreign Affairs sent on the evening of the 28th January.
- (8) Copy of telegram sent to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

2. The above is the whole of the correspondence with the Hejaz Government up to this morning. I have given in my Sarigram No. 1 of the 22nd January a sufficient account of my conversations with Fuad Bey while he

was still in Jedda. It is only necessary to add, in view of later developments, that, in my conversation of the 16th January, I told him that I might have chosen the course of taking Bakhit to the quay for embarkation under my own auspices and thereby risking an incident, but that I did not intend to do so as I preferred to seek an amicable settlement, or, failing that, to submit the case to you.

3. I will report separately on the procedure at present followed in connexion with the embarkation of slaves manumitted by the Legation.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Ryan

Translation:

WITH reference to the two slaves, Harun and Bakhit, who took refuge at your Legation a few days ago, I am glad to inform you that His Majesty's Government have decided to order the purchase of slaves brought to the country. It is contrary to their orders that the purchase of slaves who took refuge at the Legation is contrary to their orders. he therefore, in these circumstances, has become free and is in liberty to stay in the Hejaz or to go whether he wishes.

With regard to the other, Bakhit, he is one of His Majesty the King's slaves, and this is not disproved by the fact that he was bought through (him, from the hand of) Ibn Suliman, for all His Majesty's purchases are made through him. I request your Excellency, therefore, to be good enough to hand him over to Sheikh Ali Taha, Assistant Kamakam of Jedda, so that he may be sent here at an early date. Instructions have been given to him (Ali Taha) accordingly.

FEISUL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

Sir A. Ryan to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.

Your Royal Highness,

Jedda, December 31, 1931

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Royal Highness's note of the 20th December and to thank you for the measures taken to overcome the objection at first raised by the local authorities at Jedda to the departure of the Nigerian British subject, Harun.

I attach great importance to the case of the other man, Bakhit. I have therefore personally examined him, and I enclose a statement showing his replies to the questions put by me. The local authorities here evidently misunderstood my difficulty in regarding him as a Royal slave. It was not due to the mere fact of his having been sent to the Legation by Sheikh Abdullah Suliman, but to the fact that he had apparently been for a prolonged period a member of Sheikh Abdullah's household.

It seems to me that there may be some mistake as to the identity of Bakhit, similar to that which arose last year when certain slaves who had taken refuge in this Legation were erroneously confused with others who had disappeared from the household of His Majesty the King. Even if there be no such confusion in this case, it is of such a nature that I should find it difficult to surrender the man to the local authorities, as your Royal Highness requests me to do, without the consent of my Government. I am prepared to obtain the views of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if your Royal Highness wishes me to do so, but in view of the complexity of the matter, I would suggest that I should first take an opportunity of discussing it with Sheikh Fuad Hamza, if, as I hope, he is likely to visit Jedda in the near future.

With highest respects,

ANDREW RYAN

Principal Questions put to Bakhit by Sir A. Ryan on December 29, with his Answers to them, and Supplementary Questions put in the course of the Examination

Question. What is your name?

Answer. Bakhit, son of Muhammad

Q. Where were you born?

A. In the Sudan. I do not know in what place, but someone has told me that I was born in Baghurma.

Q. What do you know about your father and mother and about their religion?

A. I was brought here so young that I know nothing about my parents. Muhammad was the name of the man who brought me here. I know nothing about my father and my mother and I do not know what their religion was.

Q. How did you come to the Hejaz?

A. I came from Suakin to Jedda in a steamer.

Q. Who brought you to the Hejaz?

A. Muhammad brought me. I know nothing else about Muhammad. Muhammad came from a place in the Sudan far from Khartum.

Q. At what season did you come? Was it at pilgrimage time?

A. I came fifteen days before the pilgrimage time.

Q. What happened to you after you came to Jedda?

A. I was given to a man named Hamid as-Suleiman. Some Bedouins and a Turk named Ilyas arrived in the country. They took me by the way by-me. They sold me to somebody in Ganuna. The name of the man who bought me was Ahmed bin Ghazin. I remained with him about three years and was all the time at Ganuna. After three years Ahmed brought me to Mecca and sold me to Shakir-aba-Jamal. I remained with Shakir in Mecca about five years. After that Shakir sent me to Medina with his family at the beginning of the war of Ibn Saud. Shakir himself stayed in Mecca. I stayed about one year in Medina with the family of Shakir. Then the Amir Muhammad, son of Ibn Saud, entered Medina and he took me. I remained with him three days. Then he sent me as a gift to Ibn Musaad at Hail. I remained with Ibn Musaad at Hail about six years. Ibn Musaad is the nephew of Ibn Jilawi, who is in Hasa. Ibn Musaad is the Amir of Hail. After those six years Ibn Musaad sent me to Abdullah bin Suleiman at Mecca. I remained with Abdullah bin Suleiman about one year and a half. Then I came to Jedda, having escaped from my master. My master was not in Mecca when I ran away, but his brother Hamad as-Suleiman was there.

Q. In whose house were you just before you came to the Legation?

A. I was in the house of Hamid as-Suleiman. It is one house with the house of Abdullah. My master was Abdullah.

Q. How long had you been in that house?

A. I was in that house one year and a half.

Q. Did your master buy you from anyone else, or were you given to him as a present?

A. I was given to Abdullah as a present.

Q. Why did you leave your master?

A. I left my master because if I asked him for anything he refused it.

Q. They say that you are a slave of the King. What do you say?

A. I was not sent to the King. I did not know the King and he does not know me. I was never in the King's house. I was never in the house of any of the King's sons or brothers after the Amir Muhammad sent me to Hail.

Q. But they say that Abdullah bin Suleiman brings many slaves for the King, and that many of the slaves in the house of Abdullah bin Suleiman belong to the King. What do you say?

A. When Abdullah bin Suleiman brings slaves for the King he sends them to the King and they are kept in the King's house. The slaves that are kept in the house of Abdullah as-Suleiman belong to Abdullah as-Suleiman.

Q Do you know your age when you came from Suakin to Jedda?

A I do not know at all my age. Some people tell me that my age was about 6 years.

Q Were you always a Moslem as long as you remember?

A I know myself as a Moslem, and I always pray.

Q But sometimes children who are born in Africa are not Moslems and are made Moslems. If you were circumcised when you were a boy you would remember it, because it hurts.

A It is true. When I came I was young and I did not know anything about it. I do not remember anything about it or about being circumcised. When I came to Jedda with Muhammad just before the pilgrimage time we went to Mecca, and we came back to Jedda for about ten days, and then the Hedonim stole me while I was playing.

Enclosure 3 in No 17

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Ryan

Mecca, Ramadhan 10, 1350

(January 18, 1932)

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note dated 31st December (21st Sha ban) regarding the male slave who sought refuge in the British Legation.

Since the writing of your note under reference, you have on two occasions spoken to the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs on this subject, the last occasion being on the 6th Ramadhan (10th January), he then informed you that he was studying the points which emerged from you not under reference in regard to Sheikh Abdullah as Suleiman's ownership of the slave, and that he was communicating with His Majesty the King in order to find out the truth.

I have just received an urgent telegram from His Majesty the King stating that the slaves placed in Abdullah as Suleiman's possession do not belong to him but are the property of His Majesty, and that the slave Bakht, the subject of the present enquiry, was actually sent by Ibn Musaid as a present to His Majesty the King, who ordered that he should be left with Sheikh Abdullah as he being, as you are aware, the person who takes charge of any unwanted slave or other property of His Majesty for future disposal.

In view of this fact and in accordance with the agreement concluded between His Majesty and Sir Gilbert Clayton during the negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Jedda in the year 1927, and in which it is laid down that no slave belonging to His Majesty and seeking refuge in the premises of the British agency, will be accepted, I trust that your Excellency will see no objection to returning the slave Bakht to his Government, and that it may be sent to us. I earnestly hope that you will appreciate this situation and will take steps to remedy it.

With highest respects,
FEISUL

Enclosure 4 in No

Fuad Bey to Sir A. Ryan

Mecca, Ramadhan 11, 1350

(January 19, 1932)

(Translation)

Dear Sir Andrew,

IN the official note which his Highness the Minister is sending you to-day, he has lost your official note concerning the case of the slave Bakht. After it had been ascertained from His Majesty the King himself that the slave is the property of His Majesty.

You asked me on the day of our last meeting, Saturday last, about the nature and the scope of the agreement made by the King of the Hedonim in the Treaty of Jedda concerning the return to his Majesty the King's slave to seek

refuge in the British agency. I have already informed you in the course of conversation that I was present only during the preliminary part of the negotiations and that my illness prevented me from attending the later stages.

I, however, know that, after His Majesty the King had absolutely refused to agree to allow the British consuls the right of manumitting slaves who should seek refuge of their own accord in the consulate, an agreement was reached by which His Majesty, at the pressing request of General Clayton, agreed to the continuance of the then state of affairs, provided that the British agent at Jedda should maintain the spirit (i.e. of co-operation) displayed in remedying the position at that time, and on condition that it should be understood also that the slaves belonging to His Majesty should be distinguished, for it was known that the King would not request the restitution of slaves who were not his property. No agreement was, however, written down at that time, but a statement was made after the meetings had closed. This statement in regard to slaves referred to "those who belong [sic] which as you know means 'belonging' (English word used), to His Majesty." His Majesty followed up this statement with an explanation to the effect that the slaves who belong to His Majesty are of two kinds: "either servant or soldier of ours."

From this you will see that the agreement, as we understand it, is a general agreement to allow the British consuls the right of manumitting slaves who belong to His Majesty the King without any special conditions having been made concerning

I hope that this explanation will help you in your consideration of the way in which you may be able to solve the case of the slave Bakht or any other case which may arise in future.

With highest respects, &c
FAD HAMZA

Enclosure 5 in No 17

Sir A. Ryan to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.

Your Royal Highness,

Jedda, January 21, 1932

(After Compliments.)

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Royal Highness's note of the 10th Ramadhan (the 18th January) relative to the slave Bakht, who took refuge in this Legation some weeks ago. Before this case arose, I had no knowledge of the special position of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman as regards the slave Bakht. I have, however, been informed by your Royal Highness's Secretary that you had been good enough to explain to me. I need hardly say that I accept without hesitation the King's assurance that the slave Bakht, though resident in the household of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman since he was sent from Hail, belongs to His Majesty.

There remains the more difficult question as to how the case of Bakht is affected by the understanding reached between His Majesty and the late Sir Gilbert Clayton in the Treaty of Jedda, the provisions of the slave trade and manumission in connexion with the Treaty of Jedda. His Majesty the King will readily understand that I must consult my Government as to the nature and scope of any arrangements then made, but not embodied in the text of the treaty and the annexed letters. In view of the wish expressed by His Excellency Fuad Bey that this question should be dealt with in an unofficial manner, I am in communication with him on the subject with a view to elucidating the questions to be submitted to my Government.

With highest respects,
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure 6 in No. 17

Sir A. Ryan to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca

Your Royal Highness,
(After Compliments)

Jedda, January 28, 1932

WITH reference to my note of the 21st January, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, after careful consideration of the case of the man Bakhit, who fled to this Legation from the house of Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, find themselves unable to accept the contention of the Hejazi Government that the man in question should not have been given asylum at the Legation and manumitted in the usual way.

My Government, who attach the greatest importance to this case, have instructed me to take the necessary steps to embark the man in question in His Majesty's sloop "Penzance," now lying in Jedda Harbour. I am taking the necessary measures to carry out these express instructions without delay and would ask that the local authorities of Jedda may be informed accordingly.

The decision which my Government have intimated to me is categorical regarding the case of Bakhit. I am still in communication with them regarding the wider issues raised in the personal letter which his Excellency the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs addressed to me on the 11th Ramadhan (1931). I have also had my discussion with Fuad Bey on the 21st January.

With highest respects,

ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure 7 in No. 17

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Ryan

(Telegraphic)

Mecca, January 28, 1932

WITH reference to your note dated 28th January, I must express my deep regret at its contents concerning decision given (and) that I should be compelled, in accordance with the right and agreement made between us, to refuse it and to consider it contradictory to the mutual understanding to which my Government strictly adhere. Therefore the Government cannot agree to allow the local authorities at Jedda to give permission for the departure of the slave in question. With regard to the other points of your note, I will reply at a later opportunity.

Enclosure 8 in No. 17

Sir A. Ryan to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, January 29, 1932

I HAVE received the telegram sent by your Royal Highness on 28th January. In respect of my Government or what is right and what is wrong, as is known throughout the world, I cannot act contrary to their decision. I am sending Bakhit to the sloop to-day. If local authorities raise any difficulty all responsibility will lie with your Government.

E 795 314 25]

No. 18.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 17)

(No. 62)

Sir,

Jedda, February 1, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 15 of the 29th January relative to the disposal of the ex-slave Bakhit, I have the honour to forward the following three documents which complete up to date the correspondence enclosed in my despatch No. 58 sent earlier that day:—

Translation of a telegram received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 1.15 P.M. on the 29th January,

Copy of paper presented to the port authorities at the moment of Bakhit's embarkation at 4.15 P.M. that day

Copy of telegram sent to Minister for Foreign Affairs in the evening of the same day.

2. In view of the possible repercussions of this affair it may be well to record what actually happened. When I sent my note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the afternoon of the 28th January my intention was to make no attempt to embark Bakhit until the 30th January, so that the authorities in Mecca should have had time to communicate by wireless with Ibn Saud. As they replied the same evening, I decided early on the 30th January to advance the plan already made, which was to send Bakhit to the usual embarkation place in the sloop "Penzance" and by other necessary means to get him to the sloop and to embark him in the Legation launch for conveyance to His Majesty's sloop "Penzance," unless the police, &c., offered such opposition as to amount to forcible resistance. If such resistance were offered Mr. Hope Gill would do everything possible to prevent the man's falling into the hands of the local authorities and to bring him back to the Legation pending consideration of the next move. I saw nothing in the enclosed telegram from Mecca to necessitate any alteration in the arrangements. I enclose a memorandum by Mr. Hope Gill showing how they were finally carried out.

3. I thank you, Sir, on Mr. Hope Gill's behalf and my own for your telegram No. 16 of the 30th January congratulating us on the successful embarkation of the ex-slave. I may say that it was necessary to consider every possible contingency and that certain risks had to be taken. Mr. Hope Gill and the other members of my staff concerned deserve great credit for their handling of the situation at the port, which was such that the fullest advantage was taken of the amazing ineptitude of the Hejazi authorities both high and low. I understand from a trustworthy source that the Governor of Jedda refused to have anything to do with the matter as being one within the province of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It would appear that Fuad Bey Haniza then gave direct instructions to the police. They were that if I myself took Bakhit down they were to remonstrate but not to resist, whereas if he were accompanied by Captain Senger, who normally deals with slaves, they were to prevent the embarkation by every means. Mr. Hope Gill's report shows that they were taken by surprise, perhaps owing to the effect of the Ramadhan fast, and that Bakhit was on board before they collected themselves enough to confront a situation not foreseen by Fuad Bey. The presence of myself and of several members of my staff headed by Mr. Hope Gill, who is known to act as His Majesty's representative for long periods. The head of the police party was thrown into prison in due course. I have even been sounded as to whether I might not get him out.

4. As I pointed out in my telegram No. 15 of the 29th January, the matter is not ended by the embarkation of the individual concerned. Ibn Saud has been dealt with, for very good reasons, like any little Trucial Sheikh. Fuad Bey, who feels that the maintenance of the right of manumission is the one breach in the independence consecrated by the Treaty of Jedda, will encourage the King to believe that I am primarily responsible for the affront. Your action has followed so logically on the line which I myself had taken in discussing the Bakhit case that people of their mental outlook will assume that I inspired your decision. My position with both the King and Fuad Bey may become more than difficult, especially as Ibn Saud has been none too pleased with me since August 1930.

5. It is also probable that the question of manumission generally will come to a head. The Hejazi authorities have been more and more obstructive over

ordinary slaves. I have reason to believe that they have now issued most stringent instructions with a view to preventing slaves from gaining access to the Legation. An opportunity of testing the Hejazi attitude will present itself in the immediate future. I have at present in the Legation two ordinary slaves. I obtained the consent of the local authorities to the embarkation of one of them on the 23rd January, after they had made all sorts of difficulties. The man was on board the Khedivial steamer just before it sailed for Port Sudan, but had to be refused a passage as he was found by the ship's doctor to have an infectious disease diagnosed on board as small pox, on shore as chicken pox. In the other case the usual period of notice to the local authorities has not yet expired and I do not wish to give the authorities any excuse for criticism. I have therefore arranged to keep those two cases separate from that of Bakhit and to endeavour to embark the men in the ordinary way on the 6th February, when the one will have recovered and time will have been allowed for the completion of the formalities in the second case. Mr Hope Gill will keep you informed of developments during my absence from Jedda.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 18

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Ryan.

(Translation)
(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 29, 1932

IN reply to your telegram of to-day's date, my Government do not agree, and never will agree, to the action of the local authorities in preventing the embarkation of a person in a manner contrary to the laws which are observed and are in force. They cannot accept your statement that the responsibility for the opposition lies on them. On the contrary, we consider that they are very much to be commended for their insistence on their rights and the right of their authorities in their territories will not result in any responsibility (falling) on them. The responsibility, rather, falls on those who wish to violate the great right. And they, while insisting on this right of theirs and on their refusal to accept responsibility, notify you that they consider your Excellency responsible personally for precipitating and causing an incident which results in a violation of their authority, and they consider you responsible for the future results of this hasty action.

But if you wish to bring the "Penzance" into the matter, their regret for this second aggression will be much greater than for the first, and they hope that you will not make the situation more critical by bringing the "Penzance" into it.

However, they reserve to themselves their full rights in protesting and requesting suitable reparation.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18

Certificate.

BAKHIT-SIN-MUHAMMED has been manumitted by the British Legation, and notice of his intended repatriation was given to the local authorities in Jedda on the 21st December. He is being sent on board His Britannic Majesty's ship "Penzance" to-day in accordance with instructions received from His Majesty's Government. A communication in this sense was addressed to the Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs by His Majesty's Minister on the 28th January, and was confirmed by a telegram to His Royal Highness the Minister this morning.

In these circumstances, I have instructed Mr Hope Gill to take the necessary steps for the embarkation of Bakhit in the launch of the Legation, to be conveyed to H M S "Penzance".

(Legation Seal) ANDREW RYAN

British Legation, Jedda,
January 29, 1932

Enclosure 3 in No. 18

Sir A. Ryan to Minister for Foreign Affairs Mecca.

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, January 29, 1932.

I HAVE received your Royal Highness's telegram of to-day. Greatly as I regret any cause of dissension, I was compelled to submit case of Bakhit to my Government after failure of my efforts to settle it amicably. They do not admit that this particular case is covered by any existing agreement. I carried out their decision this afternoon, and am responsible to them for my action.

Enclosure 4 in No. 18

Memorandum by Mr Hope Gill

Minister,

YOUR order of yesterday, that the Royal slave, Bakhit, was to be taken off to H M S "Penzance" openly, without subterfuge and after due warning to the Hejazi authorities, was carried out by the Legation.

A preliminary reconnaissance of the port by the head canvas did not reveal any unusual circumstances. A new Nejd police officer and half a dozen Nejd soldiers had been posted at the quay. The slave was driven in the Legation car to the main entrance to the Legation, where he was met by Mr. Wikeley.

Mr. Wikeley, accompanied by the head canvas and the launch boy, proceeded to the quay, and with the police made a futile attempt to prevent the slave from being taken off. The launch boy, who was in the launch, did not know who I was. The launch was not allowed to stop. I slackened speed, and the launch proceeded to the quay. The slave was taken off by Mr. Wikeley and Captain Seager.

Mr. Wikeley remained on the quay, and explained that it was indeed the slave, Bakhit, who had been taken off. Captain Seager had some difficulty in persuading anyone to accept your embarkation certificate. The passport officer eventually took it, but handed it at once to the police officer, who hurried off to report by telephone to the Governor. Mr. Wikeley and Captain Seager returned to report to you.

In my return to the quay I brought back the head canvas and the launch boy to the Legation, but no attempt has been made to interfere with them. The staff did their work well, and without hurry, fuss or opposition.

C G H G

January 30, 1932

E 798 314 251

No. 19

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon. (Received February 17)

(No. 66)

SIR, WITH reference to Sir A. Ryan's despatch N. 62 of 1st February, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum which explains in detail the procedure of manumission as at present observed.

[7797]

c 4

2. This memorandum shows the extent to which the local authorities can go in being used to prevent the embarkation of a slave or a destitute by the Legation. No person may leave Jedda by sea without permission from the Governor. The ordinary traveller must obtain an exit visa. In the case of a slave or a destitute who is being repatriated the Governor's signature is required before the port officials will allow him to embark. It was owing to the refusal of the Hejazi Government to allow the Governor to authorise Bakht's departure that the certificate enclosed in the despatch under reference was handed to the passport control at the quay.

I have, &c
C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 19

Memorandum respecting the Manumission of Slaves who take Refuge in the Legation

Procedure

A SLAVE arrives at the Legation, usually in the very early morning and by stealth. Having succeeded in crossing the wall of the guarded Mecca gate disguised as one of the West African day labourers who live outside the walls, he usually arrives at the Legation gate, a few feet away from a local household. Pursuit generally stops at the Legation gate, but if it does not, the slave is sent to the Legation itself and have had to be turned out. Now and again a slave is sent to the Legation by another mission, for none of these themselves manumit slaves.

2. The slave's arrival is reported by the door keeper to the pro-consul, who interrogates him (or her) and has him thoroughly searched for anything in the way of money or valuables or arms. If of such kind or quantity as a slave would not normally possess, but might be suspected to have stolen, they are taken from him and kept pending enquiry.

3. The slave is then examined by the Legation interpreter in the presence of a cavass and his full story is extracted, pieced together and written down. He is then passed for cross-examination, with his history, and in charge of the same cavass, to the Indian vice-consul, who has long experience of the country and slavery conditions.

4. The slave is then returned, with the report of his examination and cross-examination, to the pro-consul, who, if he satisfies himself that the slave is a *bond fide*, gives the slave a room on the ground floor and places him in charge of the door keeper. During the night the door keeper is to supply the slave with food for his food, which is purchased for him by the door keeper. He is not required to do any work of any kind.

5. The slave's history sheet is meanwhile passed to the Chancery for filing and is handed to the Head of Chancery, whose duty it is to assure himself that the case is a straightforward one requiring manumission. If satisfied, he passes the file to the pro-consul with instructions (a) to inform the local authorities unofficially that the slave has taken refuge, giving them such details as may enable them to trace his master and satisfy themselves that he is not a fugitive from justice, and (b) to draw up a manumission questionnaire (specimen attached (1)). This form is submitted to the Minister for External Affairs and his signature (see 11).

6. Any case which presents unusual features is reserved for the Minister's decision before further steps are taken *vis-à-vis* the local authorities.

7. A slave's master seldom makes any attempt to retrieve him. In a few cases, however, more especially in regard to female slaves, the master sends a friend to the Legation, very occasionally coming himself, to try to persuade the slave to return. He has, however, to speak to him (or her) in the presence of the pro-consul. It is sometimes then found possible to arrange for voluntary manumission by the master, which takes the form of a declaration of grant of freedom made before the Shari'at Court of Jedda and accepted by the court and presented by the master to the Legation for safe keeping. The ex-slave thereupon leaves with his (or her) former master.

(1) Not printed

8. In the majority of cases, however, the master makes no move and the slave remains in the Legation. The slave is allowed to walk about as he pleases, but if, as in the normal run of cases, he is ready to accept manumission by the Legation and repatriation to Africa, seven days are allowed to pass before the local authorities are officially approached by the Legation. They are then asked for the necessary permission, without which no one, bond or free, foreigner or native, is allowed to leave the country. This period has by usage become a minimum time, in which the local authorities are expected to be able to satisfy themselves that the slave is not a fugitive or otherwise unduly charged by his master. It is normally exceeded only by the time necessary to await the arrival of a suitable ship on which to embark the slave.

9. Shortly before the date of sailing, and provided the authorities have had seven days' notice of the slave's arrival at the Legation, a written request is addressed to the Governor "to grant the usual facilities in respect of so-and-so, who is being sent by the Legation to . . .". If higher authority in Mecca has intervened, or if a claim lies against the slave, the "facilities" are refused until the matter is settled with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In such cases, which have not hitherto been many, the slave is kept until the next sailing. Ordinarily, however, the Governor endorses the request with his signature, an act which has two functions: it authorises the slave's departure, and is thus equivalent to the permissive exit visa which all departing travellers must obtain; and it grants exemption from the usual fees, from which destitutes and slaves, who are being repatriated by the Legation, have been exempted.

10. The request passes to the Legation's Quarantine Department, who return it and send two written orders to the Quarantine Department, instructing them to allow so-and-so to pass freely and without payment of the usual fees. Armed with these orders, the slave is accompanied by the door keeper to the quay, embarks him in the Legation launch, and places him on board ship.

11. The Legation's act of manumission itself is comprised in the signing by the Minister of the manumission questionnaire. This has hitherto and by usage been a purely official document. It now (specimen 11) specifically declares it. This form is sent under cover of a despatch to the authority who is to receive the ex-slave on arrival, and goes by the same ship. A copy is retained in the Legation file of manumissions. Statistics of the slaves manumitted in 1930 and 1931 are attached (C(1)).

12. The majority of slaves are sent to Suakin, where the Sudan Government maintain a special "slave's cubicle" for their reception. After the necessary period of quarantine, the Commissioner at Port Sudan, who receives and files the Legation manumission form, interests himself in finding suitable employment for the liberated man. Very few manumitted slaves are known to return to Arabia.

Jedda, February 3, 1932

(1) Not printed

E 729 463/25)

No. 20.

Sir John Simon to Ahmet Ferit Bey.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, February 19, 1932

WHEN I had the pleasure of seeing you on the 25th January your Excellency was so good as to inform me that your Government had received a request from the Hejaz-Nejd Government for assistance in the training of their air service and arms, and to explain that the Turkish Government, having regard to the friendly relations existing between them and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, desired to ascertain their views before replying to the Hejaz-Nejd Government's request.

2. I desire again to express to your Excellency the appreciation of His Majesty's Government of the friendly spirit which prompted the Turkish

Government to consult them regarding this matter, and I have the honour to inform you that, after full consideration, they see no reason why the Turkish Government should not accede to the request of the Hejaz Nejd Government.

I have, &c

JOHN SIMON

[B 1010 640 25]

No. 21.

Memorandum by Sir A. Ryan on the Situation in Hejaz Nejd as it affects His Majesty's Government.

(A)—Position as regards various Questions of Interest to His Majesty's Government.

1. *The Hejaz Nejd Situation.*—The proportions of a nuisance, but one which causes infinite trouble all round. It tends to envenom all our relations with Ibn Saud, and might again produce a dangerous situation if he decided to countenance raiding on an important scale from Hejaz Nejd, or went further and decided to have a fling at Transjordan as he did in 1924. We have been unable to get Ibn Saud into direct relations and letting them settle their tribal differences between them, and/or attempting a readjustment of frontiers so as to give the Wadi Sirhan to Transjordan (or perhaps neutralise it) and clear up once for all the question of Akaba and Maan. The difficulties in the way of any remedial radical are notorious.

2. *Persian Gulf Questions.*—Our main objective is to induce Ibn Saud to remove the embargo on trade between Nejd and Kuwait. I do not know whether Colonel Blasco made any headway with this during his recent interviews with Ibn Saud. The proposal to exercise pressure by increasing transit dues at Bahrein appears to be in abeyance.

3. *Arabian Air Route.*—We have reduced our demands on Ibn Saud to a minimum, viz., facilities for the landing of service aircraft at suitable emergency landing grounds. The background—Fuad Hamza's reaction to my latest representations in January 1925—results from his conversations with Ibn Saud and Yusuf Yassin. I have no details as to what he asked for or as to how far he got any firm undertaking.

4. *Shell Refinery.*—No redress has been given for the outrageous raiding of the Hejaz Government have defaulted on the contract made with the Director General of Finance in order to patch up the affair. My representations in January have produced no effect, the proposals made to Gellatley, Hankey and Co. having been of an entirely unsatisfactory nature.

5. *Other Money Matters.*—All efforts to get the settlement of the Government of Hejaz not of primary importance to obtain payment. As for the Eastern Telegraph Company, the Hejaz Government to make proper monthly settlements is a constant source of trouble. They have of late been keeping the arrears down to some extent by paying doles on account. The situation would become really serious only if Imperial Communications lost patience to the extent of refusing to work the cable. Minor money matters, like the failure of the Hejaz Government to pay British and British protected chauffeurs, are tiresome, but hardly of major importance.

6. *Pilgrimage.*—The maladministration of the pilgrimage gives rise to many complaints on the part of Indian and other Moslems. They are often apt to exaggerate the difficulties. The main difficulty is the want of proper equipment of making the pilgrim routes secure. Ibn Saud has done little to effect any permanent improvement in pilgrimage conditions, and tends more and more to exploit or tolerate the exploitation of pilgrims. If a good opportunity offered, it might be worth while to attempt an agreement under certain main headings to secure the temporal interests of pilgrims.

7. *Slave Traffic.*—It is impossible to verify the claim made by Fuad Hamza on behalf of Ibn Saud that he has taken serious steps to prevent slave traffic in accordance with the obligation accepted by him in the Treaty of Jeddah, an obligation which he has firmly refused to repeat in his treaties with France and Italy. He is wholly recalcitrant regarding the maintenance of slavery in his dominions. He resents the continued exercise by the British Legation of the right of manumission preserved by way of *modus vivendi* in the letters annexed to the Treaty of Jeddah. Frequent efforts are made to obstruct the repatriation of slaves manumitted by the Legation. The question has been brought to a head by the case of the slave Bakht, whom Ibn Saud claimed as his property, though not as a member of his household or army, and to whose manumission he objected on the strength of an alleged oral agreement with Sir G. Clayton qualifying the letters attached to the Treaty of Jeddah.

8. *Deportation of British Subjects and Protected Persons.*—Although His Majesty's Government do not question the right of the Hejaz Government to deport British subjects, &c., without stating reasons, the arbitrary conduct of the Hejaz Government in the matter is a cause of not infrequent hardship.

9. *Akaba and Maan.*—The question of the juridical status of this area is in abeyance. There is no urgent reason for reopening it on our side, unless it is found that the Hejaz Government are claiming the area as part of the Jebel TUBEIK, or unless serious inconvenience results from claims by Ibn Saud to regard tribesmen from the disputed area as his subjects. The question should be kept under review.

10. *Hejaz Railway.*—This question is also in abeyance, and the reasons for leaving it so are even more cogent than in the case of Akaba Maan, owing to the sensitiveness of Moslem opinion, inflamed by the illusory idea that the railway is a Wakf. Otherwise it would probably be in the interest of all concerned if the former proposal to recondition the railway as a whole, without reference to claims to Moslem ownership of it, could be made practical politics.

11. *Naval Visits.*—Greater freedom in the matter of visits to Hejaz and Asiri ports, other than Jeddah, is desirable, but not, in my opinion, essential for any practical purpose.

12. *General Summary.*—The foregoing list is a general summary of the more important specific matters requiring attention. It is not intended to be exhaustive. The Hejaz Government are in a position, but not (apart from the repercussion of the Bakht affair) an acute one, except in so far as the settlement of the questions at 1 to 4 inclusive, and perhaps the Eastern Telegraph Company question at 5, may be regarded as urgent. I have omitted a number of matters which I have not included from memory. I do not think I have omitted anything of first-class importance, but the list would need revision, if required for more than the present purpose of a general review. It might be expanded in various directions, e.g., it does not deal with matters like the state of the port at Jeddah and the vexatious character of certain customs regulations.

(B.)—Position of Ibn Saud

Ibn Saud is almost certainly on the down grade. He has perhaps not reached the limit of ambition and may, therefore, be tempted into dangerous enterprises, but he has reached the limit of what he can achieve without embroiling himself with His Majesty's Government or else trying conclusions with the Imam of the Yemen. People used to look upon him as a man of great ability and energy, but he has faded from the scene. It is now a question whether he can maintain it during his own lifetime. He is still physically robust and there is no reason why he should not last another twenty years or so, though it may be true that he tends towards

impotence and finds it disconcerting, and it is now certain that he suffers from dyspeptic troubles. The reasons for the deterioration in his political position are manifold, but may be summed up as follows:—

- (a) He has made a complete mess of the Administration of the Hejaz, his tenure of which goes back only six or seven years. The population has no guts, but discontent with his régime is widespread.
- (b) He has pursued a policy of Wahabism, which has alienated the Dependencies, based on personal ascendancy and reinforced by his suppression of the 1929 revolt, is seriously impaired.
- (c) He isolates himself in the Arab world by his individualism, his hostility to the Hashimites and his dislike of any manifestations of Arab nationalism (e.g., the Arab alliance project) not tending towards his own domination.
- (d) He antagonises large sections of Moslem opinion by his religious intolerance, fundamentally that of a Wahabi, though with a difference, as manifested e.g., in the desecration of shrines.
- (e) He unfits himself for a real place in the family of nations by his intractability, his excessive jealousy of his independence and his dislike of any form of foreign penetration. His attitude regarding slavery affords a test of his remoteness from a world in which all civilized Moslem Powers and most enlightened Moslem opinion agree that slavery is an outworn institution. I say only "a test," because no one, except Great Britain to some extent and potentially the League of Nations, if Ibn Saud sought membership, minds very much about slavery as it exists in Arabia.
- (f) He has no advisers fit to help him in organising a modern State. He clings to Abdullah Suleiman, a glorified office-holder who is in a high position in his Central Government, but who is a Minister from any European point of view but exactly the opposite of what is required under modern conditions. He is clever and much respected but not experienced or strong enough to create order out of chaos and himself too mad on the idea of independence to take large views. The other Syrian, Yussuf Yasin, is a useful secretary but fundamentally a fanatic. Hafiz Wahba, a sensible but easy-going man, is out of the picture and hates the Syrians. These and perhaps a few other non-Nejdites are genuinely devoted to Ibn Saud's cause, most of the minor Syrians and other alien odds and ends are in his service for what they can make out of it. He has scrapped the one man, also a Syrian, personally ambitious but useful, who seemed likely to make a success of the embryo regular army on European lines.
- (g) At the back of all, just now, is financial stringency operating on a small scale but far from negligible. The Saud and Abdullah Suleiman between them have destroyed what little credit the country might have had because the Hejaz has no serious resources other than the diminishing pilgrimage, and because the Hejaz has to carry a great part of the burden of Nejd. The Government as such is unquestionably bankrupt. There is no means of verifying or disproving the belief held in some quarters that Ibn Saud has collected a substantial reserve for his own purpose at Riyadh.

(C). *Position of His Majesty's Government.*

It is a common supposition in the East that Ibn Saud subsists by the favour of His Majesty's Government. As a present-day proposition this is absurd but it is true that Great Britain is the only Power that really counts in Arabia. Ibn Saud's greatest achievements in the international sphere have been the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah on equal terms and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. It is a question of major policy whether we should follow one or three broad courses, viz:—

- (a) To give positive support to Ibn Saud, on the ground that he is, in spite of everything, a product of the best example of his type and reasonably well disposed, so long as he is not crossed

- (b) To let the present situation evolve on its own lines, maintaining a generally friendly attitude towards Ibn Saud without really helping him, and recognising that we can hope for no real satisfaction in regard to matters like those enumerated in part (A) of this memorandum;
- (c) To stiffen our attitude all along the line, at the risk of definitely antagonising Ibn Saud, and perhaps, promoting his downfall or perhaps driving him into mad adventures.

Alternative (a) is ruled out by the fact that we cannot help Ibn Saud in the only way that would be really useful to him, i.e., by financing him in one way or another, and because we cannot back him against other Arab rulers.

There is much to be said for alternative (b), because the problem of Ibn Saud, though important, is but a small factor in the present world situation, and, unless he seeks further aggrandisement at our expense or at the expense of our special interests in Arabia, it matters very little whether he survives or collapses, but in this alternative we must be prepared to tolerate the Transjordan nuisance and to go easy with everything else, including the questions of Kuwait and the Arabian air route, unless Colonel Biscoe has already got them on to a definitely better basis.

There is something but perhaps not so much to be said for alternative (c) if Ibn Saud's difficulties are really as great as they are. He is weak and our grievances against him are solid. We could make out a case for rigidity good enough to appeal even to many Moslems, though many others would rally to his support on the general principle of defending any Moslem cause against any European Power.

ANDREW RYAN.

Foreign Office, February 23, 1932

E 957 957/25]

No. 12

Sir John Simon to Mr. Morgan (Angora).

N 2)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 1, 1932

WITH reference to my despatch No. 65 of the 22nd February forwarding a copy of my note of the 19th February to the Turkish Ambassador, in regard to the request made to His Government by the British Government for assistance in the training of their air service and army, I have to inform you that the Turkish Ambassador called here again on the 23rd February.

2. He alluded to my above-mentioned note, and stated that his Government would be glad, in view of the close relations existing between our two countries, to exchange any information of common interest about the Hejaz-Nejd which might reach either Government.

3. In reply, his Excellency was informed that His Majesty's Government fully appreciated this offer and, should any information be received of a nature to interest the Turkish Government, opportunity would be taken to pass it on to them on a footing of reciprocity.

I am, Sir,
JOHN SIMON

E 1119 266/25]

No. 23.

Consul General Biscoe to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, March 3.)

(No. 2. Confidential)

Sir,

Bahrein, February 8, 1932

I HAVE the honour to submit a brief report on my recent visit to His Majesty King Ibn Saud at Hama.

2. I left here by slow mail for Bahrein on the 18th January and arrived there the following day. I had asked the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq if arrangements could be made to bring Colonel Dickson down by air to Bahrein, and he very kindly placed a flying boat at his disposal and Colonel Dickson

arrived on the 22nd. Meanwhile telegraphic communication had been established informally between Bahrain and Hasa, and I received a message from Ibn Saud asking me to come as soon as possible as he was anxious to return to Riyadh, and informing me that arrangements had been made for my reception at Qajar. As I thought it probable that questions concerning Bahrain might arise during the discussions, I asked permission from His Majesty to bring Captain Prior with me, and this was readily accorded.

3. Accordingly, on the 23rd we proceeded from Zilag, on the south side of Bahrain Island, in a launch belonging to the Qasabis, to Qajar. Fortunately the weather was fine and we accomplished the journey in about five and a half hours. At Qajar I was received by Yusef Yasin, His Majesty's private secretary, and left at about 3.30 for Hasa.

4. The road for about the first 35 miles runs over a series of sand dunes, which I think would certainly be described as quite impracticable for motor transport, except immediately after rain. However, there seems to be no limitation to the capabilities of Mr Ford's products, and the car in which I was driving surmounted these piles of sand without check, and we reached Hasa at 5.30. The other cars which were possibly not in such good condition and were also more heavily laden were not so fortunate, and our luggage and servants did not arrive till 1 p.m. the following day, having taken about twenty-two hours to accomplish the 40 miles journey.

5. Colonel Dickson, Captain Prior and I were lodged in the same house as that occupied by His Majesty, and arrangements were made to provide us with European food. Owing to the fact that it was the month of Ramazan, it would in any case have been awkward for us to have attended dinner, of which His Majesty partook at about 5.30 directly after sunset. Soon after my arrival His Majesty came and saw me and we had about an hour's conversation on ordinary subjects.

6. We stayed in Hasa four days, during which our programme was as follows. About 10 a.m. Yusef Yasin would visit us, and after half an hour's talk we went to visit the King, with whom discussions took place lasting generally two hours. After lunch Yusef Yasin occasionally came and had a short discussion, and in the afternoon cars were placed at our disposal and we were allowed to walk through the date groves. We were informed that it was undesirable that

since the population nowadays is not in the least fanatical, whatever it may have been once. On our return on two days we had further interviews with the King, each lasting about one and a half hours, and after dinner discussions with Yusef Yasin, lasting generally till midnight.

7. The following matters were discussed either with the King or with Yusef Yasin, and will form the subjects of separate despatches:—

- (i) The Kuwait blockade
- (ii) Emergency landing grounds on the Hasa coast
- (iii) Telegraphic and postal communication between Hasa and the outer world via Bahrain.
- (iv) Passport facilities for Nejd subjects proceeding to India or Iraq.
- (v) The possibility of some consular status being afforded to Nejd representatives in Bahrain and Kuwait.
- (vi) Incursions by Nejd officials and troops into Kuwait territory.
- (vii) The possibility of having a very simple extradition treaty between Bahrain and Nejd.

8. As stated above, the details of these discussions will be dealt with in my despatches. His Majesty's private secretary took his cue from him. Even so controversial a matter as the Kuwait blockade, after a little preliminary fulminating on the usual lines, was discussed by the King in a most friendly spirit, and when he lays himself out to please there are few men who can be more charming than Ibn Saud. His Majesty was looking extremely well, he informed me that when he left the Hejaz he had been leading a very sedentary life and had done a great deal of work and had been in the desert, which had done him a great deal of good, and he hoped

after the 'Id to spend another month or so in the desert with his family before proceeding to the Hejaz for the Haj. He mentioned that he was 53 years of age now, and as the Arabic year is eleven days shorter than the solar year this would make him about 51 according to our reckoning. He certainly does not look more. He made no attempt to disguise his financial difficulties, to which he referred repeatedly. He stated that the expenditure of the Hejaz was a million pounds, and its revenue about £400,000, and of all the revenues of Hasa one-fourth went to Qasabis (presumably against advances received from them), one-fourth went to Ibn Jiluwi for the administration, and one-fourth was remitted to the Hejaz. He was in such straits that he had written to his leading sheikhs informing them that in future he could only receive them on certain stated occasions, and that they were not to visit him at other times. He mentioned that he himself had no private estates, and that the Bent al Mid, which formerly went to the privy purse, was now paid into the general revenues and that literally he hardly knew how to support himself and his family.

9. On the other hand, his expenditure on motor cars must be enormous. I was told that he had between five and six hundred, and there is no doubt that

he wore and tear on a car across the desert. He was in such straits that he had written to his leading sheikhs informing them that in future he could only receive them on certain stated occasions, and that they were not to visit him at other times. He mentioned that he himself had no private estates, and that the Bent al Mid, which formerly went to the privy purse, was now paid into the general revenues and that literally he hardly knew how to support himself and his family.

and decreed that they should each have one leg and one arm cut off. This was done on the morning of my departure, and the dismembered limbs were exposed publicly in the bazaar. It will probably be a long time before any other member of this tribe steals a camel. An enlightened member of the Bahrain commercial community, with whom I returned, spoke most approvingly of this method of punishment, and said that the British system of locking a man up was no

11. In the course of conversation Ibn Saud said to me that though the British Government had troops, aeroplanes and ships they could not control the bird upon the twig, neither could they control the Bedouin, but he (Ibn Saud) could, and certainly, so far, his authority in Nejd is unquestioned.

12. His Majesty spoke most warmly about the late Sir Gilbert Clayton and said that he gave a definite "yes" or a definite "no," and was a man, and he knew where he was with him.

13. He further mentioned that Mr Philby had just left Hasa to cross the desert, going to cross it twice, proceeding by one route to the Hadramaut and then back by another route. He spoke cordially of Mr Philby, and said that although not headed he was a loyal friend.

14. We left Hasa on the 2nd January after a most pleasant stay of four days, and as our luggage on this occasion got through with greater rapidity we were enabled to leave Qajar in the Qasabi launch at 4 p.m., and, again favoured by good weather, had a smooth crossing and arrived in Bahrain about midnight. There I was delayed for four days awaiting the departure of the mail steamer, but we finally left on the 1st February getting back to Bushire on the 2nd.

I left, Ibn Saud asked me to transmit a message from him to His Majesty's Government, and after he had delivered it verbally I suggested that Yusef Yasin should write it down. His Majesty therefore dictated it to him, and freely translated it runs as follows:—

"I wish you to give my greetings to the British Government and say to them that I speak to them with the word of a Moslem Arab.

"Firstly that I do not desire or seek greater friendship from anyone else in all the world, either from among the European or the Moslem Powers, than that which I have with the British Government, and it is quite

impossible that I should oppose them in any matter. Secondly, I desire peace and friendship with the whole world, but specially with those of my neighbours and others who are in relations with the British Government. And I ask of them that if anyone says such a thing of me, that they should refer the matter to me and let me know what mistake I am supposed to have committed, but on the condition that the reference should be made through an intelligent man who can grasp the actual facts and will not misconstrue them.

The Arabic is in one or two places a little ambiguous, doubtless due to the fact that the King took no trouble to choose his words but dictated it straight away. I therefore enclose a copy of the message in Arabic as well. (*)

16. My visit was, I think, unquestionably a successful one chiefly owing to the fact that it was informal, and that I came with no instructions from His Majesty's Government, but simply to establish friendly relations and talk over questions of interest to us both in a friendly spirit. Ibn Saud was friendly, cordial and reasonable, and at times, when recalling his battles and intrigues of the past times with the Turks, was very eloquent. His attitude towards the two questions that I was chiefly interested in, namely, the Koweit blockade and the emergency landing grounds on the Hasa coast, was helpful, and as regards the latter I was given clearly to understand that there would be no difficulties about facilities on islands, though he was still opposed to landings on the mainland.

17. On my departure Ibn Saud expressed the hope that we might meet again, and I hope an opportunity will recur next year. Ibn Saud presented me with a stallion and a mare, and also gave a horse each to Colonel Dickson and Captain Prior together with the customary abbas and abawia. The horses are of no value at all, and I am endeavouring to induce some Arab sheikh to take them. Colonel Dickson assured me that this would not be viewed amiss since such presents are regarded as a part of a gentleman's code. Moreover, among the presents given to us was a gun which when Ibn Saud was on the back of the King of the British Army had previously been presented at some time by His Majesty's Government to Ibn Saud.

18. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

H. V. BISCOE, *Lieut. Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

(*) Not printed.

[E 1145 260 25]

No. 24

Consul General Basra to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, March 5.)

(No. 3. Confidential.)

Sir,

Basra, February 5, 1932

I HAVE the honour to state that during my recent visit to His Majesty King Ibn Saud I discussed with him the question of the Koweit blockade. I began by informing His Majesty that my visit was entirely private and informal and that I had no mission of any kind on my part, and I received my instructions from His Majesty's Government, and emphasised that His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah was, of course, the channel for official communications. At the same time I said (it being desirable to discuss the matter on a friendly basis with the Persian Gulf informally, and I asked Ibn Saud if he had any matters which he wished to raise affecting the Gulf.

2. Ibn Saud replied that sometimes quite small matters loomed large in places in which they arose, because the places themselves are so small, and that he had nothing of importance that he wished to discuss. I then said that there

was one matter regarding which I would like to take the opportunity of ascertaining His Majesty's views, and that was the embargo on trade between Koweit and Nejd. I pointed out that at present Koweit was being ruined by the cessation of its commerce with the interior, that the customs receipts had fallen from about 8 lakhs to under 2 and that, though some of this loss might be due to the prevailing commercial depression, there was no doubt that the embargo was a great factor. His Majesty replied that he had asked His Majesty whether, in view of his close former relations with Koweit, some means could not be found to alleviate the situation. Ibn Saud said that Koweit interests were his, and that he and Sheikh Ahmad were brothers, but what he feared was the loss to his own country. He had to consider that first of all. He was in direct straits for money, though he made small allowances to his subjects for their prayers. He said that he had paid the revenue of the Beit-al-Mal, which formerly went to the Ruler, was now paid into the general revenues. He added: "I swear by God as a Moslem that I have no money for my subjects, and I have no money for my country without it." If he allowed his tribes to go to Koweit he would lose the revenue now derived from Hasa and Qajar.

3. I mentioned that in the days of the former Nejd Government the tribes traded with Koweit and the then Government presumably took its dues, why should they not now? His Majesty replied that if there were a Ruler there was no Government, the tribes did as they pleased. What would suit him best was for his people not to trade with Koweit under any circumstances. I mentioned that they were apparently permitted to trade with Iraq through Zubair, to which His Majesty replied that he proposed to stop this, too, and compel them to get all supplies in their own country through their own ports.

4. The conversation continued for some time on these lines, and ultimately His Majesty said that there were three ways in which the matter could be settled—

- (1) He should be allowed to establish a post at some place on the outskirts of Koweit territory, e.g., Subahiyah, where he would take his customs. Koweit to guarantee that all goods should pass through this place, and that nothing should leave its borders by any other route.
- (2) A Nejd customs post in the hands of Nejd official, with, however, no official position in Koweit, should be established at the gate of Koweit town and he would collect the Nejd dues as caravans passed out.
- (3) Koweit should make a fixed annual payment representing the Nejd share of the Koweit customs.

5. I suggested that, since caravans must follow certain well defined routes in order to obtain water, a chain of border posts could easily control them, though, obviously, a few odd camels could slip through from time to time. His Majesty retorted that smuggling would certainly take place, and that even now they could not prevent luxuries which paid higher duty from being smuggled. I pointed out that it was virtually impossible on a long frontier line to stop a certain amount of smuggling in any country and that we had been unable effectively to stop gun-running, despite the expenditure of very large sums of money, but what was possible was to exercise control over caravans conveying smuggled goods into the interior, provided the caravans passed through one's own territory. The Persian Government, I said, had a very large export of opium, and I asked Ibn Saud if he would consider the possibility of making a similar arrangement with the Persian Government.

6. His Majesty then went on to say that if the embargo on trade with Koweit was continued, Ojar would be killed and Hasa would lose one-fourth of its trade. So for the time being I left the matter at that.

7. Subsequently I discussed the matter with Yussuf Yassin, and he informed me that His Majesty's proposals (1) and (2) put forward by him were impracticable. Koweit could not possibly guarantee that all goods would pass through the post at Subahiyah, and that a post at the gate of Koweit town would never be accepted by the sheikh, and in any case would prove unworkable. For instance, many of the Koweit Arabdar and tribesmen from Iraq come in to purchase goods in Koweit. It would not be possible for the

Najd officials to distinguish between them. The only solution he could suggest was that there should be an annual payment by Kowent to Najd. The sheikh, however, had informed Colonel Dickson previously that he would never agree to anything of this sort as it would be regarded as a tribute in Arabia.

8. Yusuf Yasin mentioned that some customs arrangement of this kind was in force between Palestine and Syria and in other places. I said I knew nothing about this, but he must bear in mind that an arrangement which would be perfectly feasible between two Powers of equal standing might bear a different appearance when entered into between a big man and a small man. I also pointed out that the blockade really amounted to an act of war, and that if the Government of India took similar action, say, in the case of Goa, in order to divert trade to their own port, Bombay, it would unquestionably evoke very serious protests on the part of the Portuguese Government. Colonel Dickson and I, however, did not entirely dismiss the possibility of some solution on the lines of a payment by Kuwait to Najd and thought that circumstances might force the sheikh to agree.

[illegible]

"(d) The despatch in the whole was dictated - it must have been dictated by Sir John Wood-Croft, as he has written it. His Lordship's secretary said that at that time a proposal was made to him to have a number of troops sent to the Gulf. His Lordship said that he would not lose revenue or have to incur heavy expenditure on the establishment of posts along the coast. I think now I have explained everything."

I asked Yusuf Yasin if the real reason of the blockade was not that His Majesty was afraid that the tribes might establish too close relations with Koweit. He said "No, not nowadays. We have got them too much in hand."

11. If I may say so, I think perhaps it would have been helpful if His Majesty's Government had seen fit to inform the Nejd Government of the large and exceedingly well substantiated claims put forward by Koweit against them. It would have given me, to some extent, a lever. All that we could do under the circumstances was for Colonel Dickson to mention the matter to Yussuf Pasha. While normally I doubt if much can be accomplished by the appointment of arbitrators, especially in the present case, it is rather different. I have no doubt one of Ibn Saud's commissioners will be a member of the Quasibi clan. Koweit also has one or two merchants of considerable standing. The latter will be fighting for their own existence and welfare, and will certainly spare no effort to arrive at some arrangement, and once the question is reduced to a commercial one, there is some prospect, at any rate, of a settlement being arrived at. It seems possible that they might agree to increase the Koweit customs duties, which are at present merely 4 per cent., and then for so many annas in the rupee to be paid to Nejd, or something of that sort. If an arrangement of this sort was arrived at between the commissioners, the mercantile community of Koweit would certainly bring a good deal of pressure to bear on the sheikh to accept it. I would, therefore, suggest that if the sheikh agrees to the appointment of arbitrators Ibn Saud should then be asked to select a member of his family to represent him, and to send a representative of the Koweit merchants to represent them. I would suggest that the arbitrators should be asked to report to the British Consul at Bombay. What these results will be, and how far they will go, I cannot say. I would, however, suggest that the British Consul should send a representative of the British Government to the Nejd, and to the Koweit, and to the Hamza personally of the Koweit claims, and, if he considers it desirable, let him have a copy. He can say at the same time that His Majesty's Government

had not presented these claims as they were hopeful that a friendly settlement of the Koweid claims would be reached. I am asking Colonel Dwyer to inform the Nejd Government that these claims had been submitted and will report further in due course.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah and to the Government of India.

I have, &c
H. V. BISCOE, *Lieut Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

[2 1191 1191 25]

No. 25

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 80)

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and desires to thank him for a report on the heads of foreign missions at this post for the year 1931

Jedda, February 10, 1932

Enclosure to No. 25

Confidential Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Jeddah

(Passages marked with an asterisk (*) are reproduced from last year's report.)

Egypt

HASSAN ACHMOUNI BEY was supermised in March 1931 by Hafes Amer Bey, a gentleman with no previous diplomatic or consular experience, but said to be a big fellow. I saw him as a member of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was originally an advocate at Tantah, his home town, and later before various courts and appeals in Egypt. He speaks English imperfectly and French very sketchily. He is by way of being very friendly with the British Legation and pays extravagant compliments, especially to my wife. He affects an air of frankness which, for the most part illusory but which gives him an excuse for his own great inquisitiveness. On the whole, he is an agreeable character but excessively so. He is an Arabic talker and what a talker! Moreover, right at the start of his career and after conversations before he had been long here, he conceived a very poor opinion of the Wahhâbi régime. Little is known of his diplomatic activities except that he pursues in an unfavourable atmosphere the long-outstanding conversations with a view to a better understanding between Egypt and Hejaz Nejd. It is too soon to judge of his capacity.

Hafez Amor Bey has a family, but they live in Egypt.

Reference

*M Roger Maigret who occupies the peculiar position of being Charge d'Affaires at Legation at Tunis, is a Frenchman of perhaps 40. He has had a long career in the French Near East service, and was employed for some twenty years in Morocco, including Tangier, where, I believe, he was employed up to 1921. He was subsequently employed in Iraq, whence he came to his post here. I have been told by a source who is well regarded in Morocco, but cannot vouch for this. He is intelligent and witty, and has a

considerable knowledge of Arab countries. In his lighter moments he claims also to know a great deal of the Parisian underworld, having cultivated *espéce* in his conscript days. As we have both been in Morocco, though at different periods, I have many interests and acquaintances in common with him. I find him, however, rather too "army" on the personal side and rather too reticent about the affairs which now interest us both officially. He has little social value of a general kind, for, though he has a passion for Arabian travel, he sticks very tight in his house when in Jedda. I have not heard him speak English, but he appears to have considerable book knowledge of this language, and has already completed a French translation of Mr. Philby's recent work on "Arabia

*He is married, but appears to be permanently separated from his Spanish or half Spanish wife. She has never come to Jedda. A venerable mother has recently come to live with M. Margaret instead.

Since the above was written M. Maigrot has become even more of a recluse. He is seldom seen away from his house. His amusements are said to be quite considerable, but he does practically no entertaining, except for a small weekly card party.

GERMAN

M. Heinrich de Haas arrived in Jeddah in the autumn of 1930 to spy out the land for trade. Having settled down to do business in partnership with a Moslem Tripolitan exile, and as a result of the ratification of the treaty between Germany and the Hejaz Nejd, he was appointed consul for the Hejaz, obtained an exequatur, and entered upon his functions in March 1931. He continues, nevertheless, to trade.

He is about 38 years of age and the son of the late Dr. Walter de Haas, who spent most of his life in Australia, where both were interned during the war, and who was subsequently employed in the German Foreign Office as head of the so-called "Anglo-Saxon" Department. Shortly before the death of his father last November, M. de Haas left Jeddah, and he may not return. His post is meanwhile unofficially occupied by a resident German merchant.

A pleasant colleague with an excellent knowledge of English and good French. He is unmarried.

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*The Italian representative, M. Solmazzo, calls himself consul, although Italy has not yet established normal relations with Ibn Saud. He is a youngish man of about 35, but not aggressively Fascist. He speaks French reasonably well. He is a good looking, intelligent, friendly fellow. He hides himself, I think, rather overshadowed by the Italian administrators in Eritrea. He does not seem to care much for society; but I find him an agreeable and useful colleague, very ready to exchange information on matters of interest.

*M. Sollazzo married not long ago an attractive and pleasant but not very interesting Italian wife. She wears all the vices but they both do, keep them.

The foregoing paragraph is less than just to Mme. Sollazzo, who has come out a great deal and now shows herself fairly able, intelligent and

Netherlands

M. Varner Menden was succeeded in July 1931 by M. C. Ahlstrom who made arrangements with the existing Det. arrangements the same year or there about to prepare to take over the post of Charge d'Affaires. He is a very well rounded and a good fellow. He does not speak English as well as his predecessor but has quite an adequate command of it. He has made a serious study of the "Red" and the fact of the matter is that Murgess had acted as general secretary to the 1st. Council Conference at London in 1929. He is a 2nd of it he speaks English. As a Det. he gives the impression of being steady rather than spunky. He maintains the traditional good relations with the Legation and the Legation very friendly with a life.

M. Adnan has a wife and family in Houston.

Perfido

*M. Habibulla (or Habibulla Khan) Hoveida bore in the days of Persian titles that of Ain-ul Mulk. He was "diplomatic representative" when I arrived and is now Chargé d'Affaires. He is a Persian Moslem, but his special habitat appears to be in Syria. He is an elderly man. He was recommended to my favourable attention by Sir R. Clive, but I fear that I find him unattractive, in spite of his great desire to please and his ability to speak English passably. I have heard him accused of making so much per head out of his pilgrims, but I have no reason to believe a charge so easy to invent in connexion with the representative of a country like Persia in a country like this. He left Jeddah some six months ago. ~~Some time since~~ ~~the day when he left Jeddah was~~ ~~way~~ ~~to~~ telling us that his wife was ill and asking us to forward correspondence to his chief at Beirut. Little seems to have been heard of either since then, and the Persian Legation is not effectively occupied. I much doubt whether M. Hoveida will return. His health suffered here, and I rather think that he covets the post of Persian representative at Cairo.

M. H. did not return to April 1931 but stayed on until the end of the year. He did not come back again until the end of December. On this occasion, however, he left a subordinate, who is also his sister's husband, in charge. During his stay he gave one spectacular diplomatic dinner, after which he photographed the company. This was the only time that he was seen in the company. It was a very good dinner, but it was not as good as the one that might have been expected. I was, perhaps, too hard on him last year. At any rate, his friendship towards us appears to be genuine.

Series Number

*M. Nezir (sometimes called Nezir Bey) Touracoulov, the only Minister besides myself, presented letters before me, and is therefore doyen of the Diplomatic Body. He comes from Turkestan, and is a round-headed young man with distinctly Tartar features. He seems fairly intelligent, and has learnt enough French and Arabic since he came here a couple of years ago to carry on conversation in those languages. He usually talks Turkish, which he knows better, on the comparatively rare occasions when we meet. He has a sound, simple sense of humour and is an agreeable companion, but he goes little into European society. I have never attempted to talk politics to him. On the one occasion on which I had occasion to seek information from him on a non-political matter connected with public health he was very helpful. He presents no appearance of wishing to make a splash. He strikes me as a nice, straightforward person, rather more interested in commercial and economic subjects than in others, and as being a genuine Moslem. If I am wrong and he is deep, then he must be very deep indeed. M. Touracoulov is married to a Russian lady from Samara. She is a professional doctor or nurse, and left Jedda before I arrived in May to take charge of some sort of institution in Moscow. She has not returned.

I continue to like M. Touraculov, but doubt whether he is as simple or as good a Moslem as I supposed. He had a burst of diplomatic activity in the summer, when he went into the business of selling benzine to the Hejazi Government, and perhaps attempted even greater things, with a view to bringing his country into closer relations with the Hejaz. He went on long leave in October. It is doubtful whether he will return.

Turkey

Seni Bey left in July to take up an important post in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Ankara. He was succeeded in July by Ahmed Lutfullah Bey. The latter had a small post at the Sublime Porte in the old days in Turkey and is a favourable specimen of the type of official produced there. Before his appointment in Jeddah he had been employed at Ankara and in London, and appears to have been favourably regarded by British colleagues. He speaks French well and has some knowledge of English. He has varied interests. He claims to be an authority on protocol (he has published a work in two volumes on the subject), and he dabbles in the arts. He is amiable and talkative. In our short acquaintance I have been unable to form any opinion of his capacity, but

January 1932

No. 26

Jeddah, February 16, 1932

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2. Copies are being sent to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Bombay, Amman, Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Athens, Lagos, Klartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloop, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have. &c
C. G. HOPE GILL

Jidda Report for November and December 1931

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THE occasion is taken of repeating the information that the spelling "Jedda" is consecrated by Foreign Office usage. It is, moreover, convenient that a place where His Majesty's Government maintain a Legation should be known in official English by a fixed name. Some other posts still seem to find it difficult to reconcile the spelling "Jedda" with their philological principles. If these can finally be overcome, it will be much appreciated at Jedda.

I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS

THE King continued in Riyadh throughout November and December, but he was no longer able to brood on his personal troubles, there came home to roost in Nejd the troublesome offspring of union with the Hejaz. The last two reports have described the process of further disintegration which the already rotten state of the Hejaz passed through after Ibn Saud's withdrawal into Nejd in June. In the first days of November he had before him at Riyadh a memorandum on the situation drawn up by his son Faisal, the Viceroy, and Fud Bey Hamza, his Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. These had at length revolted against the virtual dictatorship of his henchman and Director-General of Finance, Sheikh Abdulullah Sulaiman, who had to go to Riyadh to give his own account of his stewardship. The latter reported a state of anarchy in the Government of the Hejaz amounting to deadlock and a critical state of financial chaos. It furnished no basis for action. His Majesty's Ministers, the Hejaz's stomach for a budget and a "Cabinet." He now, however, accepted both, with what difficulty is not known, and sent his chief political adviser, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, to Jeddah with a proclamation and to concert financial measures with Fud Hamza. Abdulullah Sulaiman he retained in Nejd until the trouble should blow over.

References

2 On the 3rd November the Hejaz was shocked by the news that, by direct order of the King, the Treasury and all its branches were to be closed and the tiller locked, and that no payments, however small, were to be made pending further instructions. This was the first sign of Ibn Saud's reaction to the situation. Its inconveniences were manifold, for all daily paid public and municipal work at once ceased, and the Quarantine Department, for instance, had to borrow fuel for its launch in order to function at all.

3. Late on the 12th November, Yusuf Yasin arrived post haste in Jeddah, where the Amir Feisal and Fuad Hamza were awaiting him to learn the King's decisions. On the following morning His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was invited to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to receive the welcome news of financial and constitutional reform. The latter, he was given to understand, was not yet elaborated, but the King had conceded the principle of a Council of Ministers on whom would rest joint responsibility for government in addition to individual responsibility for their departments. The resulting decree, which was not published until January, falls to be considered in the next report. As to financial reform, Yusuf Yasin and Fuad Hamza were in a position to announce the establishment of a budget.

4. They told Mr Hope Gill in confidence that the revenue would be in future apportioned under four headings:

85 per cent., official salaries, intended to cover all normal costs of administration.

25 per cent., indebtedness, to cover all arrears of salaries as well as the Government's internal and external debt.

15 per cent., reserve (a novelty with all the attraction of a pot of honey) and

25 per cent. extraordinary expenses, intended to ensure the comfort and health of pilgrims and to develop the country's hidden resources.

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Even approximate figures of estimated revenue were not yet available, but it had been calculated that current indebtedness could be met in about two years. There Sheikh Yusuf's information stopped, and he left to say his prayers. Nevertheless, it was gratifying to learn of even the birth of a budget.

5. On the same day the "Umm-al-Qura" published a long proclamation by the King to his people announcing the information contained in the preceding paragraph, but omitting the percentages, establishing the principle that all creditors must stand on an equal footing, and forecasting with pious hope the beneficial results that would flow from the policy of retrenchment and development which had now been adopted. Further communiqués published in subsequent issues announced the King's commands to reduce expenditure, to select a Reorganisation Committee, to create a Treasury Department, and to appoint a Treasurer, and, meanwhile, to employ the Director-General of Finance and the Vice-President of the Hejaz Legislative Assembly in an inspectional tour of the other side of Nejd (whence they had not returned by the end of December). The King's personal expenditure was also to be reduced, for which the "Umm al Qura" gave him loyal praise.

[illegible]

7 One other point emerging from the budget discussions has been that the financial capital will in future be Jeddah instead of Mecca. The idea of supplementing the reform by the employment of a European financial adviser is still canvassed, and the post is said to have been offered to the local manager of the Dutch Bank, M. Jacobs, and also to another Dutchman, M. van Leeuwe. Nothing definite has transpired, however.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

8 The Amir Faisal, Viceroy and Minister, moved his Government and Department back to Mecca on the 6th November from Taif, whither he had removed them on the 6th July for the summer. On the 7th November his Under-Secretary informed the foreign representatives that the Jeddah office of the Ministry had been transferred (from the flat which it occupied in the offices of an Italian shipping agent and for which it was obliged to pay too agreed rent) to a separate building of its own. This has meant nothing more than a welcome change of environment, which will make it no longer necessary for the Under-Secretary to speed his parting visitors through *ad fresco* macaroni parties on the stairways. The new office, however, is just as vacant as the old. Personal contact with the foreign representatives at Jeddah, which it had been hoped a year ago (December 1930 report, paragraph 1), would become more frequent, is as rare as ever, and heads of foreign missions are becoming restive and increasingly critical of their isolationist treatment.

On the 1st he gave His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires a three-hour interview. He returned on the 7th to await the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who came on the 8th, signed a treaty with France on the 10th, and left on the 13th. They were joined on the 12th by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, hot-foot with the reforms from Riadh, and Mr Hope Gill had a further interview with Fuad Bey, which was attended by the Sheikh. They both left Jedda on the 14th November. Yusuf Yasin returned to Riadh on the 2nd December, and Fuad Hamza, after a flying visit to Jedda on the 4th-8th December, followed him there on the 15th, the day on which His Majesty's Minister arrived. He was not seen again until January.

Financial Situation.

10. The general financial position at the close of the year was as gloomy as the year before. The Government, which had no one capable of running it rationally. The Treasurer, for example, is a bankrupt of 35. Nor were the prospects of revenue brighter. A pilgrimage from overseas of 20,000, or half the number of the meagre 1931 pilgrimage, was all that was expected. The Government's revenue was reduced by the reduction of pilgrimages and general depression. For the lunar year ended in June 1929 they were believed to have ranged round the million mark for that ending next May they seem unlikely to exceed half a million sterling. With this decreased security on the breakdown of the negotiations with the Dutch Bank (July-August report, paragraph 9), no business from any European country have receded out of sight. Relations with Soviet Russia, which alone might engage in trade, or even finance, on uneconomic lines, remained obscure. A consignment of 42,000 cases of Russian kerosene arrived at Yanbu' and Jedda on the 26th November in fulfilment of the July contract (July-August report, paragraph 10), and Russian matches were also on sale; but big business between the two Governments seemed out of the question. The "prohibition" of Soviet merchandise was maintained.

11. The sterling crisis of September had at first no direct effect on the currency of the Netherlands, which was the gold standard currency of the region and not on sterling as such. By November, however, one noticeable effect became evident in the lessened volume of gold in circulation, probably owing to hoarding and to heavy purchases of gold made by the local Dutch bank. English and Egyptian notes came into increasing use, the former possibly on account of the shortage of gold coins and the latter because of their smaller denominations.

[illegible]

13. No Government indebtedness was recorded as at 12 November 1913 December, with the notable exception that the Eastern Telegraph Company received three months' salary totaling some £1450 in respect of their long outstanding account. Despite this, the debit Hejazi account amounted to some £2,000 at the end of December. Official salaries were for the most part six months in arrear on the 12th December, from which date the budget is to operate. It is, however, the declared intention of the Government to lump these arrears with the general floating debt, which it is hoped to pay off in the next two years. In face of the poverty of all classes of officials, this arrangement has not made any wide appeal.

14. Throughout the autumn the Legation received a stream of complaints from British and British protected citizens or foreigners mostly women, who had been attracted to the country during the 1931 pilgrimage season by the high wages

of certain Government-controlled motor companies, but who, on being discharged after the season, had been quite unable to obtain the balances due to them. The claims, where they appeared genuine, were forwarded to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but, although the Government's liability was not contested, no claim was settled up till the end of the year, and in only two cases were the men able to make even sacrificial arrangements with the companies. In most cases the drivers were reduced to beggary and had to be repatriated by the Legation.

15. The Government of India debt is dealt with in paragraph 44, and that due to Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. in paragraph 45.

16. In November His Majesty's Government were approached by the Ottoman Debt Council with the proposal that they, in conjunction with the representatives to the Hejaz-Nejd Government in the matter of the shares of the Ottoman Public Debt due by the latter. It appeared that the Hejaz-Nejd Government, invited by the council to settle their quota of the debt, had replied or taken any action in the matter. This can hardly be regarded as surprising. His Majesty's Government had earlier in the year been approached by the French Government with a similar proposal of the council in respect of the European Governments, who were similarly debtors, and had replied that, while they agreed in principle to the proposal, they considered the moment inopportune for the purpose. No further action was accordingly taken in this instance, a formal acknowledgment only being sent to the Council.

Economic Situation

17. It was generally felt, at the end of the year, that the economic situation could hardly have been worse. The merchants of Jeddah and Mecca had, for the past two years, been increasingly hard hit, not only by trade depression, but by extortion from them by the Government in the guise of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman. To this was now added the uncertainty produced by monetary crises elsewhere. Prices of imported goods had risen considerably, and as most of the necessities of life, particularly in the Northern Hejaz, the utmost misery was reported. Their livestock, especially camels, have been seriously depleted by Government requisitions for military purposes, and they have been compelled by necessity to sell off much of what remained at heavy losses. Tales of famine were rife, although stories of hoarding were also heard. It was impossible, however, to discount the continuous reports of hunger and increased mortality received from all sources and all directions.

Economic Development

18. Mr Twitchell has shown great activity. He first installed his American prospecting machine at Taif, where he was in November and December prospecting for gold, with results so far unknown. Mr Twitchell then resumed work on the Wazirah Wells near Jeddah (September-October report). The American prospecting machine, which was producing a regular flow of water, which at one time found its way through the old Turkish conduit to Jeddah. His success stopped there, for the conduit developed serious leaks, and the authorities shrank from the expenditure necessary to recondition it. By the end of December the hoped-for flow of water into the town had still not been attained. On the 15th December Mr Twitchell departed on an extended tour through Nejd under the King's auspices, to investigate potential supplies of minerals and water. His wife remained at Jeddah in charge of the windmill and certain water-seeking operations which had been started in the neighbourhood with the aid of a hand drill.

Customs Duties

19. An official communiqué of the 10th November announced the levying as from that date of additional customs duties on benzine, kerosene, sugar, tobacco and cigarette paper, and matches.

Wireless Installation

20. No further instalments of payment were made by the Hejazi Government (September-October report, paragraph 18), and at the end of December payment was five months in arrear. Some progress in installation was made. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 20th November reported that the station at Hail was now in communication with Taif, Mecca and Medina. This, however, would appear to be an original Turkish plant, since, according to Marconi's engineer, no work at all had as yet been done at Hail. On the 4th December it was announced that the Tabuk station was working as from the 28th November, thus confirming a previous report. M. Boucicault, who had completed it, was at the end of December still detained through lack of stores and benzine at Tabuk, where famine was reported to be increasing. The main Riyadh station had not been begun. A report of December 1931 stated that the station at Jeddah, who objected to wireless as an invention of the devil, and had to be silenced by a Royal harangue reinforced by a squad of soldiery. The old Turkish installation at Jauif has been removed to Skaka, the new headquarters of the district Amir. M. Boucicault had intended to erect a new Marconi station at Jauif but it is learned that Ibn Saud now wants him to proceed to the Haas first. There is a difference of opinion, however, as to who should pay his travelling expenses.

Legislation

21. His Majesty's Minister had in July drawn the attention of His Majesty's Government to a Hejazi regulation published the previous February, under the terms of which writs issued by foreign courts for use in the Hejaz had to be countersigned by the Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had suggested that the seals and signatures of all courts or officials in British territory which might be accepted for the purpose, should be communicated to him. The Government of India was requested by the India Office on the 4th November to act in this sense, and the Governments of certain Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories were similarly addressed by the Colonial Office on the 20th November.

Communications

22. Early in November His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires questioned the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs as to the reported proposal to start a motor-service on the old pilgrim route from Najaf to Medina (September-October report, paragraph 21). Fuad Bey confirmed that the Iraq Government had proposed to start a motor-service from Najaf to Medina via Taif and Mecca, and had been told that it was impracticable for cars between Jauif and Taif on account of the soft sands of the Nafud desert. He added that the Hejaz-Nejd Government were now studying the possibilities of the old direct route, the "Darb Zubeyda" from Najaf to Medina via Mecca, and that it was a matter of time before the report that the King would shortly travel to Hail to inaugurate it.

23. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 11th November published a long article entitled "Moslem Routes." Eight routes, it stated, were formerly used by pilgrims to Mecca, and were still in use. These were: (1) The "Darb Zubeyda" from Bagdad (the Darb Zubeyda), but most of these had been abandoned of recent years in favour of the sea routes to Jeddah. The Government were now examining a project to open a motor route from Iraq via Najaf, Al Ruwān, and Jauif, an Iraqi company running motor-services as far as Jauif, and a Hejazi company running a corresponding service on from Jauif to Mecca and Medina. A route from Jauif to Hail and Medina was also being considered. Subsequent articles intimated that the Government had said that applications for permission to open a road from Syria to Jauif, which they were studying, and that over 2,000 pilgrims were expected this year to travel overland from Iraq, though it was not yet settled which route would be used.

24. The October number of the "Oriente Moderno" also mentioned the project of a motor route from Syria and Iraq via Najaf, stating that Syrian, Persian and Iraqi pilgrims would be able to use it and thus escape the vexatious

Syrian and Egyptian quarantine regulations. An Iraqi company would probably obtain the concession to run motor-services on the route, in preference to the British company which was said to be applying.

The Hejaz Railway

25 The Moslem Congress held at Jerusalem on the 6th to the 16th December formed a committee to study and report on the vexed question of the Hejaz Railway. The committee's report was neither accurate nor profound. The discussion of it was too inflamed to be serious. The following resolution was finally adopted —

"After hearing the report of the committee on the Hejaz Railway and perusing the documents relating thereto, the congress declares its resentment of the usurpation of Moslem property, which is essentially a Wakf. The congress hereby requests His Majesty's Government in this regard and should empower the Executive Committee to discuss other means for the recovery of this line."

26 It remains to be seen what action, if any, Ibn Saud will take

Moslem Congress at Jerusalem

27 On the 14th November the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, under the direction of Lord Dunsany, met His Majesty's Ministers of Foreign Affairs to ascertain His Majesty's Government's attitude towards the proposed Moslem Congress. The Grand Mufti of Palestine, Fuad Bey said, had invited the Hejaz Government to send a representative and leading persons, like himself and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, to attend. He stressed the probable anti-British and intensely anti-Saudi complexion of the conference, and said that the King did not know whether it should be held in Palestine or to send a representative to look after his interests. He did not like the agenda and was confused by the fact of receiving an invitation from a Palestinian Government official. No he relied on a lead from His Majesty's Government.

28 Fuad Bey was told on the 21st November, in reply, that His Majesty's Government regretted that they could not take the responsibility of advising Ibn Saud as to whether he should send delegates or not. He might, however, be glad to know that His Majesty's Government were in no way associated with the proposal to hold the congress, and that it had neither their encouragement nor support. Their attitude was one of detachment, excepting in so far as regarded any possible reaction on public security in Palestine. As for the Grand Mufti, he was no doubt acting as a religious dignitary and not as a Palestinian official.

29 A week later Fuad Bey was informed that as a result of recent conversations between the High Commissioner for Palestine and the Grand Mufti, His Majesty's Government did not anticipate that political issues would be raised, or that the proceedings of the congress would cause embarrassment to Ibn Saud's Government. Moreover, the Grand Mufti had given a specific assurance that the Caliphate question would not be raised. Fuad Bey expressed gratitude for this information.

30 In the event Ibn Saud sent no delegate, his "Umm al-Qura" snubbed the congress (although Fuad Hamza sent a message of support), and the only question raised at Jerusalem, which appeared to affect Ibn Saud were that of the Hejaz Railway, dealt with in paragraph 25 above, the proposal that a committee be appointed in each Moslem country to raise funds for the projected university at Mecca, and the question of the proposed deputation to the Hajj of Mecca, denouncing the Saudi régime. It may also be noted that the delegates visited the tomb of the late ex King Hussein, and lunched with his son Abdullah. Wahhabi tendencies were displayed at the congress by Rashid Ridha, an Egyptian, but met with opposition from the rest.

Security

31 The only known case affecting internal security continued to be that of the Druse Moslem K. He was taken to Jerusalem on the 24th September. A report was received that he had been detained in the prison at Transjordan and a report was pressed for more and accurate information. Fuad Bey only replied that nothing was known of the affair.

II. — FRONTIER QUESTIONS

Transjordan

Raiding.

32 The Hejazi Government have lately complained of the five following raids, said to have been made from Transjordan into Nejd in December —

- On the 1st December at Kalaki, twenty-five camels taken,
- On the 2nd December at Rajm-an-Naam, sixteen camels taken,
- On the 8th December near Shinam, sixty camels taken,
- On the 8th December at Ar Rajaa, twenty-five camels taken,
- On the 14th December at Mudhaibia, a caravan taken and two men killed.

No raid was complained of on the Transjordan side of the frontier during November and December.

33 Repercussions from the raid of the 26th September at Haj (not Hazim, nor Hazim) engaged attention. On the 2nd December the Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs stated categorically that the victims, the Atun section of the Huweyfat, were subjects of Ibn Saud. The Transjordan authorities, however, claimed that the subjects were British. In order to settle the question, the correspondence was examined in an attempt to settle the question, but without final result.

Glubb-Ibn Zaid Meetings.

34 No meeting was held, but preparations were made to hold one early in January.

MacDonnell Investigation

35 On the 2nd November the Hejazi Government replied in these words to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires' request of the 6th October for the payment of the Hejazi share of the costs of the investigation —

"The agreement, in accordance with the terms of which the arbitration took place, contained the proviso that each party should bear the expenses of the arbitration. It was no ruling to meet the case of no judgment being given against either party. My Government are convinced that they should be prepared to pay half the expenses of the arbitration, when they have experienced heavy loss as a result of the reduction of the claims of their subjects."

This Semitic calculation on an arbitral award, which held that the claims of both sides cancelled each other out, was transmitted to His Majesty's Government on the 1st December, and when Mr. Hope Gill had occasion, during a telephone conversation with Fuad Bey later in the month, to refer to it in appropriate terms, he received the soft answer that, if the Hejazi Government were prepared to pay, they would probably do so. He advised Fuad Bey that the Hejazi Government would not be able to pay the expenses of the arbitration, but that they would be prepared to pay half the expenses of the arbitration, when they have experienced heavy loss as a result of the reduction of the claims of their subjects. Nothing, however, by the end of December.

Aerial Trespass

36 On the 1st December, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires replied to a Hejazi protest, made in October, to the effect that three British aircraft had violated the Transjordan-Nejd frontier. He explained that one machine had been compelled by engine trouble to land, but that the atmosphere was hazy, and the leader of the formation was therefore doubtful of his exact position, he thought that the landing was made in Transjordan territory. In fact it was made in Nejd territory. Mr. Hope Gill drew attention to the fact that the landing was due to circumstances beyond the pilot's control and expressed His Majesty's Government's regret. In reply of the 12th December, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he found it necessary to draw His Majesty's Government's attention to the fact that, although the Hejazi Government were always ready to afford all possible

assistance, they could not avoid taking such measures as would leave no room for any infringement of their regulations or violation of their honour.

37. In transmitting this reply to His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Minister observed that its language reflected the churlish spirit in which the Hejazi Government habitually dealt with questions of this kind. It might almost be construed as a menace, but in view of His Majesty's Government's desire to avoid fruitless correspondence over the matter, Sir A. Ryan did not propose to pursue it in writing, but would draw Fuad Bey's attention to the unfriendly tone of the reply on his return from Riyadh. He did so in January. Fuad Hinnzu explained somewhat lamely and obscurely, what he apparently had to condone a violation of territory, it did not impair their rights. In view, however, of the friendly nature of contemporary correspondence about the missing Iraqi pilot, Squadron-Leader Warburton, Sir Andrew did not press the matter further.

Iraq

38. There is nothing of interest to report, except the death at Riyadh in October or early November of the Mutair chieftain Faisal ad Dawish, once a prominent figure in the 1920 rebellion against Ibn Saud. He is said to have died of an internal disorder in the nature of dysentery.

39. The project of a pilgrim route for cars from Iraq to the Hejaz has been noted in paragraph 22.

Koweit and Bahrain

40. There is nothing definite to report, beyond a certain increased activity on the Koweit border on the part of Ibn Muhairib, Ibn Saud's frontier official.

Anr and the Yemen

41. The meeting of Saudi and Yemeni delegates referred to in paragraph 46 of the last report was held early in November at An Nadhir, near Mount Arwa, the place in dispute. Neither side would give way, however, and the matter was referred to their respective Governments. Telegraphic messages were thereupon exchanged between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya, as a result of which the latter asked the former to arbitrate. "Wherefore His Majesty," as the Hejazi himself put it, "was obliged to accept the offer of arbitration." The result of the arbitration was the surrender of Mount Arwa to the Yemen. Friendly relations have thus been established between His Majesty the King and His Highness the Imam on firm foundations, please God Almighty. Ibn Saud must have felt that circumstances were indeed against him, to induce him to yield ground to the Yemen.

42. The local pact nevertheless bore fruit. On the 15th December a treaty of friendship, neighbourliness and extradition was signed at Abu Arish between the Hejaz Nejd and the Yemen. It came as a surprise and is not much believed in.

III—RELATIONS WITH STATES OUTSIDE ARABIA

British Empire

43. Relations were normal. They centred round the Transjordan frontier, the Hejaz air route and Ibn Saud's debts. The first named has been dealt with in paragraphs 32 to 37. Air matters are reported in paragraphs 55 to 60 below. It is convenient to mention the debts here.

44. At the end of the year, when His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 13th November (see paragraph 4 above), the Hejazi Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs preferred a request that His Majesty's Government would allow the Hejazi Government to be placed on a basis of equality with the whole of Hejaz Nejd indebtedness. Mr Hope Gill replied that he would communicate the

request to His Majesty's Government, but that facts and figures would certainly be required. Fuad Bey was in no position, however, to say what the other indebtedness was, either by category or in total, but he thought that it would be possible to liquidate it all in two years. This meagre information was telegraphed to London.

45. Mr Hope Gill then reminded Fuad Bey of the benzine debt of £13,000 to Messrs. Gellatt, Hankey and Co., which he insisted could not be deferred, but must be paid according to the agreement of September. Fuad Bey took note of this, but promised nothing. As regards the current debt to the Eastern Telegraph Company, which was always £2,000 or more, he assured Mr Hope Gill that all postal and telegraphic receipts would henceforth be reserved for its liquidation and would not be pooled with the Government's other resources. Mr Hope Gill made a passing reference to the Hejazi half share of the costs of the MacDonnell investigation, a matter of only £1,700, and was promised an early reply (see paragraph 35). He made no reference to the Marconi debt, which, though mounting up and £5,000 high at the turn of the year, is a matter on which neither the company nor Mr Philby, their agent, has yet approached the Legation. He mentioned, however, the several hundred pounds owing to a number of British and British-protected chauffeurs in Government employ (see paragraph 14), but without drawing more than a sardonic reference to the similar plight of all Government employees in the country.

International

46. On the 23rd November the Hejaz-Nejd telegraphed to Geneva its adherence to the proposed armaments truce. No decision to accept the invitation to attend the Disarmament Conference was notified before the end of the year.

France

47. The treaty with France was at last signed on the 10th November, together with an agreement covering relations with Syria. The former is the result of nearly two years' negotiation, it is understood to follow the lines of the Treaty of Jeddah, but to exclude all mention of the suppression of the slave trade, that civilised aim to which His Majesty's Government had succeeded in binding Ibn Saud—on paper.

The Netherlands

48. M. Adrianse returned to Jeddah on the 5th November and presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires. He had spent a fortnight in London, as secretary to the Orientalists' Conference at Leiden, but he finds the local Arabic well-nigh unintelligible.

Germany

49. M. de Haas went on leave in November, leaving a local German merchant in charge of his consulate.

Soviet Russia

50. A second consignment of Soviet oil was delivered at Jeddah in November (see paragraph 10).

Turkey

51. Lutfullah Bey was in November at length able to present his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires. His Legation has since been charged with Afghan interests.

Peru

52. Am al-Mulk Habibullah Khan Hoveida once more returned to Jeddah after a brief visit to Lima on the 26th December.

United States of America

53. The prospecting activities of Mr Crane's engineer are described in paragraph 18.

Denmark

54. There being no Danish representative here, His Majesty's Government were asked to have enquiries made by the Legation as to the fate of an adventurous Dane, with results that are told in paragraph 31.

IV - AIR MATTERS

Hejaz Air Force Machine

55. Following on the crash of one machine (September-October report, paragraph 6), and the departure of the last British pilot (*ibidem*, paragraph 62), the four Wapitis remained in their hangar throughout November and December. No one was in particular charge of them. The British engineer who looks after the local sea-water condensers was occasionally asked to look at them, he reported that the engines were apparently sufficiently well greased, but that the fabric and stays were suffering from moth and rust respectively. The roof of the hangar then fell in; the machines were moved to an adjacent spot where they were kept under lock and key and a cover of cotton sheets.

Hejaz Air Force Personnel.

56. On the 7th November the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs gave a private hint to His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires that if His Majesty's Government were to propose that a British aviation mission should be sent to the Hejaz, he would be prepared to urge Ibn Saud to accept it. The position, he explained, had changed since the King had refused an offer of even partial assistance in 1927, and Fuad Hamza was now so anxious to avoid the impression of Anglo-Hejazi estrangement which would be given by their engagement of a personnel other than British that he was ready to act as indicated. He was not in a strong enough position to do more.

57. To this suggestion and to the King's defer to proposals reported in paragraph 67 of the September-October report, His Majesty's Government replied on the 14th November. They pointed out firstly that their willingness to accept new personnel for the Hejaz Air Force was based on the Hejaz Government's proposals of the 17th June (May-June report, paragraph 56), which were ~~accepted by the Hejaz Government~~ referred to above. These had been ~~accepted by the Hejaz Government~~ referred to above. The King's request that the personnel should be ~~accepted by the Hejaz Government~~ could not be complied with for reasons fully stated in the September-October report, paragraph 66, and so far as the alternative proposal to engage British personnel for instruction and maintenance and for operation of the aircraft was concerned, it was pointed out that it was not a proposal to which His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires was authorized to give effect. He pointed out that even the Hejaz Government would have to accept the conditions, (a) that the personnel should be ~~accepted by the Hejaz Government~~ against rebels, the Government of ~~the Hejaz~~ having their primary position at this point, and (b) that no foreign personnel could be engaged for flying the aircraft for which British personnel would be responsible. Moreover, the lack of international machines, the language difficulty, &c., were, in any case, serious obstacles to the success of the scheme, while complications over the payment and treatment of the personnel would ~~be a serious obstacle~~ in view of the state of the Hejazi treasury. The ~~Hejaz Government~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~ ~~reluctant~~ ~~to~~ ~~accept~~ ~~the~~ ~~proposal~~ ~~that~~ ~~it~~ ~~would~~ ~~not~~ ~~meet~~ ~~Ibn~~ ~~Saud's~~ ~~apparent~~ ~~desire~~ ~~to~~ ~~use~~ ~~the~~ ~~pilots~~ ~~against~~ ~~possible~~ ~~enemies~~ ~~or~~ ~~rebels~~, while its cost, no part of which His Majesty's Government could bear in the existing crisis, would be greater than that of an unofficial mission.

58. The decisions regarding Ibn Saud's later proposals and the air mission ~~subject~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~re-~~ ~~considered~~ ~~by~~ ~~His~~ ~~Majesty's~~ ~~Government~~. On the 22nd November the latter forwarded a message from the King regretting His Majesty's Government's decision, reaffirming that he did not wish to use the ~~Hejaz~~ ~~Government's~~ ~~air~~ ~~force~~ ~~for~~ ~~warlike~~ ~~operations~~ ~~but~~ ~~did~~ ~~not~~ ~~have~~ ~~them~~ ~~under~~ ~~his~~ ~~orders~~ ~~whenever~~ ~~necessary~~ ~~for~~ ~~defence~~, and stating that, while he understood His Majesty's Government's attitude, he was ~~delighted~~ ~~to~~ ~~look~~ ~~for~~ ~~personnel~~ ~~else-~~ ~~where~~. This was not the first little rift in the lute, but it began to affect the tune.

59. The ~~Hejaz~~ ~~Government~~ ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~any~~ ~~position~~ ~~to~~ ~~engage~~ ~~foreign~~ ~~personnel~~, except an un-~~official~~ ~~mission~~ ~~of~~ ~~personnel~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~Hejaz~~ ~~Government's~~ ~~air~~ ~~force~~ ~~for~~ ~~warlike~~ ~~operations~~ ~~but~~ ~~did~~ ~~not~~ ~~have~~ ~~them~~ ~~under~~ ~~his~~ ~~orders~~ ~~whenever~~ ~~necessary~~ ~~for~~ ~~defence~~, and stating that, while he understood His Majesty's Government's attitude, he was ~~delighted~~ ~~to~~ ~~look~~ ~~for~~ ~~personnel~~ ~~else-~~ ~~where~~.

Arabian Air Route

60. His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires had on the 10th October suggested to His Majesty's Government that, if they could help Ibn Saud to obtain the air personnel he required, his agreement to the facilities they sought from him in regard to landing grounds on the Haza Coast (July-August report, paragraph 72) might be requested as a *quid pro quo*. He suggested an annual rental for those grounds of £1,000 gold as the lowest which Ibn Saud would be likely to consider. On the 23rd November His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires informed the Foreign Office that while ~~it was not possible to engage foreign personnel for the Hejaz Air Force~~ ~~as to the King's attempts to engage foreign personnel, except an un-~~official~~ ~~mission~~ ~~of~~ ~~personnel~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~Hejaz~~ ~~Government's~~ ~~air~~ ~~force~~ ~~for~~ ~~warlike~~ ~~operations~~ ~~but~~ ~~did~~ ~~not~~ ~~have~~ ~~them~~ ~~under~~ ~~his~~ ~~orders~~ ~~whenever~~ ~~necessary~~ ~~for~~ ~~defence~~~~, they would like it to be broached to Ibn Saud at the first suitable opportunity. They considered, however, that the suggested rent was excessive, as they did not require the grounds for exclusive Royal Air Force use, but only asked that they should be marked out and available for pilots flying on the Persian Gulf route to land on in case of distress, the other desiderata relating to the treatment of the crews of distressed aircraft were, they suggested, no more than His Majesty's Government could expect to obtain from Ibn Saud's generosity and international courtesy. An annual rental of £50 for each of the three grounds would, in their opinion, be adequate to meet the cost of maintenance and renewal of the machines. His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires was accordingly instructed on the 2nd December to take up the matter with the Hejaz-Nejd Government at a suitable opportunity, one did not, however, arise before the end of the month.

V - MILITARY MATTERS

Northern Hejaz.

61. During November and December the only addition reported to have been made to the Saudi forces in the northern amirates was that of a draft of 150 men to Tabuk. The Amir of Jauif, Turki as-Sudairi, moved his headquarters and wireless to Skaka, a village 22 miles north-east of Jauif, in November. In December he posted 100 camelmen and five cars under Ibn Handan forward in the Wadi Sirhan, at Hawiya.

62. Everywhere in the north the condition of the garrisons continued to deteriorate. Still no pay was issued, and at Kaf and Tabuk the troops were said to be on the verge of starvation. Circumstantial reports were, at the same time, received from Muxa and Medina that a Nafir al 'Amm, or general call to arms for Jihad, was being issued by Ibn Saud. It was commonly thought that Ibn Saud was on the point of risking his arm in a throw against Transjordan as the only way of escaping the general discontent and offering his starving tribes the chance of helping themselves. Reflection, of course, suggested that Ibn Saud would not engage openly in an enterprise which would bring him into direct conflict with His Majesty's Government, but the possibility could not be dismissed in the case of a man such as he, strong-willed and ambitious, who was already in hard straits and might be desperate in a few months. There was, of course, the alternative possibility of the main object being the promotion of authorized raids, but no untoward development in either direction took place before the end of the year.

East (Nejd)

63. The death of Faisal ad Dawish in prison at Riadh (see paragraph 38) is said to have caused widespread consternation and gloom amongst the Mutair and increased bitterness against Ibn Saud. The common belief was that he had been murdered.

64. Apart from this, there were rumours of much dissatisfaction in Nejd and some specific allegations of discontent owing to oppressive taxation, non payment of wages and bounties, levies in kind on merchants, attempts to impose the use of the unpopular Hejazi dollar, and the reforms instituted in the Haza by the mission of Muhammad-at-Tawul, whose life was said to have been

more than once in danger; but there was no active outbreak or military movement. I think I have been, however, misled from British lines and withdrawal of horsemen from the Bass Coast into Nejd had been noticed in November, and from Mecca to the effect that some 24,000 rifles had been collected and repaired there and sent to Riadh. The inference drawn was that, while Ibn Saud was certainly consolidating his position there, it was probably more as a precautionary measure than with a view to expansion or conquest. That is as much as can be said of a situation that was unsettled and

South (Air).

45. Clashes were reported between Khalid bin Luwey and dissidents in the
in the North. Although some clashes took place in the north, however, the
southern frontier was quiet, thanks to the conversations reported in
paragraphs 41 and 42, which resulted in the pact of Mount Arwa and a treaty
with the Yemen.

VI.—NAVAL MATTERS.

06. No naval visits by British or foreign warships took place during November or December.

On 5th November His Majesty's Government communicated to His Majesty's High Commissioner for the Eastern Mediterranean the following instructions:-
 "Frequent visits by His Majesty's ships to ports in the Hejaz and Asir desired by the Admiralty (July-August report, paragraph 7A). It was decided to maintain for four months the present practice, by which His Majesty's ships visit none of these ports except Jeddah, and to review the situation at the end of this period."

Forged Rupee Notes.

VII.—PILGRIMAGE.

88 More reports were received regarding the presence in the Hajaz of forged Indian currency notes. In one case pilgrims from districts on either side of the N.W. Frontier had been said to be in possession of forged notes believed to have been distributed there by Soviet agents; in another German agents were said to be distributing forged notes among pilgrims in the Hajaz. No confirmation of either story could be obtained, however. In December another letter was received from the alleged broker of forged notes in Syria by the member of the Foreign Office who had tried to contact him in Constantinople (January-February report, paragraph 51). The matter was covered in H.M. Magazine's article on Beirut dated 27th October 1936.

Nigerian Pilgrim Destitutes.

[illegible]

70. It was therefore arranged to examine and classify at the Legation all Nigerian documents then in Ibadan and seeking repair to or. This examination

was carried out during the second week of November by the pro-consul, in the presence of a member of the Italian consulate, who assisted in the interrogation of the pilgrims and agreed the conclusions arrived at. It involved five days' exhaustive work, but the results were striking. During the month which had elapsed since the opening of the question, many more destitutes had flocked to Jeddah under the stress of economic depression throughout the country, and a total of over 900 was finally examined. Some 100 had come to the Hejaz via Suakin, and 400 via Massawa. Of the former, thirty-two held return tickets, all of which were time-expired, the remaining two-thirds had come to the Hejaz between pilgrim seasons on single tickets. Ninety-four held pilgrim passes or other Sudan papers, the rest had lost theirs.

[illegible]

American Pilgrimage Control

72. The examination of Nigerian pilgrim destitutes described in paragraph 70 above incidentally showed up three undesirable aspects of the present system. The first was that the fares are too high a proportion of those embarking at Suakin do not come during the pilgrimage season, when they are compelled to purchase return tickets, but slip over between seasons on single tickets. Another was that the six month period of validity of return tickets is too short to suit the leisurely habits of the African pilgrim. The third was that the pilgrims have to spend a considerable amount of money before recrossing the Red Sea. His Majesty's Minister, who had the previous May suggested to the Sudan Government that return tickets should be made compulsory for pilgrims all the year round and should be valid for at least a year, on the 21st December again emphasised these points in a despatch to Khartoum.

73. The third and most important fact of which corroborative evidence was now afforded was the existence of a regular pilgrim traffic by sambuk from Massawa to ports on the Arabian littoral. The Foreign Office, in a despatch of the 9th October, had forwarded corroborative evidence of this, collected independently by the German Consul at Ismailia and the Austrian Consul at Aden. The despatch had been forwarded to His Majesty's Government to represent the more forcibly to the Italian Government the failure of the Eritrean authorities to implement the relevant articles of the 1920 Sabatary Convention. The despatch had been forwarded to His Majesty's Government on the 24th November.

74. On the 10th September the Nigerian Government gave their general approval to the proposals for improved control of the West African pilgrimage drawn up between the Legation and the Sudan Government (March-April report, paragraph 63).

1932 Pilgrimage

75 Despite active propaganda on behalf of the pilgrimage carried out in India, Malaya, and Java by the Hejaz Government, including an assurance that Pilgrimage Day in 1932 would fall on a Friday, prospects at the end of December were very poor. All the direct sailings from Singapore during November and

December were cancelled for lack of bookings. Only about 2,500 Japanese arrived during these months, and the Dutch Legation thought these to be about half the eventual number, which would thus be 5,000 as against the 18,000 of 1931. The Indian pilgrim trade promised slightly better, but it seemed unlikely by the end of December that the total number of overseas arrivals for 1932 would much exceed 20,000, as against the meagre 40,000 of last year.

Manumissions.

VIII.—SLAVERY.

76. One Nigerian male slave who took refuge in the Legation in December was taken to the Sudan by the Sudanese authorities.

Intelligence Service.

77. As a result of a meeting of the Standing Aden Committee held in London in July, His Majesty's Government decided not to establish a slavery intelligence service on the Arabian coast of the Red Sea.

Abyssinian Slaves.

78. The successful repatriation by the Legation of two Abyssinians sent back by way of Jibuti (July August report, paragraph 84) led His Majesty's Government to enquire of His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa whether the Government would be willing to accept a system of repatriation submitted in future by the British Legation at Jeddah being sent by this route at the cost of their Government, as a permanent rule. Sir S. Barton in his reply of the 2nd November stated that he would prefer to take up specific cases as they arose, rather than press the Ethiopian Government to agree to any permanent system.

IX.—MISCELLANEOUS.

79. Mr. Twitchell left Jeddah on the 15th December for a prospecting tour in the north. His activities have been reported in paragraph 18.

A. Fazl ul Haq, former Minister in Bengal and member of the Round Table Conference, arrived in Jeddah on the 20th December and left six days later after visiting Medina.

Colonel Nawab Osman Jar-ud-Daula, Commander-in-chief of the Hyderabad State Army, arrived at Jeddah on the 20th November and left on the 4th December after visiting Mecca and Medina.

Princess Saniya Isheerah visited the Hejaz early in November and left for India on the 26th November en route for Hyderabad.

Prince Mehmed Djemaledine (son of Prince Mehmed Shevket), with his wife and two other persons, arrived in the Hejaz in November, and, after being refused visas for India, left for Massawa on the 8th December en route for either Suez or Aden. Their journey was apparently to be a short one, but local generosity rose to no more than the cost of their passages out of the country.

Departure.

80. Throughout October and November a certain Muharik Ali, an Indian, was in the Legation, and a great deal of trouble was caused. He had been, i.e., fled like the Prophet, from the infidel land of India, had been bombarding the Legation with threats and the British Legation with threats and threatening letters from Mecca. His grievances at first concerned certain losses on exchange which he said he had suffered through the depreciation of sterling. But his scope was extended in subsequent letters to include the treatment of the Legation, in a third person note, to call him "Sir"; the duties of British representatives, the barbarism of half-naked European women, and the coming of the Mahdi and his triumph over Christians in battle. Explicit reference was made in the last case to massacre of unbelievers, and the Legation was constrained on the 21st November to ask the Hejaz Government to deport him.

Staff.

81. Sir Andrew Ryan returned to Jeddah from leave of absence, and resumed charge of the Legation on the 15th December.

Mr. Wikeley arrived back in Jeddah from leave of absence on the 18th November.

Meteorological.

82. Office readings for the year were as follows:

	Humidity Average Percentage of Saturation.	Highest Maximum Reading.	Average.		W. S. W. N. E. S. W. N. E. S. W.
			Maximum by Day.	Minimum at Night.	
Jan.	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.
Feb.	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.
Mar.	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.
Apr.	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.
May	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.
June	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.
July	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.
Aug.	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.
Sept.	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.
Oct.	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.
Nov.	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.
Dec.	65	85	74	51	W. S. W.

Wind was about 90 per cent. constant but variable in force, the prevailing quarter was north west (Red Sea).

Annex to Enclosure

(Translation)

Budget Regulation for the Financial Year beginning Shaban 1, 1350 (December 12, 1931), and ending Rajab 30, 1351 (November 30, 1932).

A HIGH decree has been issued sanctioning the Government budget regulation for the financial year which commences the 1st Shaban, 1350 (the 12th December, 1931), as follows:—

1. The funds specified for Government Departments for the financial year beginning the 1st Shaban, 1350 (the 12th December, 1931), and ending the 30th Rajab, 1351 (the 30th November, 1932), as mentioned in the attached lists, amount to 108,442,544 piastres miri (about £967,650 gold).

2. The revenues of the Government for the present year, mentioned in article 1 and in the attached lists, also amount to 108,442,544 piastres miri (about £967,650 gold).

3. There must be strict compliance with all the orders, Acts and financial regulations in force regarding the 10 per cent. and 15 per cent. reduction of salaries and the 10 per cent. reduction of some of the allowances.

4. There must be strict compliance with all orders, Acts and financial regulations regarding the method followed in the past of paying out, receiving, entering, recording, stamping, keeping, and checking of accounts.

5. There must be strict compliance with the orders of the Council of Ministers No. 10,000 of 24th Rajab 1350 (the 2nd December, 1931) regarding the reduction of the budget regulation for the present financial year.

6. The Ministry of Finance, the Director-General of the Treasury and the heads of the competent Departments are authorised to put into effect the provisions of this regulation, each in what concerns him. The Minister of Finance must prepare the final accounts, and submit them at the end of the financial year in their final form.

[7797]

53

List of Allowances decided for the Financial Year 1350-1351

	Piastres mirl.	Roughly equals £ gold
Royal allowances	6,000,000	60,000
Debt instalments	16,500,000	150,000
Allotment to amirs, Royal diwan, palaces, and the officials of the Treasury Department	12,650,000	115,000
Forces of the frontiers	3,500,000	35,000
Share of the Hejaz in Defence Depart- ments	22,000,000	200,000
Communications and Transports	11,000,000	100,000
Headquarters of Justice and Sharia Courts	1,127,692	10,252
Viceroy's office and sections	3,148,530	29,005
Legislative Council and Administrative Councils	577,310	5,248
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and sections	1,490,789	13,553
Public Health and quarantines	2,734,240	24,857
Water condensers and sections	1,359,223	12,302
Public Department of Education	1,717,047	15,000
Customs Department and sections	1,240,832	11,250
Finance Departments	2,253,028	20,482
Public Security	10,441,106	94,920
Government press	181,820	1,471
Committees of Virtue	165,070	1,501
Miscellaneous allotments	688,720(?)	6,261
Posts, Telegraphs, Wireless and Tele- phones	4,210,450	38,277
The two Sanctuaries and Wakfs	2,048,137	18,610
Grand total	106,442,544(?)	967,659(?)

(1) The Arabic text not clear, it may be 988,720

(2) Incl addition, total = 105,955,000 or about 2963 237 gold

(3) Calculated at "official" rate of piastres mirl 110 = gold £1, but market rate on the day piastres mirl 22½ = gold £1. The "official" rate has been used for the purpose of calculation, although the Hejaz Government have admitted in confidence that the market rate of the above allotments, according to their convenience

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No 27

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon (Received March 8, 1932)

HIS Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Jeddah presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for India and encloses herewith a copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 13th February, enclosing an official notification and an extract from the "Umm al Qura" of the 14th February respecting relations between Italy and Hejaz Nejd

Jeddah, February 17, 1932

Enclosure 1 in No 27

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mecca, to Mr. Hope Gill

Mecca, Shawwal 8, 1350 (February 13, 1932)

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mecca, has the honour to inform you that the Ministry has received from the Press Department of the Government of His Majesty the King and of Italy

(Seal)

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Enclosure 2 in No 27

Official Notification No 16

ON the date mentioned hereunder, a plenipotentiary on behalf of the Government of His Majesty the King and a plenipotentiary on behalf of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy signed treaties of friendship and commerce between the Kingdom of Hejaz Nejd and its Dependencies and the Kingdom of Italy, at Jeddah, on Wednesday, the 3rd Shawwal, 1350 (the 10th February, 1932). The texts of the two treaties will be published later

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mecca,
Shawwal 3, 1350 (February 10, 1932)

Enclosure 3 in No 27.

Extract from "Umm al Qura" of February 14, 1932

TEXT OF OFFICIAL RECOGNITION BY ITALY

Your Royal Highness,

ON signing a treaty of friendship and a commercial agreement between the two Kingdoms of Italy and the Hejaz Nejd and its Dependencies in my capacity as Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Italy, I have the honour to declare that the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy recognise His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Abdurrahman al Faisal al Saud as King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.

In according this recognition the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy express their intention of strengthening the friendly relations existing between the two Governments and of strengthening the commercial connections between Italy and the Colony of Eritrea on the one side and the Hejaz Nejd and its Dependencies on the other

His Royal Highness then made a suitable reply (Not published.)

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No 28

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 14)

Sir,

India Office, March 11, 1932.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf on the subject of the Muscat Succession.

I am, &c

S. F. STEWART

Enclosure 1 in No. 28

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India

Sir,

Bushire, February 23, 1932

IN continuation of my telegram No 104, dated the 12th February, 1932, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter dated the 15th February, 1932, from the Political Agent, Muscat, and a translation of its enclosure, regarding the accession of His Highness Sayyid Said bin-Taimur to the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. To complete the record I also enclose a copy of my letter of the 9th February referred to in His Highness's letter.

I am sending a copy of this letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India

I have &c

H. V. BISCOE, Lieutenant Colonel

[7797]

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Political Agent, Muscat, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

Sir,

Muscat, February 15, 1932

IN continuation of my telegram No. 40 of the 13th February, 1932, I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter in Arabic, with English translation, addressed to you by His Highness.

2. His Highness's accession took place on the 10th instant without incident. There was a certain amount of discussion between his uncles when they were informed of the late Sultan's abdication, but the latter's letter to His Highness nominating him as his successor and your letter conveying the fact that the accession had taken place, overcame all opposition that might have been offered. As a matter of fact, considering that His Highness is the eldest son of Sir Taimur bin Feisal, and that he was generally looked on as the heir apparent, no other member of the Royal Family had any claims to the throne.

3. The only one of His Highness's many uncles who was at all recalcitrant was the eldest, Sayyid Nadir, who was a great man, and was a great help to His Highness by personal ambition but by fears for himself. On the morning of the 9th I was informed by Captain Alban, on behalf of His Highness, that all the uncles, who had been informed on the 7th instant of the approaching accession, had agreed to support His Highness. On the 10th instant, Sir Taimur bin Feisal, who announced his intention of interviewing the Political Agent. He, His Highness, had no objection. I had no wish, of course, to interfere in the family differences of the Royal Family, but as this was an important matter I sent a message to Sayyid Nadir saying that I would be pleased to see him.

4. Sayyid Nadir talked to me for a long time, his refrain being, "If His Highness 'did anything against him' would I as Political Agent—help him?" I informed him, politely but firmly, that His Highness was Sultan and that I had no intention of interfering in such obviously internal affairs as the relation between the Sultan and his uncles. I purposely kept the conversation, as far as I was concerned, on a high level, and did not descend to the petty personal considerations seriously. I introduced a little judicious flattery, by saying that instead of interfering, I should be glad to help His Highness with his advice and assistance, which, doubtless, would be most useful. Sayyid Nadir finally took his leave looking rather lugubrious, but apparently my advice had a beneficial effect as—having got nothing out of me—I heard afterwards that he hastened to His Highness and effusively offered him his full support. I informed the Sultan later of my conversation with his uncle. His Highness told me that he was very pleased, and that he gave Sayyid Nadir, and added, with a smile, that he imagined that the latter's apprehensions were concerned with a possible cut in his allowance.

5. On the 11th instant as arranged with His Highness, I made my official call on him, with Captain Mackay, to offer my congratulations on the 'Id and on his accession. There were present members of the Royal Family and notables. I made a short speech to which His Highness replied.

6. As far as can be judged the abdication of Sir Taimur bin-Feisal and the accession of His Highness have caused little stir or excitement in Muscat. The late Sultan, owing to his prolonged absence from his dominions, had faded out of the picture, and his son was looked on as the inevitable heir. Moreover, the population of Muscat are commercially, not politically, minded, and such matters as the export price of dates and the value of the rupee are of more real interest to them, especially in these hard times, than the accession of a new Sultan. Such interest as has been displayed in the town is all in favour of His Highness. The tribes along the coast, and in the interior, will doubtless display more concern. When indications of their attitude are received I will submit a further report.

I have, &c.

T. C. FOWLE, Lieutenant-Colonel

The Sultan of Muscat to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

(After compliments.)

February 10, 1932

I ACKNOWLEDGE with pleasure the receipt of your honoured letter dated the 9th January, 1932, in which you informed me that my father has abdicated from the Throne of his State and has appointed me as his successor. You state that you have informed His Majesty's Government of this and that the High Government have been pleased to recognise me as Sultan of Muscat and Oman. I would request you to convey my thanks to the High Government. I am writing to inform you that I have, in conformity with the orders issued by my father, ascended the Throne of the Sultanate to-day and have intimated to the members of my family the decision of my father to abdicate from the throne and that he has nominated me to succeed him. They have approved of that and have accepted me as Ruler of the State. I would request you to inform the High Government that it is not hidden from me that I shall endure in my rule by the continuance of their help and assistance to me and my Government in the same manner as my ancestors were helped by them. And it is hoped that you will assure the aforesaid Government that I have accepted all the obligations to the High Government descending to me from my father and that I am determined to follow the policy of my father, and to maintain the peace and stability of the help of the Government and declare that in accordance with the wishes of my father I will be guided by its views in important matters, as I am assured that the Government will not be pleased except in what profits my State and desires the maintenance of the independence of our Government and Sultanate. And since, nowadays, there are no other representatives of those Powers in Muscat with whom we are in treaty relations, we would request His Majesty's Government to inform the Governments of the United States, France and Holland of our accession.

In conclusion, I thank your Honour for your sincere wishes and hope that our friendship and union may continue.

Your sincere friend,

SAYYID BIN-TAIMUR

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman

Your Highness,

H. M. S. "Fowley," January 9, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Highness that your father, Sayyid Taimur bin Feisal, at the conclusion of an interview which I had with him at Karachi, addressed to me a letter in which he announced his unwillingness to return to Muscat for reasons of health and his determination to abdicate from the throne and informed me that he had nominated your Highness to succeed him and to exercise all powers as Ruler of the State.

I have communicated the text of this letter to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, who, in accordance with the wishes expressed in your father's letter, have authorised me to inform you that they recognise your Highness officially as Sultan of Muscat and Oman.

In conclusion, permit me of your Highness's kindness to express my very sincere wishes that your Highness may have a long and prosperous reign, and to renew our friendly relations.

Yours, &c.

H. V. BISCOE, Lieutenant-Colonel

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No. 29

Mr. Hope Gull to Sir John Simon. (Received March 24.)
(No. 113.)

Enclosure 1 to No. 29. A despatch from the
King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies to the
King of the Yemen, dated 13th day of Shaban, 1350, in
confirmation of the treaty between the Hejaz Nejd and the Yemen.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Rome and to Aden)

Jedda, February 29, 1932

Enclosure 1 to No. 29

Extract from "Imam al Qura" of February 26, 1932 (Shawwal 19, 1350)

(Translation.)

TREATY WITH THE YEMEN

WE publish in this issue the text of the treaty concluded between the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies on the one side and the Yemen on the other, on the 13th day of Shaban, 1350 (the 13th December, 1931), and the ratification of which has been mentioned in the previous issue.

Treaty of Friendship and "Bun-Yaxinaga" between the Kingdom of the Hejaz, and of Nejd and its Dependencies and the Yemen.

In compliance with the commands of His Majesty the King, Abdul Aziz bin Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz, Yahya bin Muhammad, the King of the Yemen, has been informed of the above, and we have the honor to inform you that the text of the treaty has been sent between the two Governments and is hereby confirmed.

ARTICLE 1

Both countries shall maintain friendship and good neighbourliness, strengthen the bonds of amity, and not permit in their territory any activity prejudicial to the other (side).

ARTICLE 2

Each Government shall hand over (to the other) at the request of his Government any criminal, whether political or non-political, who shall commit a crime after (the conclusion of) this agreement.

ARTICLE 3

Each country shall treat the subjects of the other residing in their territories as its own subjects.

ARTICLE 4

Each country shall guarantee and give full Sharia rights to the subjects of the other. Any difficulty which the Amirs and officials are unable to settle shall be referred to the King and the Imam.

ARTICLE 5

Each country shall refuse admittance (into its territories) to any fugitive, criminal, or person of ill repute, who is seeking to escape from obedience to his country. Such a person shall be returned to his country of origin.

ARTICLE 6

In the event of a subject of either Government causing an incident in the other country, he shall be tried by the courts within whose jurisdiction the incident arose.

ARTICLE 7

Amirs and officials (of either country) shall not interfere with the subjects (of the other country) in such a manner as to cause disturbance and to bring about a misunderstanding between the two countries.

ARTICLE 8

In the event of a subject of one of the Governments residing in the territories of the other being required by his own Government, after (the conclusion of) this agreement, he shall immediately be sent to his Government.

This is what has been agreed upon between the representatives of His Highness the Imam and His Majesty the King Abdul Aziz bin Abdulrahman al Saud. The execution of these eight articles is subject to agreement and ratification by the two great Kings. The above has been written in duplicate, one copy having been given to each party, on this 5th day of Shaban, 1350 (the 15th December, 1931).

(Signatures and Seals.)

Yahya bin Muhammad, King of the Yemen
Abdul Wahhab bin Muhammad bin Abdulaziz, King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies
Sakhar Abdullah bin Ali Manaa
Abdul Wahhab bin Muhammad bin Abdulaziz, King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies
M. Hammad bin Dalim bin Zaata Hamad al Abdali
M. Hammad bin Dalim bin Zaata Hamad al Abdali

[E 1485/165 25]

No. 30

Mr. Hope Gull to Sir John Simon. (Received March 24.)

(No. 119.)

Sir,

Jedda March 5, 1932

In his despatch No. 36 of the 21st January, Sir A. Ryan transmitted to you the budget of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies for the year 1932, which is now to be based. At the same time he drew attention to the fact that the "budget" contained no detail of estimated revenue, the Hejazi Government simply assuming that sufficient revenue would accrue to meet the estimated expenditure, of which alone certain details were given.

2. To facilitate study of these details, I have prepared a list, (1) which I attach, grouping them under six main heads:

- (1) Royal allowances
- (2) Royal Princes, palaces, diwan, and Treasury
- (3) Frontier forces and Defence Departments
- (4) Communications and transport
- (5) Debt instalments
- (6) Administrative Departments

* Not printed

3. The fifteen subdivisions (a) to (s) of item (6), however, are estimated to the uttermost piastre. In view of the fact that they represent chiefly the salaries and wages of departmental staffs and employees, and in view also of Fuad Hamza's admission reported in paragraph 4 of Sir A. Ryan's despatch that much of the expenditure would, in fact, be incurred in silver, it is, I think, safe to assume that the whole of item (6) is calculated in silver piastres. The current rate of these is about 190 to the £ gold. At this rate item (6) would represent some £175,000. The total estimated expenditure would thus amount to £835,000 in the current financial year which ends the 30th November next.

4. The fifteen subdivisions (a) to (s) of item (6), however, are estimated to the uttermost piastre. In view of the fact that they represent chiefly the salaries and wages of departmental staffs and employees, and in view also of Fuad Hamza's admission reported in paragraph 4 of Sir A. Ryan's despatch that much of the expenditure would, in fact, be incurred in silver, it is, I think, safe to assume that the whole of item (6) is calculated in silver piastres. The current rate of these is about 190 to the £ gold. At this rate item (6) would represent some £175,000. The total estimated expenditure would thus amount to £835,000 in the current financial year which ends the 30th November next.

5. You will observe that none of these items of expenditure bears any relation at all to the percentage allotments which Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Fuad Bey Hamza informed me officially and confidentially last November would form the basis of the budgetary reform. Thirty five per cent. of the revenue was to be devoted to the administration of the country, 25 per cent. to the liquidation of the public debt, and 40 per cent. to the reserve fund. This basis has evidently gone by the board. When reporting its adoption, I remarked that it was not clear how the King would live. It is now quite clear, however, that about half the revenue, £417,500, was to be put aside as a reserve fund. This basis has evidently gone by the board. When reporting its adoption, I remarked that it was not clear how the King would live. It is now quite clear, however, that about half the revenue, £417,500, was to be put aside as a reserve fund.

6. The administrative costs and salaries, are likely to be the first to suffer from any diminution of revenue below its "assumed" total. As I have already reported elsewhere, only 70 per cent. of the first financial month's salaries and none of the second month's have so far been paid. The third month is now drawing to a close and the officials are pessimistic. As for the debts, it is the declared intention of the Government to make no repayment until the end of the financial year. I make no bold as to prophesy that they will then declare their inability to make any repayment.

7. What I have written is no more than a series of assumptions. It is unfortunately impossible to submit to you anything more valid at the present time. It is possible that when the Dutch financial adviser arrives—and I learn that he may shortly be expected—something more concrete may materialise. In the meantime, I have the honour to transmit herewith an interesting memorandum by Mr. F. Elzeuge on the results of the Indian vice-consul's conversations with a leading and intelligent notable, Sheikh Sulaiman Gabil, an erstwhile Mayor of Jeddah. It discloses, with what accuracy I cannot say, a little of the inner history of the "budget," and makes an attempt to estimate revenue which seems to fall short of the estimated expenditure by about 25 per cent. of the latter. I am very much inclined to agree with the ex mayor's dictum that "the whole budget is so much eye wash."

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the recipients of copies of Sir A. Ryan's despatch under reference.

I have &c
C. G. HOPE GILL.

(*) Not printed

[E 1558 121 91]

No. 31

Sir John Simon to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington).

(No. 891)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 30, 1932.

Mr. ATHERTON saw me this morning with reference to the transfer to the Eastern Gulf Oil Company of the oil concession which the Eastern and General Syndicate are seeking to obtain from the Sheikh of Kuwait. General Dawes had mentioned this matter to me last December, and I had referred what he had said to the Colonial Office. Mr. Atherton indicated that the State Department were

concerned at the lapse of time which had taken place without a reply from the British Government, especially as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a rival concern, has been in the meantime conducting geological investigations in the area, and has been following these up by an expedition equipped with drilling machinery and plant.

Mr. Atherton left with me a note which he had been instructed to deliver, and observed that inasmuch as a satisfactory arrangement had been made in reference to Bahrain, his Government considered that there ought to be no objection in the case of Kuwait. I explained to him that my own absence at Geneva had to some extent delayed the reaching of a conclusion on the matter, but that I had, since my return, been studying it afresh. Several Departments were interested in the question and I hoped to have the opportunity of bringing the matter before the Cabinet at its next meeting in a week's time, after which I would communicate with him again.

I am &c
JOHN SIMON

Enclosure in No. 31

Mr. Atherton to Sir John Simon

United States Embassy
London, March 20, 1932

Sir,

ACTING under instructions, I have the honour to inform you that my Government recalls the enquiry which it made through this Embassy in 1929 as to the policy of His Majesty's Government in the matter of the holding and operation of petroleum concessions by American nationals in British protected Arab territories such as Bahrain. His Majesty's Government is aware of the solution subsequently arrived at in the specific case of the Eastern and General Syndicate which, on behalf of the Eastern Gulf Oil Company, was at that time seeking a modification of the so-called "nationality clause," the inclusion of which in the concession was objected to by the Colonial Office. The arrangement then agreed upon had appeared to my Government only just in view of the extremely liberal treatment accorded in the United States and in its possessions in reference to the operation of petroleum concessions by British companies. My Government had therefore supposed that the policy of His Majesty's Government would be no less liberal in the matter of according open-door rights to American nationals in Kuwait than it had shown itself to be in the almost identical case of Bahrain. The American Government sincerely trusts that it has been correct in this assumption and would appreciate an early indication that such is the case.

My Government understands that it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to require that such companies obtain the prior consent of the rulers of such States to the entry and operations of such companies in the territories in question. The American Government is informed that contrary to the impression that seems to have prevailed in the Colonial Office, the Sheikh of Kuwait is understood to be quite agreeable to the specific entry of the Persian Gulf Oil Company and to the granting on behalf of that company of an oil concession without the inclusion of the "nationality clause." The American Government trusts that in view of the apparent willingness of the Sheikh in this matter, His Majesty's Government will see its way clear to taking up, in the case of the Kuwait concession, no less liberal an attitude than was assumed in the case of the Bahrain concession.

The American Government understands that, despite the fact that the Colonial Office as early as 1925 gave its full and unqualified consent to the negotiation by the Eastern and General Syndicate of an oil concession with the Sheikh of Kuwait, that office later qualified its consent by insisting upon the inclusion of the "nationality clause." The American Government trusts that in view of the apparently specific purpose of preventing the entry into that territory of the Persian Gulf Oil Company, which would involve a considerable understanding with the syndicate as to the transfer of any concessions that it might obtain from the Sheikh. The continued insistence of the Colonial Office on this point and its apparent unwillingness to accord to that syndicate the same

treatment as was accorded in the case of Bahrain has seriously handicapped the syndicate in bringing to a conclusion with the sheikh the negotiations which that concern was authorized by the Colonial Office to undertake.

The above situation is further complicated by the fact that at the very moment while His Majesty's Government had under consideration the petition of the syndicate for the elimination or modification of the "nationality clause," permission was granted the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a rival concern, a small party of geologists to Kuwait for the purpose of studying the surface geology of the ground.

It will be recalled that this Embassy on repeated occasions requested of the Foreign Office that the company in question should not be permitted to proceed to Kuwait. The Government has been informed that this study of the surface geology has been followed by a second expedition equipped with drilling machinery and plant. The Government of the United States greatly regrets that no effect has been given to this Embassy's request in this matter, but would not be allowed to initiate against the position of the syndicate and its affiliate, the Eastern Gulf Oil Company, in the eventual granting of an oil concession in Kuwait.

I have, &c.
RAY ATHERTON,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

E 1787 704 26)

No. 32

Treaty of Friendship and Consular Rights between His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the Kingdom of Italy (communicated by Italian Ambassador April 4, 1932)

(Translation)

His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies on the other, animated by the desire to establish and consolidate the bonds of friendship between the respective countries, have decided to conclude a treaty of friendship.

For this purpose His Majesty the King of Italy has appointed Commendatore Guido Sollazzo and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies has appointed His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal as their respective plenipotentiaries.

Who, having examined their credentials and having found them to be in good and due order have concluded the following —

ARTICLE 1

In consequence of the recognition by His Majesty the King of Italy of His Majesty Abdulaziz bin Abderrahman-el Feisal-al Saud as King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, and of the recognition of the Kingdom of Italy by His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, and perpetual peace shall prevail between them and their respective kingdoms and subjects.

ARTICLE 2

Carrying the preceding article into effect, the contracting parties agree to establish permanent consular relations between them. The consular and diplomatic representatives of each of the contracting parties shall enjoy in the territory of the other the treatment established by the principles of international law and they shall likewise enjoy, subject to reciprocal treatment accorded to the most-favoured nation.

ARTICLE 3

The contracting parties undertake to use their endeavours to maintain good relations between themselves and to take steps to prevent their territories being used by any party as a base for illegal acts against the territory of the other party.

ARTICLE 4

The nationals of each of the contracting parties shall enjoy in the territory of the other party, subject to reciprocity, most-favoured nation treatment in regard to their persons and their property.

The same treatment shall be accorded to companies of each of the contracting parties in the territory of the other party.

ARTICLE 5

His Majesty the King of Italy recognizes the national status (Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies) of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies who may be within the territories of His Majesty the King of Italy.

Similarly, His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies recognizes the national status (Italian) of all the subjects of His Majesty the King of Italy who may be within the territories of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies. The law in force between independent Governments shall be respected.

ARTICLE 6

His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, in order to grant facilities and protection, to the like extent as to other pilgrims, to Italian subjects of the Moslem faith who proceed on pilgrimage to the Hejaz for the practice of their worship.

His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, moreover, undertakes to protect the property of Italian subjects who die in the Hejaz after the formalities of the competent tribunals have been completed and the taxes prescribed by the laws of the Hejaz and Nejd have been collected, be delivered, failing a legal administrator in the Hejaz, to the Italian representative in Jeddah, who engages to transmit such property to the legal heirs. In the event of a legal administrator being in the Hejaz, the estates of deceased pilgrims shall be handed over to such administrator.

ARTICLE 7

The present treaty is drawn up in duplicate in the Italian and Arabic languages.

Both texts shall have equal validity.

The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time and shall enter into operation upon the exchange of the relative instruments of ratification.

GUIDO SOLLAZZO
FEISAL

Jedda, February 10, 1932

Exchange of Notes

(1)

Commendatore Sollazzo to the Emir Feisal

(Translation)

Your Royal Highness,

Jedda, February 10, 1932

WITH reference to article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship, the text of which is as follows —

(Quotation.)

I desire to assure your Royal Highness that the said article cannot in any case refer to the favourable treatment which, for reasons which are generally known, has been granted to the representatives of a third Power in the matter of slavery, this question having been settled between us by means of an exchange of notes

I have, &c

GUIDO SOLLAZZO

(2)

The Emir Feisal to Commendatore Sollazzo.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 10, 1932

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have received your note of to-day's date regarding the estates of our subjects deceased in Italian territory and, after the completion of the legal procedure and the collection of the relative taxes, to hand them over, in the absence of a legal administrator of the deceased in your country, to the competent representative of the Hejaz for that territory or, failing such a representative, to His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c

FEISAL.

(3)

Commendatore Sollazzo to the Emir Feisal

(Translation.)

Your Royal Highness,

Jedda, February 10, 1932

I HAVE the honour to assure your Royal Highness that the second paragraph of article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship between Italy and the Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, relating to the procedure for determining the procedure to be followed in the handing over of the property of Italian pilgrims deceased in your territories and those of your subjects who die in our territories, I desire to assure you that the procedure in regard to them will, as you have stated, be based on the principle of reciprocity with intermediate stage.

This will take effect without prejudice to the procedure relating to the estates of deceased persons who were not pilgrims, which will be accorded the reciprocal treatment that is the basis of the usual practice between independent States.

I have, &c

GUIDO SOLLAZZO

(4)

The Emir Feisal to Commendatore Sollazzo.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 10, 1932

IN reply to your note of to-day's date regarding the estates of our subjects deceased in your territories and those of your subjects who die in our territories, I desire to assure you that the procedure in regard to them will, as you have stated, be based on the principle of reciprocity with intermediate stage. His Majesty's Government will therefore arrange to take charge of the estates of your subjects who die in our territories and, after the legal procedure has been completed and the relative taxes collected to hand them over, in the absence of a legal administrator of the deceased in our country, to the Italian representative at Jedda.

The Government of His Majesty the King of Italy will reciprocally undertake to take charge of the estates of our subjects deceased in Italian territory and, after the completion of the legal procedure and the collection of the relative taxes, to hand them over, in the absence of a legal administrator of the deceased in your country, to the competent representative of the Hejaz for that territory or, failing such a representative, to His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c

FEISAL

(5)

Commendatore Sollazzo to the Emir Feisal

(Translation)

Your Royal Highness,

Jedda, February 10, 1932

IN the course of the negotiations which have happily concluded in the Treaty of Friendship between His Majesty the King of Italy and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, I had the honour to explain the point of view of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy in regard to the traffic in, and the manumission of, slaves, which is as follows:—

1. The Government of His Majesty the King of Italy, in accordance with the principles of the Treaty of Friendship, is determined to employ all the means at their disposal to suppress the traffic in slaves and co-operation is destined to strengthen the efforts of the Government of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, in the same direction.

2. Similarly, the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy, in accordance with the principles of the Treaty of Friendship, is determined to employ all the means at their disposal to suppress the traffic in slaves and co-operation is destined to strengthen the efforts of the Government of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, in the same direction.

I trust that His Majesty the King of Italy and the Government of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies will appreciate the efforts of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy and the reasons which induce them to improve the traffic in slaves in this matter.

I have, &c

GUIDO SOLLAZZO

(6)

The Emir Feisal to Commendatore Sollazzo

(Translation.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 10, 1932

I HAVE considered your note of this day's date regarding slavery. The Government of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and Dependencies, while appreciating the humane sentiments which have induced the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy to make the request contained in the note under reference, desire to make the following explanatory statement on this subject.

1. The suppression of the illicit trade in slaves constitutes one of the most important questions to which our Government have directed their attention. His Majesty my Sovereign, from the day on which he ascended the Throne of the Hejaz, has displayed particular interest to the end that the entry of slaves into his territory should be prevented, it may, in fact, be said that for several years no person has been able to import slaves into this country. The Government will spontaneously persevere in this line of action.

2. As a result of the negotiations which have happily concluded in the Treaty of Friendship between His Majesty the King of Italy and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, the Government are using on their own initiative their endeavours within the

country to reach the end which is enjoined by our Islamic law with its principles of supreme justice and its pure sentiment of humanity. The reason for which our Government abstain from granting the power requested in the paragraph is that the exclusive right of our Government

I have, &c.
FEISAL.

E 1804 704 25

No. 33.

Commercial Treaty between Hejaz Nejd and Italy—(Communicated by Italian Ambassador, April 4, 1932.)

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the King of Italy, on the one hand, and His Majesty the King of Hejaz Nejd and Dependencies, on the other hand, being moved by the desire to consolidate the commercial relations between the respective countries, have decided to conclude a commercial treaty.

For this purpose His Majesty the King of Italy has appointed *[Name]* as his Plenipotentiary, and His Majesty the King of Hejaz Nejd and Dependencies has appointed His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal as their Plenipotentiary.

Who, having examined their credentials and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:—

ARTICLE 1.

The contracting parties undertake to facilitate commercial exchanges between the respective countries.

ARTICLE 2.

Each of the contracting parties shall grant to the subjects, vessels and merchandise of the other party the same treatment, particularly as regards the fixing of customs duties, transportation and the security and liberty of commerce.

Similarly, the products of the soil and industry of each of the contracting parties, which are imported into the territory of the other for the purpose of consumption, transit and exportation, shall be treated there, on condition of absolute reciprocity, as the like products of the soil and industry of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 3.

The contracting parties express the desire to conclude at the appropriate time a postal and telegraphic convention.

ARTICLE 4.

The relations of economic exchange between the Colony of Eritrea and the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, and fishing along the Red Sea coasts of the Colony of Eritrea and of the Hejaz Nejd and Dependencies, shall be regulated on the basis of absolute reciprocity until such time as the said matters constitute the object of a special convention.

ARTICLE 5.

The present treaty is drawn up in duplicate in the Italian and Arabic languages.

Both of the texts shall have equal validity.

The plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed the seal of their respective authorities in the shortest possible space of time and shall deliver the relative instruments of ratification.

ARTICLE 6.

The present treaty shall have the duration of ten years from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, and one year prior to its expiration the two parties shall come to an understanding in case they intend to replace or prolong it.

GUIDO SOLLAZZO
ITALY

Jedda, February 10, 1932.

E 1708 165 25]

No. 34

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon—(Received April 6.)

(No. 140.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 26, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 119 of the 5th March on the subject of the budget, I have the honour to report that I learn from a confidential and fairly trustworthy source that the Jedda Customs receipts for the first quarter of the current financial year amounted to some £27,500 gold. The customs houses at Yanbu and other ports may have taken half as much again, bringing the total to about £40,000, but I have no figures to go on. Revenue from customs would thus fall well below the rough estimate of £100,000 as average customs revenue per quarter, which I submitted in my previous despatch. The detailed figures of the quarter's receipts are attached.

2. I also learn, from the quarantine authorities, that the number of pilgrims who arrived during the quarter was about 9,000. These will have yielded, at the generally computed figure of £7 per head for Kosban, a total of £63,000 gold, plus £9,000 in quarantine dues.

3. Out of this minimum total revenue of about £110,000 for the quarter, the only known outgoings have been some £20,000 in respect of the first and third quarters of the year. The balance of the revenue is thus only one month in arrear on the completion of the first quarter of the new budgetary year.

4. It is, I think, probable that most of the remaining £90,000 of revenue has gone to Riyadh.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the recipients of my despatch under reference.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 34

Jedda Customs Receipts

First Quarter of Current Financial Year

Month	Piastres mint	Pure-
Rajab	1,490,348	3
Shaban	2,151,040	10
Ramadhan	1,284,120	25
Total	4,925,558	38

It has been ascertained that these are not piastres gold. They therefore, equal about £27,400 gold at the current market rate.

E 1733 121/91]

No. 55.

Sir John Simon to Mr. Atherton

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 9, 1932

WITH reference to your note No. 1596 of the 29th March regarding the application of the Eastern and General Syndicate for an oil concession in Kuwait, which they propose, if granted, to transfer to United States interests, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to the representations made by General Dawes and yourself on this subject, and I am now in a position to return you a reply.

2. Your Government will appreciate in the first place that the Sheikh of Kuwait, though an independent ruler, is in special treaty relations with His Majesty's Government and enjoys their protection. These special relations lead him to seek their advice on important matters of policy, and place His Majesty's Government under an obligation to watch over his interests. Many years ago the predecessor of the present sheikh gave an undertaking that he would not grant an oil concession in his territories without their consent.

3. In paragraph 2 of your note of the 29th March you mention that your Government are of the opinion that the Sheikh is agreed to the entry of the Eastern Gulf Oil Company and to the granting on behalf of that company of an oil concession without the inclusion of the "nationality clause." As was explained to you in a semi-official letter of the 22nd December last from my colleague, Mr. G. H. D. Jones, it is not clear that the Sheikh has actually agreed to this. It is true that the Sheikh has expressed his willingness to consider the proposal, but he has not yet decided whether or not to grant it. In your letter of the 29th March you refer to a letter from the Sheikh to Major H. Jones, representative of the Eastern and General Syndicate, on which the American interests apparently based the information on this point given to your Government. His Majesty's Government have caused enquiry to be made of the Sheikh, who replied that he was still averse from receiving in his principality a company other than an entirely British one, but that he did not consider himself in any way committed by his letter to Major H. Jones to grant the Eastern and General Syndicate the concession which they seek. I will be observed from a reference to the Sheikh's letter that it is not a final decision, but only an expression of his present feelings on the matter. For the present, therefore, no definite agreement has been reached between the Sheikh and the Eastern and General Syndicate.

4. We are examining the necessity for the concession, and the inclusion in any oil concession in Kuwait of a clause confining it to British interests. His Majesty's Government have no objection to dealing with their own interests in Kuwait, but they are bound to consider the best terms possible for the Sheikh of Kuwait. It is our duty to consider the possibility that it would be undesirable for the local British authorities to control the affairs of the Sheikh's principality, and to resolve them with the Sheikh's interests. Our policy is to consider the concession on its merits. His Majesty's Government are, however, now prepared for the event, not to this, in this case that any concession granted to a company entering it to British interests, if the Sheikh or his part is willing to grant a concession without such a clause.

5. I should like to make it clear that the above does not imply agreement on the part of the Government to the proposed concession to the Eastern and General Syndicate, which the Sheikh, as stated above, has not yet decided. It is no way committed. His Majesty's Government indeed do not consider that they could properly advise the Sheikh to give prior or preferential treatment to the Eastern and General Syndicate, but hold it to be necessary that any application for a concession which he might be forthcoming from any quarter be examined with a view to decide which, if any, will best serve the interests of the Sheikh and his principality. I should add that the draft concession submitted to the Colonial Office by the syndicate would in any case need revision, both in respect of the provisions designed to safeguard the interests of His Majesty's Government (clause 8) and on many points affecting the interests of the Sheikh.

6. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of your note of the 29th March you have referred to the operations now being carried out by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in

Kuwait and reminded me of the requests made to my Department that this company should not be permitted to proceed with its operations pending a decision by His Majesty's Government as to the exclusion of all but British interests. I would explain that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company manifested an interest in Kuwait oil, and, indeed, made a formal application for a concession before the Eastern and General Syndicate had even appeared on the scene, though the negotiations were at that time not brought to a conclusion, chiefly because the terms suggested were not satisfactory. Several months before any representations were made by General Dawes or yourself in the matter, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company made a request for permission to carry out a geological survey in Kuwait with a view to decide whether to submit an application for an oil concession. In order to ensure that any oil concession which the Sheikh may grant shall embody the best available terms, it is, in the view of His Majesty's Government, desirable and proper that any interested companies be given every opportunity to make their views known before any concession is granted to any one offer. His Majesty's Government therefore raised no objection to the grant by the Sheikh of the application of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. I understand that their present activities in Kuwait are confined to such a geological survey.

7. The position therefore is that His Majesty's Government, for their part, are prepared to agree to the omission from any oil concession, which the Sheikh may be prepared to grant, of a clause confining it to British interests. If, therefore, the Eastern and General Syndicate desire to renew their application to the Sheikh for a concession, which they would subsequently transfer to the Eastern Gulf Oil Company, His Majesty's Government will raise no objection to the application being taken into consideration together with any other applications for oil concessions which may be forthcoming from other sources.

I am, &c

JOHN SIMON

E 1963 4 91

No. 36

India Office to Foreign Office — (Received April 21)

Sir,

India Office, April 20, 1932

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a despatch from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India dated the 7th April, on the subject of the abolition of the Council of Ministers, Muscat State, and consequent changes.

I am, &c

S F STEWART

Enclosure 1 in No. 36

Consul General Bucoo to Government of India

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, April 7, 1932

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for the information of the Government of India a copy of a letter addressed to the Political Agent by His Highness the Sultan of Muscat, announcing the abolition of the Council of Ministers and the division of the work of the State into three offices.

2. In forwarding this letter, I am informed that it is reported that Sayyid Hamad bin Faisal, an uncle of His Highness the Sultan, has been placed in charge of internal affairs, while Sheikh Zubair bin Ali has been placed in charge of the administration of justice. As the Government of India are aware, Captain R. G. Alban fills the appointment of financial adviser in addition to that of Commandant of the Levies.

3. These arrangements are, I think, satisfactory. Sayyid Hamad is a capable and fairly well-educated man, he was formerly Vali of Sohar, where he was left for a considerable period with little or no supervision on the part of the

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State, and his conduct was not altogether satisfactory. His Highness, however, informs me that he works satisfactorily as long as he is supervised, which he will be in his present post. He is probably the most capable member of the ruling family, and in Muscat it is exceedingly difficult to get anyone with the requisite energy or ability to hold administrative posts. Sheikh Zubair is a quiet, steady, going individual, who was formerly on the council for many years past, and will,

not desire that these persons should receive the title of "Ministers," and, I think, proposes to take a very active part in the Administration himself.

4. In this connexion I would venture to put before the Government of India certain considerations which, I think, should guide us in our future dealings with the Muscat State, and which are the outcome of numerous conversations which I have had on different occasions with His Highness the Sultan. We have now to deal with a very different personality to that of the ex Sultan, Sayyid Taimur. We have ourselves given to Sayyid Said a better

He has been educated partly at Bagdad and was for four years at the Mayo College,

imbued with I will not say a nationalistic outlook, for this would be too strong an expression, but with some of that desire for independence that is moving so

ment of India and he is most genuinely grateful for the help they have given him lately. When one gets to know him well he is a very attractive personality

and I do not think he will be difficult to deal with provided he is not, if I may use an expression so much in vogue on this side of the Gulf "pin pricked" over minor matters, and is given at least that measure of autonomy which is enjoyed by the States in India.

5. To illustrate my meaning, I would mention that in a discussion which I had with His Highness at Sur regarding the finances of the State, the question

that had arisen in connexion with obtaining the consent of the American Government. I mentioned that, as he was aware the American Government in return for their consent were asking for most favoured nation treatment in respect of personal status for their citizens. In my express letter No. 75-S of the 12th February, 1932, I expressed the view that the State were unwilling to give this most favoured nation treatment to American citizens largely for reasons of

of State for India, the Government of India expressed the view that I had

those treaties, and asked whether the State was to be bound for ever by treaties entered into a century ago with his ignorant forefathers, and whether the State

a treaty." He went on to ask why he should give the same treatment to American

totally different to those with any other State. He owed much to the British but nothing to other countries. I could not help feeling much sympathy with His Highness's point of view.

6. Again, some Muscat subjects in Charhar are encountering certain difficulties about passports with the Persians and have appealed to the Muscat for assistance. His Highness has addressed a letter to the Political Agent saying that if his subjects in Charhar are ill treated he will retaliate on Persian subjects resident in Muscat. I am investigating the matter, but merely mention these incidents now as examples of the feelings and character of the Sultan with whom we are called on to deal.

7. I have always been anxious to encourage Arab rulers in the Persian Gulf to administer their own States with as little interference by us in internal affairs as possible. We are adopting this policy elsewhere, and it is in accordance with present-day views and sentiment, moreover, I believe it to be the most government of India in respect of Bahrain, in their telegram No. 3458-S of the 27th November 1929, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India. As regards

the particular case of Bahrain, owing to the total ineffectiveness and incompetence of the present ruler, I see little alternative but virtually to carry on the administration of the State ourselves through the financial adviser, but I venture to express my entire concurrence with the general policy outlined in the telegram referred to above. I think there is no doubt that not only Bahrain, but also Muscat, has been a cause of "signs of Arab uneasiness on the Trucial Coast," which has added considerably to our difficulties there, and that "after all it is

Arab Administration. It actually increases our power vis-à-vis foreign intruders, thus, an obviously autonomous Arab State can close its doors in a way in which an obviously British run State cannot."

8. To sum up: we have now in Muscat a young Sultan who if tactfully handled, should I think, turn out a good ruler. He should, I think, be given every chance to administer his State. Arab rule should every effort be made to free him from those relics of the past which are galling to him, while we should try, at the same time, to build up a façade of independence in the eyes of the world. I do not think there is any risk of his failing to abide by his undertaking to be guided by us in important matters; he is certainly desirous of retaining Captain Alban's services as long as possible, and told me that he felt that he would for many years to come need the services of a European to manage the finances of his State, since there was no local official who was in any way competent to do so.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

I have, &c.
H. A. BISCOE, *Political Resident in the Persian Gulf*

Enclosure 2 in No. 6

Sultan of Muscat to Political Agent, Muscat

(After Compliments.)

Shamal 2, 1350 (February 17, 1932)

I TAKE the opportunity of writing you this letter to inform you that on the 1st of February 1932 the Council of Ministers has automatically abolished the office of the Political Agent in Muscat. I have therefore established three offices to carry out the work, and they are—

- (1) Office of the financial adviser, which will deal with finance and what concerns it.
- (2) An office to look after internal affairs.
- (3) An office to hear cases that is the Court of Justice besides the Shara Court, which concerns the Shara Law, but all important matters will be referred to me direct by all offices. Whenever I am absent from Muscat I shall appoint a deputy and will let you know in due course. I desired to inform you of the above.

In conclusion please accept, &c.

Yours sincerely,
SAID BIN TAIMUR

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No. 37

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. Warner—(Received April 26)

(Confidential)

My dear Warner,

Jedda, April 8, 1932.

PHILBY reached Mecca from the Rub' al Khali on the 5th April, and came to Jedda on the 6th. I saw him then, and again yesterday, when he described his trip with the aid of "Southern Arabia" (Thomas), published last September by the Royal Geographical Society. If the details interest, pull out the map and I will recount them as briefly as I can.

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Philby left Hufuf on the 8th January, with thirty-two of the finest Omaniya sheikhs of the Ajman and Murr tribes, chosen by Ibn Jiluwi of Hasa and engaged by him for the adventure at 30 riyals (£2) a head, with the promise of a gratuity at the end. They took with them only dates and rice, also tents. Philby carried a sporting gun, sextant, compass, chronometers, &c., as well as four different kinds of Kodaks and a Zeiss "Ikon" cinema camera, with which he took several hundred photographs and reeled 200 feet of film. He and three of his companions kept Ramadhan (the 9th January-7th February) religiously, and felt all the better for it. Two salukis accompanied them throughout and caught hares for them during the first part of the trip.

They first made south-east across the Jafura, which, like the Duhana to its west, is a prolongation northward of the Rub' al Khali. Arrived at Salwa, which lies at the southern end of the bay separating Qatar from Basm, they turned south westward to the Jabrin oasis (about $23^{\circ} 15' N$, $49^{\circ} 15' E$). Philby found that Cheeseman's plotting of Jabrin is about 25 miles too far to the west, as are the other mapped points of that area.

From Jabrin they went south to a magnificent well called Maqanama, dug 22° 10' N 49° 10' E.

Travelling thence due east, they came to Bir Fadhil (about $22^{\circ} 15' N$, $50^{\circ} 40' E$), a fine 130 foot well, and there they turned south-eastward towards the coast. They passed not only a regular group of shallow wells, but also large surface deposits of fresh water shells and quantities of dressed flint implements. Philby is of the tentative opinion that this area is still directly connected with the Wadi Maqran now shown on the map as finishing some 300 miles away, a little south of west, but which he thinks must have flowed in ancient times into the Persian Gulf. An unnamed one of these wells he has called Bir Maqran.

I should here explain that Philby's immediate objective was the traditional city of Uhar, with its fabled Qisur—castles or palaces—which used to house 2,000 beauties and other delights. Fifteen years ago he was told that the site was easily recognizable and marked by an iron statue of a camel or a piece of iron as big as a camel; he does not exactly remember which. One of his guides now told him that he had found a lump of what looked like iron, but which Philby pronounces to be a piece of meteorite, 27 cm. long by 15 by 15, and lying on the surface of the sand near two craters. One of these is 150 yards across, the other somewhat smaller. They crown a gently rising tract of desert of some 2 miles radius, and their lava-like walls protrude from the surrounding sand. On the inner side they stand about 30 feet high round about shallow crater-bottoms covered with slag heaps. Philby is sure that this is Uhar, although Thomas thought that it might lie at about $18^{\circ} 50' N$ by $52^{\circ} 25' E$. Philby's companions are convinced that the crater-walls are the ruins of the famous palaces, but Philby knows them to be either the lips of extinct volcanoes or else the edges of the points of impact of meteorites; he is not sure which. They are vitreous and clearly the product of great heat. The desert for miles around is dotted with small, quite round lava like pebbles, which Philby's Bedouin declared to be the black pearls of these ancient beauties and collected greedily. Philby has brought many such specimens from the site, including the piece of meteorite. Thomas, by the way is said to have found a similar smaller piece a hundred or more miles to the S.S.E. of Farajja.

After "Uhar" Philby went southward along a string of wells to Naifa (about $19^{\circ} 50' N$, $51^{\circ} 25' E$), and then southward to the coast. This well is 100 feet deep, and containing water with all the properties of Epsom salts. The right kind of wind made the sands sing. Then tobogganing down with the falling sand, he drew deep trombone-notes with his hands from the moving surface. He was intensely pleased, collected samples of the sand, and speaks of vacuum as a possible cause of the sound. Here, too, he tracked down the Bedouin myth of the walking stones, stones which lie quiet when a man approaches, but which leave a tell tale trail behind them. These Philby found only on sufficiently sloping ground.

Around Naifa lay another marked grouping of shallow wells, more deposits of fresh-water shells, and frequent traces of flint weapons. This area Philby

tentatively connects with the distant Wadi Dawasir in the west, but unfortunately he was unable to check *en route*. From Naifa, where he had to abandon one camel, Philby went south again to Thomas's Shanna (about $19^{\circ} 50' N$, $52^{\circ} 25' E$), and then southward to the coast. The crossing of Rub' al Khali along the longest completely waterless line. Thus, he reckoned, lay over the 350 odd miles from Shanna to Sulayil in the west (about $20^{\circ} 25' N$, $45^{\circ} 30' E$). On about the 21st February they set out. Each morning the baggage camels went ahead at 2 a.m., the rest followed at 4. On the fifth day out, and just short of the south of Shuwankila, about a third of the way across (say, $19^{\circ} 25' N$, $49^{\circ} 25' E$) Philby found the baggage train halted at midday, the camels sheltered from the sun in tents, the men frightened and refusing to move further. The camels had broken down with sunstroke, and all that could be done was to make back at once to water. They just succeeded in five more days in reaching Naifa again, helped by two camelious miscarriages, which they ate, and running out of water twelve hours before reaching the well on the 1st March. There they rested, feasting on the two weakest camels, which they killed, and reorganised.

Philby thereupon decided to make the second attempt light, and sent back to Riyadh. There was apparently some competition among them to proceed instead of returning. Philby was then completely disgusted with the company of his companions, whom he regarded as desert craft very highly.

Philby set out on the second attempt on about the 5th March, with fifteen camels, ten men, sundried camel-flesh, two skins of dates, and six skins of Epsom-salty water, with another 10 gallons in petrol tins as an iron-rations. He took his route due east, and set out for Sulayil. For ten days they moved steadily across the emptiest part of the Empty Quarter, guided by directional instinct checked by the compass, finding practically no sign of life of any kind, and on one day spending eighteen hours in the saddle. The camels were given no water with the exception of four of the weakest, who received an occasional teapot full poured into the nostrils or squirted in by men's mouths, "to cool their brains," they said. They picked up very little grazing by the way, and for three days there was not a twig nor a blade. Most of the way lay over undulating, rolling, or corrugated sand desert, but they crossed one 50 mile wide stretch of fine dead flat gravel, which lay in the midst of their course, and which Philby reckons to be 150 miles long and to afford the finest speed track in the world.

At the end of 111 hours' riding from Naifa and after fifty five days since seeing another human being, the party reached Sulayil with their iron-rations intact. There they rested and feasted, and thence they made their way by easy stages through the comparatively civilised surrounding of Bisha, Turaba, and Taif, to Mecca, which they reached on the 5th April, in nice time for the pilgrimage. Philby's Omaniya celebrated her arrival with a foal. She must have done nearly 1,800 miles in the ninety days' outing.

His determination to ride into Mecca broke down, however, a few miles out at Saif, where he saw a motor car, and incontinentally deserted his camel.

As for climatic conditions, at Salwa the morning sand had been too cold to walk upon (Philby is tender-footed). In the Rub' al Khali it scorched him. The sun temperature there was about 140, with about 100 in the shade. The nights were cold and he appreciated two quilted coverings throughout his trip. No rain was supposed to have fallen in the Rub' al Khali for twenty years. On the same day that Mecca was flooded, however, and people were drowned (the 6th March), there was heavy rain near Naifa, and rainstorms seemed to have flanked much of the passage of the Fajr al Eighth, but they left the party dry.

Philby says that he has enough material to work on for a year. I think it likely that he will visit England in a month or two and take his specimens with him.

Yours ever

C. G. HOPE GILL.

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No. 3A.

Consul-General Biscoe to Colonial Office. (Communicated to Foreign Office, April 27)

No. 10. Confidential)

Sir,
In paragraph 1 of my despatch No. 2 of 1931, I referred to the possibility of some consular status being afforded to Nejd representatives at Bahrain and Kuwait.

I now have the honour to amplify somewhat the brief reference to this subject therein made. The question was raised by Yusuf Yasin in the course of one of our lengthy nightly discussions, and he began by asking me whether it would not be possible to accord some consular status to a Nejd representative at Bahrain. I replied by saying that he knew how delicate was the position at Bahrain, and that there was a very large Persian colony at Bahrain, and that if we allowed the Hejaz-Nejd Government to have a consular representative the Persians would inevitably put forward a similar demand. In fact they had already made a request to this effect, to which His Majesty's Government had not acceded. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin admitted the force in this contention and did not press the matter any further in respect of Bahrain, but went on to ask whether it would not be possible to give some sort of official status to Nafsi, Ibn Saud's trade agent at Kuwait, since, as far as he was aware, there were no difficulties with the Persians at that place. I replied that this was not altogether correct: the Persians did not claim Kuwait, but did not recognise it and impounded Kuwaiti passports if brought to Persia, &c. It would, in my opinion, be extremely undesirable to allow the Persians to have a consular representative at Kuwait for reasons which he would doubtless appreciate; but if any consular status was accorded to Nafsi we could hardly refuse a similar concession to the Persians, who had a large number of subjects in Kuwait. He saw the force of this argument and did not press the matter further.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

H. V. BISCOE, Lieutenant Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

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No. 39.

Sir John Simon to M. de Fleurian

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 30, 1932.

WITH reference to the note which you were so good as to address to me on the 25th January last in connection with the Red Sea Light Convention, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th March last, and to inform you that the matter has been referred to the Committee of the Convention.

2. His Majesty's Government will agree that the French Government had been informed of the proposed Convention on the 20th November 1931, and that they had been asked to express their views thereon. His Majesty's Government would not have been able to do so at the time, as they were then engaged in negotiations with the League of Nations regarding the proposed Convention, and as they were then unable to give any definite answer to the French Government. His Majesty's Government would not have been able to do so at the time, as they were then engaged in negotiations with the League of Nations regarding the proposed Convention, and as they were then unable to give any definite answer to the French Government. His Majesty's Government would not have been able to do so at the time, as they were then engaged in negotiations with the League of Nations regarding the proposed Convention, and as they were then unable to give any definite answer to the French Government.

Majesty's Government have caused the entire question to be examined afresh, but I regret that they are unable to recede from this position.

3. It is unnecessary for me to recapitulate the difficulties and delays which preceded the signature of the Red Sea Light Convention. The history of these negotiations has, however, convinced His Majesty's Government that to reopen them with a view to the modification of even the most trivial point, could only postpone indefinitely the entry into force of the convention, and cause renewed difficulties and complications which His Majesty's Government are not prepared to face. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government cannot contemplate any negotiations with the company until after the convention has definitely been brought into force by the ratification of at least four Powers. The convention has now been ratified by Italy and by the Netherlands, and the British ratification can now be completed at very short notice. The French Government are therefore in a position to bring the convention effectively into force in the near future. Should they, as His Majesty's Government much hope will be the case, now be ready to do so, the British ratification will be ready to be signed. His Majesty's Government will, as you have previously been informed, be ready, upon the entry into force of the convention, to consider in as sympathetic a spirit as possible the company's reasonable demands. I think it well, however, in order to remove the possibility of future misunderstanding, to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government have considered the company's demands, as stated in your note of the 20th November, 1931. In particular, it is clear from the statement, which I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herein, that the annual remuneration provided for under the temporary agreement with the company would have been amply sufficient to meet the actual annual expenditure incurred on the maintenance and repair of the three lighthouses during the quinquennium 1926-31, and at the same time to provide a considerable margin of profit.

4. The maintenance and repair of these lights have, as your Excellency is aware, been for many years a charge on His Majesty's Exchequer alone. In any circumstances the continuance for an indefinite period of this charge for services rendered by the company would be a very heavy burden on the Exchequer. His Majesty's Government have no alternative but to reduce the amount of the financial burden which they are called upon to bear. In order to do so, the Red Sea Light Convention can be effectively brought into force in the near future, they have decided, as an initial measure of economy, to close down the Centre Peak Light. A draft notice to mariners, which will be issued on the 1st September next, has accordingly been prepared. A copy of this draft notice is enclosed herein. It is proposed, should it prove necessary, to issue it to all concerned on the 1st June.

5. His Majesty's Government are confident that your Excellency's Government will appreciate that they have only reached the decision to close the Centre Peak Light if the convention does not enter into force after mature consideration and with extreme reluctance. It is still their earnest hope that the French Government will see their way to ratify the convention, and to use their influence with the company with a view to induce them to accept the reasonable offer which remains open to them. Should they do so before the 31st May the provisional arrangements which have been made for the issue of the notice to mariners will be immediately cancelled, and the lights will be handed over to the company in accordance with the terms of the convention. In the contrary event, His Majesty's Government will regretfully be obliged to forward copies of the notice to mariners to the other Powers signatory to the convention, with the necessary explanation of the circumstances which have obliged them to decide, as from the 1st September next, to close down the Centre Peak Light.

I have &c.

JOHN SIMON

(Not printed)

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 9)

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Jedda, April 27 1932.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jedda report for March, as well as the January and February. I am glad to be able to transmit to render the report bi-monthly as usual, which has been due to the pressure of current work last month.

2. I am sending copies to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, Bombay, Rangoon, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Yokohama, Kobe, Manila, Saigon, Haiphong, Lagon, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloops, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

1 have, &c.

C G HOPE GILL

Enclosure in No. 40

(Confidential)

Sedda Report for January, February and March, 1932

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Chapter I.—Internal Affairs

Ibn Sana'

THE King left Riyadh on the 2nd January for Hufuf, the capital of the Hasa. News of this visit was telegraphed by His Majesty's Minister to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and advantage was taken of it to arrange a meeting between Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe and Ibn Saud, with results which are mentioned in paragraphs 41 to 43. Colonel Biscoe arrived at Hufuf on the 23rd January and stayed until the 26th. On the 7th February Ibn Saud left the Hasa to return to Riyadh for the Id-al-Fitr, the breaking of the fast of Ramadan. He remained there for the rest of February and March.

Accession Day.

2. His Majesty the King telegraphed a message of good wishes to Ibn Saud

3. As a result of the opposition of the Wahhabi Ulama of Nejd, reported in the preceding article, the celebration of the accession day was modest by comparison with that of last year. Mecca, being a religious centre under puritan protection, was entirely spared the defilement which joy occasions, but at Jeddah, where morals are looser, school children sang about the streets, the Governor held a morning reception of the foreign representatives, and a large tea-party at the Green Palace—which, incidentally, has not yet been paid for—was given by the British Consulate. This was organized by the local Education Committee, and attended by the Viceroy, who came from Mecca expressly for the festival. The review of the troops was held for the first time since the King's promise to his divines to be good, but there was neither review nor dinner-party, nor the poetry cum picnic-luncheon at Wadi Fatima, features which so polluted the occasion last year.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

4. Although His Majesty's Minister had returned to Jeddah on the 15th December, direct communication with him by letter or telephone was possible until the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs returned from Nejd, whither he had gone on the 15th December. He left Riyadh on the 2nd January, arrived at Mecca on the 5th, and came to Jeddah on the 7th, followed the next day by his preceding Minister. The latter made no attempt to live up to his title of Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was, nevertheless, entertained to dinner at the Legation on the 11th January, and seemed languidly pleased. All business was transacted with Fuad Bey Hamam, in a series of interviews held on the 11th, 13th, 16th, 18th, 19th, 21st and 24th January. The Amir Feisal returned to Mecca on the 18th, his Under-Secretary on the 26th.

5. They returned to Jeddah together on the 10th February for the signing of the Italian Treaty, remained to meet the first Iraqi diplomatic representative on the 14th, and left again on the 17th. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires discussed current matters with the Under Secretary on the 11th and 16th. The next visit to Jeddah was paid on the 18th March, when Fuad Bey came alone to discuss pilgrimage matters with Mr Hope Gill. He did so on the 19th, and left a day or two later. He was in Jeddah again during the last days of March fixing up his trip to Europe, but was not heard of seen by the Legation. Perhaps he felt that ten conversations a quarter were enough to hold with any foreign mission. Be that as it may, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, for his part, was disposed to agree that one can easily have too much of a bad thing.

Constitutional Reform

5a. In paragraph 3 of the last Jedda report it was remarked that Ibn Saud had at length conceded the principle of a Cabinet charged with joint responsibility for Government and individual responsibility for departmental affairs. On the 15th January the "Umm al-Qura" published in the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, a "Regulation concerning the Council of Ministers" In form it calls for more compassion than a busy man is inclined to feel, such a rignarole is it, such a mesh work of cunning knots and ship-knots. In effect,

however, it is just the sort of measure in which a subtle Syrian Under-Secretary of State can entangle an autocratic Nejd Director-General of Finance, who has the reputation of being a man of no great ability. That is the reason why the Syrian clique against the possessive Nejd gang Fuad Bey Hamza had long been preparing it. What is probably its most effective article reads: Ministers may make enquiry of each other and ask for a written explanation of each other's actions. The decree's least convincing feature is in its title, "Council of Ministers." There is only one individual Minister in the country, namely, the Amir Feisal, and he is quadriform, being Viceroy and President of the Council as well as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and now Minister for the Interior, a new function and Ministry brought surreptitiously to birth by implication out of article 3. "Ministers" who attend the Council are the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Director General of Finance, the Vice-President of the Council, and the Director of Finance Departments, who happens to be a brother of the Director-General. The Council is a body of 12. There seem to be more of the Thousand Nights and a Night in it all than of modern statecraft. The text of this important constitutional advance forms Annex "A" to this report.

Financial Reform

6. Paragraphs 3 to 7 of the last Jeddah report gave warning of the new "budget," and a copy of that instrument was annexed to the report. It is now possible to show more of its inner workings. These are exposed in a tentative schedule drawn up by the Legation, which forms Annex "B" to this report. Items 1 to 5, comprising royal and military expenditure and liquidation of debt, are officially estimated in round figure sums, multiples of 110. It is therefore fairly safe to assume that they are based on the official gold rate of 110 piastres Mtr = £1. Thus the King is paid in gold. The fifteen sub-divisions of item 6, however, are estimated to the uttermost piastre. They represent the costs of administration, such as salaries, wages, &c., and in view of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs' admission of the 11th January to His Majesty's Minister, "the cost of the Hejaz," it is also fairly safe to assume that all payments under item 6 are calculated to be made in silver piastres.

7. This curiously mixed statement of estimated expenditure, called "the budget," seems to bear no relation at all to the percentage allotments confidentially stated last year to form the basis of the budgetary reform (November-December report, paragraph 4). This basis seems to have gone by the board already. It is now clear, however, that he or his comptroller, Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, will receive about half the total Hejazi revenue, namely, items 1 to 3, or £410,000 to be devoted to royal and military needs. The Hejaz Nejd memorandum, circulated at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, leads one to suppose that he will also take care of item 4, £100,000 for Communications and Transport, and thereby have the spending of half-a-million pounds.

8. If revenue does not over-run expenditure, and these have been set out conveniently vague—item 5, liquidation of Government indebtedness, will undoubtedly be the first to suffer the pinch, followed by item 6, the salaries & wages of Government servants. The first four months of the Hejazi financial year have now passed, but only three months' salaries and wages have been paid, this is a serious situation. The Hejazi Government has no other means of pay which have been consolidated for eventual liquidation under item 5.

9. The Hejaz of Ibn Saud, in fact, is not unlike the England of King Charles II, with the pleasing difference that the King does not have to ask Parliament for money. His Nabobs contribute revenue to the Government out of it in specie to His Majesty. At the end of Ramadan, for instance, no salaries were paid but £12,000 in sovereigns and 100,000 silver riyals (nominally £10,000) were reported to have been sent from Mecca to the King at Riyadh. Nevertheless, Ibn Saud has been recently heard to say that he literally hardly knows how to support himself and his family, and that one quarter of the revenues of Hama had to be remitted to Mecca to help finance the Hejaz.

10. To sum up the financial reform in the dictum of an ex-mayor of Jeddah, "the whole budget is so much eye wash."

11. News of the engagement of a Dutch financial adviser, M. van Leeuwen, was published in March. He is expected to complete his labour in a year. The "Un-nu-al-Qura" of the 1st April published a vigorous denial of the rumoured loan of £500,000 by His Majesty's Government to Ibn Saud, "in return for his renunciation of certain matters which affect his independence, such as the appointment of an English adviser to supervise the organisation of his finances." The editor of the paper, however, concluded "The Government of His Majesty have not contracted a loan with anybody, thank God, and they cannot tolerate interference in any matter which concerns their complete and full independence." M. van Leeuwen is due to arrive in April.

12. The market value of the Saudi riyal fluctuated during the quarter between 17 and 15 to the gold sovereign, and 13 and 11½ to the £ sterling, with a strengthening tendency due to the approaching pilgrimage.

Economic Situation

13. Ramadan is normally an expensive and busy month, when the merchants and shop-keepers expect to do well. This year there was absolute stagnation in Mecca, and conditions were little better in Jeddah. The populations of the towns were too crippled with debt to move. Such information as was received about the tribes indicated that their condition was still no better than that of utmost misery described in paragraph 17 of the November-December report.

Economic Development

14. Mr Twitchell returned to the Hejaz on the 18th January from his previous visit. He has been very busy with his work. It is known, however, that he advocates the sinking of wells along the Jeddah-Riyadh Hufuf road, and the construction of a harbour at Ras Tanura on the Gulf. The latter is a very important project. He has also been very busy near Medina called "Mabdi Dhabab" or "Cot of Gold," which are supposed to date from Harun ar Rashid's days. He considers it worth while to employ up to 10,000 men to dig for them. Mr Twitchell's quarters near Taif does not seem to have found anything worth reporting. He left early in March for the United States of America, and Mr and Mrs. Twitchell sailed for the Yemen on the 7th March leaving voluminous reports and recommendations in the hands of Ibn Saud and his Council. The former apparently resented being given advice for which he had not asked. The latter passed the reports round amongst their more commercially-connected friends, no doubt with suitable safeguards against the time when concessions should be granted. The work of development is not yet begun. If there were enough, this would be the wealthiest country in the world. But where energy and ability is needed, there is no power and no might save in God alone.

Customs

15. The Jeddah customs receipts for the first three Moslem months of the financial year, which began on the 11th December last, were, according to unofficial sources, £1,000,000. The receipts for the first three months of the year 1351 were £1,000,000. The receipts for the first three months of the year 1352 were £1,000,000. The receipts for the first three months of the year 1353 were £1,000,000. The receipts for the first three months of the year 1354 were £1,000,000. The receipts for the first three months of the year 1355 were £1,000,000. The receipts for the first three months of the year 1356 were £1,000,000. The receipts for the first three months of the year 1357 were £1,000,000. The receipts for the first three months of the year 1358 were £1,000,000. The receipts for the first three months of the year 1359 were £1,000,000. The receipts for the first three months of the year 1360 were £1,000,000. The receipts for the first three months of the year 1361 were £1,000,000. 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16. None of the monthly instalments of £1,000 have been paid to the Marconi Company since last August. It is understood that they have now been relegated to item 5 of the "budget," entitled indebtedness, payable if and when funds admit. Meanwhile, the work of installation proceeded slowly. Mr. Boucraut is believed to have completed the $\frac{1}{2}$ kilowatt station at Qaf or Qaryat-al Mith the "salt-villages" in the Wadi Sirhan. Kurdy Bey has started work on the main 6-kilowatt station at Mecca.

17 The projected motor-route to connect Medina with Iraq has made no material progress. It is still in the stage of a preliminary exchange of views as to terms, dues payable, passport and quarantine controls, &c., between the Hejazi and Iraqi Governments. The former's proposals are greedy, and not very practical, and have not been well received.

18 Instructions governing the boarding of ships lying in Jidda harbour were issued in January. They were brought officially to the notice of the foreign missions in February. These were asked to supply lists of the names of their staffs, so that embarkation permits might be issued to them. This appeared to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to infringe diplomatic immunity, and therefore meet to be resisted in that momentary forgetfulness to carry the permit might seriously interfere with the port of call of a ship to visit a port of a departing vessel. He therefore expressed regret to the Hejazi Government that he could not instruct the Legation staff to carry this type of permit, but he communicated the required lists, containing thirty three names, and asked that they might be made known to the control officials posted on the quay. There the matter has been allowed to rest, and no cases of interference have been reported. The only exception was a case of interference in February to hold up the Indian vice-consul when visiting pilgrim ships.

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[illegible]

22. The Empty Quarter has again been crossed by an Englishman, this time under the auspices of Ibn Saud, who, according to the "Umm al Qura," appears to regard that desert also as a part of his dominions. Mr Philby set out from Hafuf on the 10th January and reached Mecca on the 5th April. Ibn Saud's Amir of Hasa provided him with thirty-two of the best Omaniya camels and eighteen Bedouin, sectional sheikhs of the Ajman and Murra tribes as attendants and guides. Their route was as follows: Hafuf Salwa, on the coast between Qatif and Hasa, the Jahra oasis, Maqanama Well (22° 15' N., 49° 10' E.), Bir Fadhil (22° 15' N., 50° 20' E.), Farajja (21° 35' N., 50° 45' E.), 10 miles to the west of which Mr Philby thinks he found the Bedouin traditional site of the ancient city of Ubar (which really was in the Yemen highlands), Naifa (19° 50' N., 51° E.), and Shanna (19° N., 51° 05' E.)

Chapter 11 Frontier Questions

Краткое

25 No raids were reported to have been made during the quarter from

28 It will be recalled that, after much diplomatic preparation in Jeddah, a series of meetings between the frontier representatives for the liquidation of past raids and the settlement of future differences was arranged last April. The preliminary meeting was held on 11th April 1931 at Jeddah and was established between Captain Glubb and Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn Zeyd. The first phase of the main meeting was not held until the 15th August, the Nejd was then quite unprepared, but agreed to return a little later while Captain Glubb feared open rupture if they were to meet again and went on leave. At the end of October, however, he invited the Sheikh to meet him again for the second phase. He received a reply two months later and they met near Haditha on the 7th January. This meeting proved fruitless. The atmosphere was very friendly and the two representatives quite old friends, but the Nejd had no authority to dispose of 31 claims until the raid of the 28th September last was disposed of. They failed to agree on this or any matter, except provisionally to meet again after Ramadhan, mid-February. The Legation is unaware that this or any other meeting has been held.

27. In pursuance of a plan provisionally made in London while on leave last autumn, but advanced somewhat by certain circumstances in Transjordan His Majesty's Minister left Jedda on the 2nd February to visit His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan. He spent the 12th and 13th at Amman where the following matters were discussed with the British Resident, who was assisted by Mr. Kirkbride Peake Pasha, and Captain Glubb:

- (1) The Atun action of the Iluweylai, with special reference to—
 - (a) Their national status.
 - (b) Aruif camels.
 - (c) The effects of the raid of the 29th September, 1931.
 - (d) Hejaz: handling of the loot taken.
- (2) The Bent Atrya—
 - (a) Their national status.
 - (b) The proposed refusal to them of access to Transjordan.

- (3) (a) General question of determination of tribal nationality
(b) Possibility of agreement with Hejaz-Nejd as to allocation of tribes.
- (4) The military and quasi-military situation on the frontier, with special reference to—
(a) Competitive establishment of posts.
(b) Ibn Saud's alleged military preparations.
- (5) The general situation on the frontier, with special reference to—
(a) Actual or possible recrudescence of raiding.
(b) Glubb-Ibn Zeyd position and future co-operation.
(c) Complaints against Captain Glubb, retaliatory confiscation, withholding returnable.
(d) Handing over of "raiding criminals".
- (6) (a) Diplomatic discussion at Jedda of Fuad Bey Hamza's
(b) Establishment of direct and normal Transjordan relations with Hejaz-Nejd.
- (7) Minor points outstanding at the end of 1931—
(a) Commission on loot.
(b) Allegation of asylum given to criminals.
(c) Allegations of enticement.
(d) Taxation of sojourners.
(e) Press attacks.
- (8) Closer and more direct collaboration between Jerusalem and Jedda—
(a) Greater conciseness in Transjordan reports and greater expedition in forwarding.
(b) Sifting of Transjordan reports by Jerusalem in the light of major policy.
(c) Importance of recording all raids, and as soon as possible.
(d) Clear indication as to distribution of copies of despatches and reports.
(e) Codes.
(f) Exchange of intelligence.
- (9) Miscellaneous—
(a) Nature of Transjordan forces.
(b) Bedouin Control Board and the Amir Shukr.
(c) Druze refugees in Nejd.
(d) Frontier at Jebel Tubaik.
(e) Commercial relations with Hejaz-Nejd.
(f) Wireless communications.

29. These discussions at Amman, though not conclusive on various questions, were most useful and enabled His Majesty's Minister to clear up many points in a frank and friendly manner. Sir A. Ryan has recorded his appreciation of the cordial atmosphere which prevailed throughout the discussions, and his readiness to recognise that such divergences of view as arise from time to time are not due to unwillingness on the part of the Legation at Jedda to support Transjordan in dealing with a most difficult situation, but to the frequent difficulty of accommodating action as regards Transjordan questions, with the broad policy of keeping Ibn Saud sweet and giving him moral support for reasons of Imperial interest.

20. On the 13th February His Majesty's Minister was received by the Amir Abdullah at a most affable. He spoke temperately throughout of the "King of Nejd." While not excluding the possibility of full recognition of Ibn Saud, if His Majesty's Government considered that the right course, he put his finger unerringly on the weak spot, from his point of view in any argument in favour of his adopting it just now. As the most likely aspirant, perhaps, to the reversion of the Hejaz throne should the Sharif's reign collapse, he is doubtless very unwilling to compromise his hopes by recognising the kingship of Ibn Saud at a time when the latter's position is menaced by so many difficulties.

30. On the 15th February His Majesty's Minister reviewed with His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan the most important, from a Jerusalem point of view, of the matters discussed on the previous days at Amman. Sir A. Ryan left Jerusalem on the 16th for London, whither he had been unexpectedly summoned for consultation by His Majesty's Government.

Export of Cereals.

31. The Hejaz-Nejd Government drew the Legation's attention in January to reports they had received of some sort of an embargo on trade from Transjordan into Nejd. After enquiry had been made of Jerusalem, they were informed that an embargo had been placed on the export from Transjordan of cereals, irrespective of their destination and that the order had been necessitated by internal prices in Transjordan, but might be removed in the future. The Hejaz Government replied in March that they appreciated these motives, but hoped that it might now be possible to remove the prohibition against their own subjects.

Ibn Hamdan

32. At the instance of the High Commissioner for Transjordan, the Hejaz-Nejd Government's serious attention was drawn in February to an unfriendly incident of the 28th December, staged on the frontier by Nejd troops under the command of one Ibn Hamdan. They had apparently approached four Transjordan Arab Legionaries who were encamped in Transjordan territory, then drawn closer and scrutinised the Legion camp through field glasses. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires protested against this unwarranted and unfriendly action on the part of armed forces under the control of the Hejaz-Nejd Government, asked for a full enquiry, and suggested that in the interests of friendly relations a full investigation should be made.

33. In conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in March, the High Commissioner for Transjordan stated that he had been informed that Transjordan Legionaries had been camped in Nejd territory, but he promised a full investigation and an early reply. No reply has yet been received.

MacDonnell Investigation

34. His Majesty's Minister followed up the earlier representations in paragraph 35 of the last Jedda report by speaking emphatically to the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the 11th January about the refusal of the Hejaz-Nejd Government to bear their share of the costs of the MacDonnell investigation. He strongly advised them to reconsider their attitude without awaiting the reaction of His Majesty's Government to their note of the 26th November, hinting that otherwise the reaction might be very disagreeable. On the 17th January His Majesty's Minister received from the High Commissioner for Transjordan a letter stating that the High Commissioner had given his gracious command to the effect that no objection should be raised to the payment of the sum and that he sanctioned its payment to the British Government, with thanks. The sum has not, of course, been paid, and is unlikely to be paid until item 5 of the "budget" is financed (see paragraph 8 above). The sum in question is £1,728 7s. 6d.

The Beni Atiya

35. The movement of Beni Atiya into Transjordan foreseen by Captain Glubb last summer (see paragraph 37 of the Jedda report for September-October) actually took place in February, when some 250 tents moved northward over the frontier. Their motive, however, was apparently rather to find grazing than to establish a permanent settlement. It is true, as suggested by Captain Glubb last year, that they had received *carta blanca* from Ibn Saud to raid in order to dissuade disaffected Hejazi tribes further south from making northward for Transjordan through the Beni Atiya. No rain at all is said to have fallen this year in the Northern Hejaz between its northern frontier and a point some 50 miles south of Tama, so that the Beni Atiya, together with the Huweyat at Tibana and the Billi, moved both north and south from their normal *diras* in search of grazing.

36. While some were moving northward, the Amir of the district called forth from Tabuk with 130 camelmen and a machine gun. He set out immediately after the fast of Ramadhan and held to the eastward of the Beni Atiya tents, marching quickly up the Hejaz Railway until near the Transjordan frontier. A little short of Hujf he turned westward, thus interposing his force between the Beni Atiya and the nearest tents and progressed steadily southward through the rest of them back to Tabuk, which he reached on the 20th after mopping up everything in his way and driving off 350 camels, the Arabs say, beside many more sheep. On the same day the leading tents of the Beni Atiya began to cross into Transjordan. The southward-bound portion of the tribe had meanwhile passed to the south of Tanna.

37. Information available to the Royal Air Force in Transjordan indicates that the Beni Atiya who entered Transjordan were refugees from justice, but Captain Glubb, who was in close touch with them, was convinced that their migration was of a routine nature, but began before the normal time because of the lack of rain further south. By the middle of March, according to Royal Air Force reports, 300 tents had crossed the frontier with 2,000 camels. They were collected well away from the frontier and sent north of Ma'an under police supervision.

38. On the 29th February the Hejaz Nejd Minister in London requested that these tribesmen should be returned by the Transjordan authorities to the Hejaz. It was suggested to him at the Foreign Office that such frontier questions could best be raised through the frontier authorities, or, if that was impracticable, through the Legation at Jedda. He promised to suggest the former channel to his Government, but the latter on the 9th March addressed themselves to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, invoking the inconclusive correspondence of 1931. The Beni Atiya groups (see 1931, January-February report, paragraph 11), and expressing the Beni Atiya in Transjordan. An exchange of views and reports on the facts of the matter proceeded between London and Jerusalem, but no decision as to a reply had been reached by the end of the month.

Iraq

39. A letter from the Iraqi representative to the Legation at Baghdad dated 11th January 1932, in which the Iraqi representative stated that the Iraqi representative had received in January, but was not used, as Husayn Bey had not again mentioned the matter, and the Iraqi representative was expected shortly to arrive. The gist of the reply, if made, would have been that these chiefs were not near the frontier, and that, so far as was known, they were keeping quiet and had received no special favours.

40. The Iraqi representative's arrival is reported in paragraph 38. It is to be hoped that he will shortly be in a position to relieve the Legation completely of questions concerning Iraq.

Koweit and Bahrain

Biscoe Ibn Saud Meeting

41. As soon as it was known definitely in Jedda that Ibn Saud had left Riyadh on the 2nd January for the Hasa, steps were taken to bring about the courtesy visit to him of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf which had been spoken of at His Majesty's Minister's audience of the King on the 2nd March, 1931 (March-April report, paragraph 29), and recorded at the inter-departmental conference held at the Foreign Office on the 12th August 1931. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs having arrived at Jedda and His Majesty at Hufuf, Sir A. Ryan was able to communicate through the former by wireless with the latter and prepare him for the visit. On the 17th January Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe telegraphed a personal message from Bushire via Bahrain to Ibn Saud and received a reply asking him to come as soon as possible. Accompanied by the Political Agents at

Koweit and Bahrain, he reached Hasa via Uqair on the 23rd January, stayed four days in Hufuf with the King, and left for Bahrain on the 28th.

42. The following matters were discussed either with Ibn Saud personally or with his chief political adviser, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin:—

- (i) The Koweit blockade
- (ii) Emergency landing-grounds on the Hasa coast
- (iii) Telegraphic and postal communication between Hasa and the outer
- (iv) Passport facilities for Nejd subjects proceeding to Hasa
- (v) Incursions by Nejd officials and troops into Koweit territory

43. Ibn Saud's attitude throughout was one of extreme cordiality. The visit was successful, chiefly owing to the fact that it was informal and that Colonel Biscoe went with no instructions from His Majesty's Government, but merely to establish friendly relations and talk over questions of mutual interest. Results will be recorded as they come.

44. On the 28th January 1932, Ibn Saud gave the following message to the British Government:

I wish you to give my greetings to the British Government and to tell them that I speak to them with the word of a Moslem Arab.

First, I neither desire nor seek greater friendship from anyone else in the whole world, whether European or Moslem Government, than the friendship of the British Government, and it is impossible that I should seek to differ from them in any matter.

Secondly, I desire peace and friendship with the whole world, especially with those of my neighbours and others who are in relations with the British Government. Who speaks to the contrary about me is wrong or a liar and has not understood. If such a thing is said of me, I ask the British Government to refer the matter to me and explain to me the exact mistake attributed to me, but on condition that the request be made through the agency of an intelligent man who will understand from me the truth and will not misunderstand.

This message should be read, however, in conjunction with the slavery chapter of this report.

Koweit

45. On the 1st March 1932, Colonel Dickson discussed with the Ruler Ibn Saud's proposals regarding the raising of the commercial blockade of Koweit. The Ruler's proposals were as follows:—(i) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1932 to the 1st March 1933, and (ii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1933 to the 1st March 1934, and (iii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1934 to the 1st March 1935, and (iv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1935 to the 1st March 1936, and (v) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1936 to the 1st March 1937, and (vi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1937 to the 1st March 1938, and (vii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1938 to the 1st March 1939, and (viii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1939 to the 1st March 1940, and (ix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1940 to the 1st March 1941, and (x) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1941 to the 1st March 1942, and (xi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1942 to the 1st March 1943, and (xii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1943 to the 1st March 1944, and (xiii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1944 to the 1st March 1945, and (xiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1945 to the 1st March 1946, and (xv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1946 to the 1st March 1947, and (xvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1947 to the 1st March 1948, and (xvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1948 to the 1st March 1949, and (xviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1949 to the 1st March 1950, and (xix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1950 to the 1st March 1951, and (xx) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1951 to the 1st March 1952, and (xxi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1952 to the 1st March 1953, and (xxii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1953 to the 1st March 1954, and (xxiii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1954 to the 1st March 1955, and (xxiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1955 to the 1st March 1956, and (xxv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1956 to the 1st March 1957, and (xxvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1957 to the 1st March 1958, and (xxvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1958 to the 1st March 1959, and (xxviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1959 to the 1st March 1960, and (xxix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1960 to the 1st March 1961, and (xxx) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1961 to the 1st March 1962, and (xxxi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1962 to the 1st March 1963, and (xxxii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1963 to the 1st March 1964, and (xxxiii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1964 to the 1st March 1965, and (xxxiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1965 to the 1st March 1966, and (xxxv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1966 to the 1st March 1967, and (xxxvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1967 to the 1st March 1968, and (xxxvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1968 to the 1st March 1969, and (xxxviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1969 to the 1st March 1970, and (xxxix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1970 to the 1st March 1971, and (xl) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1971 to the 1st March 1972, and (xli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1972 to the 1st March 1973, and (xlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1973 to the 1st March 1974, and (xliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1974 to the 1st March 1975, and (xliv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1975 to the 1st March 1976, and (xlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1976 to the 1st March 1977, and (xlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1977 to the 1st March 1978, and (xlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1978 to the 1st March 1979, and (xlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1979 to the 1st March 1980, and (xlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1980 to the 1st March 1981, and (l) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1981 to the 1st March 1982, and (li) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1982 to the 1st March 1983, and (lii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1983 to the 1st March 1984, and (liii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1984 to the 1st March 1985, and (liv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1985 to the 1st March 1986, and (lvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1986 to the 1st March 1987, and (lvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1987 to the 1st March 1988, and (lviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1988 to the 1st March 1989, and (lix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1989 to the 1st March 1990, and (lxi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1990 to the 1st March 1991, and (lxii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1991 to the 1st March 1992, and (lxiii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1992 to the 1st March 1993, and (lxiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1993 to the 1st March 1994, and (lxv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1994 to the 1st March 1995, and (lxvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1995 to the 1st March 1996, and (lxvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1996 to the 1st March 1997, and (lxviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1997 to the 1st March 1998, and (lxix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1998 to the 1st March 1999, and (lxx) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 1999 to the 1st March 2000, and (lxxi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2000 to the 1st March 2001, and (lxxii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2001 to the 1st March 2002, and (lxxiii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2002 to the 1st March 2003, and (lxxiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2003 to the 1st March 2004, and (lxxv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2004 to the 1st March 2005, and (lxxvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2005 to the 1st March 2006, and (lxxvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2006 to the 1st March 2007, and (lxxviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2007 to the 1st March 2008, and (lxxix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2008 to the 1st March 2009, and (lxxx) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2009 to the 1st March 2010, and (lxxxi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2010 to the 1st March 2011, and (lxxxii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2011 to the 1st March 2012, and (lxxxiii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2012 to the 1st March 2013, and (lxxxiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2013 to the 1st March 2014, and (lxxxv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2014 to the 1st March 2015, and (lxxxvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2015 to the 1st March 2016, and (lxxxvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2016 to the 1st March 2017, and (lxxxviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2017 to the 1st March 2018, and (lxxxix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2018 to the 1st March 2019, and (lxxxx) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2019 to the 1st March 2020, and (lxxxxi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2020 to the 1st March 2021, and (lxxxxii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2021 to the 1st March 2022, and (lxxxxiii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2022 to the 1st March 2023, and (lxxxxiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2023 to the 1st March 2024, and (lxxxxv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2024 to the 1st March 2025, and (lxxxxvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2025 to the 1st March 2026, and (lxxxxvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2026 to the 1st March 2027, and (lxxxxviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2027 to the 1st March 2028, and (lxxxxix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2028 to the 1st March 2029, and (lxxxxx) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2029 to the 1st March 2030, and (lxxxxxi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2030 to the 1st March 2031, and (lxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2031 to the 1st March 2032, and (lxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2032 to the 1st March 2033, and (lxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2033 to the 1st March 2034, and (lxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2034 to the 1st March 2035, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2035 to the 1st March 2036, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2036 to the 1st March 2037, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2037 to the 1st March 2038, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2038 to the 1st March 2039, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2039 to the 1st March 2040, and (lxxxxli) to suspend 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2052, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2052 to the 1st March 2053, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2053 to the 1st March 2054, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2054 to the 1st March 2055, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2055 to the 1st March 2056, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2056 to the 1st March 2057, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2057 to the 1st March 2058, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2058 to the 1st March 2059, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2059 to the 1st March 2060, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2060 to the 1st March 2061, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2061 to the 1st March 2062, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2062 to the 1st March 2063, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st 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from the 1st March 2133 to the 1st March 2134, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2134 to the 1st March 2135, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2135 to the 1st March 2136, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2136 to the 1st March 2137, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2137 to the 1st March 2138, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2138 to the 1st March 2139, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2139 to the 1st March 2140, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2140 to the 1st March 2141, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2141 to the 1st March 2142, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2142 to the 1st March 2143, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2143 to the 1st March 2144, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2144 to the 1st March 2145, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2145 to the 1st March 2146, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2146 to the 1st March 2147, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2147 to the 1st March 2148, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2148 to the 1st March 2149, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2149 to the 1st March 2150, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2150 to the 1st March 2151, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2151 to the 1st March 2152, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2152 to the 1st March 2153, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2153 to the 1st March 2154, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2154 to the 1st March 2155, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2155 to the 1st March 2156, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2156 to the 1st March 2157, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2157 to the 1st March 2158, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2158 to the 1st March 2159, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2159 to the 1st March 2160, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2160 to the 1st March 2161, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2161 to the 1st March 2162, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2162 to the 1st March 2163, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2163 to the 1st March 2164, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2164 to the 1st March 2165, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2165 to the 1st March 2166, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2166 to the 1st March 2167, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2167 to the 1st March 2168, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2168 to the 1st March 2169, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2169 to the 1st March 2170, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2170 to the 1st March 2171, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2171 to the 1st March 2172, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2172 to the 1st March 2173, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2173 to the 1st March 2174, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2174 to the 1st March 2175, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2175 to the 1st March 2176, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2176 to the 1st March 2177, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2177 to the 1st March 2178, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2178 to the 1st March 2179, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2179 to the 1st March 2180, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2180 to the 1st March 2181, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2181 to the 1st March 2182, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2182 to the 1st March 2183, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2183 to the 1st March 2184, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2184 to the 1st March 2185, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2185 to the 1st March 2186, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2186 to the 1st March 2187, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2187 to the 1st March 2188, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2188 to the 1st March 2189, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2189 to the 1st March 2190, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2190 to the 1st March 2191, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2191 to the 1st March 2192, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2192 to the 1st March 2193, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2193 to the 1st March 2194, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2194 to the 1st March 2195, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2195 to the 1st March 2196, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2196 to the 1st March 2197, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2197 to the 1st March 2198, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2198 to the 1st March 2199, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2199 to the 1st March 2200, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2200 to the 1st March 2201, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2201 to the 1st March 2202, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2202 to the 1st March 2203, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2203 to the 1st March 2204, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2204 to the 1st March 2205, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2205 to the 1st March 2206, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2206 to the 1st March 2207, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2207 to the 1st March 2208, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2208 to the 1st March 2209, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2209 to the 1st March 2210, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2210 to the 1st March 2211, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2211 to the 1st March 2212, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2212 to the 1st March 2213, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2213 to the 1st March 2214, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2214 to the 1st March 2215, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2215 to the 1st March 2216, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2216 to the 1st March 2217, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2217 to the 1st March 2218, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2218 to the 1st March 2219, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2219 to the 1st March 2220, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2220 to the 1st March 2221, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2221 to the 1st March 2222, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2222 to the 1st March 2223, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2223 to the 1st March 2224, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2224 to the 1st March 2225, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2225 to the 1st March 2226, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2226 to the 1st March 2227, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2227 to the 1st March 2228, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2228 to the 1st March 2229, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2229 to the 1st March 2230, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2230 to the 1st March 2231, and (lxxxxliii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2231 to the 1st March 2232, and (lxxxxliiv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2232 to the 1st March 2233, and (lxxxlv) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2233 to the 1st March 2234, and (lxxxlvi) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2234 to the 1st March 2235, and (lxxxlvii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2235 to the 1st March 2236, and (lxxxlviii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2236 to the 1st March 2237, and (lxxxlix) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2237 to the 1st March 2238, and (lxxxxli) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2238 to the 1st March 2239, and (lxxxxlii) to suspend the blockade from the 1st March 2239

Disarmament Conference.

57 The Hejaz Nejd Minister in London was delegated in January to represent his Government at Geneva. A lengthy memorandum giving information of the Hejaz Nejd Government's attitude to the conference on the 8th February, followed on the 24th by a memorandum by the Hejazi delegation notifying his views as to the need and manner of disarming the world.

Congresses

58 The Minister in London was also delegated to the International Congress of Local Authorities (July-August report, paragraph 54) was being deputed to represent them. An invitation to attend the London International Congress on commercial education was apologetically declined.

Italy

59 A treaty of friendship with Italy and a commercial agreement were at length signed on the 10th February, after negotiations lasting two years. The Italian draft anti-slave trade clause has been dropped (cf November-December report, paragraph 47).

Germany

60 M. de Hans resumed charge of his consulate on the 23rd March.

The Netherlands

61 M. Adriaens left Jeddah on the 7th March on a brief visit to the Yemen (see report, paragraph 40). No other political significance is attached to this visit.

62 A M. van Leeuwen, erstwhile of the Netherlands Trading Society, was at £2,000 (see paragraph 11 above).

Soviet Russia

63 The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires has presented the Amir Faisal with a small arms exhibition in his Legation. He was also discovered recently holding a small arms exhibition in his Legation. No arms are known to have been ordered.

64 The last consignment of Soviet benzene, 30,000 cases, was landed at Jeddah in February in completion of the contract of last summer (July-August report, paragraph 14). It was valued at £100,000, or 10% of the "budget."

Turkey

65 On the 26th January the Turkish Ambassador called on His Majesty's Minister in London. He said that the Turkish Government had been asked by the Hejazi Government to lend pilots and mechanics for the development of their air service and to send a military mission to give similar help to the Hejazi army. Ferit Bey said that, before replying to this request, the Turkish Government, having regard to their very friendly relations with His Majesty's Government, desired to inform them of the request and to consult them about it. He was thanked for his communication and subsequently told that His Majesty's Government saw no reason why the Turkish Government should not accede to the Hejazi Government's request. This request follows upon the similar one made to the British Government in November-December report, paragraph 59). There is no sign as yet of the arrival of any Turkish personnel or mission.

Egypt

66 At the end of 1931 the Egyptian Prime Minister informed His Majesty that he had sent a representative of some ability at Jeddah, and that, according to this official's reports, the difficulties which stood in the way of establishing friendly and regular relations were not insoluble. Sidky Pasha added that he was occupying himself with the matter, with the purpose and in the hope of solving the difficulties, which were of a religious as well as of a political order. Hafiz Amer Bey, however, who went on leave of absence last September, has not yet returned to Jeddah, and nothing is known locally either of any progress in Egypto-Hejazi relations or of the Egyptian consul's movements.

Iraq

67 Dr. Najib al-Asl, King Faisal's first diplomatic representative at the Court of King Ibn Saud, arrived in Jeddah on the 14th February with a wife (not a daughter) and a young son. He was greeted as a guest of honor by the Viceroy, but his letters of credence were not accepted, they named him specifically to Mecca instead of to Jeddah. His language and his note-paper bore the same address (see paragraph 40 of the report for September-October). There has apparently been either a misunderstanding on the part of Nuri Pasha, who seems convinced that Ibn Saud agreed with him last March that Mecca should be the seat of the new Legation, for reasons of special consideration for his brother Faisal, or else Ibn Saud did indeed agree to the proposal but his Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who was ill and absent at the time, must have managed on his return to make him go back on his decision and to retract his promise. Whatever the cause, the result was distinctly disagreeable to Dr. Najib, who has taken his anomalous position very philosophically, however, has failed as yet to secure an honourable compromise, and has been obliged to wait for a further opportunity. He has been told that King Faisal would send a personal message by special courier to Ibn Saud, and that the latter would then agree to the establishment of the Legation. Dr. Najib has shown himself very friendly disposed to the Legation, which he often visits for advice and to exchange information.

Afghanistan

68 Ahmad Shah Khan, Minister of Court and cousin of King Nader Shah, arrived on pilgrimage on the 17th March, and with the further object of negotiating a treaty with Ibn Saud and of building an Afghan pilgrim caravanserai at Mecca which should redound to the credit of the Afghan king. Having brought very little money, he is having difficulty with this objective. Nothing definite is yet known of the course of the negotiations, but there are indications of a deplorable atmosphere of suspicion.

United States of America

69 Mr. C. A. ... arrived in Jeddah on the 7th March after making a ... He had been recommended to Ibn Saud for the development of his wealth by the purchase of American machinery and the engagement of American mining experts (see paragraph 14 above). He may return shortly to press his suit, which is not thought to please the King, however.

Poland

70 In February a Polish professor of Chinese culture, who claimed to speak forty languages and to live in Cairo with a tubercular wife, visited Jeddah. He had been recommended to Ibn Saud for the development of his wealth by the purchase of American machinery and the engagement of American mining experts (see paragraph 14 above). He may return shortly to press his suit, which is not thought to please the King, however.

79 In March, however, the Hejazi Government weighed in with a formal protest against the same district on the 22nd and 23rd February and the 3rd March. The matter was referred for enquiry.

Chapter V — *Military Matters.*

General

90. Ibn Saud is his own Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief. It is true that the "Council of Ministers" decree, annexed, goes out of its way to state that the President of the Council controls the Military Departments, but this constitutional change has been denied by a responsible member of the Government. Either he or the decree is wrong, probably the latter. The Military Departments comprise a Directorate of Military Affairs (regulars) under an ex-Turkish General, Hamdi Bey, a camel-corps (irregulars) under a Qaid al Hijaz, and Sherkh Abdullah Suleiman, who is also Director-General of Finance and King's Comptroller, as Quartermaster-General and Master of Ordnance.

Armed Forces

81 The Hejaz Nejd memorandum of the 24th January communicated to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva contained a lengthy dissertation on the Arabian Peninsula. It may be summed up in the opening words of section 8 "The natural and social conditions of this country are so extraordinary that they may be regarded as peculiar to it. This also applies to the military organisation." The following tables were annexed —

Table 1 *Total Armed Forces*

Number of men	41447
Number of officers	734

Explanatory Notes

- (1) The armed forces consist of:
 - (a) Police, 33 officers and 340 men
 - (b) Regular troops, 53 officers and 1,780 men
 - (c) Camel corps, 230 officers and 12,600 men.
 - (d) Constabulars, 14 officers and 211 men
 - (e) Garrison troops, 350 officers and 20,500 men
 - (f) Frontier guards, 23 officers and 1,400 men
 - (g) Air force, 11 officers and 130 men
- (2) Military service is not compulsory, and men are engaged by voluntary enlistment. In war time, all males between 14 and 45 are liable for active service.
- (3) In certain units the period of service is not specified, the men serving for as long as they wish or for as long as they give satisfaction.
- (4) The police, constabulars and regular troops serve under contract for a definite period, which may not exceed five years.

Table 11 - *Use Force*

Number of aeroplanes	9
Total horse-power	1750

Table 111 - Annual Expenditure

Police	59 211
Investigative	11 340
Frontier guards	5 000
Air force	12 000
Other categories	650 600
Material and ammunition	10 450
Transport and communications	100 000
Total	830 251

Total	..	430.51
-------	----	--------

On the 17th January, however, the latter answered His Majesty's Ministers' note of the 2nd January with a notification that the tariff was fixed on a gold basis and charges must be collected accordingly. The Legation at once informed the Government of the change and advising them to estimate the total cost of pilgrimages at 1 100 rupees.

to the notice of all intending pilgrims still to come, so that they might come with their eyes open, expecting neither financial assistance from the Legation nor any remission of dues from those who have to live on pilgrims. The Government of India, however, had no objection to the Legation's action in this respect. The telegram. There was a noticeable falling off in the numbers of pilgrims embarked thereafter, the last two or three ships arriving almost empty at Jodda.

would not again be raised, and endeavoured to obtain from the Hejazi Government an agreed copy of the charges as finally fixed. This was withheld and the promise went for nothing. Transport conditions and charges have remained chaotic. The experience of the last three months makes it imperative to devise means before the next pilgrimage of curbing the appetite of this shamelessly hungry Government.

Verfahren

07. The descriptions related to the personnel of the said report were all put to the test. Since a very small number of cases with the known victim Mary had been reported, the following information was given to assist in the recovery of the case. The victim was a young blonde girl who was two years younger than the boy who was reported to have been involved in the case. She was about 15 years old and was a high school senior.

As the result of a 1992-93 survey, the N.Y.C. Department of Social Services (DSS) reported that 10,000 children and adolescents were placed in foster care in 1992, and were sent to Massachusetts and Southern New Jersey to find a family to receive and care for them.

Summary

99 Recommendations were made by the Legation in March to Sheikh and Aden with a view to improving the control of the Somali pilgrimage

Chapter VIII.—Slavery

Bakht Incident.

100. Two male slaves, Nigerian and French Sudan by origin, had escaped towards the end of December from Sherik Abdullah Saleman's house at Mecca and taken refuge in the Legation. It was intended to manumit them in the

necessary papers to leave the country, on the ground that they were Royal slaves. His Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs by telephone on the 24th December, and the opposition to the Nigerian's departure was withdrawn. He claimed with apparent truth to have come on board ship as a slave, and to have been sold into slavery. His case seemed thus to fall under article 7 of the Treaty of Jeddah relating to the suppression of slave trade. He was consequently repatriated as intended, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in a note of the 28th December admitting that he was a free person wrongfully enslaved.

101 The Hejazi Government asked, however, that Bakhit, the other slave, should be handed over to the local authorities as being a Royal slave. They stated that the fact of his having been with Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman was immaterial, as the latter bought all the King's slaves. Bakhit was therefore retained in the Legation and personally questioned by His Majesty's Minister. He gave a straightforward and convincing story of having been brought from Aden, where he had been captured, to the Yemen, sent many years later to Medina, taken when the city fell to Ibn Saud's son, sent by him to Ibn Saud's cousin Ibn Musa'id, and by him to Abdullah Suleiman eighteen months ago. He had had nothing to do with the King. Copies of His Majesty's Minister's *questionnaire* and the man's replies were sent to the Hejazi Government on the 31st December.

unnecessary to describe in detail. The Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London made representations to the Foreign Office. His Majesty's Minister had a series of patient interviews with the Hejazi Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in a sustained effort to find a compromise. Fuad Hamza, however, was unimproving, became heated, and eventually lost his head. There seems little reason to doubt that, once armed with Ibn Saud's claim to have the slave returned, he made no further reference, or inadequate reference, of the course of the affair to the King or to any other official of the royal household, who would

103. His Majesty's Government, who were kept fully informed by His Majesty's Minister by telegraph, stated on the 27th January that the matter was one of very great importance on which they could not yield. They instructed Sir A. Ryan to inform the Hejazi Government and promptly to arrange with the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Station, to embark Bakhit in H.M.S. "Fenimore." They added that the matter was so important that, had it been possible, they would have sent a ship for the purpose. They realised that the embarkation might present difficulties, but they considered that it was essential that the Hejazi Government should be kept informed. His Majesty's Minister accordingly informed the Hejazi Government on the 28th January of His Majesty's Government's views and their expressed intention, which he added he was taking the necessary steps to carry out without delay. He asked that the local authorities be informed.

104. After consultation with Commander Farquhar it was decided to leave the process of embarkation to be carried out on the following afternoon by the Legation staff, openly from the quay in the Legation launch. If and when this was done, the British Government would then be in a position to consider the need for naval co-operation. The next day was decided upon in order that the His Majesty's Government might communicate by wireless with the Russian Government telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister the same evening. The Russian Government replied to his note, that they would never agree to the departure of the ship. A Russian telegraphed back the following morning that he was sending Bakhit to the ship that day.

195 The man was duly embarked in the afternoon without difficulty, the doubled Nejd guard on the quay making no attempt to intervene until too late when the launch was already under weigh, then they made a futile rush to the water's edge and stood there shouting and gesticulating. It was later learned that Fuad Hamza, who is no ordinary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had himself issued standing orders to the police to shoot Bakhit on sight outside the Legation, and particular instructions, in the attempt to embark him, to oppose Sir A. Ryan if he accompanied the slave in person, without, however, using physical force in the last resort but if I were Captain Senger who usually deals

with slaves), to resist him by every means at their command. Happily it was Ramadhan and the guard failed to adjust their wits in time to the arrival of Mr Hope Gill, followed by the slave, flanked by Captain Seager who engaged the party and Mr W. was rescued. The Nejdî commanding the guard was made to take the man from behind. The Nejdî commanding the guard was summoned to Mecca and imprisoned.

The landing party had not been used to do the thing in style, but it had a deplorable effect on Ibn Saud's temper which could certainly have been avoided had Fund Bey Hamza kept his head. The general opinion was that, had the King been kept fully informed, he would undoubtedly have made a large gesture at the last moment, *faute de mieux*, and given the slave to Sir A. Ryan, thereby saving the trouble of the whole affair. The Nejdî commanding the guard was summoned to Mecca and imprisoned. The Nejdî commanding the guard was summoned to Mecca and imprisoned. The Nejdî commanding the guard was summoned to Mecca and imprisoned.

Other Slaves

107. Two other male slaves took refuge in the Legation in January and were manumitted and repatriated to Africa early in February without difficulty. A woman who had been a slave and feared re-enslavement, and a fourth male slave, who took refuge in the Legation in February and was manumitted, were also repatriated. Three slaves who escaped from the Amir Feisal's retinue when he visited Jeddah in February, were expected to attempt to reach the Legation, and the local authorities took elaborate precautions to prevent and find them. They apparently made good their escape by other means and were not found.

Chapter IX - Miscellaneous

Visitors

108. Lady Dorothy Milla, known to some as "Unseen and Unbeaten," explored Jeddah from the 12th to the 15th January, and was accommodated in the Legation. Prominent pilgrims will be noted in the next report.

Departations

109. Mu'arrif Ali was deported on the 25th January by the Hejazî Government in response to the Legation's request (see November December report, paragraph 80). A misguided disciple named Mirza Suleiman Ahmed was made to accompany him.

Staff

110. His Majesty's Minister left Jeddah on the 2nd February in H.M.S. "Penzance" for Port Sudan on an official visit to Jerusalem, to discuss Transjordan matters with His Majesty's High Commissioner. Mr Hope Gill became *Chargé d'Affaires*.

The Indian vice-consul, Munshi Hasanullah, received the well merited title of Khan Bahadur on the 1st January.

The Malay pilgrimage officer returned to Jeddah for the season on the 29th February.

Annex "A" to Enclosure

(Translation)

Extract from "Umm-al-Qura" of January 15, 1932

REGULATION CONCERNING THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

(After Compliments.)

A high decree has been issued sanctioning the following regulation:

Article 1. The Council of Ministers (*Majlis-al-Wukalaa*) is composed of the President of the Council (*Rais-al-Majlis*), the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (*Wakil-al-Kharajya*), the head of the Finance Department (*Wakil-al-Mahya*), and the Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly (*Wakil ash-Shur*).

Art. 2. The President of the Council of Ministers, in the absence of His Majesty the King, will be President of the Council of Ministers only when His Majesty is present he will be President of the Council of Ministers only.

Art. 3. The Presidency of the Council at the present time directs the Affairs of the Kingdom (*Al-Amal*) and the Ministries of Interior (*Wazarat ad-Dakhil*), Foreign Affairs (*Wazarat al-Kharajya*) and the War Department (*Wazarat al-Harab*).

Art. 4. The Council of Ministers will be under the charge of a chief responsible for the administration of its affairs. This office shall issue instructions to the Ministries (*Wakalat*) and Departments (*Idarat*), whether emanating from the Council of Ministers or from the President thereof, either in his capacity as President or in his capacity as Viceroy of His Majesty during the latter's absence.

Art. 5. The Council of Ministers derives its authority from His Majesty the King, the Ministers (*Wukalaa*) are jointly responsible to His Majesty the King for the general policy of the country, and each of them is responsible also for the affairs of his Ministry (*Wazara*).

Art. 6. The decisions of the Council of Ministers will be taken in accordance with the opinion of the majority. No decision may be executed unless it bears the signature of the majority and includes the signature of the Minister (*Wakil*) whom the decision primarily concerns.

Art. 7. In the event of a difference of opinion arising between the Ministers (*Wukalaa*) on any matter, or when opposition is raised to any decision made by the majority, the President of the Council, when he is Viceroy, if the matter is an important one, can order the execution of the decision on his own responsibility. If the matter is one which can be postponed for submission to His Majesty the King, the President should defer its execution until he has referred it to His Majesty for his gracious command.

Art. 8. The Ministers (*Wukalaa*) may make enquiries from each other and may ask for the production of a written explanation concerning the action of their colleagues in regard to decisions taken the execution of which has been entrusted to those colleagues or to one of them. The colleague responsible must produce such an explanation, and when difficulty is experienced in bringing about agreement, the matter should be referred to His Majesty the King so that the party asking for the explanation may be freed from responsibility.

Art. 9. The President of the Council is the channel through which Royal Orders are issued to the Government Departments (*Dawair*) and Ministries (*Wakalat*), and he is the authority to whom these Departments (*Dawair*) should address themselves in their official dealings.

Art. 10. Should any Minister (*Wakil*) or other head of a Department or any subordinate happen to think of a new matter, which may be beneficial or which may serve to avoid an abuse, when such matter is not provided for in the regulations of the Government nor laid down in the relevant arrangements, he should submit it in writing to the President of the Council for the latter to consider it, add his observations thereto and refer it, together with the observations, to His Majesty the King for his gracious command as to what should be done in the matter.

Art. 11. If the President of the Council should direct one of the Ministers (*Wukalaa*) to execute an order which is not provided for in the regulations laid

down, nor issued as a decision of the Council, or issued as a decision of the Council but has been disputed or opposed by the Minister (Wakil) responsible for its execution, then the opposing Minister (Wakil) must execute the order immediately provided that it is communicated in writing and supported by a Royal Command, the number and date of which must be mentioned. If the Royal Command supporting it is not mentioned, the matter should be referred to His Majesty the King.

Art. 12. The Council is to meet nightly when the majority of the members are present at one place. It must in any case meet once a week during the daytime or at night for dealing with all questions submitted to it, which questions are to be prepared and classified by the Diwan.

Art. 13. In the event of one of the Ministers (Wukalaa) being absent when (Daira), the matter should not be postponed, the necessary decisions should be taken in respect of it and communicated to the Ministers (Wukalaa), including the absent one, according to the usual practice. If the absent Minister has anything to say against a decision taken in his absence, he should immediately submit his views to the President and to his colleagues so that they may defer execution of the decision pending consultation and meeting. If the absent Minister has nothing against the decision it must be carried out, if he has not opposed the decision within twenty-four hours after learning of it, his silence will be interpreted as approval unless he has some legal [sic legitimate] excuse for delaying his opposition. Otherwise the decision will come into force.

Art. 14. The decisions of the Council shall be communicated to all the Ministers (Wukalaa) concerned with its execution, as is provided for by the decision of the Council No. 7 shown in the record under No. 6 of the meeting which took place on the night of Thursday the 18th-19th Rajab 1350 (the 29th-30th November, 1931).

Art. 15. A special record should be kept in writing of every meeting of the Council of Ministers, and every decision is to be entered separately therein, the signed text of the record of the proceedings is to be kept in the Diwan, and the necessary copies are to be distributed. In addition to this, a record of the proceedings should be copied under a serial number into a big register kept for the purpose.

Art. 16. The following administrations (jihat) correspond direct with the President of the Council —

1. The Royal Diwan
2. Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Kharijiya)
3. Finance Department (Mal)
4. War Department (Askar)
5. Legislative Assembly (Shura)
6. Ministry of the Interior (Dakhiliya)
7. The Grand Qadhi's Office
8. The Amirs of the Dependencies

Departments (Dawair) other than the above correspond each with the (Dughar) Department (Daira) to which it is attached, and the principal Department (Daira) corresponds direct with the Presidency of the Council.

Art. 17. The Ministry of the Interior (Wazarat ad Dakhiliya) supervises the following Departments (Dawair) —

1. Health
2. Education
3. Posts and Telegraphs
4. Quarantine
5. Central Police
6. Shar'aa Courts (in the cases when these do not depend from the office of the Grand Qadhi)
7. The Municipalities

Art. 18. It is not the intention of the previous article that the Departments (Dawair) should never correspond with His Highness the Amir. It is understood that communications received at the Diwan addressed to the Minister (Wazir) of the Interior will be sent to that Ministry (Dakhiliya) without any action being taken concerning them by the Diwan.

Art. 19. The Viceroy's Office, as it exists in its present form, will be divided into two parts: One section relates to the Ministry (Wazarat) of the Interior and will remain in the present office, carrying out the same duties as at present, the other section relates to the Presidency of the Council and will be incorporated in it. The Departments (Dawair) are to be informed when this division has taken place so that communications concerning the Ministry (Wazarat) of the Interior will be addressed to that Ministry, while those from Departments (Dawair) attached to the Presidency of the Council will be sent direct to the Presidency.

Art. 20. The name of the present Viceroy's Office will be changed to Ministry of the Interior (Wazarat ad Dakhiliya), while the name of the Diwan will become "Diwan of the Viceroy and of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers" (Diwan Nash al Amm wa Riasat Majlis al Wukalaa).

Art. 21. Transactions requiring the signature of His Royal Highness the Amir will be classified as follows —

1. Documents issued when His Highness is charged with the office of Viceroy of His Majesty the King in the latter's absence, which will be signed "Viceroy of His Majesty the King" (Nash al Amm li Julalat al Malik).
2. Documents issued when His Majesty the King is present and His Royal Highness is only President of the Council, which will be signed "President of the Council of Ministers" (Ras Majlis al Wukalaa).
3. Documents emanating from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Wazarat al Kharijiya) which will be signed "Minister for Foreign Affairs" (Wazir al Kharijiya).
4. Documents emanating from the Ministry of the Interior, which will be signed "Minister of the Interior" (Wazir ad Dakhiliya).

Art. 22. Departments (Dawair) will be notified of this arrangement, so that they may put into practice in their transactions and in communications addressed by them to His Royal Highness the Amir.

Art. 23. The Diwan will be (properly) arranged and its activities organized so that the transactions concerning any one Department (Daira) or any one subject will be kept in one register, and registers and copies of correspondence must be properly kept.

Art. 24. The Diwan can best be arranged in the following way —

- Head of the Diwan
- His assistant
- Officer in charge of Telegrams
- Officer in charge of Registers and Archives
- Work concerning the Council of Ministers and the Royal Diwan
- Work of (other) Departments (Dawair)
- Typists and copyists section

Art. 25. The head of the Diwan is the channel of communication between the Departments (Dawair) and the Amir. He attends the meetings of the Council of Ministers and shares in its work, and he has complete control over the work of the Diwan.

Art. 26. The assistant of the head of the Diwan is directly responsible for the work of the Diwan. He controls the staff and supervises the work of filing and registering documents and answering communications, &c. The other officials have each their own work, and, if necessary, an assistant to help them with it, each one does the work that concerns him, looks after it and distributes it.

Art. 27. The reorganisation of the Ministry of Interior (Dakhiliya) will be carried out in such a manner as to meet the requirements of the work. Superfluous clerks and employees will be transferred to the Diwan of the Presidency of the Council.

Annex B to Enclosure

(Tentative Schedule)

Financial Year 1350-51 A.H. (December 12, 1931, to November 30, 1932)

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE

Item.	Piastres (†)	£ Gold
1. Royal allowances	6,000,000	60,000
2. Royal Princes, palaces, Diwan; Treasury	12,850,000	115,000
3. Frontier forces and Defence Departments	25,850,000	235,000
Royal and military total		410,000
4. Communications and transport.	11,000,000	100,000
5. Debt instalment	16,500,000	150,000
Total		660,000
6. Administration—		
(a) Justice	1,127,492	
(b) Foreign Office	3,100,000	
(c) Legislative Assembly	577,310	
(d) Ministry for Foreign Affairs	1,400,780	
(e) Health and quarantines	2,734,240	
(f) Water condensers	1,353,227	
(g) Public education	1,717,047	
(h) Customs Department	1,240,852	
(i) Finance Departments	2,200,028	
(j) Public security	1,014,000	
(k) Government press	160,820	
(l) Committee of virtue	167,570	
(m) Posts, telegraphs, telephones, wireless	1,200,450	
(n) Works and sanitation	2,100,170	
(o) Miscellaneous	1,880,720	
Total	35,658,026 at 192 = 175,000	
Grand total		835,000

(†) 110 piastres = £1 gold.

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No. 41.

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE HEJAZ-NEJD MISSION

First Meeting

THE first meeting with the Hejaz-Nejd Mission was held in the Foreign Office at 12.15 p.m. on the 30 May.

Present

Sir L. Oliphant (in the Chair).	The Emir Faisal.
Mr G. W. Rendel.	The Minister for the Hejaz and Nejd
Mr C. F. A. Warner	Fuad Bey Hamza.
	M. Zaid (Secretary of the Legation)

The business was of a formal nature.

Sir L. Oliphant after a complimentary reference to the presence of the mission in this country, and to the good relations existing between the two Governments, said that he was glad to see the mission for the discussion of the questions which they had raised. He stated that he had been instructed by the Foreign Office to meet them in the afternoon for this purpose.

The Emir Faisal, after expressing pleasure at the friendship which bound the two countries, agreed to Sir L. Oliphant's proposal, and it was arranged that Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and Fuad Bey Hamza should come to the Foreign Office for a further meeting at 4 o'clock.

Sir L. Oliphant said that the Emir would have learnt already from His Majesty the King, and from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that it was their desire that the most cordial relations should be maintained.

The Emir Faisal expressed the pleasure with which he had heard these sentiments from His Majesty and Sir John Simon, and said that his father set great store by the maintenance of such good relations.

Sir L. Oliphant enquired whether there was any question which the Emir Faisal wished to discuss. The Emir replied that he had already alluded to the one question of fundamental importance. It was their desire that there should be between the two countries a true friendship, not merely an official one. He was much gratified by the assurances he had received on this point. He did not himself wish to raise any other questions, and would leave the discussion of any other points to Fuad Bey Hamza.

Foreign Office, May 9, 1932

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No. 42

Record of Second Meeting with the Hejaz-Nejd Delegation held at the Foreign Office at 4 p.m. on May 9, 1932

Present

Foreign Office.

Hejaz and Nejd Delegation

Sir L. Oliphant.
Mr G. W. Rendel.
Mr C. F. A. Warner

The Minister for the Hejaz and Nejd.
Fuad Bey Hamza

SIR L. OLIPHANT asked Fuad Bey Hamza to mention any questions which the delegation wished to discuss.

Fuad Bey Hamza replied that King Abdul Aziz had instructed them to raise the following points.—

1

The main purpose of the mission was to ascertain whether His Majesty's Government still felt for the Hejaz-Nejd Government the same goodwill as in the past, and still desired the maintenance of close relations of friendship. King Abdul Aziz had been anxious for some time past as to whether His Majesty's Government's attitude towards him had not undergone some modification. He had mentioned the matter to Sir Andrew Ryan in June last, and Sir Andrew had no doubt reported it. His Majesty hoped to receive from His Majesty's Government, not only formal support, but also moral and material support, such as he had received from His Majesty's Government in earlier days. The mission were, therefore, to ask for an assurance on this point and to enquire to what extent His Majesty's Government are prepared to support and advise the Hejaz-Nejd in time of need. King Abdul Aziz also wanted to know how he should guide his policy in order to meet the views of His Majesty's Government. This was the principal purpose of their mission.

II—Economic Questions.

Fuad Bey Hamza emphasised the present economic difficulties of the Hejaz-Nejd. King Abdul Aziz ardently desired the help of His Majesty's Government. The needs of the Hejaz-Nejd Government are numerous. They require, above all, financial help. The mission was therefore charged to enquire whether His Majesty's Government could make a loan to the Hejaz-Nejd Government and help them in other ways in their economic difficulties.

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E 3

There were in countries under British control various pious foundations, the proceeds of which, according to the wishes of the founders, should be devoted to the Holy Places of Islam. These proceeds are not now received in Mecca, and the Hejaz Nejd Government desired the help of His Majesty's Government in putting this right.

IV - Transjordan.

Fuad Bey remarked that it was useless to disguise that there had been considerable difficulties between Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan. The mission was charged by King Abdul Aziz to declare his readiness to make with Transjordan similar arrangements to those recently made with Iraq.

V - Soviet Activities and Propaganda

They were also to enquire, as King Abdul Aziz had enquired in the past, what policy His Majesty's Government would advise him to follow in regard to Soviet activities.

Fuad Bey Hamza said that these were the points which the mission were instructed to take up with His Majesty's Government. The one of fundamental importance was the first. If the reply on that point was encouraging, the others could be dealt with in turn.

Sir L. Oliphant then replied on each of these five points in turn.

As regards the first point, King Abdul Aziz's attitude towards the British Government, he said he had always been puzzled when, from time to time, it was reported that King Abdul Aziz felt doubts as to the continuance of the friendly attitude of His Majesty's Government. He assured Fuad Bey Hamza emphatically that in fundamentals that attitude was as cordial as ever. He stressed the phrase "in fundamentals." With the extension of the dominions of King Abdul Aziz, the points of contact with His Majesty's Government had increased in number. Since the war, His Majesty's Government had certain connexions with territories which were adjacent to those dominions and which formerly had been part of the Turkish Empire. Sir Lancelot emphasized that these were not colonies, but mandated territories, and that this distinction connoted a real difference of relationship, and a real difference in the degree of control exercised by His Majesty's Government. With the more numerous points of contact, occasions of differences between His Majesty's Government and the Hejaz Nejd Government had naturally arisen. King Abdul Aziz before now had explained that, when he spoke frankly, it was because it was appropriate to do so between friends. His Majesty's Government agreed with this sentiment, and when causes of difficulty arise, they too, believed in speaking frankly, as the best means of clearing up differences between friends. His Majesty must, therefore, not misunderstand them when they did so, or think that this showed a change of fundamental attitude. As he said before, he could give an absolute assurance that, fundamentally, His Majesty's Government's attitude remained one of sincere friendship.

Sir Lancelot added that if Fuad Bey, when he returned to his country, would explain this to His Majesty and remove any misapprehensions which might have on this subject, the mission's visit to this country would have been well worth while.

Fuad Bey Hamza expressed his pleasure at Sir L. Oliphant's statement, and he said he would do his best on his return to the Hejaz to eradicate from King Abdul Aziz's mind any mistaken ideas that might remain on this subject.

Passing to II, the mission's request for a loan, Sir L. Oliphant explained to Fuad Bey that it was at all likely that the mission's request could be answered soon, so that the mission might, if they wished, approach financial houses, although he feared that from that quarter, too, the chances of getting a loan were remote.

Fuad Bey Hamza said that, if His Majesty's Government would themselves make a loan to his Government, they could, perhaps, arrange one with some financial houses. His Government only required a loan of £500,000. In answer to a question, he explained that he meant £500,000 gold, or its equivalent, and that he had data as to what could be offered as security.

Sir L. Oliphant said that, while he could not encourage any hope in Fuad Bey, he would consult the competent department.

In regard to III, Haramain Wakfs, Sir L. Oliphant recalled that King Abdul Aziz had made a similar request some years ago, and His Majesty's Government had given a written reply. The Government of India could not interfere in religious and quasi-religious matters, and there were no religious courts in India. But His Majesty's Government had explained that, if the Hejaz-Nejd Government wished, they could have recourse to the civil courts, and had expressed readiness to consider sympathetically any request for assistance or advice.

Fuad Bey Hamza said that there were Wakfs administered by Government departments in British-controlled territory, e.g.

- (i) There were Wakfs in Palestine, administered by the Supreme Muslim Council.
- (ii) Certain moneys, sent by the Nizam of Hyderabad, were distributed in the Hejaz. Fuad Bey seemed to think that these might be the proceeds of Wakfs.
- (iii) A certain Ali Surraty († Sorati), probably an Indian, died in Java leaving properties in Rangoon, the proceeds of one third of which were to be devoted to the poor in Medina and Mecca. The Hejaz Nejd Government had applied to the authorities in Java, who replied that they could do nothing in respect of the properties in Burma and that application should be made to the Administrator General of Trade there. Nothing had been received by the Hejaz Nejd Government.

Fuad Bey also said that his Government might wish to send a delegation to India to make enquiries.

Sir L. Oliphant said that he would cause enquiries to be made regarding the Wakfs mentioned by Fuad Bey.

He would probably be ready to advise the Hejaz Nejd Government as to the choice of legal representatives if required.

In regard to point IV, Transjordan, Sir L. Oliphant said that there was no friction, and that in 1930 they were very bad indeed. He did not wish to go into details at the moment. It was, however, in his opinion, a very good sign that King Abdul Aziz should now have declared his readiness to make with Transjordan similar agreements to those made with Iraq. The matter was not, however, quite plain sailing, as he had already mentioned. Transjordan was not in this matter might arise. He would have the question examined.

As regards V, the question of relations with the Soviet, Sir L. Oliphant said that he would refer the matter to the Secretary of State.

Fuad Bey Hamza said that the relations of the Hejaz-Nejd Government with the Soviet Government maintained an embargo on Soviet imports. Reminded of the contract for the supply of certain consignments of Soviet benzine to the Hejaz Nejd, Fuad Bey Hamza said that that was a Government contract, and an exception to the general rule.

In reply to Sir L. Oliphant's enquiry whether there was any other question which he wished to raise, Fuad Bey Hamza said that, as he had already mentioned, the Hejaz-Nejd Government looked to His Majesty's Government for assistance in regard to the Wakfs. He said that Mr. Twitchell, who was no doubt referred to Mr. Twitchell, had recently been exploring the mineral

resources of the Hejaz and Hama, and had presented reports which he (Fuad Bey) had with him. King Abdul Aziz always preferred to deal with the British, and would welcome the assistance of British firms in exploiting the mineral resources of his country.

Sir L. Oliphant intimated that British firms might hesitate to accept the report not drawn up by a British expert, and that there might be doubt as to the value of British assistance at the present time.

E 2404 1494 25

No. 43.

Record of Third Meeting with the Hejaz-Nejd Delegation, held at the Foreign Office on May 19, 1932, at 11.30 a.m.

Present	
<i>Foreign Office</i>	<i>Hejaz and Nejd Delegation.</i>
Sir L. Oliphant (in the Chair)	The Minister for the Hejaz and Nejd
Mr G. W. Rendel	Fuad Bey Hamza
Mr C. F. A. Warner	

SIR L. OLIPHANT said that he was now in a position to reply, one by one, to the points raised by Fuad Bey Hamza at the previous meeting. He hoped that Fuad Bey would thereafter ask for any elucidation which he might desire.

I. He wished to confirm the assurance which he had given to the delegation at the last meeting, that His Majesty's Government desired, as in the past, the most cordial and friendly relations with the Hejazi Government.

II. As regards a loan by His Majesty's Government, it was quite out of the question for them to meet the wishes of the Hejazi Government in the matter. But arrangements had been made since the last meeting that Fuad Bey Hamza should be received at the Bank of England, where he would be given explanations as to the present financial situation in the city and could discuss the possibility of a public loan or one by some reputable financial house. But in saying this he did not desire to raise any false hopes. He had also spoken to the chairman of the Imperial Bank of Persia, and the chief manager of the bank, Mr. Eldred, would be happy to see Fuad Bey and to explain to him the preliminaries necessary for any financial ventures. Mr. Eldred would discuss the possibility of the Imperial Bank of Persia acting as London correspondents of the Hejazi Government, should this be desired. Sir L. Oliphant had also consulted a high official of the Treasury, who had confirmed his conviction that there was little, if any, chance of a loan for the Hejazi Government being entertained in the City at the present time.

III. As regards the Haramain Wakfs, the India Office had telegraphed to the Government of India, with special reference to the bequest of Ali Shirazi who had died in Java, the case to which Fuad Bey Hamza had specifically referred.

The Colonial Office had also consulted the Government of Palestine about the Palestine Wakfs, raised by Fuad Bey Hamza, but the reply which they had received was not clear. These two points would be actively pursued, and an answer made to the Hejazi Government as soon as possible.

IV. Dealing with Transjordan, Sir L. Oliphant said that, as he had already told Fuad Bey Hamza, he personally thought that if agreements could be made between the Hejaz and Nejd and Transjordan similar to those made between the Hejaz and Nejd and Iraq, it would make a vast difference in the relations between the two countries, and while there were considerable difficulties in the way, a further study of the matter would be pursued energetically.

V. As regards the relations between the Hejaz and Nejd and the Soviet Government, the opinion of His Majesty's Government was that the views and tenets of the Soviet Government were presumably very different from those of King Abdul Aziz. If, however, King Abdul Aziz thought fit, in spite of this, to change his present policy towards the Soviet Government, it would, of course, not be a matter upon which His Majesty's Government would be in a position to feel aggrieved.

Fuad Bey Hamza said that he wished, as regards point I, to express his thanks for the assurances given by His Majesty's Government, he would communicate them to King Abdul Aziz.

It was a great personal grief and disappointment to him that His Majesty's Government could not see their way to assist the Hejazi Government with a loan. His Government might now have no alternative, but to look elsewhere for help. He wished to be quite frank and not to leave His Majesty's Government under a false impression.

Sir L. Oliphant here interrupted him to assure him that it was a matter of great regret to His Majesty's Government also, and that it was of course natural that the Hejazi Government should try to raise a loan elsewhere, and that His Majesty's Government would not for a moment misunderstand such action.

Fuad Bey Hamza continued that in connexion with Transjordan, the Hejazi Government would wait to hear further from His Majesty's Government. The proposal for the conclusion of agreements had been made in the interests of the two countries and not from any personal motives.

As regards the Soviet, he thought it unlikely that there would be any important change in the attitude of his Government.

At Mr. Rendel's suggestion, Fuad Bey Hamza said that he would like to see Mr. Eldred, and that he would like to see the Minister for the Hejaz and Nejd, but this was to be regarded as a personal suggestion of his own.

He was assured that the matter would be examined.

The meeting was then concluded.

E 2469 27 25

No. 44

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated by Colonial Office, May 19)

(No. 14. Confidential.)

THE Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonial Office, London, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of a letter from the Political Agent, Kuwait, No. 48, dated the 6th April, 1932 (with enclosure) respecting the Sheikh of Kuwait's visit to Riadh.

Bushire, April 22, 1932

Enclosure 1 in No. 44

Political Agent, Kuwait, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

(No. 48. Confidential.)

Sir, Kuwait, April 6, 1932.

REFERENCE my telegram No. 45 dated the 5th April, 1932.

2. I have the honour to send you some notes on the Sheikh's recent visit to Riadh, which you may find interesting, including the impressions left on the Sheikh's mind by the visit.

3. I enclose five copies in case you would like to distribute them.

4. I am sending one copy direct to Jeddah as they may be found useful.

I have, &c.

H. B. P. DICKSON, Lieut.-Colonel,
Political Agent, Kuwait

Notes on his Excellency Sheikh Ahmad's Trip to Riadh.

HIS Excellency the Sheikh returned to Kuwait on the 3rd April, 1932, having back an extra twenty four hours there.

of Kuwait proceeded on the 2nd April to Khabrat al Duwsh, 57 miles out, to meet the Sheikh and party. As he failed to arrive the Political Agent and the others again went out to a point 22 miles from Kuwait on the 3rd April, 1932 (Hawabidah). This meeting of their Ruler is an old custom and highly valued by both Ruler and people of Kuwait.

3. The following are the main points of interest connected with the Sheikh's entry into the city.

- The Sheikh and party arrived there at 3.30 P.M. in fifteen cars. Ten being those his party took to Riadh and the remaining five being new ones presented by Ibn Saud.
 - The Sheikh halted half an hour for coffee and to get tidied up preparatory to making his official entry into the city.
 - This entry was made at 5 P.M., a total of some forty cars taking part in the procession.
 - The Sheikh led the procession in a large "Cadillac" 8-cylinder saloon car, presented to Ibn Saud by Mr. Crane, the American, and which formed the principal present of the King to the Sheikh.
 - The Sheikh mounted on the Political Agent sitting on his right hand during the entry.
 - Wonderful scenes of rejoicing were met with, and route from Jahara Gate to the town palace was lined with thousands of cheering crowds. In particular, large numbers of women were in evidence, both in the streets and lining house-tops, and their ululations and singing were a feature. At intervals swordsmen danced before the cars to the accompaniment of drum beating, &c.
 - The Ruler made his way to his Great Mijlis hall on the sea front, and there halted and held a reception at which the whole city seemed to be present. This lasted till nightfall, when the Sheikh was able to get away and see his own family at "Daaman" Palace.
- and the welcome the people gave their Ruler was significant as well as touching.

4. On the 4th April 1932, the Sheikh came and saw the Political Agent and recounted his experiences, which were as follows:—

- The outward journey, of exactly 462 miles by mileometer, and made in twenty three hours of actual driving, was via Manaqish, Khabrat al Duwsh, Khabari Wantha, Jarraya Ilya, Thalant Turaibi to Kauhara (immediately east of the Dhana on Sadher's 1910 route). From there cars turned sharp west and proceeded to Rumia and Rumhiyah. From there again cars followed the route Shaib Humayim, to Hamama, Hamama, through Bawabiyat, direct to Riadh, leaving Banban about 7 miles to west.

(Return journey was the same except that the party were taken to Al Khafs by the King, who spent two days in camp there with the King. At Khafs the cars went up Shaib al Tauki till they reached Riadh.)

The road was hard and gravelly going except when Dhana was crossed. This strip was sandy and very trying on cars. Tyres had not to be deflated however, but the Sheikh remarked that any cars travelling by this route in future should have five wheels each, excluding driver, as frequently cars stuck and only five persons could get cars out of sand.

From Rumhiyah to Riadh road was terribly stony, with many boulders everywhere.

At Bawabiyat was, perhaps, the worst portion of the whole road, as here the track wound down a steep spur with precipices on one side, and a single mistake would have meant that a car would go over the edge and be dashed to bits in the gorge below.

The return detour via Khafs though a trifle longer, was easier.

- The Sheikh and party arrived at Riadh on the 5th April, 1932, and went out to pitch camp for him. The meeting was most cordial and affectionate, and was followed by eight days of Royal entertainment in the capital with two days in the camp at Al Khafs.
- The Sheikh saw all members of the Al Saud family, including Amir Saud (son), Mahomed (brother), Abdullah (brother), Ibn Musand, Governor of Hail (cousin), and the leading members of the Ibn Rashid family of Hail, including Mahomed bin-Tallal, the ex Amir of Jebel Shammar.
- As the Sheikh was not like other Arabs, who usually come to beg for money or a gift. His sole object was to see his old friend and brother, and to remove wrong impressions that the newspapers and other interested parties were trying to convey, namely that he Sheikh Ahmad, was trying to form a confederacy of Arab Rulers of the Gulf, more or less in opposition to him the King. He added that Ibn Saud was his elder brother, and as such it was his (Ahmad's) duty to come and see him from time to time. He wished Ibn Saud clearly to understand from the beginning that he desired no form of favour or present from him nor would he accept any but that if he would like to give his servants the customary largesse, that, of course, was not his concern.
- According to the Sheikh, Ibn Saud who literally wept copious tears on their arrival, in reply to this preliminary speech, swore that Kuwait was the loveliest spot in the whole universe, its Ruler his dearest friend, and its women the most fair. That his love for the house of Subah was eternal and that just as the Al Saud and Al Subah Standards had flown side by side in every victory or defeat, during the last 300 years, so he prayed and believed it would continue to so fly in future. This and very much more in the same strain was said according to the Sheikh, and Ibn Saud surpassed all expectations in the way he went out of his way to make his guests feel comfortable and happy.

5. The following were the principal subjects of conversation that took place between himself and Ibn Saud (according to the Sheikh):—

- He said he could manage Europeans easily, but he believed a European war was again coming, in which case the Turks would find a way of returning to Iraq, and Persia would endeavour to seize Bahrain and Muscat. The Turks and Persians were far away the worst Moslems in the world, and also far more cunning in their methods than any European Power. Hence he feared them.
- He thought a great deal of King Feisal, whom he liked for his honourable and straight dealings. Abdullah of Transjordan, on the other hand, he thought was a poisonous intriguer who was responsible for all the trouble in the Arab world. He said he could not rest and let the past be. He feared Abdullah would not be happy till he raised another rebellion against him (by this he meant said the Sheikh, that Abdullah was responsible for the Akhwan rebellion of 1929-30).
- Ibn Saud told him that he intended shortly sending Emir Feisal, his second son, on a tour of the European capitals in the same way as the King of Saudi Arabia had done. Feisal would be accompanied by him and his secretary, Yusuf Yasin, would in their absence be in charge of his Foreign Office.
- He would return to Mecca on or about the 5th April from his Khafs tour. He had already sent back certain stones and objects of interest to Riadh to be forwarded to him in Mecca.

- (e) The King did not press the Sheikh to go to the Haj this year but promised that next spring (1933) he would come up to Kow for a few weeks and then would take Sheikh Ahmad to the Haj, making first a tour of Riath, Qasim and Hail. From the latter place he would go to Medina and then lastly to Mecca. This plan he had worked out and would follow to the letter.
- (f) The Sheikh asked if he, Ibn Saud, had really borrowed £500,000 from the English. But his host did not give him a "yea" or "nay," but contented himself by saying that he was trying to get a loan, and that Egyptian and Iraqi newspapers would stupidly attach ridiculous conditions and terms to any efforts of his to raise such loan.
- (g) The Sheikh warned him again and again to go slow in the matter of expenditure, and said that in the way he was going he would most assuredly "crash." The Sheikh said that he particularly talked "straight" in the matter of the obvious waste that he saw all round him where motor cars were concerned. He urged Ibn Saud reduce his number of cars by three-quarters and standardise by concentrating on one make of cars. He said that he saw a few good cars, but expenditure on every form and variety of expensive cars which he saw round him. In this connexion the Sheikh said that it made his "stomach pain and his heart sore" to see the number of cars obviously new and expensive that, after doing only 5,000 kilom., were discarded as scrap-iron. Ignorant Bedouin drivers were, of course, responsible and lack of proper supervision. The Amir Saud, for instance, had eighty cars to himself, and God knew how many Ibn Muzaid and the Amir Faisal possessed. According to the Sheikh, he strongly advised the King to appoint a good Englishman in place of the rascally Indian "Sadiq" to be in the sole charge of all mechanical transport, together with half a dozen honest British mechanics (ex soldiers) who would be under him. The Englishman, of course, to have extensive powers for fines, dismissals, &c. The King did not seem to relish the suggestions.
- (h) The Sheikh asked if he had had the country round Riath and Al Khafra. The King said "yes," but that he was not anxious in the least to grant concessions to foreigners.
- (i) Whilst in Riath, a convoy arrived bearing machinery and gear for a 4,000 mile radius new wireless set. This was to be set up in Riath.
- (j) The Sheikh said he asked Ibn Saud what would be his policy when the English withdrew from Iraq altogether. Ibn Saud replied, obviously in joke, said the Sheikh, that he would not be slow to take advantage of such situation, as Iraq was a good country.
- (k) On the subject of the Kuwait blockade, Ibn Saud kept complete silence, and Sheikh Ahmad said it would have been undignified for him to open the question or make any mention of a matter which might convey the impression that he came as a suppliant. Ibn Saud did, however, mention that he knew his frontier officers were mostly bad. He said that he was responsible for a number of them that took place. He said that he was not going to let them go, but he was going to let them go. He said that he was not going to let them go, but he was going to let them go. He said that he was not going to let them go, but he was going to let them go.
- (l) The King, after the lunch, went to the Residency, Hushra and Gomer, Dammam and Hushra, and expressed great pleasure at having met them in Hushra recently.

The following are some of the impressions on the Sheikh's mind as a result of his visit:

- (a) Ibn Saud's position was unassailable so long as he remained alive. The whole laboriously built system would, however, most assuredly topple

and collapse as soon as the King died. Ibn Saud still inspired wholesome fear wherever he went, and this was especially evident at Riath. He was a very powerful man, and his system was more than ever a one man show.

- (b) Ibn Saud was, on the other hand, a definitely sick and unfit man. Gone were the days when he was the hardest man in his kingdom and led every raid and foray.

Sheikh Ahmad opined that this was because he never took any exercise these days at all and ate far too much. On one occasion he, Ibn Saud, took the Sheikh to his old capital of Dharaiyeh and both got out to walk. After 100 yards or so the King began to pant and blow and said he could not go on. This gave the Sheikh the opportunity of giving him a lecture, and he urged on him the vital necessity of taking at least half an hour's walk each day, and begged him to stop taking drugs, which apparently the King now cannot do without.

- (c) The King, said the Sheikh, ate far too much to be good for him, and at one sitting could put away a whole lamb himself.

- (d) The Amir Saud was a fine upstanding young man, as tall as his father and with lots of character, but at the "break up" which would assuredly follow the King's death, the Sheikh much doubted if Saud would be able to "make good." There were the ambitious Mahomed and Abdullah and a host of others, who all even now hated and were jealous of one another, to be reckoned with. All would be at each other's throats when the strong hand left them.

The Sheikh was particularly taken with the Amir Saud's charms of manner, and was overwhelmed altogether when the latter called and, after paying his respects, said: "I want you to treat me *firstly* as your best friend, and *secondly* as your son, and *thirdly* as your enemy." Perhaps the Amir Saud saw the day not far distant when he would wait on him on the coast.

- (e) The Amir Ibn Muzaid had aged very greatly. He was only 40 years old, but the Sheikh, who knew him well, said he was shocked to see what a great change had come over him. He was obviously being killed by worry and the cares of his high office.

- (f) The town of Riath was indescribably filthy, and, except for the group of houses in the centre, the town was a mass of filth. The flies were dreadful, and smells and refuse in painful evidence. The Sheikh said he again and again urged the King to build outside the city for health reasons and encourage the members of his family to do likewise.

- (g) Splendid rains fell during his sojourn in Riath, and the whole country south and west of the Dahana was green and dotted with wild flowers. A contrast to the state of affairs north of the Dahana and round Kowit.

H. R. P. DICKSON, Lieutenant Colonel

E 2609 76 25

No 45

Telegram Communicated by Colonial Office.—(Received May 23)

(1)

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

(No 38. Secret.)

(Telegraphic) P

May 26, 1932.

I HAVE received information to-day from a reliable source that from 200 to 400 tribesmen of Billa and other frontier tribes have passed recently through Akaba from Sinai on riding camels, not accompanied by their families, and are

travelling southwards into the Hejaz. Local reports (especially from Akaba) say that the object of this expedition is to raise the Hejazi tribes to revolt against their King.
(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 23.)

2

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

No. 39)

(Telegraphic) P

May 26, 1932

My telegram of the 26th May No. 38, Secret

The order in my immediately following telegram is being issued by Emir Abdullah to day, addressed to the Transjordan Government and to the Officer Commanding the Arab Legion

(3)

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

No. 40)

(Telegraphic)

May 26, 1932

FOLLOWING is condensed summary of my immediately preceding telegram

"It has come to my ears from the British Resident that a large number of tribesmen without their women and children, have passed through Southern Transjordan and assembled south of Akaba under leadership of Hajj bin Rasadah. It is said that these people expect help from me for some evil purpose in Hejaz. I order you to cause these people to return to their families in Sinai, Palestine or Transjordan and to prevent passage through Transjordan of any persons whose movements give cause for suspicion that their intentions are not wholly peaceful

[E 2619/76 25]

No. 40

Chargé d'Affaires, Jeddah, to Sir John Simon (Received May 28)

(No. 59)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, May 27, 1932.

JERUSALEM telegram No. 38 to Colonial Office.

Hejaz Government on 14th May sent long and somewhat strongly worded reply to my Beni Atiya note of 22nd April. Translation went by bag, due London 4th June, and Jerusalem via Residency, Egypt. Besides dealing with Beni Atiya and asking for agreement with Transjordan similar to that with Iraq, it asked for explanation of "arrangement made by Amir of Transjordan to provoke disturbance in Akaba-Moon area," alleging that Hajj bin Rifada-al-Awar was in Egypt under instructions from Amir Abdullah, that he was to receive from the Hejazi Bedouin money to return, and instructions to work in the Hejaz, that Amir would help them with money and arms, and that there were special parties of Bedouin at Akaba who had been paid to prepare for operations to disturb the peace in the Hejaz. I had to request further necessary information, such as—

be investigated on basis of the fullest information from the Hejaz Government. This was followed on 25th May and 26th May by interviews with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was hostile and not to be trusted. He promised more information, especially about Awar, who was a troublesome refugee of long standing.

I should not have telegraphed this but for serious nature of reported raid and its potential consequences and possible connexion with both Hejazi allegations.

I should like to know date of passage of raid through Akaba so that I may give Hejaz Government friendly warning if you agree and if Captain Glubb has not already given it to Ibn Zaid.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 82)

E 2660 76 25]

No. 47

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan — (Received in Foreign Office May 31)

(No. 39)

(Telegraphic) P

Colonial Office, May 28, 1932

REFERENCE the last paragraph of Jeddah telegram to Foreign Office, No. 59 repeated to Transjordan, No. 42. I shall be glad if you will report date of passage through Akaba if known. Has Glubb warned Ibn Zaid? If he has

favour of His Majesty's representative at Jeddah giving immediate friendly

quoted in your telegram No. 40 at the same time. His Majesty's representative at Jeddah is being given authority to take any action which may be required in the light of your reply, which should be repeated to him.

(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 42)

E 2694 76 25

No. 48

Sir A. Rynn to Sir John Simon — (Received June 2)

(No. 61)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah June 1, 1932

TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 41 to Colonial Office

Owing to increasing urgency of matter Hope Gill telephoned substance of Transjordan telegram No. 38 to Minister for Foreign Affairs early on 30th May

although it did not deal specifically with points raised therein. My immediately following telegram gives gist of this communication.

Hejaz Government have pressed me for immediate reply to their latest note. I have confined myself to conveying to them my latest information as given in

ment could have acted in the short time available on the vague information in Hejaz note of 14th May or that Ibn Rifada's performance implicated Transjordan Government head of which, in fact, issued suitable instructions as soon as possible (see Transjordan telegram No. 23 to Jeddah), and saying I must postpone further reply pending your instructions. I trust I may receive these as soon as possible in view of obvious desire of Hejaz Government to exploit the incident and its possible repercussions on Hejaz side of the frontier.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 83)

E 2695 76 25]

No. 49

Sir A. Rynn to Sir John Simon — (Received June 1)

(No. 82)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, June 1, 1932

FOLLOWING is condensed summary of Hejazi note of 30th May, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.

I tried to convince you in conversation on 24th and 25th May (sic) of importance of matter and harmfulness of leniency. We are accustomed to give British Government warnings of impending risings, which they doubt

at first but afterwards find to be true. Our telephone conversation of 30th May shows that our information about Ibn Rifada was correct and that he had entered our territory with evil intent. Had British Government paid attention to our note of 14th May there would have been no need for your telephone message. We can cope with Ibn Rifada and have taken precautionary measures. We must, however, draw attention to danger of such incidents in view of untrustworthy attitude of Transjordan Government after incident, because Ibn Rifada could not himself equip even one person for such an enterprise and undoubtedly got help in Transjordan. We learn that he took arms from Akaba itself, and send you a copy of a telegram from Governor Dhaba supplementing previous information. We cannot keep silence regarding attitude of Transjordan Government consequently

1. We protest against their indulgence, which has resulted in escape into our territory of Ibn Rifada fifteen days after we warned British Government.

2. We seek immediate information regarding action taken by British Government before and after the incident to prevent help being given to evil-doers.

3. We request undertaking from British Government on its own behalf and that of Transjordan to prevent entry of any of the criminals into Transjordan.

4. We request similar undertaking to surrender to us immediately any criminals who have participated in these evil actions and have fled to Transjordan.

This is what we ask in connexion with present incident. We also request that effect be given immediately to our suggestions for solution of difficulties between us and Transjordan before matters develop with evil consequences.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 84.)

[E 2691 76 25]

No. 50

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. — (Received in Foreign Office, June 2)

(No. 41)

(Telegraphic) P

May 30, 1932

With reference to your telegram No. 39 of the 28th May, on the night of the 20th/21st May some 400 to 450 tribesmen passed north of Akaba and established themselves in Hejaz territory at Sharieh, some 7 kilom. south of Akaba. According to latest reports they moved off further south on the 27th May. Glubb has not warned Ibn Zeid, and it is not possible to make arrangements for Glubb to see him immediately. I am of opinion, therefore, that a warning should be given by His Majesty's representative.

(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 26.)

E 2734 76 25

No. 51

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon. — (Received June 3)

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, June 3, 1932

MY telegram No. 61

Situation in Northern Hejaz is evidently causing much perturbation in Government circles here. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs is seeing me to-morrow morning to discuss matters dealt with in recent correspondence.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 85.)

E 2735 76 25

No. 52

A. Ryan to Sir John Simon. — (Received June 3)

(No. 64.)

Jeddah, June 3, 1932

I received this morning long Hejazi note, dated 1st June, and evidently written before receipt of my reply to note summarised in my telegram No. 62. My immediately following telegram gives main points.

Admission that forces, apparently consisting of Akhwan, are being moved towards frontier, indicates serious situation in north, which may possibly be ripe for widespread revolt. I postpone further comment until after conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-morrow.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 86.)

E 2743 76 25

No. 53

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon. — (Received June 3)

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, June 3, 1932

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following are main points in Hejazi note of 1st June:—

(a) Passage of tribesmen through Transjordan must have occurred before 2nd/3rd May. It is impossible that a force of 400-450 men could have passed without the knowledge of Transjordan Government, nor is it reasonable to suppose that British authorities were ignorant of these proceedings.

(b) In view of information conveyed in Hejazi note of 14th May and request therein for precautionary measures, the British authorities should have had information some six days before arrival of mischief-makers in Transjordan.

(c) Hejazi Government are confident, in view of strong and recently confirmed friendship between them and His Majesty's Government, that latter had no information concerning the matter and gave no instructions, but action of Transjordan Government in permitting formation of enemy force and allowing it to pass has been hostile and contrary to international law. They are responsible, even without regard to Hejazi Government's information that they have helped with money and arms.

(d) Hejazi Government are perplexed and desire a clear definition of His Majesty's Government's attitude towards action of Transjordan Government, so that they may know what attitude themselves to adopt towards that Government and their completely hostile action.

(e) The King has ordered forces from village settlements in north-west of Nejd to move towards the frontier districts, and has also ordered necessary preparations to meet all eventualities.

f) Responsibility for consequences of these movements must rest on Transjordan Government. In addition to requests contained in their note of 14th May, Hejazi Government reserve the right to compensation for losses which may result from incident contrary to international law and to the letter and spirit of Hadda Agreement.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 87.)

E 2743 76, 25,

No. 54

Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner, Transjordan.

(No. 41)
(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, June 4, 1932.

FOIPA telegrams Nos. 61, 62, 63, 65 and 66 to Foreign Office show that there is danger of serious situation developing in Northern Hejaz, which may involve stability of Ibn Saud's regime in that area. Friendly relations existing between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud, and, indeed, ordinary international obligations, make it essential to ensure that possible rebellion obtains no support or assistance from Transjordan, that rebels are unable to use Transjordan as base of operations or place of refuge, and that good faith of His Majesty's Government in whole affair should not be open to doubt. It is therefore essential that any situation which appears to be developing may have to be urgently considered early next week, and it is essential that I should be in full possession of your views at earliest possible moment, particularly on following points.—

- (a) Do you consider that there is any possibility of the existence of complicity or connivance on part of Amir or leading Transjordan Arabs or for statement that Ibn Rifada purchased arms in Akaba and obtained money from Transjordan sources?
- (b) Do you supply any information regarding control measures in force, particularly in Akaba district, prior to Rifada incursion which could be effectively quoted to show that reasonable measures were in force to prevent Transjordan territory in this area being used in connexion with subversive activities against Ibn Saud?
- (c) Please report fully as to measures taken to prevent assistance being given to possible rebels by persons in Transjordan, since Amir's order of 26th May.
- (d) Do you consider that if serious rebellion should develop in Northern Hejaz and rebel Hejazi subjects attempt to escape from Ibn Saud's forces into or through Transjordan, it would be possible to close frontier against them?
- (e) If not, what measures can you suggest to ensure that any fugitive rebels who may enter Transjordan are so controlled as to prevent them from using Transjordan territory as a base for further hostile incursions into Hejaz or further subversive activities against Ibn Saud?
- (f) Do you consider that His Majesty's Government should be informed that no guarantee could be given that any rebels escaping into Transjordan would be surrendered to Hejazi authorities, and that each case would have to be examined as and when it arose. If, however, large scale rebellion should develop as result of, or in connexion with, Ibn Rifada's incursion, it may be necessary to consider adoption of policy corresponding to that adopted by His Majesty's Government at the time of rebellion in North Eastern Nejd in 1929, when escaping rebel leaders were as far as possible surrendered. In that event, do you consider that any kind of arrangement for the surrender of rebel leaders would be desirable?
- (g) Can you suggest any measures to prevent further passage of possible rebels into Northern Hejaz through Transjordan territory?

With regard to Hejaz-Nejd Government's final request in Jeddah telegram No. 62 as proposed, it is that a waspish incursion into Jordan their suggestion for conclusion of treaty settlement between Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd on lines of that concluded with Iraq is receiving consideration, but cannot be decided forthwith and must therefore be left to be dealt with independently of present issue.

(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 44.)

E 2743 76 25,

No. 55

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 4, 1932.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 61-66 of 1st to 3rd June Ibn Rifada's incursion into the Hejaz.

Hejaz-Nejd Minister made somewhat similar representations here on 1st June.

Now see Colonial Office telegram No. 41 to Transjordan, repeated to you.

Pending High Commissioner's reply, when further instructions will be sent, you may let Hejaz-Nejd Government know that His Majesty's Government are in urgent communication with him as to facts and as to measures which can be taken.

(Repeated to Transjordan No. 42.)

E 2326 76 25]

No. 50

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 7)

(Nos. 67 and 68.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 7, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 45.

I sent formal message in prescribed sense to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cairo, on 4th June. I had been told by the Acting Minister that the points of which were as follows. He said that his Government had known of Ibn Rifada's activities for about ten months. They were connected with a plot having ramifications in Cairo, Baghdad and Amman. Egyptian consul here (now on leave) had tried to create secret committee to upset Hejaz Government, and had on his return to Egypt encouraged Ibn Rifada. Others implicated were Amir of Transjordan and Iraqi representative here, whose secretary was a creature of King Ali and whose efforts to promote success of plot had included insistence on being allowed to reside in Mecca, &c.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to secret source of information in Egypt, more particularly evidence of a refugee from Wejh, named Mahmoud, who was connected with Ibn Rifada. The refugee had received £20 from Transjordan agent in Egypt and had gone to Amman, but finding out scheme was not properly organised had disclosed facts in letter to the Amir of Hejaz, dated 30th May. The Amir Abdullah had given £1,000 to Ibn Rifada. Invading party was said to have included a person said to be an Egyptian or according to others a British officer. Bedouins were reported to be saying that the enterprise had British and Egyptian support. Suspect Egyptian launch had been detained at Wejh.

The King was satisfied that His Majesty's Government were not concerned. He had not anticipated danger from country like Transjordan, where British officers were stationed. He had now ordered forces from various village settlements as well as large loads of arms and supplies. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was satisfied that the situation was under control. The King desired advice of His Majesty's Government in regard to particular incident and as to whether he should regard Egypt, Transjordan and Iraq as enemies or friends.

I deprecated hasty conclusion. His Majesty's Government desired stability in Arabia, and would certainly not wish Transjordan territory to be used for purposes hostile to Ibn Saud. All British officials in Transjordan were above suspicion, but they could not know every Bedouin movement at moment of its occurrence. I discounted evidence against the Amir and Transjordan Government pointing out worthlessness of such a man like Abu Togeysa, and emphasised immediate action taken by the Amir. Transjordan Government could not be accused of breach of international law unless they had been accomplices or so negligent as to have thereby facilitated passage of Ibn Rifada. I described the whole episode as a serious one, but one which could only be averted by personal collaboration on frontiers.

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I asked for elucidation of King's request for advice as regards neighbouring Governments. He said that he was not accusing Governments but persons in the capital, e.g., he drew distinction between King Feisal and King Ali. He asked me to await further conversations before telegraphing.

In second conversation Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs pressed me for my personal view of position of Egyptian Government and probable attitude of His Majesty's Government if his Government used retaliatory measures to meet breach of international law involved in toleration of hostile activities. I expressed inability to answer latter question, but said as from myself everything to Egyptian Government or precipitating rupture over the present incident. He definitely asked whether, as there had been violation of Transjordan territory by Ibn Rifada, I would put up with Egyptian Government on behalf both of Transjordan and of Hejaz-Nejd. I promised to put the question, but was guarded as to your probable reaction.

He asked me to collaborate in communiqué designed to prevent distorted rumours. I refused on ground of delay which would be entailed by reference to actual facts and not to envelop the situation by controversial attribution of responsibility.

He said the King intended to evacuate all tribesmen from area south of Hejaz Transjordan frontier as a temporary measure of military necessity. I made no comment, but criticised as being contrary to Hadda Agreement a decision which he had spoken earlier to require Atun and [Ibn] Huweitat to settle superseded by plan to evacuate whole area provisionally.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs put forward on behalf of King request that Transjordan should not allow them to approach frontier authorities. He wished to see them overstepping it in ignorance. (b) His Majesty's Government should conclude, or cause Transjordan to conclude, agreement with Hejaz Nejd similar to those between latter and Iraq.

I could get no information of magnitude of situation in affected area. According to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ibn Rifada is still near frontier and is not getting assistance for which he had hoped from Transjordan. My impression is that his adventures may possibly have misfired, but that in any case King is pursuing definite aim as follows: (a) to crush any movement, (b) to use incident as means of pressure on His Majesty's Government to bring about new treaty settlement between him and Transjordan.

I agree that last-named question is separate from immediate issue, but in present circumstances any attempt to evade it or treat it as entirely independent will breed suspicion.

Diplomatic atmosphere is completely friendly so far.

Will you give necessary telegraphic information to Cairo and Bagdad? I will send them record of above conversation.
(Repeated to Transjordan, Nos 88 and 89.)

E 2812/76 25] No. 57

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 8.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic) P

June 7, 1932

YOUR No 41 of the 4th June.

(a) It is believed that movement has been financed and engineered by Ibn Rifada. The Emir was previously aware of it, but is not believed to have given financial assistance. His proclamation

(see my telegram No. 40 of the 26th May) can be quoted against allegation of his concentration, which is in Hejaz territory, is composed almost entirely of Hejaz tribesmen. No money has been obtained from Transjordan sources, but some twenty five rifles are reported to have been purchased in Akaba.

(b) Prior to Rifada concentration, as no abnormal situation was anticipated, there were no special measures in force.

There is a small police post at Akaba, but concentration of Ibn Rifada in Egypt and his passage through Palestine and Transjordan were unknown to the Governments of Transjordan and Palestine till after he had entered Hejaz territory. It has not been possible to stop infiltration in spite of orders to prevent further Hejazis passing.

(c) The Beni Atiya have been effectively prevented from joining movement, and guarantees have been taken from other Transjordan sheikhs in southern area.

I am anxious to close the frontier, and suggest that Ibn Saud should be informed that onus of preventing escape of his rebels from Hejaz rests with him. All possible steps will, however, be taken to assist Hejaz authorities. Rebels could probably be stopped if they were to attempt to pass near Akaba, but if they move north and attempt to cross at night it would be difficult to stop them.

(d) Except for possible isolated individuals, the rebels have not come from Transjordan. Transjordan will be disarmed and removed from the frontier.

No guarantee should be given for surrender of escaping rebels, since under Palestine and Transjordan law in absence of an extradition agreement, their surrender would be illegal. It is not possible to guarantee that no kind of guarantee will be given, but I am not prepared to honour any guarantee, however limited its terms.

(g) The strip of Transjordan territory over which these people pass is very narrow near the coast. Every possible police measure will be taken in Palestine and Transjordan, and should still more so be taken in Sinai.

Owing to lack of food in Hejaz this year, I consider that food scarcity may go far to check any rebellion.

I am now taking energetically all measures possible to prevent food supplies being sent to the rebels from Palestine or Transjordan, and I have no doubt that these measures will be effective.

It is clear that the present situation is not a serious one, and that it is not clear that the present situation is not a serious one, and that it is not clear that the present situation is not a serious one.
(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 20.)

E 2813 76 25]

No. 58

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 60)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 8, 1932

MY telegram Nos. 67 and 68 of 6th June.

Urgent message received last evening from Minister for Foreign Affairs communicates report that brigands have been at Sharith, four hours south of Akaba, for ten days, and that Ibn Rifada himself has gone to Amir (sic) to procure certain requirements, also that brigands are buying rifles at Akaba for £5 or £6 each.

Hejaz Government draw attention of His Majesty's Government to this and request the arrest and surrender to them of Ibn Rifada.
(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 90.)

[7707]

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[E 2815/76/25]

No. 59

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 205.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 11, 1932

IN my immediately preceding despatch is transmitted a translation of a speech delivered by Ibn Saud in Mecca on the 12th April, as reported in the "Lum-al-Qura." I understand from some who were present that much more was said in the same vein of religious emotion, but that the newspaper has succeeded in adequately reproducing the main gist of the matter.

2. The occasion was the customary Royal banquet given to some 500 representatives of Moslem States at Arafat. Neither the Indian vice-consul nor, I think, any of the Moslem foreign representatives were present, although they were invited. A number of prominent Indian pilgrims attended however.

3. The speech as heard and retailed has been badly received and is severely criticised, the remark "By God, I fear the foreigner once, but I fear those who pretend to be Moslem three thousand times," being regarded as particularly offensive. My Turkish and Iraqi colleagues are highly indignant at the uncomplimentary reference to the Saudi régime as "processes of the East." It is done, the sins committed, and the peace violated." I am credibly informed that when Ibn Saud came to Jedda after the pilgrimage he shocked a number of leading Jeddawis by greeting them with the words "I could cut the throats of every one of you."

4. All observers are agreed that Ibn Saud is at his wit's end to obtain money, and many affirm that he is feeling insecure. He certainly seems to have lost much of the poise and balance which distinguished him in the early days of his Hejazi adventure. His present state of uncertainty, with its symptomatic lack of control of ideas and expression, but not yet of action, seems to me to be caused by a very real fear for his financial position, an increased feeling of futility amid the complexities of government, and a growing sense of the hostility which surrounds him in the Hejaz and the Moslem world outside. It was noticed that during the forty-eight hours which he recently spent at Jedda he remained outside the town, which he normally never fails to visit for some inspection or other, indeed he hardly put foot outside the palace building.

5. The effect of these obsessions is aggravated by ill health. At my short formal audience of the 1st May Ibn Saud was listless, and looked a very different man from what he was a year and a half ago. His face had yellowed under the skin and was puffy, puckered and much more lined. Dr. Najj al-Asil, who has had a number of private audiences in Mecca, confirms my impression that Ibn Saud is physically very unwell and mentally obsessed by problems which he cannot solve and which he now fears to face. It is probable that he will return to Riyadh as soon as he decently can, probably in less than a month's time.

6. I may here mention that on the 1st May Ibn Saud was polite, but distant. He smiled once or twice, but had nothing to say. I purposely allowed two long pauses to lengthen in order to draw, if possible, some reference to current topics, such as the Minister's absence. Ibn Saud at length broke the first silence with a comment on the weather, which had already received adequate comment. I broke the second one myself with a request for permission to leave.

I have, &c.

C G HOPE GILL.

[E 2835/76/25]

No. 60

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 9.)

No. 70

Jedda, June 9, 1932

TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 43 to Colonial Office

I appreciate High Commission's difficulty and am myself averse from undertakings, fulfilment of which cannot be guaranteed or scope of which may be subject of controversy. I must, however, draw attention to the following—

(d) Formal intimation to Ibn Saud that onus of preventing escape rested with him would justify him in massing troops along the frontier. This would greatly increase the danger of his violating Transjordan territory, even if he should wish in good faith to avoid it.

(f) Argument that surrender of criminals is illegal in the absence of extradition agreement was not used in the formula in Jedda report for May-June 1931, paragraphs 27 and 28, although promise of surrender was avoided in second formula and provision was made for expulsion. If argument of illegality is now used openly it will not only strengthen support to Ibn Saud's theory that new treaty settlement, including extradition agreement, is only cure for situation.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 94.)

[E 2860/76/91]

No. 61

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 71)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 9, 1932

MY telegram No. 60

Further urgent message received last night from Minister for Foreign Affairs conveys information in following paragraph, with request that greatest care may be taken in preventing supplies from reaching rebels, and that persons crossing into Transjordan may be arrested and handed over to Hejazi authorities only. Message is slightly obscure in parts.

Rebels are at Sharrah. Ibn Rifada, with Mohammed Abdurrahman and Abu Bageyga [sic], went to see Amir at Amman. Akaba merchant Abu Kabarti also went to Amman. He said that Amir had promised to send him two aeroplanes and a quantity of arms and ammunition, and to make a promise of abundance of further supplies and arms after ten days. Aeroplanes were sent to Amman and to Sharrah. Kaseba had feared that the rebels because party were further south.

It is not clear from message whether promise mentioned above is attributed to Amir or was given by Ibn Rifada, &c., to their followers.

(Repeated to Transjordan No. 97.)

[E 2859/76/25]

No. 62

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

No. 48)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 10, 1932

YOUR telegrams Nos. 60 and 70 of 7th and 9th June received. I am anxious to avoid any incursion.

I approve your language.

You may now reply to Hejaz-Nejd Government on following lines.—

His Majesty's Government much regret that, owing to extreme narrowness of Palestine and Transjordan frontiers, and the fact that the only route was able in very few hours to pass from Sinai into Hejaz before Palestine or Transjordan authorities were aware of their entry.

[7797]

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Prevention of escape of rebels from Hejaz must rest with Hejaz-Nejd Government. But entry of Hejazi forces into Transjordan territory could not be permitted. But all possible steps will be taken to assist Hejazi authorities, and any fugitive rebels entering Transjordan will as far as possible be disarmed and removed from frontier to place of safety. You should also inform Hejaz Nejd Government of other measures of co-operation, such as stoppage of food supplies, &c., mentioned in Transjordan telegram No. 43 of 7th June to Colonial Office.

You may add in whatever way you consider most suitable that it is impossible to guarantee to surrender any rebel leaders who may escape into Transjordan territory. Every possible effort will, however, be made to prevent such persons from giving trouble to Hejaz Nejd Government.

With regard to suggested general treaty settlement with Transjordan, you should reply in the sense of final paragraph of Colonial Office telegram No. 41 of 4th June to High Commissioner for Transjordan.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 44 and Cairo, No. 69.)

E 2867 76 25]

No. 63

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 60)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, June 10, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 60 of 7th June. Ibn Rifada

You may communicate to Hejaz Nejd Government information contained in Transjordan telegram No. 31 to you of 9th June, making it clear, however, that latter part is not necessarily authoritative.

E 2861/76/25]

No. 64

Sir John Simon to Sir P. Loring (Cairo)

(No. 100. Secret)

As we have seen, the King's Head is a very important symbol of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is a symbol of the power and authority of the King, and it is a symbol of the unity and integrity of the Kingdom. It is a symbol of the faith and devotion of the people, and it is a symbol of the glory and honor of the Kingdom. It is a symbol of the strength and resilience of the Kingdom, and it is a symbol of the hope and future of the Kingdom. It is a symbol of the love and loyalty of the people, and it is a symbol of the peace and prosperity of the Kingdom. It is a symbol of the wisdom and justice of the King, and it is a symbol of the righteousness and virtue of the Kingdom. It is a symbol of the greatness and magnificence of the Kingdom, and it is a symbol of the glory and honor of the Kingdom. It is a symbol of the power and authority of the King, and it is a symbol of the unity and integrity of the Kingdom. It is a symbol of the faith and devotion of the people, and it is a symbol of the glory and honor of the Kingdom. It is a symbol of the strength and resilience of the Kingdom, and it is a symbol of the hope and future of the Kingdom. It is a symbol of the love and loyalty of the people, and it is a symbol of the peace and prosperity of the Kingdom. It is a symbol of the wisdom and justice of the King, and it is a symbol of the righteousness and virtue of the Kingdom. It is a symbol of the greatness and magnificence of the Kingdom, and it is a symbol of the glory and honor of the Kingdom.

Please investigate reports as soon as possible, and if you consider that there is any foundation for allegations regarding King Fuad's implication in intrigue, discuss matter frankly with him, avoiding, however, any indication of source of secret reports, and explain grave embarrassment which anti-Saudi intrigue may cause His Majesty's Government, emphasising urgent necessity for preventing it from going any further.

Please report by telegram substance of any conversation you may have with His Majesty.

E 2859 76 25]

No. 65

Sir John Simon to Sir P. Loring (Cairo)

(No. 101)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, June 10, 1932.

JEDDA telegrams Nos. 67 and 68 of 7th June. Ibn Rifada's incursion into Hejaz.

Ibn Rifada, a Hejazi exile, who raised rebellion against Ibn Saud at Wejh in 1929, crossed from Sinai through Palestine and Transjordan territory into Hejaz with party of from 400-450 armed followers on night of 20th/21st May presumably to raise rebellion in Northern Hejaz. Incursion was apparently organised in Egyptian territory, and High Commissioner for Transjordan reports that it is believed that movement has been engineered and financed by Hizb-al-Hejazi in Cairo. High Commissioner for Transjordan, in view of international pressure, has endeavoured to prevent further incursions, and as far as possible to disarm and remove from frontier any Hejazi rebels escaping into Transjordan.

Please endeavour to arrange that corresponding instructions to take similar action are sent as soon as possible to authorities in Sinai Peninsula, with a view to preventing any further activity on part of rebels or their supporters in Egyptian territory, or their passage across Palestine-Egyptian frontier in either direction.

Please repeat the above to Sir A. Ryan and hereafter inform him by telegram of any measures taken, indicating whether he may communicate them to Hejazi Government and repeating such messages to Jerusalem.

(Repeated to Jerusalem No. 144.)

E 2866 76 25]

No. 66

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 11.)

(No. 43)

(Telegraphic) P

Colonial Office, June 9, 1932.

JEDDA telegram No. 69 to Foreign Office repeated to you.

Telegram not quite clear, but if, as it seems to suggest, Ibn Rifada has crossed into Transjordan, I presume that steps will be taken to ensure that he does not leave that territory.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 36.)

E 2867/76 25]

No. 67

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 11.)

(No. 44)

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, June 9, 1932.

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, No. 31:

"Your telegram No. 60. Ibn Rifada is not in Transjordan. According to recent reports rebels are still at Haikl, and says they will not move until the end of June. Total rifles about 200, and food supply sufficient about one month."

[E 2870/76/25]

No. 68.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon. (Received June 11)

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 10, 1932.

I have your telegram addressed to Transjordan No. 68.

Your telegram No. 31.

I have been in touch with the British High Commissioner in Transjordan since 1st May and have been informed of the situation in the area.

I have been in touch with the British High Commissioner in Transjordan since 1st May and have been informed of the situation in the area.

"I propose, however, to communicate to Minister for Foreign Affairs only such of it as relates to movements close to the frontier and location of rebels, omitting anything relative to their intentions or equipment. Do you agree?"

I have been in touch with the British High Commissioner in Transjordan since 1st May and have been informed of the situation in the area.

population of Wejh have taken to boats, fearing attack on the town"

[E 2873/76/25]

No. 69

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon. (Received June 12)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 11, 1932.

I have your telegram No. 48.

I have been in touch with the British High Commissioner in Transjordan since 1st May and have been informed of the situation in the area.

But in receiving your instructions I had received another report from the British High Commissioner in Transjordan since 1st May and have been informed of the situation in the area.

I have been in touch with the British High Commissioner in Transjordan since 1st May and have been informed of the situation in the area.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 99.)

[E 2874/76/25]

No. 70

Sir P. Lorrain to Sir John Simon. (Received June 12)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 11, 1932.

I have your telegram No. 101.

I have been in touch with the British High Commissioner in Transjordan since 1st May and have been informed of the situation in the area.

I have been in touch with the British High Commissioner in Transjordan since 1st May and have been informed of the situation in the area.

I have been in touch with the British High Commissioner in Transjordan since 1st May and have been informed of the situation in the area.

Minister at Jedda by telegram.

(Repeated to Jedda and Jerusalem.)

E 2886 1494 25

No. 71

Sir P. Lorrain to Sir John Simon. (Received June 13)

(No. 209.)

Sir

Moscow, June 6, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Emir Feisal, accompanied by his suite, arrived in Moscow from Warsaw on 2nd May. He was met at the frontier by officials of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and was greeted by brass bands which, according to the press, "played the Internationale and various Arabian airs." On his arrival in Moscow, where the station was decorated with banners inscribed "The Arab Republic of which the Emir Feisal was received by Comrade Krestinski among other officials, and by the Persian Ambassador.

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Yours faithfully,
P. LORRAIN

E 2877 76 251

No. 72

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan (Received in Foreign Office, June 13)

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, June 10, 1932.

His Majesty's Government have now given consideration to your telegram of 7th June, No. 43, and are grateful for the full and useful appreciation of the position which you have furnished and for action already taken.

You will realise that His Majesty's Government's international obligations make it essential that all possible steps should be taken with a view to preventing passage through Transjordan of further rebels or of infiltration of disaffected individuals seeking to join rebels in Hejaz. It is essential for the same reason to make every effort to obtain disarmament and removal from neighbourhood of frontier to places where they can be watched of any rebels escaping from Hejaz whose entry into Transjordan it may not be possible to prevent.

While, therefore, I recognise the impossibility of closing the frontier entirely, I feel confident that you will take all possible measures, especially at such danger points as Akaba bottle-neck, to prevent passage of rebels to and from Sinai, and I presume that you are satisfied that forces at your disposal are adequate for this purpose.

It would be useful if detailed particulars of measures taken could be supplied for communication to Hejazi Government as indication of good faith.

I agree that, in view of your recommendation, no undertaking to surrender that leaders of such rebels should be effectively detained in place of safety whence they cannot escape, while action is being considered as to their future disposal. Meanwhile, I am not clear why surrender of fugitive rebels would be illegal. I shall be glad if you will telegraph explanation.

It would be useful to define more closely to Hejazi Government nature of steps, referred to in paragraph (d) of your telegram, to assist Hejazi authorities. For instance, do you contemplate attempt to turn back rebels before they cross Transjordan frontier (note Ibn Saud's request (a) in eighth paragraph of telegram No. 67 and 68 from Jeddah)? Do you think that it would be possible or desirable to try to establish any kind of liaison with Hejazi forces?

The Foreign Office are sending instructions by telegraph to the High Commissioner for Transjordan, particularly with a view to intensifying supervision of Hejazi refugees in Sinai and control of Sinai frontier.

Foreign Office instructions to Jeddah, concerning reply to be returned to Hejazi Government will be repeated to you.
(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 49.)

[E 2877 76 25] No. 73.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 13.)

(No. 46 Secret.)
(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, June 10, 1932

Y.O. R. telegram No. 43, paragraph (a).

In view of volume of circumstantial evidence in possession of His Majesty's Government, possible complicity of Amir cannot at present be excluded.

It is not possible to say whether or not the Amir is implicated in the present question of providing police measures on frontier districts and in safeguarding any disarmed rebels, &c.

Despatch follows.

[E 2881 76 25] No. 74.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 13.)

(No. 47 Secret.)
(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, June 10, 1932

MY secret telegram No. 46 of 10th June.

Among reports which have reached His Majesty's Government from secret sources it is stated that on 11th May Ibn Saud visited him. Is it possible for you to ascertain whether or not such visits took place?

[E 2923 76 25]

No. 75.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office June 14.)

(No. 47)

(Telegraphic)

June 13, 1932.

Y.O. R. No. 47 of 10th June

Amir has informed the British Resident that Ibn Saud's last visit was in Ramadan.

It is impossible to affirm that he has had no communication with Amir, but Cox is convinced that Amir has not sent him money for a good reason he has none to spare.

(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 34.)

[E 2924 76 25]

No. 76.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 13.)

(No. 48)

(Telegraphic) P.

June 13, 1932.

Y.O. R. telegram No. 45 of 10th June

1. The High Commissioner is requested to inform the Amir of the fact that the British Resident has been informed that Ibn Saud's last visit was in Ramadan. It is impossible to affirm that he has had no communication with Amir, but Cox is convinced that Amir has not sent him money for a good reason he has none to spare. (Repeated to Jeddah, No. 34.)

2. All rebels, other than leaders, will be disarmed, removed from the country in which their families are located. Every effort will be made to ensure that they are not allowed to re-enter the country. It is not possible to say whether or not the Amir is implicated in the present question of providing police measures on frontier districts and in safeguarding any disarmed rebels, &c.

3. The High Commissioner is requested to inform the Amir of the fact that the British Resident has been informed that Ibn Saud's last visit was in Ramadan. It is impossible to affirm that he has had no communication with Amir, but Cox is convinced that Amir has not sent him money for a good reason he has none to spare. (Repeated to Jeddah, No. 34.)

4. It is not possible to say whether or not the Amir is implicated in the present question of providing police measures on frontier districts and in safeguarding any disarmed rebels, &c.

(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 35.)

[L 3157 133 405]

No. 77.

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 14.)

[Enclosures not printed.]

No. 213.

Jeddah, May 18, 1932.

WITH reference to Sir A. Ryan's despatch No. 255 of the 3rd July last, regarding the proposed compendium of the constitutional laws of the world, I am at present unable to furnish a reply. A copy of the proposed compendium is being sent to the High Commissioner for Transjordan, who will be able to furnish a reply. The proposed compendium is being sent to the High Commissioner for Transjordan, who will be able to furnish a reply.

2. It is not possible to say whether or not the Amir is implicated in the present question of providing police measures on frontier districts and in safeguarding any disarmed rebels, &c.

"Fundamental Rules," as it is also sometimes styled. I have the honour to transmit herewith, marked "A," an amended translation which has now been made from an Arabic text of the Constitution communicated to this Legation by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

3. The first important change in the Constitution occurred on the 29th January, 1927, when the Sultanate of Nejd and its Dependencies was made a kingdom and was formally united with the Hejaz under Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and of Nejd. Its Imperial Majesty's Royal decree as published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 8th April, 1927, is attached, marked "B."

4. In June 1927 a Committee of Inspection and Improvement was constituted by Royal command. A translation of the relevant extract from the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 1st July is attached, marked "C."

5. On the 9th July, 1927, and on the recommendation of this committee, articles 28 to 31 of Part IV of the Constitution regarding the Legislative Assembly were modified. A translation of the amending regulation published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 15th July is attached, marked "D."

6. In July 1928 this regulation was superseded by a similar regulation, which made no reference, however, to its predecessor, but only to Part IV of the Constitution. A translation of the text of the new regulation as published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 13th July, 1928, is attached, marked "E."

7. An undated regulation concerning the Directorate General of Finance and referring by implication only, to articles 20 to 22 of the Constitution, was published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 21st September, 1928. A translation is attached, marked "F."

8. In October 1930 the Pilgrimage Committee, as defined by article 14 of the Constitution, was modified by Royal command. A translation of the text published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 5th October, 1930, is attached, marked "G."

9. In December 1930 a "Ministry" for Foreign Affairs was established by Royal command. Its Imperial Majesty's Royal decree, relating to articles 17 to 19 of the Constitution. A translation of the text published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 19th December, 1930, is attached, marked "H."

10. In January 1932 a Council of Ministers was constituted by an undated decree published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 16th January, a translation of which was transmitted to you under cover of my despatch No. 118 of the 1st March. This decree, which was published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 16th January, modifying and defining the functions of the Viceroy's Office, (2) article 11, by mentioning a new Ministry, that of the Interior, and (3) article 27 of the Constitution, by vesting the control of military affairs in the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. A translation of the text published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 11th March, a translation of which was transmitted to you in my printed letter No. 140 of the 19th March.

11. The text of the first national budget, presumed to apply only to the Hejaz, the cover was published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 16th January. A translation was transmitted to you under cover of my despatch No. 36 of the 21st January.

12. There have certainly been many derogations in practice from the terms of the Constitution of 1926, and probably not a few modifications have been made constitutionally, and published in some form or another, but those enumerated above are all that can now be precisely traced, in the absence of any official gazette or other authoritative and well-known source of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs has stated in semi-official correspondence on the subject that Part IV of the Constitution is amended by the abolition of the post of Inspector-General but he has been unable to locate the Imperial Majesty's Royal decree which effected this change. I have referred to the comment made on the status of Asir in paragraph 5 (b) of Sir A. Ryan's despatch No. 180 of the 15th May, 1931.

I have, &c
C G HOPE GILL.

[E 2926 165 25]

No. 76

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 14)

(No. 75)

THIS morning I received through the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs a personal message from Ibn Saud in which the latter begged me to obtain reconsideration of the decision of His Majesty's Government regarding the question of a loan of £150,000 to the Hejaz. He stated that while his Government only required between £150,000 and £200,000, the Soviet Government were prepared to lend up to £1 million, which was more than their refusal the Russian offer of assistance would have to be accepted. The Russians, he stated, had made the loan conditional on the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and commerce, their loan would take the form of goods and would consequently affect British trade. The Hejaz Government did not desire any such treaty with the Soviets and would in any case confine it within narrow limits. Nor did they desire that British trade should thus be adversely affected, and whatever happened they were determined not to renounce their policy of friendship with His Majesty's Government.

While promising to forward this message to you, I went over the course of events in London, and informed him that I could hold out no hope of a reconsideration of the decision. He stated that he was not fully aware what he had done in other directions. I also emphasised the present unpromising financial outlook in the City. After we had exchanged the customary assurances and protestations the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs hinted that even if the present appeal could not be entertained he hoped that His Majesty's Government might prove more accommodating at a future date.

I should be grateful for instructions whether, in making the formal reply which the King's message calls for, I should confine myself to the inadequate material in my possession.

[E 2930 76 25]

No. 79

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office June 15)

(No. 49)

(Telegraphic) P

MY telegram No. 48 of 13th June

In connexion with control measures to be taken in region of Akaba, I consider that it would have a good effect if it could be arranged for one of His Majesty's sloops to visit Akaba in the course of the next few days.

[E 2936 76 25]

No. 80

Sir P. Lorrain to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 15)

(No. 67 Most Confidential.)

(Telegraphic)

Cairo, June 15, 1932.

ENDING receipt of reports mentioned in your telegram No. 100, Secret, I have not yet heard of any further developments in the matter of the King's visit.

However, Sidky, when talking to me yesterday about Hejaz loyalty, spontaneously told me the following story in strictest personal confidence, asking me to make no use of it.—

Early in May Egyptian consul in Bagdad telegraphed for permission to come at once to Cairo by air in order to make a very important and secret communication the nature of which was not indicated.

He was told that he could just as well send a cypher telegram.

He again urged that he must come in person, and said it was a message from King Fuad nor Egyptian Government wished to receive any secret communication from Ali. Consul was told that if there was any concrete message he could send it by post. Ali declined to make any written communication to consul, and latter reported by letter, giving gist of message to the effect that there was much to be done if adequate funds were made available. Sidky said that neither the King nor the Egyptian Government had slightest intention of being drawn into report was merely filed.

Sidky surmised that, it being a matter of common knowledge that King Fuad was not well disposed towards Ibn Saud and that Egypt had not recognised Nejd Hejaz Kingdom, Ali may be in agreement with other members of Hashimite family was trading on this in the hope of securing King Fuad's assistance in this being under the ordinary international obligations of a neighbour to Hejaz, even though she had not recognised Ibn Saud, and that the King held exactly the same view.

I said to Sidky that I was glad he had told me this story, it was rather important. There was, as a matter of fact, suggestion in my correspondence incriminating King Fuad. Story might be useful for refuting the suggestion if I was able to get it confirmed.

This morning Sidky has let me know that the King is willing that I should be sent by Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the consul at Bagdad as follows —

Your confidential letter 31st May. It is undesirable that either I or her Sovereign should be mixed up in the question which forms the subject of proposal. Make suitable use of these instructions, and in the future avoid receiving or acting as intermediary for any similar message."

This seems to take King Fuad out.

Since receipt of your various telegrams I have been in close touch with Egyptian Government, who are making a searching investigation. Report will be sent me, and I hope to be able shortly to telegraph its substance.

E 2989 76 25

No 81

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon. — (Received June 16)

(No. 77)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 16, 1932.

TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 48 to Colonial Office.

I am having messages telephoned to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is now at Taif, embodying suitable portion of paragraph 1 of telegram under reference, but without giving number or other particulars of force mentioned. I am informing him in same message of sloop to Akaba.

I have made no use of remainder of telegram under reference or of High Commissioner's telegram No. 47.

Unless High Commissioner thinks it essential, I should prefer (a) not to raise the question of liaison until I receive reply to my notes of 11th June, and (b) not to seek consent of Hejazi Government to any action concerned with the sloop unless it concerns them clearly and directly.

My cautious attitude is inspired by desire not to stimulate critical tendency of Hejaz Government, which was strongly, though politely, manifested in further conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs on 12th and 13th June. I am reporting these by despatch.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 104.)

E 2924 76 25]

No. 82.

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 57)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office, June 16, 1932

YOUR telegram No. 76 of 13th June - Ibn Rifada's incursion

On 14th June Hejazi Minister, in reply to representations on lines of those made to you by Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, was informed in sense of my telegram No. 48 of 10th June.

He had no information of Ibn Rifada's activities since entry in Hejaz and only vaguest regarding movements of Ibn Saud's forces. He was asked to request his Government to keep you fully informed on these points for information of Transjordan authorities.

You may use suitable parts of paragraph 1 of Transjordan telegram No. 48 to Colonial Office in conversation and correspondence with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. As regards the sloop, I have no information of its movements, forces and outfit.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 54)

E 2998 76 25,

No 83

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. — (Received in Foreign Office, June 17)

(No. 51)

(Telegraphic) P

June 16, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 49 of the 15th June

I am informing commander of sloop that everything is quiet at present, and no difficulties are expected to arise in the course of the next few days. My suggestion that a sloop should visit Akaba was made in view of the possibility that it might become necessary to disarm rebels retreating through Akaba and to detain their leaders (see my telegram No. 48 of the 11th June) when the mere presence of the sloop would have a restraining effect. I had in mind also the possibility that Ibn Saud's forces, if victorious, might press on to Akaba in

I had no intention of using the sloop for interference with shipping, which might be carrying supplies to the rebels, and I suggest that, if His Majesty's Government wish to use the sloop, it should be used in the manner suggested to sloop, which need not remain fixed at Akaba.

In the circumstances, in which I suggested that presence of sloop might be useful, have not arisen as yet, nor can I say yet whether they are likely to arise in the future. (Repeated to Jedda and Cairo.)

E 3001 76 25]

No 84

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. — (Received in Foreign Office, June 17)

(No. 53)

(Telegraphic) P

June 16 1932

My telegram No. 48 of 13th June

Everything quiet in Southern Transjordan. I have no knowledge of any advance by rebels.

The police were reinforced yesterday by two half-companies of the Transjordan Frontier Force to prevent any further movement of rebels into Hejaz.

A complete embargo on exportation of food-stuffs is in force and will be validated by legislation.

[7797]

Orders as follows have been issued by Air Officer Commanding with a view to stopping Hejazi forces if they cross the frontier —

- (1) Every effort is to be made to [] turn them back without firing
- (2) Should they persist in crossing attempts will be made to disarm them. If they resist and continue to push forward into Transjordan, fire will be opened, in the first instance, on their camels and cars.
- (3) If second course is not effective, then, and only then, will the fire be opened on individuals.

With regard to arrest and interrogation of rebels or persons attempting to cross the frontier in either direction arms will be used from them if necessary. Their camels may if necessary be impounded. Rifle fire may be opened to stop persons refusing to stop when challenged or attempting to escape.
(Repeated to Jedda, No. 42, and to Cairo, No. 43)

E 2995 76 25

No. 85

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon. — (Received June 17)

(No. 78)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jedda, June 16, 1932

MY telegram No. 77

Just after drafting my telegram under reference I received a long Hejaz reply dated 15th June to my note of 11th June. It reaffirms the confident expectation of British assistance in resisting action of brigands, guilty of aggression against His Majesty's Government as well as Hejazi Government and divides the questions for consideration under two headings, viz:

- (a) Joint measures to be taken by both sides and by authorities under direction of His Majesty's Government in Transjordan, and
- (b) Investigation regarding responsibility and means of bringing it home to instigators.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says in answer four headings measures described in my note and expresses thanks for the care shown in dealing with action which he repeats has involved hostility to His Majesty's Government as well as to his Government and which violates article 2 of Treaty of Jedda, besides considering the promised measures insufficient, as rebels are only a few hours' journey from Akaba, and will, if threatened with attack by Government force, find easy means of escape. He says he has the guarantee of safety and escape penalty of rebellion against Hejazi Government. After considering these considerations further in order to show the need for severity, Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that difficulties are extremely great and that the only way to prevent the rebels from crossing the frontier and expelling them by force if they enter Transjordan, (b) arresting them on entry and surrendering them, or (c) permitting limited pursuit into Transjordan, which is authorised by Hadda Agreement, subject to the consent of the other side. Adoption of these measures, or of some of them, will help in the solution of the difficulty, will end criminal activities, and will destroy the hopes of evil doers.

Minister for Foreign Affairs reverts to the question of alleged two car-loads of supplies and arms, and makes capital out of the admission that rebels were able to obtain twenty-five rifles at Akaba, notwithstanding the prohibition of arms traffic in Transjordan. He goes on to represent the importance of investigation and fixation of responsibility as a means of solving present and future difficulties and discouraging enemies of good relations. He suggests the improbability of a fugitive like Ibn Rifada having had means of his own to procure one month's supplies and 200 rifles mentioned by the High Commissioner. He asks His Majesty's Government to suggest a method of investigation that it may be undertaken jointly and couples the request for early reply on this point with an offer to produce all evidence in the possession of his Government.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Transjordan is clear. They would defend it by force against attack. What would be their attitude and what steps would they take in converse case of aggression by Transjordan? He asks for a clear answer. In conclusion, he expresses the desire to start on them as soon as possible.
(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 105)

E 2996 76 25

No. 86

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon. — (Received June 17)

(No. 79)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 16, 1932

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Note makes show of moderation in tone partly because Hejaz Government are endeavouring to distinguish between His Majesty's Government, whose friendship they invoke, and Transjordan Government, whom they persistently wish to incriminate, partly, perhaps, because I had answered every reasonable criticism in my previous telegram. In my opinion, they are largely animated by desire to exploit political incident since first mobilisation of force sufficient to smash Ibn Rifada if necessary. I draw attention to their deliberate attempt to twist to their own purposes every piece of information supplied by the High Commissioner.
(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 106)

E 2997 76 25

No. 87

Sir P. Lorraine to Sir R. Vassall. — (Received June 17)

(No. 69)

(Telegraphic) R.

Cairo, June 17, 1932.

EGYPTIAN Government state that report of passage of Ibn Rifada and armed rebels in manner stated in your telegram No. 101 is baseless. While it is possible for small unarmed groups to cross frontier, passage of 400 armed men would not be possible in view of close surveillance exercised in that region. Nevertheless, strict orders have been given to competent authorities to exercise closest surveillance on frontier to prevent any movement or transport of provisions and arms destined for Hejaz or supply of Hejazi rebels in accordance with international rules.

(Repeated to Jedda and Jerusalem.)

E 3026 76 25

No. 88

Sir P. Lorraine to Sir John Simon. — (Received June 17)

(Nos. 70 and 71)

(Telegraphic)

Cairo, June 17, 1932.

(R.) MY immediately preceding telegram.

1. Egyptian Government's reply is an epitome of detailed information supplied by Frontier Districts Administration and Frontier Districts Administration and Frontier Districts Administration.

2. It is, perhaps, not realised that it is forbidden to carry arms in Sinai. Any Bedouin seen carrying arms is at once arrested. Governor's control of the peninsula is even sufficiently close to make it impossible for more than three or four unarmed men at a time to slip across the frontier without permits.

3. Our information is as follows: Ibn Rifada has been living in Cairo and Benha. About eight months ago he paid a visit to Transjordan. He returned to

[7797]

K 2

Cairo about two months ago and recently proceeded unarmed to Akaba, having them no money but only a few sacks of rice. He was short of money and rumours regarding payments by him were spread with the idea of encouraging recruitment. From Sinai direct Jarvis estimates that possibly fifty crossed the frontier unarmed in the ordinary course of Bedouin migration to join in incursion, but frontier for harvest work and grazing, and it is impossible to distinguish between

4. No evidence is available here of any contract between Hafez Amir and Ibn Rifada.

5. There is no official Transjordan agent in Egypt (see Jedda telegram No. 67), and I presume reference is to some private agent of Abdullah.

6. The Hizb-al-Hejazi is supposed to be a social club, the president of which is Abdel Hamid al-Khatib, Hejaz agent in Cairo during Hussein's rule. It is not known that the society has any direct contact with Sinai, but its president is reported to be in contact with Emir Abdullah. It is not a serious institution and seems ill-qualified to organise any serious movement.

7. Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs states that main point is that Egypt had allowed Ibn Rifada to organise an expedition in her territory. As she is a party to the dispute, blame lies on organisers outside Egypt. There is as yet no evidence of responsibility of Egypt's complicity with plotters, armed bands could not be organised in Sinai and sent across the frontier without the knowledge of Jarvis.

8. With reference to your telegram No. 106, it is unlikely that any Bedouin once he arrested and disarmed in accordance with permanent prohibition against carrying of arms in Sinai. All will be shepherded into their respective tribal areas more than 50 miles from the frontier. Steps have already been taken to

from Egypt except in insignificant quantities. Our information is that such raiders as came from Egypt were supplied with arms just outside Akaba. (End of R.)

9. In view of the fact that foregoing information conflicts somewhat with party from Sinai to Hejaz (see first paragraph of communication contained in your telegram No. 48 to Jedda), I must leave it to you to decide if of this telegram should be communicated to Hejazi Government. (Repeated to Jedda and Jerusalem.)

E 2028 165 25

No. 89

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 58)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 16, 1932

YOUR telegram No. 75 of 13th June. Ibn Saud's renewed request for a loan. I am sorry to hear that they cannot accede to his renewed request. You may explain that (a) apart from the exceptional cases which occurred during the world war, it is not the practice of His Majesty's Government themselves to make loans to foreign Governments, (b) in present financial conditions necessary parliamentary sanction for payment involved would in any case be unobtainable, and (c) as was explained to mission at Bank of England on 13th May, there is no possibility at present time of Hejaz Nejd Government raising a loan in London.

You should add that His Majesty's Government warmly appreciate His Majesty's friendly assurances.

E 3035 76 25]

No. 90

Sir A. Ryan (Nos. 108 and 109) to High Commissioner, Transjordan
(Repeated to Foreign Office, Received June 19)

(Nos. 81 and 82.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 10 1932

(R.) MINISTER for Foreign Affairs telephones that Ibn Rifada intends to send portion of his party along the coast of the Gulf of Akaba by sea. He asks that you should prevent this. (End of R.)

Information and request seem equally indefinite. What shall I reply?

E 2996 76 24]

No. 91

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

No. 92

Foreign Office, June 21, 1932

YOUR telegram No. 78 of 16th June. Ibn Rifada's incursion into the Hejaz. Hejaz Nejd Government has accepted this without demur.

It is undesirable to pursue further with Hejaz Nejd Government question of responsibility.

Answer to question in last paragraph of your telegram No. 78 of 16th June is well known. Hejaz Nejd Government has accepted this without demur in recent prevention of raids from Transjordan.

In these circumstances I consider it preferable to make no reply to Hejaz note of 15th June.

Meanwhile, in view of suggestion in your telegram No. 79 of 16th June that Hejaz Nejd Government may no longer be treating incursion as serious practical danger, you should, unless you are objection, press claim for latest information regarding movements both of rebels and of Ibn Saud's own forces operating in the area. The information you are requested to provide if possible is being taken by Transjordan authorities are to be effective.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 57.)

E 3146 76 26]

No. 92

Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Transjordan and Palestine, to Headquarters,
(Repeated to Foreign Office, Received June 23)

(Telegraphic.)

June 23, 1932

MAIN body of rebel party now located near Haraiba. A certain Alowis-al-Kabrati, of Suiz, brother of Hamud al-Kabrati, Mayor of Akaba, and Obaid-al-Kabrati, of Akaba, are reported to have been in Suiz before it left Egypt and Sinai, and that he now intends to organise supplies for al-Badawi, of Suiz. One cargo will go direct to his brother Mahmoud-al-Badawi, at Dhuba, to appear as normal merchandise, and to be used if, and when, rebels capture village. Another will be landed on coast of gulf, wherever Rifada displays black flag.

Amman to repeat to British Resident

(Copy to Palestine Government.)

E 3035/76 25]

No. 93

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 85)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, June 23, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 82 of 19th June: Use of His Majesty's sloop "Penzance" at Akaba in connexion with situation in Northern Hejaz.

See my telegram No. 123 to Cairo of 23rd June, repeated to you.

If Sir P. Loraine concurs, you may inform Hejaz Nejd Government, in reply to their request of 11th June, that His Majesty's Government will take all possible steps in co-operation with authorities in Egypt to assist in prevention of supplies, arms or reinforcements reaching rebels by sea.

[E 3035 76 25]

No. 94

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir P. Loraine (Cairo)

(No. 123)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, June 23, 1932.

MY telegram No. 109 of 15th June: Use of His Majesty's sloop "Penzance" at Akaba in connexion with situation in Northern Hejaz.

Hejaz Nejd Government have now requested that steps be taken to prevent Ibn Rifada from sending portion of his party along coast of Gulf of Akaba by sea.

It is serious that the use of His Majesty's ships to engage in active operations against Hejazi rebels, but in view of fact that rebels entered Hejaz from territory under British control, notwithstanding previous assurances given to Hejaz Nejd Government by His Majesty's Government and other authorities, and that Arab Abnash, a well-known agent of His Majesty's Government, was cognisant of project. His Majesty's Government are therefore anxious to give consideration to request with a view to steps being taken to prevent reinforcements reaching rebels by sea. No. 123 of 23rd June from London to RAE Transjordan to Air Ministry, repeated to Air Headquarters, Middle East.

His Majesty's Government therefore propose, subject to your concurrence or observations, to inform Ibn Saud that sloop will co-operate with authorities in Egypt in attempting to prevent supplies, arms or reinforcements sent in native craft from Egyptian territory from reaching Hejazi rebels across Gulf of Akaba or Red Sea, and to instruct sloop accordingly. You should accordingly, unless you have any observations, inform Ibn Saud that sloop will co-operate with authorities in Sinai, Suez, &c., should inform sloop immediately of any shipments from Egyptian territory which have evaded or are likely to evade their efforts to prevent and which sloop could intercept. Such informal arrangement may be matter of some delicacy, as it is important that no request should be addressed to Egyptian Government for permission to examine dhows flying Egyptian flag on shipping in Egyptian territorial waters, as this might raise whole question of our customary rights of search in Red Sea, which we desire to avoid.

Please repeat to Sir A. Ryan this telegram and also your reply.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 58.)

[E 3160/76 26]

No. 95

Sir A. Ryan to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 86.)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 23, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 62

It is not clear whether you wish me to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of paragraphs 2 to 4 or to try to avoid discussion of points in his note of 17th June other than that covered by your paragraph 3.

I myself feel Hejaz note calls for some sort of reply to obviate misunderstanding of His Majesty's Government's attitude. Paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference does not seem to me to meet the point, as aggression now complained of is not ordinary tribal raid, but incursion which Hejaz Government allege to have taken place with connivance of Transjordan Government. I had conversation this morning with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is here for a few days. He did not revert to above matter, and I was able to confine myself to other issues, most important of which were the questions of liaison on lines of contact with the British Government. No. 123 of 23rd June of 1932. Points raised in paragraph 5 of your telegram under reference.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thought communication might usefully be established between Gubb and authorities at Dhaha Tebuk and Jaul subject to practical arrangements being made. It was suggested that the account given by Gubb, which is as far as it goes, is not very accurate, suggests I may have been misled by slowness of movements on both sides into thinking situation more quiescent than it is. His account is as follows (see my immediately following telegram).

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 111.)

E 3165 76 25]

No. 96

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 92.)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 24, 1932.

YOUR telegram to the Colonial Office of 23rd June.

I thought it advisable to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs orally this morning of King Ali's visit to Amman rather than wait till news should reach him. He spoke of making written request for formal assurance from His Majesty's Government that the British Government would not be going further than was necessary or desirable, but I hope everything possible will be done to relieve anxiety of Hejaz Government.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 117, and Bagdad, No. 118.)

[E 3115, 122 91]

No. 97

Sir John Simon to Sir R. Lindley (Tokyo)

(No. 101.)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office, June 24, 1932.

MY despatch No. 358 of 11th May: Red Sea Lights Convention.

Lighthouse company are refusing to implement contract owing to depreciation of sterling, and French Government, in consequence, cannot see their way to ratify convention. His Majesty's Government are therefore making alternative arrangements and have decided to discontinue Centre Peak Light on 1st October. No further work will be done accordingly. Estimated cost of maintenance under new arrangements will be about half that under convention.

Please inform Japanese Government accordingly, and express hope of His Majesty's Government that they will be ready to contribute 4 per cent., as under convention, of reduced cost of maintenance of two remaining lights.

[E 3115/122/91]

No. 98

Sir John Simon to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

(No. 628.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 24, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 468 of the 11th May enclosing a copy of a note to the French Ambassador regarding the Red Sea Lights Convention I have to inform your Excellency that the French Government have not

[7797]

R 4

signified their readiness to accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government that both Governments should ratify the convention without further delay and that negotiations should immediately after its entry into force be opened between His Majesty's Government and the Lighthouse Company with a view to the settlement of the company's reasonable demands.

2. In these circumstances the Notice to Mariners providing for the discontinuance of the Centre Peak Light, a draft of which was enclosed in my note to M. de Fleury, is being issued to all concerned, but in view of the delay which has occurred the date of the discontinuance of the light has been postponed from the 1st September to the 1st October next.

I shall, therefore, be glad if you will at once inform the Government to which you are accredited of the reasons which led His Majesty's Government to refuse to negotiate with the company with a view to the revision of the contract annexed to article 4 of the convention until the convention had been brought into force. These reasons are fully set forth in my note of the 30th April to the French Ambassador.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Yours faithfully,
JOHN SIMON

Enclosure in No. 98

Red Sea Lights.

CONTRIBUTIONS to be made by the Powers concerned (1) if the convention is brought into force, and (2) if Centre Peak is extinguished and the remaining two Lights are maintained by the Board of Trade.

		Board of Trade, Maintenance
	£	s
Germany	95	104
France	7	77
United Kingdom	61	6,10
Italy	6	60
Japan	4	440
Netherlands	125	1,575
	100	11,000
		1,400

E 3167 76 25]

No. 99

Sir A. Ryan to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received June 26)

(No. 94)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 26, 1932

MY telegram No. 98.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has not reverted to question of responsibility or answer to note in our daily conversations since 22nd June. His line now seems to be to show confidence in genuine desire of His Majesty's Government and British authorities in Transjordan to afford practical assistance, and to keep alive the grievances against Abdulla and his associates. Communiqué, dated 21st June, His Majesty's Government.

In view of the above I may have exaggerated the importance of replying at any rate at present to Hejaz note.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 119.)

E 3168 76 25]

No. 100

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 26)

(No. 95)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 26, 1932

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Communiqué referred to represents rebels as stationary but inaccessible to troops sent from Mecca by car, so that the task of destroying them must await the arrival of forces well on the way from Nejd. It gives details of measures taken by His Majesty's Government. Leading article in yesterday's paper describes rebels as demoralised, owing to non-fulfilment of promises by persons who deputed them into the adventure and now seek to disavow them.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 120.)

E 3174 76 25]

No. 101

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 27)

(No. 99)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 26, 1932

MY telegram No. 95.

Latest information of Hejaz Government is that rebels moved from original position first to Haikl and then to Alhumaidha, intending to proceed to Badu and that they were likely to attack Muweila. They number about 600, and had hired camels from the Amraa tribe, but only one for every four men.

The above news was brought by men who had gone from Dhaha and mixed with rebels, taking about six days each way.

King has ordered Ibn Qunayil, commander of levies from Nejd, which were expected to reach Alula about six days hence, to expedite march and advance until he meets the rebels.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 125, and Cairo, No. 126.)

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 26.)

251

Jedda, May 29, 1932

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jedda report for April

Bassa, Bushire, Koweit, Suva, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea sloop and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan

I have, &c

C. G. HOPE GILL.

Chapter I—*Internal Affairs*

John Stuart

111 The King left the Royal Palace at 10.30 on the 6th April, and proceeded on the previous day by the baggage convey and a mobile wireless set. He was met on the 7th by the Emir Feisal at Laheyra and by large numbers of Meccans in two seamless wrappings, the "ihram" of the pilgrim. He entered Mecca (520 miles) at sunset on the 7th April, one week before pilgrimage day. At 7 next morning he was ceremoniously received by the Viceroy in the centre of the town in a setting of awnings and troops and popular acclamation, the while a salute of 101 guns was fired and speeches and poems eulogized His Majesty. The King then proceeded to the Kaaba and the other shrines of Mecca.

112 Ibn Saud was immediately surrounded by the multifarious cares of administration and the grievances of pilgrims. An unusually large number of pilgrims had gathered for the Festival, and these he had to give some attention. On the 12th April he made a banquet for 800 guests and delivered a sermon. It was a mediæval mixture of religion and politics.

[illegible]

their enemies. "There are some who have acted vindictively against us, looking with evil eye upon what God has granted us, thus the devil tempted them to many evil deeds. Not in one single case did I find one of the Moslems defending me. Moslems withheld the charities from the Holy Sanctuaries, and Moslems place of God? Has he allowed intoxicating drink? Has he permitted adultery and prostitution? Has Ibn Saud left the mischievous to commit evil upon earth? What has Ibn Saud done contrary to the Sharia law and Arab manliness? By God, he said, I fear the foreigner once, but I fear those who pretend to be Moslem three thousand times. I hope Moslems will forgive me for saying so, but, by God, I am true in what I say. What had Moslems agreed upon and striven for, Ibn Saud asked, and he had hesitated to join them? He had no use for words, but if Moslems went forth to action, it would be disgraceful for their honour, theirs, the Arabs', if they failed to do the same. But he did not go on to indicate any plan of action, instead, he turned aside to ventilate other grievances. He was censured for lack of rain in the Hejaz, he was said to be contracting a loan with the English, he was accused of wanting to do this and that. But he had taken nothing from the Hejaz, on the contrary he had given it peace and religious withholding charity and preventing pilgrimages (regarded, of course, as ever in the Hejaz, primarily as commercial assets). By God, he continued, I have no money and my only possessions are the sword and the Koran. I declare openly that if any of the Moslem kings, princes, or merchants wishes to do a benevolent deed for the Moslems of this country, he is warmly welcome, provided that he does not violate the honour of our country nor interfere with our independence or our religious affairs. I swear by God, the only One God, that I have not contracted a loan with the English or others—but perhaps we may need to take from the Moslems, or others.

114. Here is a very fair indication of Ibn Saud's state of mind. He is at his wit's end to obtain money sufficient for his expensive needs. Moreover he is feeling insecure and his words reflect his growing sense of the hostility which surrounds him in the Hejaz and which is spreading in the Moslem world outside. His reactions are alternately those of a man of action who would like to hit somebody, and a pious beggar for unconditional alms. But his enemies, though real to him, are intangible, while benevolent Moslems are looking askance at his fanatical destruction of their shrines and his spendthrift maladministration of the Holy Beiaz.

115. After pilgrimage, Ibn Saud visited Jeddah on the 30th April, but stayed only a day and left on the 2nd May. He startled the leading inhabitants with the words: "I could cut the throat of every one of you." The foreign representatives were received in audience, one by one, on the 1st May. His Majesty's (Chargé d'Affaires found Ibn Saud polite, but distant, and with very little to say. He looked a different man from what he was a few years ago. His face yellowed under the skin, his jaw seemed quite firm, but his lips were soft.

History of the House

116. The Emir Feisal left on the 12th April on a mission to Europe (paragraphs 53 and 127) and was replaced by Ibn Saud, 47 years of age, aged 32, as President of the Council and Viceroy-to-be.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

117 Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, at the same time, became Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Fuad Bey Hamza accompanied the Minister for Foreign Affairs on mission. Current affairs in April were dealt with by letter and telephone to Mexico. There were no interviews.

† 1979

14- The Hmong Government, in the attempt to silence the press to inform the people of the situation in the country, has kept the press in the country. They are ordered to be silent and to keep the press in the country.

of the 15th April that the crisis in the Hejaz was only a part of the general world depression; they denied definitely that they had consulted the British or any other Government about a loan, the rumoured conditions of which (appointment of an Englishman to reorganise and control all finances, settlement of the Hejaz Railway question and use of Hejaz-Nejd territory by British aircraft) were such as the Government could never accept, they foretold a conference of local financial experts, and offered to assist anyone who might wish to be charitable to the Hejaz, they promised facilities to any Moslem, were he king, or prince, or merchant, who wanted to give them a loan, provided that their rights, religion and independence were not touched.

119 The financial position was unchanged. The Dutch adviser, M van Leeuwen, arrived at Jeddah on the 23rd April on contract for a year (paragraph 62).

Economic

120 The pilgrimage, though very small, brought a little business and relief to the Hejaz. As a result of the drought, the Northern Hejaz was said to be entirely empty of tribes, who had moved in search of grazing either northward into Transjordan or southward beyond Tuma. Pilgrims to Medina were frequently mobbed by starving nomads.

Chapter II—Frontier Questions

Raiding

Transjordan

121 There were no complaints during April of raiding from either side of the frontier.

Frontier Meetings

122 None are reported to have been held in April.

The Bent Atiya

123 Under instructions from His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 22nd April replied to the Hejazi Government's note of the 9th March (paragraph 36) to the effect that the Transjordan Government recognised the Hejaz as a sovereign State, and that the British Government, in a spirit of co-operation, however, and in order to minimise the risk of trouble arising on the frontier, that the Transjordan authorities had taken measures to control these tribesmen as soon as they crossed the frontier and had sent them to the north of Muah.

Iraq

124 Nil.

Kuwait and Bahrain

125 Nil.

Arab and the Yemen

126 Ibn Saud sent a telegram of condolence to the Imam Yahya on the death of his second son, Saif al Islam Muhammad, on the 22nd April.

Chapter III—Foreign Relations

British Empire

His Majesty's Mission to London

127 The mission to London, which has been recorded in paragraph 53, the Emir Feisal, accompanied by his son, Prince Faysal, left Jeddah on the 12th April to visit the British Government. A large number of people were witnessed at the gangway, when the Emir's favourite was found on board and bundled off. It had been officially concluded that it would be necessary for him to accompany the mission, but the Emir had surreptitiously given him passage money at the last moment. Though full-grown, he howled like a child.

Another attachée, a well-known prostitute of Mecca, had left by a previous sailing for Port Said, where she intended to join the Emir. It has not yet been ascertained whether she fared better than her rival.

Italy

The mission sailed in an Italian liner, specially diverted to Jeddah for the purpose, and was accompanied by the Italian consul and Mme Sollazzo, whose duty at Jeddah had terminated with the signing of the Italo-Hejazi treaty.

The Italian Government. They were received there on the 19th by the Crown Prince of Italy and proceeded the same day to Rome. The Emir was received by King Victor Emmanuel on the 20th and stayed to luncheon. On the 21st he

visited the Vatican. He then proceeded to Milan, where he attended the 26th and the trade fair at Milan on the 27th, and passed on to Switzerland. The Italian authorities appear to have made every effort to impress the mission with Italian efficiency in the industrial field. For their views on the slave trade, see paragraph 147.

The Netherlands

128 The Dutch Chargé d'Affaires, M. Adriaans, returned to Jeddah on the 5th April from the Yemen, where he spent ten days as the guest of the Imam Yahya at Sana. He received yet another courtesy letter from Queen Wilhelmina.

129 The Dutch financial adviser, M. van Leeuwen, arrived at Jeddah on the 23rd April (paragraph 62).

Iraq

130 King Feisal's personal message to Ibn Saud regarding the seat of the Government of the Hejaz, which was received on the 10th April, was answered by a reply, in which, it seems, he regretted that he could not infringe the rule which preserves the Holy Places of Islam intact from diplomacy, and invited King Feisal to furnish his representative with fresh credentials naming him to Jeddah.

Chapter IV—Air Matters

Hejaz Air Force

132 Nil.

Emergency Landing Grounds

133 There was no opportunity in April of pursuing the matter.

Aerial Trespass

134 None was reported.

Chapter V—Military Matters

Northern Hejaz

135 The drought-stricken northern tribal lands were apparently deserted and at peace.

East (Nejd)

136 Nothing to report.

South (Asir)

137 News was received via Aden to the effect that, as a result of renewed trouble between the Saudi control at Jizan and certain Asiri tribes, the Emir bin-Shuair had been recalled from Jizan and replaced by the Emir bin-Zuair from Kufida.

Chapter VI.—Naval Matters

Naval Visit.

138. The customary naval visit during the pilgrimage was paid by Captain S. S. ... visited Jedda for the first time on the 12th April in H.M.S. "Hastings." The ... pilgrimage day falling on the 15th. It was an ... due to the navy's own genial hospitality ... Captain ... His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires and ... of Jedda receiving salutes when they returned his visit.

139. There were no foreign naval visits.

Chapter VII.—Pilgrimage

Pilgrimage Day

140. The 9th Dhul Hijja did coincide with a Friday (the 15th April). The ... were thus seven times blessed (for why, see paragraph 92). The shade temperature was then not more than 102° F., deaths were few and the general health all that could be desired. In announcing this happy circumstance, the Hejazi Government were moved to declare that the congregation that day numbered not less than 150,000. This may be ascribed as much to ignorance as to ecstasy. The desert so seldom teems that the Arab has but little knowledge of large numbers.

Arrivals

141. The official Hejazi statistics of overseas pilgrims, which are not ... up as follows:—

Nations	Last year	This year
Indians	7,000	9,000
Europeans	17,000	15,000
Egyptians	1,000	2,000
Sudanese	1,000	2,100
North Africans	2,000	1,500
Afghans	1,000	1,700
Palestinians	800	1,500
Bukharis	200	1,200
The rest	7,000	1,500
Total	49,000	29,000

142. The financial and economic depression has thus decisively outweighed the attraction of the Friday Hajj. Total approximate figures of overseas pilgrims to Mecca in recent years have been:—

1927	...	132,000
1928	...	88,000
1929	...	82,500
1930	...	85,000
1931	...	39,500
1932	...	29,000

There was a larger attendance this year than has before been known of notable pilgrims from overseas, however. The names of some of these are given in paragraph 149.

143. No Hejazi statistics of local or overland pilgrims are kept. In fact, they are not even pilgrims at all, but the Arabs, who are not pilgrims, because they bring no money into the country. Such are the Yemenis, of whom 5,000 are said to have come to Mecca this year. The estimated total of these and more local pilgrims is 20,000.

Departure.

144. There was an exceptional glut of pilgrims at Jedda during the last part of April. The slender funds of the majority were exhausted by high prices ... numbers, moreover, were unable to afford the visit to Medina, which is generally paid after the pilgrimage to Mecca. Consular and shipping staffs have consequently been working since the 20th April at considerably higher pressure than usual, in spite of the smaller pilgrimage.

Hajj Regatta

145. Another successful meeting was added on the 17th April to the long list of Hajj regattas with which, since before living memory, the waiting pilgrim ships and the European community of Jedda have filled in the time while the Moslems are in Mecca. The oldest captain could remember a time when forty-two ships lay at anchor. This year there were only eight, seven British and one French. The usual regatta meeting was held at the British Legation, the usual luncheon on board the regatta flagship, steamship "Boulac" and a programme of nine pulling and sailing events was carried through harmoniously with the valuable assistance of H.M.S. "Hastings." Ships were dressed overall on the 17th ... Salutes, however, are only fired by the shore battery, which fired them incessantly.

Chapter VIII.—Slavery

Manumissions

146. One male and two female slaves who took refuge in the Legation in April were manumitted on the 29th and repatriated to the Sudan, their country of origin.

Slave Trade

147. The signature of the Italo-Hejazi Treaty (paragraph 50) was ... plenipotentiary opined that his Government considered it necessary that Ibn Saud's Government should assume the obligation of co-operating with them in suppressing the slave trade. Similarly, his Government desired that their representatives at Jedda should have powers of manumission and repatriation. They trusted that Ibn Saud would appreciate their attitude. The slave-owner representative replied, however, that, while appreciating the Italian Government's ... trade in slaves constituted one of the most important questions to which Ibn Saud's Government had directed their attention, that His Majesty was personally interested in preventing the import of slaves into his country, and that his Government would persevere to this end. As to manumission, the Government were themselves of their own initiative endeavouring to reach the end enjoined by Islamic law, with its principles of supreme justice and its pure sentiment of humanity. The ... powers of manumission ... representative because such action was their own sole and exclusive right. The Italian face-saving and Hejazi clap-net will no doubt be published with the treaty as evidence of good faith on both sides. A further exchange of notes ... that the most-favoured nation treatment accorded to Italy by the Hejaz-Nejd did not include the "favourable treatment which, for reasons which are generally known, has been granted to a third Power in the matter of slavery"—the British right of manumission secured by the Treaty of Jedda.

148. Nevertheless, Aden has received a report that, on the 10th April, a slave boy of 14 was brought to Jizan: he is thought to have been landed on the Subeyhi coast east of Perim and to have been brought overland into Asir—and ... merchants interested in the slave trade enquired of the Emir of Jizan—whether the old or the new is not stated—whether he would encourage and facilitate a ... reports received at Aden state that two slaves were landed at Mocha in March 1931 and one in October 1931, and that at the beginning of March 1932 four

E 3214 '76 257

No. 106

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon — (Received June 30)

(No. 106)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 30, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 73.

I had already communicated all the particulars in Transjordan telegram No. 57 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, beginning "I regret"

I have been informed from Transjordan unless reaction of Minister for Foreign Affairs, from whom I have not yet heard, makes it advisable to convey the information in High Commissioner's telegram No. 50 immediately, in which case I will express regret more formally as from His Majesty's Government

(Repeated to Transjordan. No. 134)

E 3167 '76 257

No. 107

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 76)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office June 30, 1932

YOUR telegram No. 86 of 23rd June Situation in Northern Hejaz

1 In reply to note of 15th June you may address Hejazi Government on following lines —

2 You should first draw attention to numerous measures taken by British authorities in Transjordan and Palestine, and by authorities in Egypt at the same time, to suppress banditry and to prevent the spread of lawlessness from reaching rebels. You may also mention assistance which British naval authorities in Red Sea are endeavouring to render in same direction. Necessary details are already in your possession

3 As regards question of responsibility, you should say that His Majesty's Government cannot consider suggestion for joint investigation, but would be prepared, in due course, to consider question of themselves investigating any relevant evidence which the Hejaz-Nejd Government may care to produce, and you might suggest that in any case question of responsibility is of less urgency than other immediate issues

4 I read Hejaz Government's final enquiry (see last paragraph of your telegram No. 73) as applying to the question of the Hejaz-Nejd bottleneck, but to possible future organised aggression by Transjordan forces. If this interpretation is right, answer is that His Majesty's Government would not be in a position to prevent a Hejaz-Nejd attack against Transjordan

5 Question of possible general settlement between Transjordan and Hejaz is a matter which will inevitably take time to settle. This matter can, therefore, only be dealt with independently

6 In view of final paragraph of your telegram No. 94 of 25th June, detailed reply on these lines may appear to you to be unnecessary, and I leave it to your discretion whether to communicate all or any part of above to Hejaz-Nejd Government

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 76. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 85)

CHAPTER II. SYRIA.

E 171,171 89,

No. 108.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon — (Received January 12, 1932)

(No. 104. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damasus, December 22, 1931

WITH reference to my despatch No. 102 of the 17th December, regarding the political situation, I have the honour to report that the elections at Damasus have been adjourned in consequence of rioting of somewhat serious proportions provoked by the Government party's undue interference with the ballot

2 It is perhaps necessary for a complete comprehension of events to point out that the police and municipal officials are not, as might be taken for granted, a permanent body of public servants at the orders of whatever Government may be in power. On the contrary, they are the personal henchmen of the Administrative Governor (Wasseq-el-Muayyad) and the chief of police (Khatib-el-Khatib), who are bound to him by the strongest ties of personal interest. The same is true of even the fire brigade, which Wasseq-el-Muayyad has converted into a gang of partisans

3 The fortunes depend entirely on the return to power of Sheikh Taj-ed-Din, and that any other Government would dismiss them immediately. When it is added that in 1925 the former openly tampered with the ballot-boxes, it is easy to appreciate the deep suspicion of the Opposition and their insistence on guarantees of the freedom of the elections on the part of the High Commissioner

4 M. Ponsot refused to intervene further than to remove Sheikh Taj-ed-Din and his family from Damasus

5 The Government party, which was in power at the time of the elections, attempted to prevent the return of Sheikh Taj-ed-Din and his family to Damasus. They arrived at 7 A.M. in order to exercise their rights as citizens. The Government party attempted to prevent them from doing so, but they succeeded in entering the city and in holding a meeting with their constituents

6 Excited crowds gravitated naturally to the Morge, a centrally situated square adjoining public offices, including the municipality. The firemen attempted to disperse the crowd, but the pumps were soon put out of action, and the crowd attacked firemen and police with stones. The latter emptied their revolvers into the crowd and retreated to the municipality which was then itself attacked

7 The French forces arrived and established calm, and the High Commissioner's office was strongly occupied. The curfew has been imposed, and special measures taken for the defence of the Salhiyye quarter, where most of the French live

8 It is hard to estimate casualties. Five were buried yesterday and others have since died. An immense crowd attended the funeral, but guarantees had been given that no demonstrations would occur if the police did not interfere. Speeches were made, one wild attack on the mandate by a Greek Orthodox priest who should have known better, but the Nationalist leader, Fakhr Baroudi, recommended the population to behave peaceably

9 M. Solemniar has left this morning for Zahle to consult M. Ponsot and General Bigault de Grandrut. If it is decided to hold the elections again, it is only reasonable to hope that scrutineers from non-Government parties will be allowed to attend at the polling stations. Such a concession would have prevented the disturbances of the 11th

12. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Baghdad, for the use of the British Consulate at Amman and His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, on
E C HOLE

Constant Mouck Mason to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 12, 1932.)

Dr.

Alippo, December 24, 1931

8 The gerrymandering of the elections, attributed of course to the mandatory authorities, has roused the indignation even of those Christians who are opposed to the Nationalists, whether fair or foul, who would prevent the Nationalists becoming supreme in the district. It is indeed a significant commentary on the political principles of the Christian element of Aleppo that the vote of the Nationalists at election to the disadvantage of the Nationalists should seem to them admirable. A single instance of this "taking" will suffice, as typical of many others. In the "Wara-ed-Djami" quarter of 700 persons summoned to vote, only 82 appeared with their lists, which they deposited in the urn. When the latter was opened, no less than 803 lists were found in the box.

5 The "results" of the elections at Aleppo are of course farcical, and it may seem remarkable that there was so little public effervescence. The reasons

7. I enclose in original two letters^(*) written to me by Ibrahim Hanano, the local leader of the Nationalist party, they speak for themselves, and the facts are as stated, except that there were no more than 100 persons present at the meeting.

Copies have been sent to Beirut (No. 56) and to Damascus (No. 48).

I have, &c

A MONCK MASON

⁴) Not printed

No 110

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 13.)

Constantinople, January 6, 1882.

517.

Sir, WITH reference to Mr Morgan's despatch No. 433 of the 23rd December last, I have the honor to ~~acknowledge the receipt of your letter to the~~ Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning to remind his Excellency of his fears that King Feisal was a candidate for the Throne of Syria, and to say that it looked at present as though the ex Khedive, Abbas Huiwi Pasha, was now more prominent in that respect.

2. Tevfik Rustü Bey replied that he agreed that King Feisal's candidature was ideal and that the Turkish Government would prefer to see a King in Syria, but if there was to be a King, the Turkish Government had no objections to Abbas Hilmi, whom they knew well and considered as a friend of Turkey. In fact, I had a conversation with King Feisal some time thinking that His Majesty would like to see a member of the Khedivial house succeed to the throne, but it had been decided that this was not to be. I also saw the Turkish Minister. The matter had consequently gone no further, though I have little doubt that Turkey's support of the candidature of Abbas Hilmi was a good deal warmer than the Minister for Foreign Affairs led me to suppose.

I have, &c

GEORGE R. CIFRICK

No 111.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon. (Received January 14)

(No. 17.)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

ΣΤΕΡ

I HAVE the honor to report that Nuri Pasha, Prime Minister, who during his stay in Argentina is maintaining relations with many associates with the Government of Ministers and other leading Turks, many of whom are old friends of his, has concluded that he wishes to visit Europe, say with a glance at Syria. They are hoping that the conclusion of Syrian affairs may give them an opportunity of obtaining the concession of a railway line, it is being held that France, which formerly declined to them, they may be induced to make this further concession. With regard to the internal constitution of Syria, Turkish statesmen dislike its division into numerous States, and especially the existence of the State of the Grand Lebanon. Although Nuri Pasha did not say

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I have &c

GEORGE R. CLARK

No. 112.

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations, Geneva

Foreign Office, January 16, 1932

2. With reference to the eleventh paragraph of that joint request, I am to deliver herein the text of a joint request by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and by the French Government submitting, for the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, the agreement concluded by the two Governments on the 31st October last, regarding the settlement of the question of the frontier between Transjordan, on the one hand, and Syria and the Jebel Druze, on the other hand.

8. I am to request that you will be good enough to place this question on the agenda for the next meeting of the Council.

I am, Sir

G W RUNDLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 112

1 IN the month of November 1931 His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in accordance with the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant, have been asked to consider the question of the frontier between Iraq and Transjordan, on the one hand, and Syria and the Jebel Druze, on the other.

[illegible]

5. Copies of the protocol of the 31st October, 1931 and of the annex thereto, are attached to the present communication together with two copies of the duly certified text of the five maps annexed to the said protocol, and three extra copies of the three British maps.

Foreign Office, January 16, 1932

Enclosure 2 to No. 112.

*Protocol relative to the Settlement of the Frontier between Syria and the Jebel
Druse, on the one side, and Transjordan, on the other side*

I.—*Definition of the Frontier*

1. Farmak Sector

(a) FROM the point where the railway crosses the Yarmuk above El Hammo as far as the point where the railway crosses the river above El M Khebi, the frontier follows the thalweg of the Yarmuk, it being understood that the section of the railway situated between these two bridges, and lying to the east of the Yarmuk, shall be accorded, in favour of Syria, the same extraterritorial régime as was provided for, in the case of the section of the railway already delimited as far as the station of Semakh, by the Delimitation Agreement of the 3rd February, 1922 (which fixes the last point delimited).

(b) From the above-mentioned point above El M Khebi up to the point where the railway crosses the Wadi Meidan in the direction of Mezrah for the last time, the boundary is the Transjordan side of the Jordan River, which flows from the north to the south, and of its tributaries, the Wadi Zeirun and the Wadi Meidan, and where the railway runs on the Transjordan side to the south of these rivers, by the railway itself.

In the latter case, the frontier shall be established to the south of the railway and parallel to it in such a way as to leave to Syria, besides the railway itself its structures and grounds, its borrow-pits, its stations, its yards and outbuildings, and the area necessary both for the technical protection of the railway and its works and for its operation. This definition of the railway also

(c) Nothing in the preceding definition of the frontier shall have the effect of modifying the water tax in force in the Yarkand area as provided for in article 8 of the Franco-British Convention of the 29th December, 1920.

2. Dryas-Remick Sector

From the point defined above, where the railway crosses the Wudi Mei as far as the point where the frontier meets the railway to the south of Nnash, the frontier is defined by the following marks and cairns:

From the bridge on the Wadi Meidan, the frontier rejoins the line which separates the lands of the Transjordan villages of Amrawa, Shejera, Torrah and Remthe, on the one hand, from the lands of the Syrian villages of Tel Shehab, Mezerib, and Deraa on the other.

This line passes through El Bu'ib on the road from Deraa to Ramthe, and thence follows the western crest of the Jebel ez-Zumla as far as the cairn situated at the southern extremity of the line separating the lands of Deraa from those of Ramthe.

From the latter cairn the frontier runs to the cairn situated approximately 1,500 metres to the south of the farm of Rahaya, thence it passes to the cairn of Kabr Hamdan, and continues towards the cairn situated at Kerkur Sud, and thence rejoins the railway at a point situated between the Syrian village of

(¹) Not reproduced.

[7797]

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Nasib and the Transjordan village of Jahir, in such a way as to leave to each of these villages the lands which belong to them.

It is understood that when the frontier, in this second sector, follows a water course or wadi, the thalweg is meant, and when the frontier follows a crest, the water parting is meant.

It shall be further understood that whatever the actual line of the frontier, the inhabitants of Turrab shall continue to have access as heretofore to the water points in the Wadi Meidan situated to the east of Jiar Meidan.

3. Sector to the east of Nasib and Jahir

From the point above mentioned, between Nasib and Jahir, to the point where it meets with the frontier between Transjordan and Iraq, in the neighbourhood of Jebel Tenf, the frontier is defined as follows:

(a) From the above-defined point on the railway, the frontier rejoins the line of the railway, and then follows the line of the railway to the north of a line running through the following points:—

Umm-el Kuttein, Deir-el-Kahf (or Deir-el-Khbt) and Tell Rurah, these points being situated in Transjordan.

The frontier shall be indicated by boundary marks placed 3,200 metres (say, 2 miles) to the north of and parallel to the lines which join the centres of the places or localities mentioned above.

It is understood that if the village of Khirbat Awad or any part of that village is found to lie to the south of the frontier line as marked out above, the frontier shall be deflected around and to a point situated 80 metres to the south of the last group of houses at present existing, rejoining the main line to the east and to the west of the village by lines forming an angle of approximately 90 degrees at the point where the frontier is deflected, in such a manner as to include in the territory of the Jebel Druse all the inhabited part of this village as well as the land situated within this salient from the main line.

(b) From the point situated 3,200 metres north and on the meridian of the village of Tell Rurah, the frontier shall run in a straight line in the direction of Abu Kemal on the Euphrates, the geographical position of this village being calculated, for the special purpose of establishing this line, by reckoning the central point of the locality.

II.—Agreement on Frontier Relations and "Bon Voisinage"

An agreement on frontier relations and "bon-voisinage," of which the essential points are indicated hereafter, and which shall enter into force at the same time as the present agreement, shall lay down the reciprocal guarantees of security in the interests of the two States and shall assure the safeguarding of the rights of the inhabitants of the frontier zone.

III.—Maps

The following maps, which have been used in the course of the negotiations, are annexed () to the present agreement for the purposes of explanation:—

On the French side—

1. Feuille de Raqqa, édition 1930 au 1/200,000
2. Feuille du Yarmuk au 1/100,000

On the British side—

1. Yarmuk Valley, scale 1/50,000, contours at 50-metre intervals
2. Marked bromide reproduction map of the area between J. Rurah & Abu Kemal, scale 1/100,000
3. Syria-Jaffa, Damascus, scale 1/250,000 corrected

(*) Not reproduced

The frontier lines marked on these maps, having been drawn prior to the agreement, have a purely relative value for the purposes of general indication.

On the other hand, the indications shown in ink on the maps of the Yarmuk Valley are intended to support the agreed text, in particular in so far as concerns the course of the Wadi Zeirun and the Wadi Meidan.

H. PONSOT
F. H. HUMPHRYS

Paris, October 31, 1931

Annex to Protocol

General Lines of the Agreement on Frontier Relations and "Bon Voisinage."

A separate agreement will be concluded as soon as possible, to regulate relations between the two States in the frontier zone, in such a way as to allow non-nomadic, semi-nomadic and nomadic inhabitants having properties or rights of pasture, watering or cultivation across the frontier, to continue to enjoy their rights.

Such inhabitants shall be able, within the limits of a frontier zone on either side of the frontier of a width to be defined hereafter, to convey from one side of the frontier to the other their beasts, the natural increase and produce of their flocks, agricultural implements intended for their work, their vehicles, their seeds, and the cultural produce of their properties, without having to pay any dues in respect of customs, pasturage or watering, or any other tax leviable in respect of entry into the neighbouring territory.

The agreement contemplated will furthermore contain provisions designed to ensure the maintenance of complete order and security in the regions bordering on the frontier. In particular the measures to be taken against persons coming from one territory and committing acts of aggression in the other will be laid down, and provision will be made for the exclusion from a zone on each side of the frontier, of a width to be fixed by agreement between the two Governments, of any individuals whose conduct might be considered as prejudicial to peace and order in the territories under the administration of the other party.

H. PONSOT
F. H. HUMPHRYS

Paris, October 31, 1931

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No 113.

Consul Hols to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 18.)

(No 7 Confidential)

Damascus, January 4, 1932.

Sir, WITH reference to my despatch No. 104 of the 22nd December, 1931, regarding the situation in the frontier zone, I have the honour to report on the progress of events till to day.

2. The army is still in the hands of the army, though a state of siege has not been proclaimed. The control has been made somewhat less ostentatious than on the first few days after the troubles, the curfew has been abolished and barricades removed. The army is still in the hands of the army, though a state of siege has not been proclaimed. The control has been made somewhat less ostentatious than on the first few days after the troubles, the curfew has been abolished and barricades removed. The army is still in the hands of the army, though a state of siege has not been proclaimed. The control has been made somewhat less ostentatious than on the first few days after the troubles, the curfew has been abolished and barricades removed.

3. A committee has been formed to collect subscriptions on behalf of casualties in the disturbances, the members represent every section of the population, and include many most reputable personages.

4. It seemed at one moment that M. Ponsot would arrive at complete agreement with the National party: Wassaq-el-Muayyad and Bahaj-el-Khatib were both removed and the general atmosphere of the discussions was friendly. But at the council of delegates held at the Residency on the 30th December the

proposal of M. Solomias to postpone all elections was overruled and it was decided to hold elections to-morrow in all districts, except Damascus, Hama and Douma, where they will be held at a date not yet fixed.

5. Damascus will be closed to-morrow in protest, and the attitude of the Nationalists towards the elections will depend on the Aleppo results: if the chief Nationalist candidates are elected they will contest the elections at Damascus, otherwise they will boycott them.

6. In an interview, published on the 31st December, Jamil Beg Mardam Beg outlined the Nationalist demands—fresh elections in Damascus, Hama and Douma and eleven (of twenty-nine) wards in Aleppo, where it is asserted that practically the entire population is Nationalist. Although no official statement has been issued by the Residency.

7. The High Commission invited the National party to include in its list three candidates who were acceptable to the French authorities, Nassouhi Beg El Boukhar, Mohamed Ali Beg El Abid, and Rida Pasha Rikabi. The first was already conditionally on their list, they had coquetted with the second for some time on account of his great wealth, but the third is anathema. Their reason for refusal was, however, based on the principle that in a free election a party chooses its own candidates.

8. I am glad to record that Nationalist leaders have refrained from any attempt to excite public feeling in somewhat tempting circumstances and seem to be animated by a sincere desire to reach agreement with the French Administration.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut, and His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.
E C HOLE.

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No. 114

Sir P. Lorcins to Sir John Simon (Received January 20)

(No. 11 Confidential. Saving.)
(Telegraphic)

Cairo, January 20, 1932

MY telegram No. 23, Saving, 21st December

The Prime Minister has spoken to me again about the candidature of ex-Khedive Ismail Pasha. I have been exchanging copies of letters exchanged between Turkish Chargé d'Affaires and Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs on this subject which Prime Minister left with me, but it may be of interest to record, meanwhile, main points which emerged in conversation—

1. Egyptian Government have made it perfectly plain to the French Government that they would not be agreeable to them.

2. French Minister in Cairo has continued to express attitude of his Government in regard to Ismail Pasha's candidature in day and not in writing. The French Ambassador has also explained to Sidki that the reception given to Abbas Hilmi by the French High Commissioner was one merely of courtesy due to his rank.

3. Egyptian Minister at Angora having been invited to a reception by the Prime Minister in honour of ex-Khedive at which French Minister was also present, formed the conclusion that Turkish Government viewed Abbas Hilmi's candidature favourably. Soundings were thereupon taken which showed that this diagnosis was correct. Thereupon Turkish Chargé d'Affaires made a textual communication from his Minister for Foreign Affairs to Egyptian Government admitting that Turkish Government viewed Hilmi's candidature

with favour, and had had no grounds for supposing that Egypt would feel otherwise. I have also been told that Abbas Hilmi is a member of Turkish and they had supposed that he would be welcome to Egypt as a member of Egyptian Government, especially as they had assumed Abbas Hilmi had been acting hitherto in consultation and in agreement with the King of Egypt and his Government.

4. Reply from Minister for Foreign Affairs shows that these assumptions are unfounded, that Abbas Hilmi has been working entirely on his own account, and, indeed, in contradiction with understanding with Egyptian Government that he should remain aloof from politics, and explains reasons why it would create a disagreeable position for Egypt if an ex ruler of this country and an ex-pretender to its throne, to whom, moreover, the Egyptian Constitution denies access to Egyptian soil, were to become the monarch of neighbour State with which Egypt had closest ties of every description.

(Repeated to Beirut, Jerusalem and Istanbul.)

E 439 226 89]

No. 113

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon (Received January 20)

(No. 24)
Sir

Angora, January 15, 1932

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that Nuri Pasha, Prime Minister for Iraq, has informed me that during his recent stay in Angora, in connexion with Turco-Iraq treaty negotiations, he learned beyond reasonable doubt that the Turkish Government, anxious, as he says, to prevent a union of Iraq and Syria, were wholeheartedly in favour of the candidature of the ex-Khedive, Abbas Hilmi Pasha, to the Throne of Syria, and intended to support it in every way open to them. Nuri Pasha added that he did not know what the Turkish Government were doing at the moment to bring about this result. He also mentioned that he was in communication with Pasha and Iraq would support him.

2. Furthermore, his information was that Abbas Hilmi Pasha had promised large sums of money to Turkish journalists—including, of course, Yunus Nadi—to open a press campaign in his favour. He said that a considerable amount was being spent in this way, and that he was also giving his full support to the ex-Khedive, but whether to return for a pecuniary consideration or not, Nuri Pasha could not say.

3. The local newspapers contrive to find space each day for some small paragraph about the ex-Khedive. A reporter returns to Turkey from Amman with Hasan Pasha, Prime Minister of Transjordan, his reception by the King Ismail Pasha and the King Khalid, his appearance at the airport for Cannes, and also his denial that the Throne of Syria has been offered to him. According to the 'Milliyet' of the 11th January the ex-Khedive regards as premature the rumour of the creation of a Kingdom of Syria, and thinks it probable that a republic will be established in that country. His view is that a definite decision should be given by the League of Nations as to the candidature desired by the Syrians and of the mandate given to France by the League of Nations.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

(C. 106.1932, VI.)

Genève, le 26 janvier 1932.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Mandats: Frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak — (Received in Foreign Office, January 20)

Notes du Secrétaire général

A LA demande du Gouvernement français, le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de communiquer au Conseil une lettre de ce Gouvernement, en date du 23 janvier 1932, relative à la question du tracé de la frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak qui a fait l'objet de la résolution du Conseil du 9 décembre 1931.

Lettre du Gouvernement français

Au Secrétaire général,

Paris, le 23 janvier 1932.

Par résolution en date du 9 décembre dernier, le Conseil de la Société des Nations a décidé d'accepter en principe la requête des Gouvernements britannique et français lui demandant d'examiner tous les aspects des difficultés soulevées par la délimitation de la frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak, d'établir ses conclusions en ce qui concerne les intentions que traduit l'article 1^{er} de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920⁽¹⁾ et, cela fait, d'indiquer une frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak définie sur la base de cette convention, mais modifiée pour tenir compte des considérations suivantes :

En vue de la décision que le Conseil de la Société des Nations doit prendre dans ces conditions, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que le Gouvernement français estime être en droit de revendiquer pour la Syrie, par stricte application de la convention du 23 décembre 1920 précitée, la frontière décrite et brièvement commentée ci-après :

1. Secteur du Tigre

A l'est, le Tigre depuis Djézaret ibn Omar jusqu'à la limite des anciens vilayets de Diarbékir et de Mossoul

La frontière turco-irakienne ayant été, par suite de la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations, en date du 9 octobre 1925, et du Traité d'Ankara du 5 juin 1926, maintenue à l'ancien état, les deux parties s'accordent à déclarer que, dans l'attente de cette décision, les deux gouvernements s'abstiennent de toute agression et de tout acte susceptible de troubler le bon voisinage et d'entraîner, de la part de l'une ou l'autre des deux parties, des mesures de rétorsion.

A partir de ce point, la frontière est marquée par le talweg du fleuve jusqu'au point où le fleuve est saisi par la route entre les casernes de l'Armée et la Mission, telle que cette limite est indiquée sur la carte au même endroit.

2 Secteur Tigre-Koumoulan Kouï

1. Le sud et du sud-est, ladite limite des anciens vilayets vers le sud jusqu'à Roum et au sud

Au point d'intersection entre le thalweg du Tigre et la limite des vilayets, la frontière suit cette limite telle qu'elle figure sur la carte au millionième, limite qui s'infléchit vers le sud dans sa partie ouest et passe légèrement au sud de Roumsian Keni.

L'expression "jusqu'à Roumelan Keui" doit donc s'entendre "jusqu'à la hauteur de Roumelan Keui," c'est-à-dire jusqu'au point de la limite des vilayets le plus rapproché de Roumelan Keui.

L'emplacement de Roumelan Keçi est déterminé par la coordonnée géographique que lui assigne cette carte.

(1) *Note du Secrétaire-général.*—Pour le texte de cette convention, voir "Recueil des Traité," publié par le Secrétariat, Vol. XXII, p. 354.

9. Secteur Roumelian Axi-Euphrate

De là, une ligne laissant au mandat français l'intégralité du bassin du Khabbour occidental et se dirigeant en ligne droite sur l'Euphrate, qu'elle franchit à Abou Kemal

Abou-Kemal ne se trouve pas sur l'Euphrate, mais à 400 mètres à l'ouest de la rive droite de ce fleuve. La frontière ne peut franchir l'Euphrate à Abou-Kemal même; elle la franchit au point de son cours le plus rapproché de Abou Kemal.

l'origine et l'aboutissement de cette ligne étant ainsi déterminés, la ligne d'après la convention doit.

- (2) Ne frayer en ligne droite sur l'opéra de la ville (à l'ouest d'Abou Kemal)

Si l'on se reporte à la carte au millionième la ligne droite joignant les deux points précités paraît répondre à ces deux conditions.

4. Secteur Énergie-Eau

Puis une ligne droite aboutissant à Imtan au sud du Djebel Druse

Cette définition n'appelle pas de commentaire.

au millionième, éditée en 1916 et revue en 1918, que les négociateurs de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920 ont eue sous les yeux.

Peuvent être également citées comme références:

La carte au millionième annexée au Traité de Sévrou.

La carte annexée au rapport de la Commission créée par la Société des Nations d'enquête sur la question de la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak.

La carte au millionième annexée au Livre blanc britannique contenant le texte du traité conclu à Angora le 5 juin 1926 entre le Royaume-Uni, l'Irak et la Turquie ("Treaty Series, No 16 (1927)").

Je crois devoir vous faire parvenir ci-joint, à titre d'indication, un exemplaire de la carte anglaise internationale au millionième, sur lequel la frontière syro-irakienne entre le Tigre et l'Euphrate a été tracée conformément à la définition donnée plus haut (*)

Je vous serais obligé de bien vouloir porter les précisions contenues dans la présente lettre à la connaissance des membres du Conseil.

BARTHELOT

(*) La carte en question a été déposée aux archives du secrétaire.

Foreign Office to the Secretary General League of Nations (Geneva)

SIR,

Foreign Office, January 30, 1982

I AM directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to invite a reference to the resolution adopted by the Council on the 9th December last following upon a joint request from His Majesty's Government and the French Government, regarding the delimitation of the frontier between Iraq and Syria.

2. In view of that resolution I am to transmit to you for the information on the Council's views on the general question of the representation of the British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920. The Council will no doubt wish to refer this memorandum, for examination, to the commission contemplated in section 2 of its resolution of the 9th December, when that commission is set up.

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No. 122

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 27, 1932

IN paragraph 3 of Foreign Office letter of the 30th January, relative to the delimitation of the frontier between Iraq and Syria, it was stated that, in addition to the memorandum on the interpretation of article 1 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920 enclosed in that letter, a further memorandum, containing certain proposals for the revision of the frontier as defined in the convention of 1920, was under preparation and would be transmitted to you as soon as possible.

2. I am now directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you, for the information of the Council, the further memorandum (which will be enclosed with this letter) containing the proposals therein. The Council will no doubt wish to refer it, for examination, as was suggested in the letter of the 30th January, to the commission contemplated in section 2 of the Council's resolution of the 6th December last.

I am, Sir,

C. W. BAXTER

Memorandum containing Proposals for a Revised Frontier between Iraq and Syria.

IT is obvious that the definition of a frontier 400 miles long in five or six lines of print, and with reference to a map avowedly little more than a sketch map, can only be taken as a general indication of the intentions of the framers of the Franco-British Convention of 1920. Even the application of the frontier described from the map used to the ground is likely to present serious problems. Substantial modifications would have to be made in any line on the ground ultimately resulting from the application, unless a totally unworkable frontier were to be imposed on the two States concerned.

2. A line has been drawn on the above maps with a view to drawing in red a line which it is considered, would make a satisfactory and workable boundary.

- (1) *Le Caire, Direction 147 1 26 20 K. SW. et 1 NW 1927*
- (2) *Bureau topographique des Troupes françaises du Levant 200,000 Beled Sinjar 1930.*
- (3) *Bureau topographique des Troupes françaises du Levant 200,000 Hama, 1930.*
- (4) *Bureau topographique des Troupes françaises du Levant 200,000 Abu Kemal 1930.*
- (5) *Iraq Survey Directorate, 1-31,680. Country between Al Qaim and Abu Kemal.*
- (6) *Asia, 1-1,000,000. Damascus, 1918.*

3. The description of the line drawn on the map is as follows:—

First Sector (Reference Map No. 1).

From the point where the frontier between Iraq and Turkey in the north-east of the latter State crosses the frontier of the Eastern Khabur the frontier follows the said river to the north of the Wadi Saffan. The boundary ascends the median line of the Saffan to a point north-east of height 1837 on the map on the crest of the Qara Choq range, it then runs north-west to the said point 1837. From this point the boundary descends to the north of the Wadi Zayra and runs in a straight line to Tell Dalsha, so as to leave the water-meadows known as Mardana Ma near Tell Dugirkat,

to Iraq) thence a straight line to Tuwaiba. From Tuwaiba the boundary follows the line of mounds Tell Girhauk, Tell Ali Agha to Tell Sulaiman Sari, where it joins the Wadi Rumaila. The boundary then follows the said Wadi Rumaila to the point where it turns west near Tell Dalsha.

Second Sector (Reference Map No. 2)

4. The line then runs almost due west, passing to the north of Tell Aida and Tell Agha (Tell Ugha) through the complex of depressions to Tell Safrat, thence to the north of the Singar villages reasonable access to water. From Tell Safrat the line passes to the north of Khatouniye towards El Hol, but rounds the end of the Jebel Juriba to the point marked Kaeibe in such a way as to leave to Iraq the agricultural lands of Khatouniye and to Syria those of El Hol.

Third Sector (Reference Maps Nos. 2, 3 and 4)

5. From the point marked Kaeibe the boundary follows the Wadi Kaeibe southwards and passes southwards through Tell Sfeuk to Garat Moiteb so as to leave the Wadi Sihl to Iraq and the Wadi Um Ghoreiba to Syria. The boundary then follows the Wadi Haddad, Bagassat, Tell Bagassat, Tell Bagassat, Tell Biar to triangulation point 204 thence a straight line to Baghouz (Baghuz).

Fourth Sector (Reference Map No. 5)

6. From Baghouz the boundary runs south-west towards the north-eastern extremity of the island Hawajat Baghouz and then follows the valley line of the Hawajat Baghouz to the north of the Hawajat Baghouz, as the boundary between the Hami and Suwayya lands, here the frontier leaves the Hawajat Baghouz and follows the shortest alignment to a point about 3 miles from Abu Kemal on the straight line from Abu Kemal to Imtan.

Fifth Sector (Reference Map No. 6)

7. From this point the boundary follows the said straight line until it strikes the frontier between Iraq and Transjordan.

8. The above proposals for the boundary are based, firstly, on the Franco-British Convention of 1920, secondly, on the latest surveys, thirdly, on considerations of tribal needs and administrative convenience, fourthly, on economic conditions and, fifthly, on considerations of defence.

In estimating administrative convenience and tribal needs, the following principles have been observed as far as possible:—

- (a) Settled villages should have secured to them their fields, grazing grounds and essential watering places.
- (b) Nomadic shepherds of limited range of migration should similarly have secured to them, where possible, their grazing grounds and water.
- (c) No frontier can be drawn which need not be crossed by the Bedouin and similar tribes of wide range of migration, nevertheless, the fewer the sections that have to cross the frontier the better the frontier is.

9. For purposes of the following discussion, the frontier is divided into five sectors as follows:—

- 1) Tigris to Tell Dalsha.
- 2) Tell Dalsha to Qusaiba (Kaeibe).
- 3) Qusaiba (Kaeibe) to Baghouz (Baghuz).
- 4) The Euphrates at Abu Kemal.
- 5) The Syrian desert.

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(c) The following tree shows the relationship of the principal personalities of the Jarba' shakhsly family —

FARMER (Crying loudly): 1623.

First Sector (Reference Map No. 1)

(a) *The Population Affected*

(d) In recent Turkish times the Shammar were divided into two main groups, the Shammar of Dair-es-Zor under Sheikh Faria, and those of Mosul under Sheikh Farhan. The grouping was liable to variation in different years owing to considerations of grazing, feuds, friction with Government and the like, but generally the Faddaghia and Amud with the Ammar section of the Thabit were under Faria, while the Alda and Kburnsa with the Najm section of the Thabit were under Farhan. A third section of the Thabit (Az Zar'a) divided its time between Iraq and Syria falling sometimes into one group and sometimes into another.

(e) The arrangement was carried on after the war by the two successive Governments. Mishal, son of Faria, was appointed by the Syrian Government chief of the Dair-az-Zor group, and Ajul, grandson of Farhan, was appointed by the Iraqi Government chief of the Al-Habur group. The boundary line, however, in the Rumailan Khabur area runs rather east of the old rough tribal dividing line. While the Fasilugha and Amud of Syria and Abda of Iraq need the pastures of the Khurusa, who are generally found astride it. The Syrian Government has therefore appointed another scion of the house of Farhan, his great grandson Dihan. There is a growing tendency for the various sections of the Khurusa to stay definitely on one side or the other, though always in the vicinity of the existing *de facto* boundary, and this tendency will no doubt become stronger when the frontier is fixed. A large proportion of the flocks with the Abda, Khurusa and Thabit belongs to Mosul owners.

The critical time for the Iraq Shammar, from the point of view of water, is not in the summer. In most years they camp in the Jazira south of the Jebel Sinjar in years when the grazing there is inadequate they come north of the Jebel Sinjar into the Qara Chog-Rumailan area.

First Sector.

(b) Discussion of the Line Proposed

16. The Hajjan Kurds are mostly to be found on the east of the Tigris, but
 17. some are found as far west as the Tigris, and some are found as far south as the Tigris.
 18. In the Hajjan, the Hajjan tend to stay in Zumar even longer than formerly.

The villagers of Fush Khahur are accustomed to send their flocks across the river to graze on the Zhummar Bank about Khanik.

17. (a) The Shammar Bedouin Arabs are estimated to number about 5,000 tents, and are affected by the frontier almost throughout its length from the Tigris to the Euphrates, since any frontier between Iraq and Syria must cut across their traditional pastures. In view of the importance of this tribe, it will be necessary to discuss their history and divisions at some length.

(b) The Northern Shammar range over the Jazira, the Mesopotamia desert between the Tigris and the Euphrates, from about parallel 37° N on the north to 34° N on the south. In winter some sections pass with their camels (but not their sheep) south of Bagdad to Diwanis.

[illegible]

19. A line following the crest of the Qara Choq between the Tigris and the Euphrates, and the wording of the convention, but the frontier about 3 miles northwards to the Wadi Sufian, which, except for the watershed of the Qara Choq, is the only salient topographical feature. The modification is further justified by considerations of tribal needs since on the Iraq side of the watershed the only water available in summer is in wells dug in the Wadi Sufian. In paragraph 12 and 13, Iraqi tribes need to drink from the Sufian. No Syrian tribe ever has occasion to cross the watershed or even has real need of the grazing between it and the Sufian on the Syrian side water is plentiful everywhere.

The precise alignment of the frontier in the neighbourhood of the Tigris is given in the report of the 16th July, 1925, to the Council of the League of Nations —

Any invasion of Iraq from the north must follow the line of the Tigris valley on either or both banks. The Wadi Sufian and the Qara Choq form on the west bank the pendant to the Eastern Khabur and the Zukho ridge on the east bank. The Qara Choq ridge borders the enclave of Syrian territory, conveniently referred to as the *Dee du Canard* on the south. Militarily it would be of no use to Syria, for Syria would never have to repel an attack at this point of Iraq. In the event of an attack from the north Syria could never hold this salient, which is far from her bases across the desert. An advance from the north across the enclave would therefore be unobstructed. It follows that the defence of the line of the ridge is of great military importance to Iraq. If the ridge were held by the Iraqi army, the strong Zakho-Farah Khabur position which the Iraqi army might be holding in force. The possession by Iraq of the Qara Choq, even if it were only lightly held, would prevent such a movement and would, moreover, bar the road to any disturbances towards Mosul. From it also Iraq might withstand a hostile advance along the Ninawa-Mosul road, either by means of irregulars based on it, or by means of regulars with a bridge of boats behind them at Farah Khabur. If the watershed were not in the possession of Iraq the position of the latter force would be untenable. The ridge is therefore extremely valuable to Iraq with regard to both the probable lines of advance from the direction of Ninawa-Mosul and Jazira ibn Umar on Zakho. And its value is purely defensive. The defence of the ridge would be greatly facilitated if the boundary, instead of following the present *de facto* line along the watershed, which admits of no depth in the present circumstances, were to follow the line of the Wadi Sufian.

20. The present boundary follows the crest of the Qara Choq, which is the watershed to the Euphrates. The line of the watershed is the only salient topographical feature. The Qara Choq ridge borders the enclave of Syrian territory, conveniently referred to as the *Dee du Canard* on the south. Militarily it would be of no use to Syria, for Syria would never have to repel an attack at this point of Iraq. In the event of an attack from the north Syria could never hold this salient, which is far from her bases across the desert. An advance from the north across the enclave would therefore be unobstructed. It follows that the defence of the line of the ridge is of great military importance to Iraq. If the ridge were held by the Iraqi army, the strong Zakho-Farah Khabur position which the Iraqi army might be holding in force. The possession by Iraq of the Qara Choq, even if it were only lightly held, would prevent such a movement and would, moreover, bar the road to any disturbances towards Mosul. From it also Iraq might withstand a hostile advance along the Ninawa-Mosul road, either by means of irregulars based on it, or by means of regulars with a bridge of boats behind them at Farah Khabur. If the watershed were not in the possession of Iraq the position of the latter force would be untenable. The ridge is therefore extremely valuable to Iraq with regard to both the probable lines of advance from the direction of Ninawa-Mosul and Jazira ibn Umar on Zakho. And its value is purely defensive. The defence of the ridge would be greatly facilitated if the boundary, instead of following the present *de facto* line along the watershed, which admits of no depth in the present circumstances, were to follow the line of the Wadi Sufian.

21. The area affected may conveniently be referred to as the Sinjar area. The Jebel Sinjar on the north side from the village of Zawaia (Zirwana) on the east to Tell al Arus is inhabited exclusively by Yazidis, living

Second Sector (Reference Map No. 2)

(a) The Population Affected

21. The area affected may conveniently be referred to as the Sinjar area.

22. The Jebel Sinjar on the north side from the village of Zawaia (Zirwana) on the east to Tell al Arus is inhabited exclusively by Yazidis, living

in forty villages with a total population of 15,500. Of the population the population is more mixed. Of sixty villages forty are predominately Yazidi. The different elements are estimated as follows: Yazidis 1,550 houses, Kurds (many converted Yazidis) 650 houses, Arabs 650 houses, Turcomans 240 houses. The most westerly tribe of the Yazidis is the Sammoqa, who occupy the villages of Kaila Mando, Jafariya, Bir Shirin, Bara, Kora Samoka on the north side, and Juriba on the south side. The Sammoqa live in tents for three-quarters of the year and camp in the Juriba, the name of the low western tail of the Jebel Sinjar. The grazing grounds of the Yazidis on the north side extend from the mountain to the depressions of the Radd where they water at certain seasons of the year. On the south side at the western end the grazing is shared by the Sammoqa and Qiran tribes of the Yazidis, whose western limit is approximately a line from Tell al Arus to Badi al Fauqan.

23. The Tai are a Syrian tribe of mixed cultivating and pastoral elements. The nomadic pastoral sections are Al Rashid and Jawwala, and some of them, numbering about 600 tents, require to come into Iraq for about three months in the winter, when the Wadis of the Khabur are boggy. They enter the area on the north side of the mountain about as far east as Gubhal though they have been known to mingle with the Juharish far to the east. Their relations with the Yazidis are on the whole good. They sometimes camp in the Juriba area with the permission of, and by special arrangement with, the Sammoqa.

24. The Jabur of Syria are 90 per cent cultivators on the Khabur, and the shepherds come out to the Wadi Gumaiba and occasionally cross the proposed line as far as the Wadi Um Adh Dhiban.

Second Sector

(b) Discussions of the Line

25. The Jebel Sinjar is a mountain of considerable height, and its population is more mixed. Of sixty villages forty are predominately Yazidi. The different elements are estimated as follows: Yazidis 1,550 houses, Kurds (many converted Yazidis) 650 houses, Arabs 650 houses, Turcomans 240 houses. The most westerly tribe of the Yazidis is the Sammoqa, who occupy the villages of Kaila Mando, Jafariya, Bir Shirin, Bara, Kora Samoka on the north side, and Juriba on the south side. The Sammoqa live in tents for three-quarters of the year and camp in the Juriba, the name of the low western tail of the Jebel Sinjar. The grazing grounds of the Yazidis on the north side extend from the mountain to the depressions of the Radd where they water at certain seasons of the year. On the south side at the western end the grazing is shared by the Sammoqa and Qiran tribes of the Yazidis, whose western limit is approximately a line from Tell al Arus to Badi al Fauqan.

"They (the Yazidis) undoubtedly form an entirely distinct element of the population, they are a united organism and they are of some importance in regard to the question under consideration, because they form a compact body and are almost the only settled population in the western desert."

Any attempt to divide what nature has so clearly designed, and man has hitherto preserved as a unit, is a most serious error. The difficulties that would arise in connexion with nationality, passports and customs are self-evident. The difficulties that would be caused to the police of both sides in dealing with offenders who could easily slip across the frontier in a hundred places are equally obvious. Politically there would be continual attempts to play off one Government against the other, and insouciance from the territory of one State would inevitably seek refuge in the adjacent territory of the other. Any division of the Sinjar would, moreover, be a direct contravention of the most elementary principles which have been accepted in connexion with redistributions of territory which have taken place since the Great War.

26. The Jebel Sinjar has already been likened to a peninsula. It is connected with Mosul by a narrow strip of land, and is a part of the desert. Its associations, historical, religious, social and commercial, are with Mosul and not with Dair-er Zor.

The 1:1,000,000 Asia map of 1916 shows the Mosul Vilayet boundary as dividing the Jebel Sinjar in two. This was in fact, incorrect. Other maps, such as that in Cuneo's authoritative French work "Turquie en-Asie," and the index map to the 1:1,000,000 map of 1916 show the Jebel Sinjar correctly in the Mosul Vilayet. The actual facts are that up to 1870, i.e., twenty

- (1) The route to Mosul from Aleppo and Damascus is the Hatt el Zer and continues as a single road which impinges on the Jebel. Here the traveller or raider obtains his first water after passing the Khabur. In possession of this water and in ground strong for defence, quite a small force on the Jebel would prevent the incursions of any raiding parties towards Mosul.
- (2) A force holding the hill could threaten from a flank a hostile advance from Nisibin on Mosul.

36. The Dulaim is a homogeneous tribe, comprising both cultivators and camel owners, settled on both banks of the Euphrates from Falluja to the proposed frontier and gives its name to the whole Liwa. The pastoral elements of the Jughaisa section graze in the Jazira from east of Hit to the Jebel Sinjar. The pastoral elements of the Al Bu Mahal section graze in the desert on both the

37 The proposed line has been drawn to correspond with the tribal limits of the Agaidat and Hori of the Dulaim. Since the island of the town of Abu Kemal is understood to be largely obtained from the island of Hawijat Baghouz, it has been considered preferable to leave it all to Syria, rather than to bisect it. On the right bank it is intended that the boundary shall correspond with the boundaries of the riverain estates of Suwayyah of the Agaidat and Hori of the Dulaim. As explained in the note on the population, the pastoral elements of both sides would require to cross the frontier on occasion. The modification now suggested, whereby the town of Abu Kemal and the Agaidat and Hori of the Dulaim are placed on the Syrian side, is based on the assumption that the proposed frontier as a whole is acceptable.

\$§ This sector may be conveniently referred to as the Shamirya sector.

39. Apart from the pastoral elements of the riverain tribes already discussed under the fourth sector, the tribe offered is the purely Bedouin Amara, of which the Amarat section is Iraqi and the Fidan, Sha and Ruwalla are Syrian. The *diras* (grazing grounds) of these sections overlap, but, broadly speaking, the Sha and Fid'an camps are found on the northern bank and the Amarat on the southern bank of the Euphrates. The Fidan, the Sha and the Amarat *diras*, the Wadi Ubayyidh area, contains shrubs (an important item in the entire diet and grazing system of the Bedouins) in the lower half. W. J. M. A. D. H. B. C. is the principal source of information regarding the Sha and the Fidan at times accompany the Amarat in winter as far south as Judaidat-al-Arar on the Iraq-Nejd frontier, while the Ruwalla penetrate even further south into Nejd. In summer the Amarat follow the Sha up into Syria. The market towns of the Amarat are Hit, Ramadi, Falluja, Kerbala and Najaf, while the principal market town of the Sha is Aleppo, of the Fid'an Dair-ez-zor and of the Ruwalla Damascus.

10. To separate the desert from its fertile lands, to desert the dream of nomadic Bedouin. Although the straight line from Abu Kemal to Irbid up to the Transjordan frontier, which it may for the present purpose be considered to meet at Jebel Tefk, gives Syria a great advantage in the matter of water, yet in view of the purely artificial character of the straight line it is not suggested that the straight line be followed. A straight line should be none. With the very best of the latter great present and future work it should be possible to suggest a line of natural features which the boundary should follow. A reasonable amount of deviation from the straight line on one side or the other may be desirable, and tribal rights to water at various seasons of the year will need definition.

No. 128.

No. 17. Confidential.)

Damascus, February 11, 1932

With reference to my request No. 7 of the 4th January I have the honour to transmit a summary report on political events since that date.

2. The military dispositions reported in paragraph 2 of my despatch under reference were not relaxed in 1904 a fortnight after the conclusion of a strike

3. Strong pickets of Senegalese with steel helmets were posted at strategic points to provide against demonstrations.

4. The question of minorities has been the occasion of much ink-spilling during the period under review. The action of His Majesty's Government in recommending the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations aroused violent protestations in the local French press and in particular the Beirut "Orient," which published an appeal to the Syrian Christian and Jewish voters to ensure the election of a Government which would protect them from the fate of the minorities in Iraq, which His Majesty's Government was abandoning to massacre.

5. It has always been the policy of the mandatory Power to stress any differences between Muslims and Christians in Syria, and the Nationalist party have consequently striven to assert the complete union of all religious communities in the ties of patriotism. In the heated discussions that broke out in the press a sharp divergence of opinion became evident in the front ranks of the Nationalists, voiced by the editor of the "Qabas" and the Christian leader Faiz-el Khoury. As soon, however, as they perceived that they were playing into the hands of their adversaries they hastened to heal the breach.

Hama, Daraya and Douma, nor has the Nationalist party decided whether or not to present candidates. Although it is probable that the Nationalists would secure the whole of the seats if the elections are free, these would only amount to twenty-two in a Chamber of sixty-eight members. Councils are divided as to whether it is better to be an articulate but impotent Opposition or to boycott the elections altogether.

7. M. Ponsot's excursion into activity has been unfortunately conducted in a manner that has led to the belief that he is endeavoring to settle the Syrian question as M. Ponsot to obtain a more comfortable Embassy and that they were in agreement that a Syrian Chamber should be elected to conclude a treaty that would enable France to look forward to withdrawal from the Syrian mandate. The project conceived very closely with the desires of the politically-minded circles of Syria and even with those of the Nationalist party, whose views had been profoundly modified in the course of the last few years.

8. Unfortunately the High Commission is entirely out of touch with popular feeling and desire. Its influence is feeble, its action is ineffectual. It is most improbable that a freely-elected Chamber would have offered any serious opposition to M. Poincaré's proposals: it would seem that a natural and honest work with a declared pro-French Ministry added to the interested assurances of the present Ministry would have won the assent of the Chamber. Even if the Nationalists had obtained a working majority in the Chamber, their powers to ignore the mandatory Government would not have been increased: at the worst, the High Commissioner could have again prorogued the Assembly and pointed out with reason to the Chamber of Nations that the country was not ripe for self-government. At the best, a satisfactory treaty could have been concluded. Above all, the Nationalists themselves would have been subjected to the crucible test of office, which might have welded them into a useful Government or in the contrary event achieved their disintegration. In any case, it would have put an end to their self-assertion as the only pure and incorruptible party.

9. Any of these results would be more acceptable to France than a continuance of the present stalemate. An arrangement concluded with the Assembly without the participation of the Nationalists runs the risk of repudiation if ever that party comes into power. If the treaty is on the lines of our treaty with Iraq, the risk is evidently small but if it contains clauses, financial or other, which would justify the evident desire of the High Commission to deal with a Francophile Government, the danger is by no means negligible.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners in London and to the British Resident in Aleppo. His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c
E C HOLE.

E 1372 15 89]

No. 124.

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Mandats. Frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak. — (Received in Foreign Office, March 14)

Vote du Secrétaire général

(C 317 1932 V 1)

Genève, le 7 mars 1932

À la demande de la délégation française à Genève, le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de communiquer au Conseil une lettre de cette délégation en date du 29 février 1932, transmettant certains documents relatifs à la question du tracé de la frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak qui a fait l'objet de la résolution du Conseil du 9 décembre 1931.

Lettre de la Délégation française

Genève, le 29 février 1932.

Au Directeur de la Section des Mandats,
J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer sous ce pli, à l'intention de la Commission syro-irakienne :

1. Trois exemplaires d'un mémoire descriptif de la frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak qui a été établi par les soins du Haut Commissariat à Beyrouth. (1)
2. Un dossier contenant neuf cartes (2) auxquelles se réfère ledit mémoire.

En raison de leur volume, les cartes n'ont pu être envoyées qu'en un seul exemplaire. Le Haut Commissariat les a remises, avec des explications complémentaires au Colonel de Reynier et à ses collègues dès leur arrivée à Beyrouth.

R. MASSEI

Enclosure in No. 124

Mémoire descriptif de la Frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak

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Notes du Secrétariat :

- (1) Ce document sera communiqué au Conseil ultérieurement.
- (2) Un autre jeu des cartes sera immédiatement fourni par le Gouvernement français et sera placé aux archives du Secrétariat, où il pourra être consulté.

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INTRODUCTION

LES GOUVERNEMENTS FRANÇAIS ET BRITANNIQUE, par lettres des 10 et 11 novembre 1931, ont adressé au Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations une requête commune tendant au règlement, par le Conseil de la Société des Nations sur la base de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920, de la question de frontière pendante entre la Syrie et l'Irak.

Faisant état des difficultés qui ont retardé la délimitation de cette frontière, dans les conditions prévues par la convention, la requête commune mentionne :

« En second lieu, il fut constaté que quelle que pût être l'interprétation donnée à l'article 1^{er} de la convention (définition de la frontière), une frontière tracée en stricte conformité avec cette interprétation serait vraisemblablement peu satisfaisante dans certains secteurs pour des raisons militaires, politiques, administratives, de tribus, économiques, géographiques ou autres ».

Par résolution en date du 9 décembre 1931, le Conseil de la Société des Nations a décidé d'accepter en principe la requête des Gouvernements français et britannique, et a chargé le Secrétaire général, qui lui en était fait par ces deux Gouvernements, de constituer une commission "pour recueillir sur le terrain toutes informations et tous éléments d'appréciation et pour formuler des suggestions de nature à aider le Conseil dans l'étude de la question".

Le présent mémoire, établi en fonction de la définition de la frontière donnée par la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920, constitue un exposé objectif des considérations de différents ordres mentionnées dans la requête commune.

Chapitre I.—CONSIDÉRATIONS D'ORDRE GÉOGRAPHIQUE

(A) Description générale (voir carte No. 1)

Les territoires sur lesquels porte l'examen de la frontière syro-irakienne appartiennent à quatre grandes régions géographiques :

- La vallée du Tigre,
- La haute plaine de Mésopotamie ou Djezirah,
- La vallée de l'Euphrate,
- Le désert de Syrie.

(a) *Vallée du Tigre*


Aux termes de la convention du 23 décembre 1920, la frontière syro-irakienne suit le cours du Tigre jusqu'à la limite des anciens vilayets de Diyarbakir et de Mossoul.

[illegible]

Le lit du fleuve, sujet à des déplacements, est encombré de bancs de sable. Il se divise parfois en plusieurs bras, entre lesquels se trouvent des îles, dont quelques-unes sont cultivées.

La vallée du Tigre est habitée par des sédentaires groupés en villages et par des semi-sédentaires vivant sous la tente.

(b) *Haute Mesopotamie ou Djezirah*

Partie la plus septentrionale du plateau mésopotamien qui s'étend au pied des  traversée par la frontière selon une direction générale nord-nord-est-sud-sud-ouest qui, aux termes de la convention de 1920, quitte le Tigre à la limite des anciens vilayets de Diarbékir et de Mossoul, suit cette limite jusqu'à Rameelan Kous et de là, laissant à la Syrie l'intégralité du bassin du Khabour occidental, se dirige vers le sud-est jusqu'à la limite du bassin du Khabour oriental.

La région affectée par cette délimitation ne présente pas une unité géographique absolue. Elle se divise en un certain nombre de régions distinctes qui peuvent se classer comme suit :

Au nord, une zone mouvementée, marquée par les derniers contreforts des montagnes kurdes.

Au sud de cette zone, la haute plaine de Djezirah proprement dite, coupée par un pli montagneux transversal, le Djebel Sindjar

Au nord du Djebel Sindjar, la plaine mésopotamienne est sillonnée par un grand réseau de canaux qui se dirigent vers les lacs du Sud-Est et vers le golfe Persique.

[illegible]

En raison de son caractère propre, chacune de ces régions est à étudier

1 Région nord (de Rumelon Keui au Tigre) (voir carte No. 4).

Rebord septentrional du plateau mésopotamien, les chaînes les plus élevées des montagnes du Kurdistan et de l'Irak du sud et du sud-est, comme pour accompagner encore quelque temps le Tigre, avant de l'abandonner définitivement à la plaine, un certain nombre de ramifications dont les unes viennent mourir en ondulations plus ou moins marquées, tandis que les autres exhausées par des convulsions volcaniques ultérieures forment de véritables massifs secondaires. Les ondulations s'avancent jusque vers Demir-Kapou, Roumoulan Keui. Elles ont été, à une époque géologique récente, recouvertes de coulées basaltiques qui leur confèrent un aspect particulier, contribuant à distinguer cette région de celle qui lui succède vers le sud. La limite du basalte constitue approximativement la démarcation entre la zone dont il s'agit et la plaine mésopotamienne proprement dite.

Parfois les massifs secondaires poussés par la montagne en direction du Tigre, bloqués de part et d'autre par la Mer de Marmara et le Mont Dagh.

Le lac environne 200 km² et s'étend dans une forme le *Korotok* jusqu'à moins de ses 813 mètres le relief environnant et notamment la plaine sud, située à

environ 500 mètres d'altitude et qu'il barre jusqu'à la vallée du Tigre, légèrement en aval de Feichkhahour.

De formation volcanique, le Karatchok Dagh tient de ce fait un aspect tourmenté. Si son versant nord descend en pentes douces sur la zone vallonnée qui le précède dans cette direction, son versant sud tombe brusquement en escaliers rapides constitués par des masses successives de rochers. Le passage de l'un à l'autre versant ne s'opère que difficilement et en recourant à des sentiers muletiers. Géologiquement, il est constitué par du basalte alternant avec des calcaires et des gypses morénés. Des nappes de basalte, déjections d'anciens volcans, se propagent jusqu'à plusieurs kilomètres de son pied.

Le *Muchoran Dagh*, situé plus au sud, est un petit massif de formation analogue, mais sensiblement moins important.

L'ensemble de cette région est habité par des éléments sédentaires et semi-sédentaires se livrant à l'agriculture et à l'élevage et fréquenté à certaines époques de l'année par des éléments nomades.

2. *Plains Nord du Sindjar* (de Rumelan Kou au Sindjar)

Comme il vient d'être indiqué, la plaine de Djezreh proprement dite commence là où se terminent les ramifications basaltiques des contreforts du Kurdistan.

Comprise entre deux montagnes relativement peu éloignées l'une de l'autre (environ 62 kilom. entre Ramalan Kour et Snam) au top des pentes nord et sud, cette rivière constitue une sorte de dalle ou un socle où se rassemblent les eaux de l'une et l'autre montagnes. La majeure partie de ces eaux, obéissant aux lois de la plus grande pente, s'orientent vers l'ouest, en un certain nombre d'oueds constituant le bassin supérieur du Khabor occidental.

Ces exils sont

(a) Provenant des montagnes du Kurdistan et de ses contreforts

Le coudi Ouaria (ou Aouaria—voir carte No. 4), qui descend du Karatchok Dagh

Le ouidi Roumelian, formé de plusieurs branches descendant les vers
du Karatebok Dagh les autres du Loilak Dagh.

Le quadri Demir Kapon, qui descend du Djebel Tour

Le madi Khneir, qui descend du Djebel Tour.

Le ouadi Abbaa, qui descend du Djebel Tour,

Le ouadi Djerrahi qui descend du Djebel Tour.

Le ouadi Brebitch, qui descend du Djebel Tour,

(b) Provenant du Sudjar

Le ouadi Zironane, qui prend sa source près du village de Zironane (voir carte No 5) et plusieurs autres oueds non indiqués sur les cartes existant actuellement.

Tous ces cours d'eau, coulant soit du nord au sud, soit du sud au nord, sont drainés par un collecteur médian, le Radd, lui-même affluent du Jaghjagh qui rejoint le Khabour à Hassetché.

En dehors de ce réseau hydrographique, si nettement caractérisé qu'il a retenu l'attention des négociateurs de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920, lesquels ont entendu spécifier qu'il resterait d'un même côté de la frontière, la région considérée est traversée par un certain nombre d'autres cours d'eau. Quelques-uns, de régime intermittent, se perdent dans les parties basses de la plaine. D'autres, ouadi el Mour, ouadi Souendiya, ouadi Bir Ibrahim Agha ou Aouenat, vont rejoindre le Tigre, au bassin duquel ils se jettent. La ligne qui sépare les eaux de ces ouadis des eaux du Kahriz occidental d'une part, celui du Tigre, d'autre part, forme une ligne naturelle dont le tracé exact peut être facilement déterminé.

Après le versant qui se présente à l'est du Karakoum et leurs contreforts méridionaux et le Sindjar est constituée par une couche de limon provenant de la désagrégation des calcaires et des basaltes et par des alluvions apportées par les cours d'eau. Sur le Radd se rencontrent des parties tourbeuses et gypseuses.

Abondamment arrosé, le bassin supérieur du Khabour se prête à la culture dans presque toute son étendue. Il n'est actuellement habité et cultivé que dans sa partie nord et sur les rives du Badk, à Tell Safra.

Le reste de la plaine considérée forme une zone de pâturage et n'est fréquentée que par des éléments nomades et semi-nomades.

3. Djebel Sindjar (voir carte No. 5)

Massif montagneux appartenant à un pli transversal barrant d'est en ouest le plateau mésopotamien entre le Khabour occidental et le Tigre, le Sindjar constitue une région nettement à part et qui tranche sur le relief environnant. Son point le plus élevé atteint 1.602 mètres (Karu Chatb) alors que l'altitude moyenne du plateau, de part et d'autre de ses pentes nord et sud, est d'environ 400 mètres (413 mètres à Tell Bach, 33 kilom. nord de Beled Sindjar, et 404 mètres à Tell-el-Nis, 16 kilom. sud de Beled Sindjar).

Mais si l'est ainsi clairement délimité vers le nord et vers le sud, le Sindjar proprement dit se distingue également avec netteté des mouvements appartenant au même pli et qui le prolongent soit vers l'ouest, soit vers l'est. Vers l'ouest, en particulier, le Djebel Djeribé forme un massif secondaire, d'une altitude sensiblement inférieure (942 mètres au point le plus élevé), et ayant son caractère propre. À l'est une série de collines en éventail, de faible altitude, d'ont avec lui de commun que l'origine.

Défini ainsi qu'il vient d'être dit, entre le col de Samoukha, qui le sépare du Djebel Djeribé, et de Zimmeh, qui le sépare du Djebel Hamrin, à son extrémité orientale le Djebel Sindjar compte une cinquantaine de kilomètres de longueur et une vingtaine de largeur dans sa partie centrale (méridien de Beled Sindjar). Cette masse montagneuse ne peut être aisément franchie qu'à ses extrémités.

Au point de vue géologique le Djebel Sindjar est dû à une tension produite dans la plateforme arabe lors de la surrection des chaînes du Kurdistan et de l'Abd ul Anz ainsi que la série des plus pétrolifères de Mésopotamie. Le Sindjar se rattache aux formations tertiaires. Schématiquement, il est constitué par un anticlinal évidé en partie et dont subsistent plusieurs rangs de strates qui émergent brusquement de la plaine. Son arête dorsale est constituée par des roches eulénites de l'éocène, tandis que sur ses pentes alternent, avec les précédents, des gypses du miocène et des marnes sénoniennes. La diversité de ces éléments, leur résistance plus ou moins grande aux érosions et aux contractions originelles se traduit par l'existence, de part et d'autre de l'arête centrale, de deux séries de pentes et de vallées. Sur les pentes nord, les strates sont d'importantes saillies rocheuses. Alors que le versant nord tombe abruptement sur la plaine, le versant sud offre une pente plus douce, interrompue par une ligne de bourrelets formant une chaîne secondaire, parallèle à la chaîne principale, le Taug. Entre les deux chaînes court une importante vallée longitudinale. Dans ces vallées et ravins se rencontrent un certain nombre de sources donnant naissance à des oueds qui vont se perdre dans la plaine. Ceux du versant nord grossis par les pluies hivernales, rejoignent le Radd, affluent du Khabour. La présence de ces eaux, l'existence dans les replis du terrain ou au bas des pentes de couches fertiles, marneuses ou argileuses, permet la culture et favorise le peuplement humain. En fait, le Sindjar est habité par une population sédentaire, concentrée dans ses vallées ou installée au bas de ses pentes, les Yezidié.

Le Djebel Djeribé, formé de calcaire et gypseux est un massif moins important, aux pentes rudes, corrodé et rongé par le vent et la pluie. Ses vallées, profondes et étroites, sont dépourvues de sources et ne permettent aucune possibilité de culture. Elles ne se prêtent pas, comme dans le Sindjar, à l'habitat fixe. Seuls fréquentent le Djeribé des éléments nomades qui trouvent sur ses pentes quelques pâturages pour leurs troupeaux.

Au nord-ouest et à l'ouest du Djebel Djeribé s'étend une région marécageuse, marquée par un relief et une végétation qui la distinguent nettement du plateau du Khabour, le ouadi El Hol. Cette région appartient nettement au bassin du Khabour. Ses parties basses se prêtent à la culture. Deux villages sédentaires s'y rencontrent, Khatounié et El Hol, sur le lac et l'oued du même nom.

4. Plaine sud du Sindjar (du Sindjar à l'Euphrate)

Au pied des pentes sud du Sindjar s'étend la partie la plus aride du plateau mésopotamien. De caractère désertique, la région qui nous intéresse n'offrirait

aucune particularité remarquable, n'étant la présence de l'important sillou nord-sud formé par le cours du ouadi Adjij, la dépression de Roda et les salines de Bouara, Regassat, Demim, Bargouth, Sadif et Tehnabi.

Ce sillou paraît dû à l'érosion des formations gypseuses, très perméables et solubles, du plateau par le ouadi Adjij. Celui-ci, actuellement en voie de résorption, drainait encore, à une époque relativement peu éloignée, les eaux du Kaim (25 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal). Aujourd'hui, il se perd dans la Roda qui forme, avec les salines ci-dessus mentionnées, une dépression longue d'une centaine de kilomètres.

Le ouadi Adjij est le type des cours d'eau de profil désertique. De régime intermittent, il ne subsiste dans son lit, au printemps, que des flaques d'eau de quelques mètres de largeur. Ses bords sont constitués par des falaises déchiquetées.

À sec, en partie, pendant l'été, les salines forment en hiver de véritables lacs. La plus importante d'entre elles, Dourara, mesure environ 13 kilom. de longueur et 6 kilom. de largeur. Elle fournit un sel fin, peu chargé en chlorure de potassium, particulièrement apprécié des populations des vallées de l'Euphrate et du Khabour.

La région considérée malgré la présence de ces salines et ses ressources en eau, n'est pas habitée par une population fixe. Elle est fréquentée par des nomades ou semi-nomades qui utilisent pour leurs troupeaux, ses pâturages, assez abondants en hiver, et s'y ravitaillent en sel.

(c) Vallée de l'Euphrate (voir carte No. 6)

Croisée transversalement, d'abord de nord-ouest en sud-est, puis, à partir d'Abou Kemal, d'ouest en est, entre le plateau mésopotamien et le désert de Syrie, dont elle rompt brusquement la monotonie, la vallée de l'Euphrate s'élargit puis se rétrécit à nouveau, formant une série de boucles, de lacis, de lacs, de marais, de terres ou durs qui en forment le rebord.

Immense devenant à l'origine, l'Euphrate s'est résorbé peu à peu, et on retrouve souvent loin de ses rives actuelles les limites de ses lits successifs. Ces limites sont parfois marquées par des falaises verticales, hautes de 30 à 40 mètres au-dessus du fond de la vallée. Les étendues ainsi abandonnées progressivement par le fleuve forment des cuvettes dont quelques-unes atteignent une grande largeur et qui constituent des zones de peuplement et de cultures importantes. Le fleuve s'attarde en des méandres capricieux et ses eaux permettent une irrigation facile dont tirent parti les populations sédentaires et semi-sédentaires fixées sur ses rives. Il se divise parfois en plusieurs bras, entre lesquels sont comprises des îles. Quelques-unes, assez étendues, sont habitées et cultivées (en face d'Abou Kemal et à Bagdad, à 6 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal).

Les cultures cessent et toute trace d'habitat disparaît quand le fleuve, s'étant heurté à des couches résistantes, doit employer toute la force de son courant pour les franchir. Les bords du fleuve sont formés par des à-pics de plusieurs mètres de hauteur.

L'alternance de ces cuvettes et de ces étranglements, de ces parties peuplées et cultivées et de ces parties désertiques, donne à la vallée de l'Euphrate une physionomie particulière, et la sépare nettement de la région du Khabour. Les démarcations naturelles entre les différents intérêts qui s'y sont établis.

(d) Désert de Syrie.

Immense plateau calcaire qui s'étend de l'Anti-Liban et de ses prolongements nord-est aux régions montagneuses du Nedjd (Arabie) et s'abaisse dans sa partie sud-est sur le golfe Persique, le désert de Syrie offre l'aspect, dans la partie qui nous intéresse, de vastes étendues légèrement ondulées, se succédant avec monotonie et marquées seulement de quelques vallées d'oueds au lit desséché, et de quelques points d'eau, puits ou sources, généralement contenus dans les plus du terrain.

La route de Damas par la crête du Nedjd traverse cette région en ligne droite de nord-est en sud-ouest, entre Abou-Kemal sur l'Euphrate et le mont Liban.

du Djebel Tenf (rencontre approximative de la frontière syro-transjordanienne), soit sur une distance d'environ 235 kilom. Les seuls accidents remarquables de ce parcours sont constitués par les vallées du ouadi Ratga, du ouadi Akach et du ouadi Souab, affluents de l'Euphrate.

Au sud de cette ligne, mais à quelque distance de son tracé, se trouvent des mouvements plus importants, dont l'un, la Gaara, mérite une mention particulière.

Vaste et profonde dépression, longue d'une cinquantaine de kilomètres, atteignant une vingtaine de kilomètres dans sa plus grande largeur, la Gaara est une région désertique où les pluies d'hiver sont rares. Les pluies de printemps et d'été sont abondantes. Les nombreux puits permettent d'accéder. Particulièrement riche en pâturages, elle se prête même à la culture qui y a été souvent pratiquée. Elle est un centre d'attraction pour les nomades, en particulier pour une certaine nombre de tribus syriennes.

Plusieurs oueds, au lit généralement à sec, mais dont les vallées sont fortement dessinées, partent de cette région pour rejoindre l'Euphrate. L'un d'eux, le ouadi Hauran, est considéré par les populations syriennes comme formant la frontière naturelle entre la Syrie et l'Irak sur la rive droite de l'Euphrate.

Cette partie du désert de Syrie n'est pas habitée de façon permanente. Elle est parcourue par des éléments nomades qui y font pâturer leurs troupeaux au cours de la transhumance hivernale.

(B) Voies de communication

Les régions qui viennent d'être décrites présentent, au point de vue des communications, certaines particularités méritant d'être prises en considération.

(a) La vallée du Tigre forme un couloir de circulation soit du sud vers le nord, c'est-à-dire de la Syrie vers l'Irak, et inversement. Elle est suivie par une piste utilisée dans les deux sens. Quant au fleuve lui-même, son régime alpin, les crues et les étiages, le rend impropre à la navigation. Il n'est utilisé que pour le transport de matériaux par le moyen de radeaux ou de barques plates. Les riverains le franchissent soit par des gués, soit en recourant à des barques ou à des outres. Il n'en constitue pas moins une voie de communication d'un intérêt évident pour la Syrie, soit en ce qui concerne ses rapports avec l'Irak, soit en ce qui concerne ses rapports avec la Turquie, et éventuellement la Perse, sur laquelle il ouvre une fenêtre d'accès.

(b) La région comprise entre le Tigre et Rumelan Kew ne compte pas de voies de communication importantes. Bien qu'assez accidentée, elle peut se prêter à la circulation, notamment à la circulation automobile, par temps sec, à condition que les routes soient entretenues. Les pluies d'hiver vers le sud par les contreforts volcaniques des montagnes du Kurdistan et notamment par le Karatchok Dagh. Celui-ci constitue un obstacle difficilement franchissable du sud au nord et qu'il est nécessaire de contourner.

(c) La région comprise entre le Tigre et Rumelan Kew ne compte pas de voies de communication importantes. Bien qu'assez accidentée, elle peut se prêter à la circulation, notamment à la circulation automobile, par temps sec, à condition que les routes soient entretenues. Les pluies d'hiver vers le sud par les contreforts volcaniques des montagnes du Kurdistan et notamment par le Karatchok Dagh. Celui-ci constitue un obstacle difficilement franchissable du sud au nord et qu'il est nécessaire de contourner.

Les seules pistes permettant de traverser cette région sont

1. Du nord au sud, la piste Kamechlié-Bara (Sindjar), qui franchit le Radd par un gué, praticable en été, mais difficilement praticable en hiver.
2. Du nord-est au sud-ouest, la piste Demir Kapou-Hawetché, qui franchit le ouadi Khazir par un pont, le ouadi Abbas par un gué et le Radd par un gué praticable en toute saison.
3. D'est en ouest, la piste Mossoul-Demir Kapou Kamechlié (Nissibin), piste aménagée, franchissant généralement les oueds rencontrés par des ponts.

Les deux premières pistes intéressent exclusivement la Syrie. La troisième, grande voie de communication qui rejoint l'Orient-Express à Nissibin, intéresse les deux pays.

En dehors de ces pistes, la circulation automobile ne peut se faire qu'en passant extérieurement au réseau des affluents nord du Radd par la région située au sud et à l'est de ce cours d'eau. C'est par cette région que peut être établi un itinéraire direct et facile entre Deir-ez-Zor, centre administratif, commercial et militaire dont dépend la Djezireh syrienne et les confins syriens du Tigre.

(d) Le Sindjar oppose, en raison de sa nature montagneuse, de grandes difficultés à la circulation. L'existence d'une arête vive et de vallées fortement cloisonnées en rend le franchissement difficile tant dans le sens du nord au sud que dans le sens du sud au nord. Les pluies d'hiver vers le sud par les contreforts volcaniques des montagnes du Kurdistan et notamment par le Karatchok Dagh. Celui-ci constitue un obstacle difficilement franchissable du sud au nord et qu'il est nécessaire de contourner.

A noter qu'outre celles mentionnées ci-dessus (Deir-ez-Zor-Beled Sindjar, Hawetché-Beled Sindjar), la Syrie est reliée au Sindjar par un certain nombre de pistes, utilisables par les véhicules, notamment

- La piste Hawetché-Khalounié-Bara.
- La piste Cheddadi (Khabour)-Oum-el Diban-Bira.
- La piste Kamechlié-Bara.

(e) La plaine sud du Sindjar est propice à la circulation pendant la saison sèche, soit en utilisant les pistes existantes, soit même en dehors de ces pistes en évitant les obstacles, lits d'oueds trop abrupts, efflorescences riches qui viennent à se présenter. Il n'en est pas de même pendant la saison pluvieuse les fortes ondes de cette saison suffisant à rendre, en quelques heures, le sol impraticable aux véhicules.

Les voies de communication à mentionner dans cette région sont

- La piste de Deir-ez-Zor à Mossoul par Fadghani (sur le Khabour) et El Bidja.
- Les pistes dites "du sel" reliant les localités des vallées du Khabour et de l'Euphrate (Souar, Bessiré, Mayadina, Abou-Kemal) aux salines de Bouara, Reggassat, Bargouth Tehabi.

La première piste intéresse à égal titre la Syrie et l'Irak. Les pistes "du sel" intéressent surtout la Syrie. Elles sont utilisées par les caravanes transportant le sel destiné à la consommation des populations syriennes. Leur utilisation est nécessaire, été comme hiver, en raison de la nature spongieuse du terrain dans la région des salines.

(f) La vallée de l'Euphrate forme un couloir naturel emprunté par une voie de grande communication (piste aménagée) conduisant de Syrie en Irak. Parfois, la vallée s'étranglant entre des promontoires riches, la route, ou piste, doit s'élever sur le plateau voisin en franchissant de véritables défilés.

L'Euphrate constitue lui-même une voie de communication importante, mais la vitesse de ses eaux, son cours capricieux, encombré d'îles et de bancs de sable, son chenal changeant, le rendent difficilement navigable et ce n'est par les moyens rudimentaires pratiqués par ses riverains (barques plates (chartouches), radeaux et outres. Il est utilisé pour le transport de certains matériaux et denrées et seulement dans le sens de son courant.

(g) Région ouest de l'Euphrate — Plateau désertique, faiblement ondulé et peu accidenté, cette région est également favorable à la circulation. Celle-ci peut s'effectuer, en saison sèche, par tous les genres de véhicules, sans recourir à des pistes.

Elle est traversée de nord-ouest en sud-est par la piste l'ancienne Radd qui coupe le Tigre à l'est de l'ouadi Khazir et se dirige vers le sud-ouest, Abou Kemal.

Cet abandon est dû à l'insécurité qui régnait dans la région, en particulier du fait des nomades Chammar. Par crainte de ces derniers, qui, venant des steppes désertiques du sud, se livraient à d'incessantes agressions contre eux, ils furent amenés à se retirer plus au nord, avec le gros de la tribu. Ces ruines sont susceptibles d'être réoccupées et les terres de culture qui les entourent remises en valeur dès que la situation se sera stabilisée dans cette région, grâce notamment au règlement définitif de la question de frontière.

Importance de la tribu Hassénane (portion syrienne) : un millier de familles environ; actuellement trente-six villages bâtis

Alianes

Agriculteurs et pasteurs fixés l'été dans des villages bâtis, entre le Lailak et le Radd. Ils descendent l'hiver vers le sud-est, vers le Radd. Au sud, leur zone d'habitat fixe et de cultures s'étend approximativement jusqu'au parallèle de Demir Kapou.

Comme les Hassénane, les Aliane habitaient autrefois des villages situés au sud de leur zone d'habitat actuel. Ils durent les abandonner pour les mêmes raisons et se réfugier plus au nord. Ces villages sont également susceptibles d'être reconstruits et leurs terres remises en valeur.

L'hiver, les Aliane se mettent en partie sous la tente et descendent vers le sud jusqu'à une ligne Tell Bahkh (30 kilom. sud-ouest de Demir Kapou), Tell Tadj (20 kilom. sud de Demir Kapou), Tell Hamouk (22 kilom. sud-est de Demir Kapou).

Importance des Aliane de Syrie : environ 800 familles

Tchitites

Également agriculteurs et pasteurs.

La zone de leurs villages et de leurs cultures est située en dehors de la région considérée, dans la partie supérieure du bassin du Radd, entre le ouadi Djerrahi à l'est et le ouadi Brethich à l'ouest.

L'hiver, les Tchitites se mettent en partie sous la tente et descendent avec leurs troupeaux vers le sud de part et d'autre du Radd.

Importance de la tribu : environ 400 familles en Syrie

Tay

Importante tribu arabe, dont la zone d'habitat fixe (villages, cultures) est entièrement située en Syrie, dans la région sud-sud-est et est de Khatounié. Les Tay sont composés de plusieurs fractions nomades qui, en raison de leur dépendance les unes vis-à-vis des autres, et dont les territoires sont nettement séparés.

Ces fractions sont

	Tentes
Les Assaf	environ 300
Les Rached	300
Les Beni Seba	300
Les Harb	200
Les Breth	150
Les Djouallah	100
Les Ghanama	100
Les Zbeid	50
Les Bezgaras	50
Les Maamras	50

soit au total environ 2.000 tentes.

Les Tay passent l'été dans la zone de cultures située à cheval sur le Jaghjagh et le Radd. Ils descendent l'hiver vers le sud-est, vers le Radd. Les Tay sont composés de plusieurs fractions nomades qui, en raison de leur dépendance les unes vis-à-vis des autres, et dont les territoires sont nettement séparés. Les principales fractions, enfin, les Djouallah, reste plus près de l'état nomade et, ne s'adonnant pas elle-même à l'agriculture, se tient l'été aux abords de la zone cultivée des autres fractions ou tribus, entre le ouadi Abbas et le ouadi Roumelan.

Pour la transhumance hivernale, les Tay se répartissent en groupements qui vont chacun dans une zone déterminée.

Les Assaf, les Breth et les Zbeid descendent généralement à travers le bassin du Radd et, traversant ce cours d'eau, se rendent jusqu'aux pentes nord du Sindjar (vers Khan-el-Zor).

Les Rached et les Ghanama circulent dans toute la région comprise entre la piste Khatounié-Mosul jusqu'aux pentes nord du Sindjar et le Radd jusqu'à la mer. Les Rached et les Zbeid descendent généralement vers l'ouest. Le printemps les trouve souvent aux environs du lac de Khatounié, d'où ils remontent vers le nord.

Les Beni Seba et les Harb descendent à travers le bassin du Radd jusqu'au lac de Khatounié, d'où ils remontent vers le nord.

Les Djouallah ont une zone de parcours très étendue. L'automne, ils se rendent vers le sud-est, vers le Radd, jusqu'au lac de Khatounié, d'où ils remontent vers le nord. L'été, ils descendent vers le sud-est, vers le Radd, jusqu'au lac de Khatounié, d'où ils remontent vers le nord. L'été, ils descendent vers le sud-est, vers le Radd, jusqu'au lac de Khatounié, d'où ils remontent vers le nord. L'été, ils descendent vers le sud-est, vers le Radd, jusqu'au lac de Khatounié, d'où ils remontent vers le nord.

Djebboura

Importante tribu, forte d'environ 3.000 tentes et comprenant un grand nombre de fractions principales sont : les Zuhra, les Soltan, les Breth, les Mahasen, les Hazim, les Ouled Cheikh Aissa, les Mohammed Amouni, les Djejeicho, les Ben Maana, les Maamra, les Ben Khattab, les Halebiyine.

Les Djebboura sont établis l'été sur le Khabour, entre Tell Roumman (25 kilom. nord-ouest de Hassetché) et Tell Cheikh Hamed (85 kilom. sud de Hassetché) et sur le Jaghjagh entre Hassetché et Tell Hamidi (27 kilom. sud de Kamechlié). Ils se livrent à la culture sur les rives de ces deux cours d'eau. Une fraction importante de la tribu, les Halebiyine, a quitté le Khabour depuis environ sept ans dans le ouadi El Hol (affluent du Khabour), qu'elle a défriché et où elle se livre à la culture.

Les Djebboura descendent l'hiver vers le sud-est, vers le Radd, jusqu'au lac de Khatounié, d'où ils remontent vers le nord. Les fractions nomadisent vers l'est atteignant une ligne marquée par :

- Tell Archane (31 kilom. nord-nord-est de Khatounié),
- Le puits de Sifya (non indiqué sur la carte, 27 kilom. nord-est de Khatounié),
- Le col de Samoukha (Sindjar),
- Oum-el-Diban,
- El Bida,
- Le ouadi Adjij, jusqu'à hauteur de Tell Cheikh Hamed.

Cette ligne forme la limite normale de leur transhumance vers l'est. Toutefois, certaines années, en raison de l'état des pâturages, les Djebboura la franchissent plus ou moins largement.

Cherabiyyine

Tribu importante par le nombre mais constituée d'un grand nombre de fractions nomades qui, en raison de leur dépendance les unes vis-à-vis des autres, et dont les territoires sont nettement séparés.

Les Cherabiyyine sont dispersés dans toute la Djezirah. Il en existe trois groupements dans la région qui nous intéresse :

Les Ben Saleh et les Ben Hardan (environ 200 tentes) dans la région voisine du Tigre, mêlés aux Hassénane, dont ils sont les bergers. L'été, ils se tiennent aux abords des villages Hassénane. L'hiver, ils se rendent sur les pentes du Karatchok Dag et du Mochoran Dag.

Les Takat (environ 400 tentes) établis l'été sur la partie orientale du Radd, vers Tell Safra, où ils cultivent. L'hiver, ils nomadisent au sud du Radd et jusqu'aux pentes nord du Sindjar.

Les *Oghed* environ 300 tentes mées aux Djabars. Les uns sont établis sur le Khabour, les autres sur le Tigre. Ils se déplacent avec leurs troupeaux de moutons et de chèvres.

Oghed

Voir ci-dessous, vallée de l'Euphrate.

Les territoires de parcours des Oghedat, dans la région étudiée, s'étendent jusqu'au ouadi Adjij et aux salines.

3 Nomades

Miranes (voir carte No 4)

Les Miranes, appelées aussi "Kotchars" (en kurde "Nomades") sont des pasteurs vivant sous la tente. Ils possèdent de nombreux troupeaux de moutons et de chèvres.

Ils comptent environ 750 tentes et forment un certain nombre de fractions. On en compte : Surassari, Yasika, Aléka, Barzari, Armandaba, Moussaracha et Barkan.

Leurs territoires de parcours sont situés à cheval sur la frontière turco-syrienne. Ils passent l'hiver dans la région du Khabour. Certains de leurs chefs et notables sont propriétaires de villages situés par les Hassénahs, en particulier, propriétaires des villages de Khanik et Cheliki, sur la rive droite du Tigre.

L'été, ils traversent la frontière et se rendent dans les montagnes situées au sud du lac de Van.

Le territoire de parcours des Miranes est limité par le cours du ouadi Soueidiyé (affluent du Tigre) jusqu'à son confluent avec le ouadi Kunezir, et de là, par une ligne rejoignant le ouadi Demir Kapou au point où ce cours d'eau est traversé par le tracé de l'ex-chemin de fer de Bagdad, près du lieu dit "Compagnie allemande".

Chammar

Les Chammar, l'une des plus importantes tribus nomades de cette partie de l'ancien Empire ottoman, sont répartis dans toute la Mésopotamie et forment un grand nombre de fractions. Ils sont répartis en deux groupes : les uns vivent en Syrie et les autres en Irak. Il en existe même un fort groupement au Nedjd, dans la région dite du Djebel Chammar.

Les fractions Chammar d'allégeance syrienne constituent elles-mêmes deux groupements : les Chammar des Zors, qui sont sous le nom de "Chammar Khorsas" ou "Chammar de Dham," du nom de son chef Dham el Hadi.

Chammar des Zors

Comprenant les fractions qui étaient rattachées, sous le régime turc, au Sandjak de Deir-es-Zor, sous l'autorité d'un même chef, intermédiaire entre l'autorité et la tribu.

Ces fractions sont :

	Tentes
Les Feddagha	environ 700
Les Hamoud	500
Les Thabet	800
Sont au total	2.000

Ces fractions séjournent l'été dans la région du Haut-Khabour et de ses affluents, le ouadi Zorgan, le ouadi Aouadj et le Jaghyagh. Elles installent leurs campements en bordure des rivières, de la zone limitée par les semi-sédentaires kurdes. Leurs chefs possèdent eux-mêmes des villages et des terres de culture dans cette zone.

Au début de la saison des pluies, les Chammar, des Zors descendent vers le sud et se rendent les uns dans la région sud du Djebel Abdul Aziz (ouest de Hassénah), les autres dans la région intéressée par le tracé de la frontière entre

le Sindjar et l'Euphrate. Ces derniers, après avoir stationné quelque temps à l'ouest du Sindjar, dans le Djebel Djeribé, les alentours du lac de Khatounié, le ouadi El Hol, le Djebel Tchembé, circulent dans la région du ouadi Adjij et de ses affluents et des salines de Bouara, Raggassat, etc.

Certaines années, quelques éléments appartenant à ces fractions sont amenés en masse à l'est du lac de Khatounié, vers la zone du ouadi Adjij et des salines et à pousser assez avant en territoire irakien.

Chammar Khorsas (ou de Dham-el Hadi)

Ce groupement s'est formé, aux débuts de l'occupation française de la Mésopotamie, à partir des fractions qui, avant la guerre, se fixaient en territoire syrien. Dham-el-Hadi a des propriétés au village de Tchilaga situé à 3 kilom. à l'ouest de Demir Kapou.

Les Chammar Khorsas appartiennent à des fractions dont une partie se trouve en territoire irakien. Abou Kémal, Gachan, Hadba, Matbata, Gach, Khaman.

Le groupement syrien compte environ 1.500 tentes.

Ils séjournent à l'été dans les montagnes situées au sud du lac de Van, ouadi Brebitch, ouadi Djerrahi, ouadi Abbou, ouadi Khnezir, ouadi Demir Kapou, ouadi Roumelan et jusqu'au sud du Karatehok Dag.

A l'automne, passant, comme les Chammar des Zors, par la région ouest du Sindjar (Djebel Djeribé, lac de Khatounié, ouadi El Hol, Djebel Tchembé), ils se rendent également dans la région comprise entre le Sindjar et l'Euphrate, et partent jusqu'au sud du lac de Khatounié, vers la zone du ouadi Adjij et des salines, jusqu'aux abords de la vallée de l'Euphrate, à hauteur de Anah (95 km. à l'est d'Abou Kémal).

Comme pour ce qui concerne les Chammar des Zors, les Chammar Khorsas sont amenés, certaines années, à pénétrer très avant en territoire irakien.

(c) Vallée de l'Euphrate (voir carte No 6)

Les populations de la vallée de l'Euphrate intéressées par le règlement de la frontière comprennent : des sédentaires et des semi-sédentaires.

Les sédentaires sont les habitants du village d'Abou Kémal. Les semi-sédentaires appartiennent à la tribu syrienne des Chammar.

Abou Kémal

Abou Kémal est mentionné par la Convention de 1920 comme jalonnant la frontière syro-irakienne au franchissement de l'Euphrate.

Importante bourgade, chef-lieu d'un caza syrien qui s'étend vers le sud jusqu'à la frontière de facto, à 8 kilom. plus en aval, à la fois centre économique et spirituel (écoles, mosquées) de cette partie de la vallée de l'Euphrate, Abou Kémal compte environ 2.000 habitants, la plupart sédentaires. Ses habitants sont soit des agriculteurs soit des commerçants.

Les agriculteurs cultivent les terres qui entourent le village, ainsi que l'île qui lui fait face. Les commerçants vendent aux semi-sédentaires les objets manufacturés et denrées alimentaires importés de l'intérieur syrien et leur achètent les produits de leurs terres (céréales) et de leurs troupeaux (moutons, bœufs, laines, peaux), soit pour un usage local soit en vue de l'exportation.

Le rayonnement d'Abou Kémal, seul centre économique et spirituel de la région, n'est pas limité aux populations syriennes dépendant administrativement du caza dont il est le chef-lieu. Il s'étend aussi aux populations voisines de la frontière de facto, actuellement administrées par l'Irak.

Oghedat

Les Oghedat sont une importante tribu semi-sédentaire dont la zone de fixation (habitat et cultures) s'étend sur les deux rives de l'Euphrate, de Tibni (40 kilom. en amont de Deir-es-Zor), jusqu'à une certaine distance en aval d'Abou Kémal, et sur les rives du Khabour, de Tell Cheikh Hamed (95 kilom. sud de Hassénah) jusqu'à la rivière avec l'Euphrate.

Le tracé de la frontière (8 kilom. sud-est d'Abou Kémal) qui jalonne la frontière provisoire de facto entre la Syrie et l'Irak, dans la vallée de l'Euphrate, en

appliquée le 5 mai 1920 est partie sans décevoir comme marquant la limite sud des territoires Oguéidat. Il semble, toutefois, qu'il y ait là une confusion. La borne Leachman marque non pas une limite de tribu, mais une limite administrative.

Les Oguéidat ont été, comme appartenant à la région de la vallée de l'Euphrate comprise entre la frontière de facto et El Kaim (28 kilom. est de Abou Kémal). Cette région, qui était autrefois entièrement habitée par eux, et où leurs chefs avaient des propriétés, comprend encore aujourd'hui les tribus de l'Est, et de l'Ouest, les petites tribus qui étaient alliées; Selman, Karabila, Bou Hardan, Djerifa et à quelques éléments de la grande tribu irakienne des Dulaim.

Les Oguéidat sont les tribus de l'Est et de l'Ouest (Hamed à la borne Leachman) comptent environ 10.000 familles et forment un certain nombre de fractions dont les principales sont (du nord au sud) les Bou Soraya (en amont de Deir ez-Zor), les Bou Khabour, les Bkeyer (sur le Khabour), les Bou Kharab, les Bou M... (est et ouest), les Bou de Salabyé, 30 kilom. en amont d'Abou Kémal), les Bougaan, les Bou Hardan, les H... (M...), les M... (S...), les M... (S...).

L'été, les Oguéidat sont installés sur les rives de l'Euphrate et du Bas Khabour, où ils se livrent à la culture. Ils habitent soit la tente, soit des huttes de briques crues couvertes de branchages et de terre. Tentes et huttes, groupées sur la berge du fleuve, en des emplacements fixes, généralement au centre des cultures, forment de véritables villages, où se retrouvent chaque année les mêmes éléments, fractions ou sous-fractions.

Les villages de l'été sont situés en aval de l'Euphrate en aval d'Abou Kémal, c'est-à-dire au delà de la frontière définie par la Convention de 1920 stricto sensu, sont :

Sur la rive droite :

Souayé (environ 100 familles)

Hesi (environ 80 familles).

Sur la rive gauche :

Baghouz (environ 120 familles)

Aux premières pluies de l'automne, laissant quelques-uns d'entre eux dans les villages, à la garde et à l'entretien des cultures, les Oguéidat se mettent sous la tente et s'éloignent avec les troupeaux dans la steppe désertique où vont apparaître des herbages.

Les fractions de la rive gauche de l'Euphrate et du Bas Khabour se déplacent généralement à l'est de ces deux fleuves, les fractions de la rive droite de l'Euphrate à l'ouest et au sud-ouest de ce dernier.

La limite de nomadisation des Oguéidat est formée

En Djezirah

Par la ligne du ouadi Adji et des Salines

A l'ouest et au sud-ouest de l'Euphrate :

Par une ligne englobant les puits de Gabadjib (52 kilom. sud-ouest de Deir ez-Zor), Bir Khoudar el Ma (85 kilom. ouest-sud-ouest de Mayadine) et successivement vers le sud-est, Bir Haouaibe, Bir Djouhaibe, Bir Ojoub, Bir Touamar, le Djebel Khakhehat, Garat Tmagel, Bir Ratga et la région sud et sud-est de la borne Leachman jusqu'à hauteur de El Kaim.

Les fractions de la région d'Abou Kémal et notamment les Hassoun, se rendent fréquemment dans la Gaara.

(d) Région ouest de l'Euphrate

Cette région, de caractère désertique, n'est pas habitée de façon permanente. Elle est le territoire d'appartenance de tribus syriennes, les unes nomades, Anézès-Fedaan, Sbaa, Rouallah, les autres semi-sédentaires, Oguéidat. Ces tribus la fréquentent régulièrement, soit qu'elles la traversent au

(*) Voir ci-dessus, Chapitre IV, B. et Annexe No. 3.

cours de la transhumance, soit qu'elles y séjournent durant tout ou partie de la période hivernale.

En outre, plusieurs tribus syriennes, ayant leurs territoires habituels notablement plus au nord ou à l'est, viennent y chercher des pâturages ou des points d'eau, lorsque la sécheresse s'est fait sentir dans leur propre zone. Ces tribus, Haouaibe, Maouaibe, Faouaras, Beni Khaled, Hassènes, sont amenées comme les précédentes à franchir la frontière définie par la convention de 1920, dans les conditions indiquées ci-après.

1. Tribus nomades traversant régulièrement la frontière Anézès Fedaan.

Importante tribu comptant de 3.000 à 4.000 tentes.

Les Anézès Fedaan passent la limite dans la région sud-est d'Alep au voisinage du lac de Djebel, tantôt dans la vallée de l'Euphrate, entre Rakka et Meskéné, tantôt sur le Balikh, affluent de gauche de l'Euphrate. L'hiver, ils se rendent généralement dans la Gaara (*) et dans la région des Ouada, ouadi Haouan, notamment, située au sud-est de cette dernière. Leur déplacement de l'une à l'autre zone, zone d'estivage et zone d'hivernage, se fait habituellement par le Djebel Bechri (nord-ouest de Deir ez-Zor) et les différents puits compris entre ce dernier et la Gaara.

Sbaa

Environ 3.000 tentes.

Les Sbaa passent l'été dans la région nord-nord-est de Hama et dans la région de Selmanieh (30 kilom. est-sud-est de Hama).

L'hiver, ils se rendent dans la région sud-est du Djebel Azez (300 kilom. sud-ouest d'Abou Kémal) et dans la Gaara, en passant par Sakné (60 kilom. nord-est de Palmyre), les puits de Sedjri (160 kilom. sud-ouest d'Abou Kémal) et la vallée supérieure du ouadi Souab.

Rouallah et satellites

Les Rouallah et leurs tribus satellites (Sabakine, Achagea, Ould Ayy) comptent environ 1.000 tentes.

Les Rouallah passent l'été dans la région sud-est de Hama. Ils se rendent l'hiver dans la région sud-est de l'Euphrate, dans la région de Sakné (60 kilom. nord-est de Palmyre), les puits de Sedjri (160 kilom. sud-ouest d'Abou Kémal) et la vallée supérieure du ouadi Souab.

2. Tribus nomades traversant occasionnellement la Frontière

Haddidyne

Environ 3.000 tentes

Zone d'estivage : région sud et sud-est d'Alep et région de Selmanieh

Zone d'hivernage habituelle : région sud-est de Palmyre.

Les Haddidyne franchissent assez fréquemment la frontière, au cours de la transhumance, pour venir camper dans la région du ouadi Souab.

Maouaibe

Environ 1.500 tentes

Zone d'estivage : région de Hama

Zone d'hivernage habituelle : Djebel Bilas (nord-ouest de Palmyre)

Faouaras

500 tentes

Zone d'estivage : région de Hama.

Zone d'hivernage habituelle : région sud de Palmyre.

Beni Khaled

750 tentes

Zone d'estivage : région nord-est de Hama.

Zone d'hivernage habituelle : région sud de Palmyre et du Djebel Teuf

(*) Voir ci-dessus, Chapitre I, A (d).

Discussion

510 tentes

Zone d'estivage, région de Iloma

Zone habituelle d'hivernage : région sud de Palmyre

(C) *Races et Langues* (voir carte No. 7)

Les populations étudiées ci-dessus comprennent, au point de vue ethnique et linguistique, les données ethniques coïncidant en l'espèce avec les données linguistiques, deux grandes divisions : les Kurdes et les Arabes

Aix Kurdes se rattache un groupement de même race et de même langue, mais de religion différente : les Yézidés.

Auroras

Les Kurdes appartiennent à la race aryenne. Ils parlent une langue indo-européenne.

Leurs origines ont fait, à vrai dire, l'objet de nombreuses discussions. On a vu, par exemple, la commission chargée en 1925 d'enquêter sur place au sujet de la frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak (document C 400 M 147, 1925, VII). Après avoir passé en revue toutes les opinions émises et étudié elle-même la question, la commission a exprimé comme suit :

Pour conclure, l'origine des Kurdes est encore obscure, mais quel que ait été leur passé, ils sont aryanses. Cette aryansisation a été assez forte—même si l'apport du sang arien a été restreint—pour qu'ils adoptent entièrement une langue iranienne. Des influences ultérieures et des mélanges avec arabes, turcs et autres ont été nombreux. Mais le fond original semble avoir conservé toujours le dessus, il est resté vigoureux, il est encore en état

"Les Kurdes ne sont ni arabes, ni turcs, ni persans. C'est de ces derniers qu'ils sont les plus proches. Ils diffèrent et ils sont nettement à distinguer des Turcs et ils sont encore bien plus loin et bien plus différents des Arabes.

« Bien que très guerriers, indisciplinés et très divisés, ils savent vivre en assez bonne amitié avec les autres peuples habitant leurs territoires. Nous avons pu constater que de tous les mahométans, ce sont les Kurdes avec lesquels les chrétiens vivent dans les meilleurs termes. »

Ces conclusions, émises au sujet des Kurdes du vilayet de Mossoul, s'appliquent intégralement aux Kurdes des régions que nous intéressent.

Essentiellement des montagnards, les Kurdes ont essaimé au pied des monts qui portent leur nom (monts du Kurdistan) et où ils constituent l'élément dominant. Ils descendent par les derniers contreforts de ces montagnes. Cette région, qui forme transition entre les monts du Kurdistan et la plaine de Mésopotamie proprement dite, est abondamment arrosée. Les Kurdes, pour la plupart semi-sédentaires, habitant des villages bâtis, s'y livrent à la culture, tandis que leurs troupeaux sont conduits l'hiver, au sud, dans les pâturages de la steppe mésopotamienne.

Comme il est dit ci-dessus, la démarcation entre l'une et l'autre race, la race kurde et la race arabe, là où elles sont au voisinage, est fournie par le relief lui-même. Elle est formée par une ligne naturelle qui laisse aux Kurdes la zone montagneuse et arrosée propice à la culture, et aux Arabes la zone basse, propice à la vie nomade.

Pour mémoire, les tribus kurdes syriennes intéressées par le tracé de la frontière sont :

Les Miranes,
Les Hassenanes,
Les Alaines,
Les Tchitnés.

1945

Absolument distincts des autres éléments de la population au point de vue religieux (voir sous-chapitre suivant), les Yezidiés sont, au point de vue ethnique, de proches parents des Kurdes dont ils parlent la langue.

C'est la conclusion à laquelle est parvenue la commission chargée d'étudier le tracé de la frontière turco-irakienne, dans le vilayet de Mossoul, en 1925. Le rapport de cette commission s'exprime à ce sujet en ces termes (page 44) :

Les Yezidis parlent le Kurde et n'ont pas d'autre langue. Il faut remarquer aussi que, tandis que les quelques livres saints qu'ils possèdent sont écrits en arabe, (1) la prière principale est dite en kurde. La formule du baptême dite par le cheikh est prononcée en kurde, les hymnes sont chantés en kurde et, d'après leur croyance, Dieu parle kurde. On a aussi conjecturé une origine arabe et une kurdisation ultérieure des Yezidis, en se basant sur le fait que leurs livres saints sont rédigés en arabe. Mais il n'y a rien de certain à cet égard. On peut tout aussi bien se baser sur le fait que la langue arabe a pu être simplement adoptée avec l'écriture, la langue kurde restant la langue parlée. On ne peut pas non plus se baser sur le fait que les Yezidis ont adopté l'écriture arabe, car la langue arabe a pu être simplement adoptée avec l'écriture, la langue kurde restant la langue parlée. On ne peut pas non plus se baser sur le fait que les Yezidis ont adopté l'écriture arabe, car la langue arabe a pu être simplement adoptée avec l'écriture, la langue kurde restant la langue parlée.

Les Yazidiés intéressés par la tracé de la frontière syro-irakienne sont fixés sur le point de vue suivant : l'étude de ce groupement, au point de vue de l'habitat, a été effectuée plus haut.

A noter que s'il existe des Yezidiés en Irak, à l'est du Tigre (région nord et nord-est), il n'y en a pas en Arabie, en Syrie, en Liban, en Palestine, en Iran, en Azerbaïdjan, en Arménie, en Turquie, en Irak du Nord, au nord-est d'Alep. Le centre du monde Yezidi, mais sans doute beaucoup plus près du Soudan, est établi dans le nord-est de l'Arabie (le kharabé Nord-ouest de Samoukha) où il compte un millier d'individus habitant trois villages - Kerengo, Kuzakatchek et Markab. Il existe, enfin, un certain nombre de Yezidiés mêlés aux Kurdes syriens des tribus Tchitriés, Alianés, Hassachanes et Miranes (environ 500 familles réparties dans les villages kurdes).

A noter également que parmi les Yazidiés du Sindjar se trouvent des éléments de la tribu des Lajim et que le village de Beol Sindjar, entre administratifs de la montagne, comprend une forte proportion d'arabes musulmans et de chrétiens.

4 pages

Il appartient à la grande famille de saints dont les représentants un
de nos jours, se sont élevés à l'apogée de la spiritualité.

Les Arabes sont essentiellement des habitants de la plaine. De tout temps leur préférence a été constatée dans les plaines de Mésopotamie et dans le désert de Syrie. Les auteurs grecs les mentionnent et Strabon, qui est le premier de notre ère a fait d'eux une description qui serait exacte. Outre les Arabes nomades vivant sous la tente, il y avait des Arabes sédentaires établis le long du Tigre et de l'Euphrate, où ils formaient de petites principautés.

De nos jours, les Arabes restent des habitants des plaines. Comme il a été indiqué ci-dessus, leurs zones d'habitat sont constituées par les parties basses du plateau mésopotamien, la vallée de l'Euphrate et le désert de Syrie.

En Haute-Djerneh, là où ils viennent avec d'autres éléments ethniques (Kurdes) ces zones sont nettement délimitées. Elle commencent à la base de la montagne entre la plaine et les dernières ramifications de la montagne formant la Haute-Djerneh, ses contreforts méridionaux.

Pour mémoire, les tribus arabes syriennes intéressées par le tracé de la frontière sont :

(a) En Düzleşme

Les Chammar
Les Tay
Les Djebbour,
Les Chernobyne,
Une partie des Ogueidas

(b) Dans la vallée de l'Euphrate

Les Omeridat.

¹⁴ Le kurde n'en est qu'à ses premiers pas comme langue écrite. Des essais sont faits pour le codifier depuis quelques années.

2 Agriculture

Est pratiquée par les populations sédentaires et demi-sédentaires des régions naturellement arrosées ou susceptibles d'être arrosées : bassin du Khabour, Sindjar, vallée de l'Euphrate.

Les principales productions sont les céréales (blé, orge, sorgho), des légumineuses, des fruits.

3 Commerce

Consiste surtout dans la vente aux populations locales des produits manufacturés, généralement importés d'Europe : quincaillerie, tissus, certaines denrées alimentaires, etc., et dans la vente par les populations des produits de l'élevage ou de la culture : moutons, beurre, laines, peaux, d'une part, céréales, légumes, d'autre part.

Les principaux centres commerciaux en rapports avec les populations dont il s'agit sont :

Kamechlié et Demir Kapou, dans la zone nord.
Hassetché sur le Khabour.
Deir-az-Zor, Mayadine, Abou Kemal, sur l'Euphrate.

(a) Kamechlié et Demir Kapou commercent avec les populations kurdes et arabes de la partie nord de la Djézirah : Mirano, Hassenano, Aliano, Tchitié, Tay Chammar.

(b) Hassetché a pour clientèle non seulement les populations sédentaires, semi-sédentaires et nomades des régions syriennes du Khabour et de ses affluents, mais aussi les Yézidiés de la partie occidentale du Sindjar (fractions Samoukha et autres), et les tribus arabes de Hassetché de préférence à celui de Mossoul, notablement plus éloigné.

(c) Deir-az-Zor, Mayadine et Abou Kemal sont les centres d'approvisionnement et de vente des semi-sédentaires de la vallée de l'Euphrate (Oguedat) et des nomades dont les territoires de parcours s'étendent de part et d'autre du fleuve (Andar-Fedaan, Shaa, d'un côté, Chammar de l'autre). Le rayonnement commercial d'Abou Kemal ne s'arrête cependant pas à la frontière (frontière actuelle de facto), il s'étend également aux semi-sédentaires habitant la partie de la vallée de l'Euphrate voisine de la frontière (Dulaim et alliés) et à certains éléments nomades d'Irak (Amarat).

4 Exploitations particulières

Une ressource n'entrant pas dans les catégories précédentes est celle que les tribus kurdes exploitent dans le désert de Bagdadi, Bargouth, Saadif, Tehashi, situées entre Abou Kemal et le Sindjar.

Ces salines ont de tout temps approvisionné les populations syriennes des vallées de l'Euphrate et du Khabour et les tribus nomades fréquentant la région.

Elles faisaient, en outre, sous le régime turc, l'objet d'une exploitation régulière organisée et contrôlée par les autorités administratives de Syrie au profit de la dette publique ottomane. On lit encore sur le portail de l'ancien Karakol (poste) de Bouara une inscription attestant qu'à partir de l'année 1249 (1863 le 1^{er} jour du mois de Rabi' el 2^e) les salines et ses dépendances furent "régulièrement administrées, sous l'égide bienfaitrice et civilisatrice de Sa Majesté le Sultan, grâce à l'initiative et au zèle de M. Suleiman Bey, Directeur de la Dette publique à Alep."

Chapitre IV — Considérations d'Ordre Politique et Administratif

(A) Situation antérieure (voir carte No. 6)

Antérieurement à la conclusion de la convention du 23 décembre 1920, c'est-à-dire sous le régime turc, les régions affectées par le tracé de la frontière syro-irakienne appartenaient à quatre grandes circonscriptions administratives :

Le vilayet de Diarbékir, au nord,
Le vilayet de Mossoul, à l'est,
Le vilayet de Bagdad, au sud,
Le sandjak autonome de Deir-az-Zor, à l'ouest.

Les limites entre ces différentes circonscriptions sont données par la carte anglaise internationale au 1:1.000.000, qui a servi aux négociateurs de la convention de 1920. (*)

Pour ce qui nous intéresse, ces limites étaient formées :

(a) Sur le Tigre et en Haute-Djézirah, entre le vilayet de Diarbékir et le vilayet de Mossoul.

Par une ligne coupant le Tigre à 2-5 kilom. en aval de Feischkhabour et se dirigeant d'abord vers le sud-ouest pour passer à 1 kilom. au sud de Rumelan Keui, puis se dirigeant vers l'est jusqu'à un point situé à environ 36 kilom. ouest-sud-ouest de Rumelan Keui.

(b) En Djézirah, entre le vilayet de Mossoul et le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor, par une ligne partant du point où la limite entre le vilayet de Mossoul et le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor coupe le Tigre, et se dirigeant vers le sud-sud-est, à travers le Djébel-Sindjar, jusqu'à un point situé à 11 kilom. à l'est du village de Samoukha, et à environ 20 kilom. à l'ouest de Beled-Sindjar, et aboutissant à un point situé près de Baniat Hamad, à environ 190 kilom. à l'est d'Abou Kemal.

(c) Sur l'Euphrate et de part et d'autre de ce fleuve, entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad.

Par une ligne partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

Cette délimitation administrative appelle les observations suivantes :

1^{re} La limite entre le vilayet de Diarbékir et le vilayet de Mossoul, coupant le Tigre non pas à 2-5 kilom. en aval de Feischkhabour, mais à 1 kilom. au sud de Rumelan Keui.

2^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Mossoul, partant du point où la limite entre le vilayet de Mossoul et le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor coupe le Tigre, et se dirigeant vers le sud-sud-est, à travers le Djébel-Sindjar, jusqu'à un point situé à 11 kilom. à l'est du village de Samoukha, et à environ 20 kilom. à l'ouest de Beled-Sindjar, et aboutissant à un point situé près de Baniat Hamad, à environ 190 kilom. à l'est d'Abou Kemal.

3^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

4^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

5^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

6^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

7^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

8^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

9^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

10^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

11^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

12^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

13^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

14^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

15^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

16^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

17^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

18^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

19^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

20^e La limite entre le Sandjak de Deir-az-Zor et le vilayet de Bagdad, partant de Baniat Hamad, orientée d'abord sensiblement est-ouest, puis s'incurvant vers le sud pour venir couper l'Euphrate à environ 19 kilom. en aval d'Abou Kemal.

(*) Geographical Section, General Staff, Edition de 1916, révisée en 1918.

(*) Voir en particulier accord du 5 mai 1920, Annexes No. 2.

28 février et 24 mars 1930. Ces accords présentent un intérêt particulier en ce qu'ils ont fixé la limite entre les deux zones. Jusqu'à présent, la limite entre la Syrie et l'Irak doit assurer l'administration des Chammars de son ressort et les territoires sur lesquels l'Irak doit assurer l'administration des Chammars de son ressort. Cette limite a été fixée comme suit (du nord vers le sud):

Tell Roumelan, Ouadi Roumelan, Tell Tash, Col de Samoukha (Sindjar), Oumm-el Diban, Tell Markab, El Bidéa, Mfallaga, Confluent du Ouadi Adjij et Ouadi Tidjarie, Tell Tebebed, centre de la saline de Bouara, Karakof de Bouara, rebord est de la falaise ouest de la saline de Bargouth, rebord ouest de la saline de Tchaabi.

En dehors de ces stipulations précises et ayant revêtu la forme écrite, un grand nombre de points touchant à l'action politique et administrative de l'une et l'autre partie ont été mis en discussion, au cours des onze années écoulées depuis la signature de la convention. La description complète de la situation qui en est résultée dans la zone frontalière ne peut être présentée que par le biais d'un inventaire des nombreux arrangements intervenus et des usages qui se sont établis au cours de cette période.

Chapitre V.—CONSIDÉRATIONS RELATIVES À LA SÉCURITÉ DU TERRITOIRE
ET À SA DÉFENSE

- Si l'on entendait procéder à l'étude du problème de la défense du territoire, dans cette partie des frontières syriennes, cette étude serait nécessairement dominée par un certain nombre de considérations, parmi lesquelles il convient de mentionner :

(a) La configuration spéciale de la région connue sous le nom de "Bec de Canard" et qui constitue un accès de la Syrie sur le Tigre,
(b) L'éloignement de cette région par rapport aux centres syriens (Deir-er-Zor, Hama, etc.).

(d) L'importance, dans une telle situation, des positions dominantes et des possibilités de communication, pour l'organisation de la défense.

Ces mêmes considérations conservent toute leur valeur si l'on étudie le problème du maintien de la sécurité du territoire et des populations dans ces

Appendix No 1

Convention franco-britannique signée à Paris le 23 Décembre 1920

LES Gouvernements français et britannique respectivement représentés par
les plénipotentiaires soussignés.

Des reux de réputer comme les réformes soulevées par l'attachement à la
 l'attribution à la France du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban, conférés tous trois
 par le Conseil suprême à San Rémo.

Malgré cette dernière stipulation, El Bidéa a toujours été considéré comme un point de la frontière *de facto*, et a servi à définir les limites assignées à l'action administrative de l'un et l'autre Gouvernement (voir en particulier le paragraphe suivant, pour ce qui concerne la perception de l'impôt chez les Chammar).

ARTICLE 17

Les limites entre les territoires sous mandat français et britannique de Syrie et Liban d'une part, et de Mésopotamie et de Palestine, de l'autre, sont fixées comme suit :

À l'est, le Tigre, depuis Djezirah ibn-Omar jusqu'à la limite des anciens vilayets de Diarbékir et de Mossoul.

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(31) Volk Andrew No. 2.

Au sud-est et au sud, ladite limite des anciens vilayets vers le sud jusqu'à Raouthan Kocui de là, une ligne laissant au mandat français l'intégralité du bassin du Kabour occidental et se dirigeant en ligne droite vers l'Euphrate, elle franchit à Abou Kemal, puis une ligne droite aboutissant à Imtar au sud au Djebel Druze.

ARTICLE 2.

Une commission sera constituée dans les trois mois qui suivront la signature de la présente convention pour fixer sur le terrain la ligne frontière décrite à l'article 1^{er} ci-dessus entre les territoires sous mandat français et sous mandat britannique. Cette commission sera composée de quatre membres. Deux de ses membres seront nommés respectivement par les Gouvernements de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne, les deux autres seront nommés respectivement avec l'agrément de la Puissance mandataire par les Gouvernements locaux intéressés des territoires sous mandat français et britannique.

Les conflits qui pourraient résulter des opérations de cette commission seront portés devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, dont la décision sera sans appel.

Les rapports de clôture de la commission donneront la description exacte de la frontière telle qu'elle aura été déterminée sur le terrain, les cartes nécessaires seront annexées et les cartes de situation seront faites en trois exemplaires, le premier sera déposé aux archives de la Société des Nations, le deuxième sera conservé par la Puissance mandataire et le troisième par l'autre Gouvernement intéressé.

Annexe No. 2

Requête commune adressée par les Gouvernements britannique et français au Conseil de la Société des Nations en date des 10 et 11 Novembre 1931

AU mois de décembre 1920, les Gouvernements français et britannique, désireux de régler complètement les problèmes soulevés par l'attribution à la Grande-Bretagne des mandats sur la Palestine et la Mésopotamie et par l'attribution à la France du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban, conférés par le Conseil suprême à San Rémo, recherchèrent d'un commun accord une solution pratique à ces problèmes.

Les négociations engagées à cet effet par les deux Gouvernements aboutirent à la signature de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920.

L'article 1^{er} de cette convention fixait les limites entre les territoires sous mandat britannique et les territoires sous mandat français.

Aux termes de l'article 2, une commission mixte devait être chargée de reporter sur le terrain les limites ainsi fixées. Ce même article stipulait que les conflits qui pourraient résulter des opérations de cette commission seraient portés devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, dont la décision serait sans appel.

Les deux Gouvernements ont donc, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 29 du Traité de Sèvres relatives aux lignes à déterminer sur le terrain.

La commission se réunit en juin 1921 et procéda à l'abornement de la frontière depuis la Méditerranée jusqu'à El Hammé.

Au delà de ce point, elle se heurta à la difficulté d'établir un tracé qui tint compte des conditions locales. La commission ayant constaté l'impossibilité dans laquelle elle se trouvait de résoudre cette difficulté, suspendit ses travaux qui ne furent pas repris depuis lors.

La reprise de ces travaux supposait l'envoi à la commission de directives concertées entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni, et un examen des conditions d'application de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920 ne pouvant être utilement entrepris entre ces deux Gouvernements avant l'attribution définitive de toutes les parties des territoires auxquels s'appliquait cette convention.

Cette dernière condition s'étant trouvée réalisée du fait de la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations en date du 29 septembre 1925, et du règlement du Protocole signé le 22 juin 1926 le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande ont pu se conformer à la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920.

La frontière qui reste à délimiter comprend deux sections

- a) La frontière entre la Syrie, le Djebel-Druze et la Transjordanie,
- b) La frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak.

En ce qui touche la section (a), Syrie, Djebel-Druze, Transjordanie le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni ont parvenus à s'entendre sur les principes généraux de la répartition des territoires en question sur lesquels le Conseil de la Société des Nations, sur une ligne qui serait abornée sur le terrain par la commission prévue à l'article 2 de la Convention.

En ce qui touche la section (b), Syrie, Irak, les deux Gouvernements se trouvant placés devant des difficultés d'ordre géographique, politique, administrative, économique, etc., les travaux de la commission en 1921. Ces difficultés étaient de deux sortes. En premier lieu, des divergences d'opinion existaient au sujet de l'interprétation exacte de la définition de la frontière qui faisait l'objet de l'article 1^{er} de la convention. En second lieu, il fut constaté que, quelle que pût être l'interprétation donnée à l'article 1^{er} de la convention, une frontière tracée en stricte conformité avec elle interprétée strictement, risquait d'être préjudiciable aux intérêts des populations pour des raisons politiques, administratives, de tribus, économiques, géographiques, etc.

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni ont donc, par un accord, décidé de suspendre les travaux de la commission en attendant que les deux Gouvernements puissent se mettre d'accord sur la répartition des territoires en question.

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni ont donc, par un accord, décidé de suspendre les travaux de la commission en attendant que les deux Gouvernements puissent se mettre d'accord sur la répartition des territoires en question. Les deux Gouvernements ont donc, par un accord, décidé de suspendre les travaux de la commission en attendant que les deux Gouvernements puissent se mettre d'accord sur la répartition des territoires en question.

Les deux Gouvernements suggèrent que la tâche du Conseil serait facilitée par l'envoi d'une commission qui recueillirait sur le terrain toutes les informations et ferait telles recommandations qui seraient susceptibles d'aider le Conseil dans l'élaboration de sa décision.

Annexe No. 3

Accord du 5 mai 1920 fixant la Frontière provisoire entre la Syrie et l'Irak dans la Vallée de l'Euphrate

(Traduit de l'arabe.)

DANS le village d'El Achaharab.

Accord provisoire conclu entre

Le Kaimakam, Ali Jandat Bey, et le Gouverneur militaire en second de Deir ez Zor, M. Faruk Bey, représentant les autorités du Gouvernement ottoman de Deir ez-Zor, d'une part, et l'Agent politique Lt.-Colonel Leachman, d'autre part,

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Conformément aux ordres reçus par lui du commandant en chef à Bagdad, les mesures à prendre pour assurer la sécurité des caravanes de pèlerins et le Gouvernement britannique soient fixées entre Abou Kémal et El Quaim, entre les villages d'El Heri et d'Hasiba sur la rive droite de l'Euphrate, et entre El Baghuz et El Rabi sur la rive gauche. L'Armée britannique se retirera au delà de la frontière provisoire et laissera Abou Kémal au Gouvernement arabe.

A la demande ci-dessus, Ali Jaudat et Muzhar Bey, représentants accrédités du Gouverneur militaire de Deir ez Zor, donnèrent leur accord sur cette frontière provisoire. (*)

ALI, Kaïmakam

MUZHAR ARSLAN, 2^{me} Représentant
accrédité du Gouverneur militaire

COLONEL LEACHMAN,
Agent politique

Le 3 mai 1920

Annexe No 4.

Accord du 31 juillet 1922 faant les Mesures à prendre en vue de la Sécurité de la Piste Deir ez Zor-Mossoul.

(Texte français)

NOUS, soussignés, M. J. M. Flaxman, et Capitaine Coux, représentant respectivement les Gouvernements irakien et syrien et délégués par les autorités de ces deux pays pour étudier les mesures à prendre en vue de la sécurité de la piste de Deir ez-Zor à Mossoul, avons décidé, après discussion et mise au point de la question de la protection des caravanes de pèlerins, qui ont été jugées par nous comme les plus susceptibles de s'adapter aux conditions présentes et de donner des résultats.

1. Afin de supprimer l'usage des "khaouas" qui paralysent les transactions commerciales, et d'assurer la protection des caravanes de pèlerins, les "khaouas" des escortes suffisantes seront désignées pour chacun des deux États intéressés, qui assureront leur service, respectivement dans chacun de leur territoire, les Syriens en Syrie, les Irakiens en Irak.

La protection des voyageurs en automobile, ou des convois automobiles, ne pouvant s'effectuer de même que pour les caravanes, par des escortes à cheval, en raison de leur vitesse, il sera recommandé à ces voyageurs de profiter du passage des escortes dans les zones difficiles ou incertaines, pour traverser, à ce moment lesdites zones et obtenir, de la sorte, une protection indirecte qui pourra être étendue.

2. Les engagements pris par le Gouvernement irakien vis-à-vis de Chammar Dahab al Hadi reconnaissant à ce chef Chammar le droit de percevoir des "khaouas", n'auront aucun effet sur les caravanes escortées. Seulement les automobiles qui passeront sans protection d'escortes de caravanes s'exécuteront, le cas échéant, sur la demande des représentants de ce chef.

Un taux de perception sera fixé ultérieurement par le Gouvernement irakien pour éviter l'arbitraire.

Ce privilège de Dahab-al-Hadi n'est que provisoire et le Gouvernement irakien tendra le plus tôt possible à sa suppression.

3. Les escortes et leur départ seront organisés de telle sorte que deux fois par mois, à 5 et 20 de chaque mois, elles se rencontreront en un point déterminé ci-dessous.

Obligatoirement, il y aura mouvement de ces escortes deux fois par mois, même si au départ elles n'avaient aucune caravane à protéger.

Elles séjourneront jusqu'au 5 et 20 au soir, au lieu de rencontre de manière qu'il y ait liaison effective, échange dans de bonnes conditions et qu'en cas de retard dans la marche d'une escorte, il puisse y avoir un certain battement pour

la rencontre des deux escortes. Les points de rencontre seront les suivants :
au point de rencontre de la frontière provisoire.

Ali Kaïmakam

Muzhar Arslan, 2^{me} Représentant

lui permettre d'arriver. En principe, les escortes devront se trouver au lieu de rencontre, le 4 et le 20 de chaque mois avant midi.

4. En considération de la situation désertique, inhabitée et sans eau, du point où la piste coupe la frontière qui sépare les deux pays, l'éloignement considérable (60 à 70 kilom.) de ce point par rapport à tout lieu habité ou habitable, et l'impossibilité d'une rencontre des escortes, le point désigné "El Bidea" sur la carte anglaise au 1/250,000 et appelé "El Badiaa" par les indigènes sans bien entendu qu'aucun des Gouvernements intéressés puisse se prévaloir de ce point pour établir ultérieurement des revendications territoriales.

Mossoul, le 31 juillet 1922.

[E 2187 171/89]

No. 125.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon. (Received May 3.)

(No. 28. Confidential.)

Damascus, April 8, 1932

Sir,

At the date of my last political report (No. 17) of the 11th February, 1932, the attitude of the Nationalist party towards the proposed elections was still undefined, but inclining on the whole to a boycott. Their understanding of parliamentary institutions is extremely limited, and they could not conceive of occupying any position in a Chamber except that of an overwhelming majority, though it is possible that once in Parliament they will not be slow in discovering the privileges of a minority, nor backward in exploiting them.

2. Syrian politicians in Egypt and Geneva preached abstention from the elections, and for some time this simple method of remaining pure and incorruptible in the eyes of the electorate kept its strong appeal to Nationalist politicians. However, a number of their leaders decided for participation, with or without the consent of the party. Prolonged negotiations ensued with the French High Commissioner's delegate and agreement was reached that the elections would be free if the Nationalists guaranteed not to enter more than six candidates. The remainder being reserved for the French. In fact, in face of a warning from M. Ponsot, the Nationalists, in order to secure the compact, one of the official six Nationalist candidates was dropped, and the elections were accordingly held on the 30th March with a free and fair result.

3. The procedure which I had outlined to M. Solomiac on the 23rd December, 1931, and reported in my despatch No. 105 of the same date was applied in full, and complete satisfaction was expressed on all sides. The French military authorities occupied all strategic points with tanks and machine gun parties, and took other exceptional measures to maintain public security, which are still in force.

4. The secondary elections took place on the 6th April, the same military precautions were taken and somewhat intensified in the square adjoining the municipality, which constituted the only polling station. This square, which was the scene of the riots of the 29th December, 1931, was occupied by a number of tanks and the issues were held by strong detachments of Senegalese.

5. The results are not quite complete: the tenth candidate failed to obtain more than half the total votes cast, and a further ballot will be held to-morrow. The list was inevitably headed by the Jewish Deputy, who was unopposed: six Nationalists follow and two of the three French nominees. The full results with notes on the personalities are given in an appendix to this despatch. Rikabi Pasha, whom the delegation were most anxious to see elected, is second among the candidates who failed to obtain the requisite number of votes, the first is Nessim Bakri, an ex-leader of revolution turned moderate, but more to the Nationalists' liking than Rikabi, who is hated and feared.

6. Sheikh Taj ed-Din disregarded the High Commissioner's warning and entered his name as a candidate, and meeting M. Ponsot at the Légion d'Honneur ball a few days later was rewarded by as gross a personal affront as I have ever seen administered. He only succeeded in obtaining 112 votes, and leaves the political arena unregretted by anyone.

existed for some time might, if the times were normal, have provoked no greatly marked discontent, but, with the effects of the world economic crisis becoming increasingly felt, dissatisfaction naturally tended to grow apace. For some time

falling off. To counteract this numerous increases in the custom duties affecting all classes have been made. This state of things had brought it home to all that a small country like the Lebanon simply cannot afford the costly and cumbersome

remembered that, when in May 1932 the latter rushed through the Constitution, he took good care to clear out of the country as soon as possible, leaving his successors to face the effects of what was by some at least regarded as a rather poor jest. Quite apart from the cost of the thing its results—nepotism, undue influence, venality, constant intriguing and interference on the part of Deputies and politicians—were bound to be felt. During the past week or so public demonstrations of protest, in the organisation of which a body known as the "Parti de la République" took a leading part, had occurred. This body sent a deputation to Bkerkeh, to which the Maronite Patriarch expressed in no uncertain terms his dissatisfaction with the present situation. The Maronite Archbishop also expressed himself on the same lines. In general there was a tendency to popular agitation which seemed to be growing.

6. It was presumably this growing agitation which led M. Ponsot, who is accused of being over-dow and over-deliberate, to decide that the time had come when he must act and act decisively. Although there was no special indication

I have, &c
H E SATOW

Enclosure in No. 126.

Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire du 9 mai 1932 No. L. R. 55, pris en exécution de l'Acte de Mandat portant, à titre temporaire, Suspension partielle de l'Application du Statut organique de la République libanaise

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,
Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1932,
Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,
Vu le décret du 3 septembre 1928 portant nomination du Haut-Commissaire,
Vu le statut organique promulgué le 14 mai 1930,
Vu l'article 90 de la Constitution de la République libanaise ainsi conçu :

"Les pouvoirs établis par la présente Constitution s'exerceront sous réserve des droits et des devoirs de la France mandataire, tels qu'ils résultent de l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et de l'Acte de Mandat."

Attendu que le vœu général de la population du Liban s'est exprimé avec force depuis l'éclatement de la crise économique qui met en danger l'équilibre des finances libanaises pour la révision du régime politique actuel dans

et en conséquence de la des pages restant à compléter par la suite

Arrêté du Haut-Commissaire du 9 mai 1932 No. L. R. 56, relatif à la désignation du Chef du Gouvernement, à l'entrée en fonctions du Conseil des Directeurs et à la cessation des fonctions de la Chambre des Députés et des Ministres, pour la période intérimaire correspondant à la suspension partielle de la Constitution

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,
Vu l'arrêté de ce jour portant, à titre temporaire, suspension partielle de la Constitution libanaise,

Arrête :

Article 1^{er} M Charles Debbas est chargé, avec son titre actuel, des fonctions de Chef du Gouvernement dans les conditions prévues par l'arrêté de ce jour portant suspension partielle de la Constitution.

Art. 2 Les Directeurs libanais actuellement en fonctions sont chargés de l'expédition des affaires sous l'autorité directe du Chef du Gouvernement.

Art. 3 Des commissions techniques seront constituées à l'effet de rechercher les mesures propres à alléger sans délai les charges de l'Etat.

Art. 4 Les Ministres en exercice cessent leurs fonctions à partir de ce jour.

Art. 5 Les sessions de la Chambre sont suspendues.

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E 2445 171/89]

No. 127

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 30)

(No. 33. Confidential)

Sir,

Damascus, May 7, 1932

I HAVE the honour to transmit notes on the political situation since the completion of the elections reported in my despatch No. 27 of the 11th April, 1932.

2. Although Nationalist opinion had been sharply divided on the advisability of entering the elections, the success of their candidates furnished the occasion of exuberant rejoicings.

3. It was, however, difficult to sustain the note, and the electorate showed signs of flagging interest as politicians settled down to their "combinations." The congratulatory visits which they had received on their election, and made triumphal progresses to the different quarters every evening for a fortnight. These were the occasion of inflammatory speeches, most of which I am inclined to believe were a little further than the real sentiments of the orators.

4. Events in Syria increasingly reflect a conflict of opinion between the terms with their local Deputies. M. Lavastre is here thought to have inspired the creation at Aleppo of the new "Free Constitutional party," the main object of which is to transfer the centre of political activity—and the Chamber itself—to the north. M. Soliman on the other hand is confidently stated to be completely identified with the Nationalist point of view, and Damascus expects Soulehi Harakat to be discarded like so many of his predecessors. The presidency of the republic, the Chamber and the council are being dealt and redealt between Mohamed Ali Beg El Abid, Haqqi Beg El Azm and Hashem Beg El Atany.

5. Parliament is not expected to open before the end of this month nor to sit for more than a few days for the election of these officials. It will then adjourn till M. Poupot's return from leave.

6. At a meeting of the Syrian Nationalist Party, the speakers and plans were very different from those of the 1st report. It was now stated that the Nationalist party would not accept the French mandate, and that the French troops would be followed by anarchy.

7. Meanwhile Nationalist leaders are being sharply criticised for their excessive readiness to negotiate with the French, and accused of placing their private advantage before the public interest. It is felt that they were wrong in agreeing to the bargain by which they obtained only six seats out of nine, and they are suspected of consenting to a further deal, by which they will secure two Ministries in the forthcoming Government, at the cost of their independence. Most of the censure is directed on Jamil Mariani Beg, who probably deserves it.

8. More serious is the growing impatience of commercial and agricultural classes, who bear most of the burden of the taxes and derive very little benefit. The existing customs policy is incoherent and capricious and, for one individual who may be assisted by it, the rest of the market is certain to be mulcted.

9. The system of taxation applied in 1926 has been rendered intolerable by subsequent fluctuations of exchange; since I reported on it in my despatch No. 86 of the 13th June, 1927, the position has in no way improved. As the farming class is unorganised and inarticulate—in short, because it cannot go on strike—its grievances are customarily ignored, for this the Syrian officials are perhaps more to blame than the French.

10. A succession of four bad years has not been compensated by any serious concessions on the part of overstuffed administrations anxious only to assure the payment of their own salaries. Failure of winter rains and a recent ground frost have entirely destroyed hill crops and the grapes in the plains, and whole districts are faced with the prospect of starvation.

11. There are many indications that the limit of endurance of the farmer has nearly been reached.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E C HOLE.

E 3099 171/89]

No. 128

Vice-Consul Monck Mason to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 22)

(No. 25)

Sir,

Aleppo, May 28, 1932

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1 of the 22nd January regarding the political situation and the Syrian elections at Aleppo, I have the honour to report that, whereas at Damascus there has been, as I understand, some fraternisation between the extremists and the moderates, this is far from being the case at Aleppo, where the latter are still regarded by the former as traitors to the cause and looked upon with implacable hatred.

2. This hatred, which is inter Moslem, and not caused by any religious fanaticism, has since the general election taken the form of terrorism. Numbers of Moderate Deputies and adherents have been killed. The situation has reached a point where the extremists have threatened to remove the body and throw it into the sewers.

3. As most of the Syrian judicial authorities here are of the Extremist party, it is extremely unlikely that either the murderer of Omar-ed-Dayeh or other political criminals will ever be brought to justice—in any case the judges would be afraid to convict.

4. I understand from a reliable source that the majority of the newly elected Moderates are afraid to accept their offices unless the mandatory authorities can guarantee to protect their lives. The délégué-adjoint is much worried, and has done his best to dissuade them from taking a measure which might have far-reaching effects, and make matters very difficult for the mandatory Power.

5. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

A MONCK MASON

E 3223 171/89]

No. 129.

Consul Hole to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 28)

(No. 44. Confidential)

Sir,

Damascus, June 8, 1932.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 35 of the 7th May, on political events in Syria, and with particular reference to paragraph 5, I have the honour to report that the first session of the new Parliament took place yesterday.

2. The Deputies were summoned by a decree dated the 2nd June, to meet in extraordinary session on the 7th June, and the agenda laid down exactly. Firstly, election of a President and Vice-President of the Republic; secondly, approval of the elections of Deputies, and, finally, determination of salaries of the President of the Republic and the Deputies. This business completed, the session to be closed.

3. The Deputies from Aleppo were confined to their hotels, ostensibly as a precaution against disturbances. The military authorities took charge of public security.

4. The session opened at about 9 A.M.; a large number of notables had been invited to attend, but no invitation was extended to foreign representatives.

5. The High Commissioner's delegate and M. Hellen of the High Commissioner's immediate staff were present with a number of other French officials. The text of the decree convening the Parliament was read, and the oldest Deputy, Mohamed Adali of Antioch, assumed the functions of President. Fakhri Baroudi called on the assembly to observe two minutes' silence in memory of Fezi-el Ghazi (paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 27 of the 20th April, 1930), the author of the Constitution. He then asserted the right of the Deputies to act according to their conscience without fear of external influences. Shaker Nimat Shabani (Aleppo) expressed his agreement.

6. The Acting President then endeavoured to proceed to business, when Faiz-el Khouri (Damascus) also joined in, despite of the President's injunctions; Faiz-el Khouri (Damascus) also joined in, a general uproar ensued. The President ordered a policeman to remove Faiz-el Khouri, who refused to leave the tribune, aptly quoting Mirabeau: "Nous sommes ici par la volonté du peuple, et nous n'en sortirons que par la puissance des baïonnettes." The policeman was ejected. The President adjourned the meeting for twenty minutes, until comparative calm was restored.

7. The session was reopened and lemonade was served to the Cabinet. Faiz-el Khouri protested against the terms of the decree summoning the Parliament, which he stated was contrary to article 45 of the Constitution, and which it appeared that the French and Arabic texts do not agree. Nuri-el Asfari (Idlib, Aleppo) intervened with a suggestion that the House should get on with the election of the President.

8. The result of the first ballot was Soubhi Barakat (Moderate) 28 votes, Hakk-el Azm (pro-French) 23, Hashem-el Atassi (Nationalist) 17. None of the candidates having polled half the votes, a second ballot was held. Nationalists abstained and Soubhi Barakat received 30 votes, Hakk-el-Azm 23 and Hashem-el Atassi 2. Soubhi Barakat took the presidential chair, and stated that he would endeavour to work in harmony with all parties and in particular the Nationalists.

9. Other officials were then elected, the whole of the posts falling to Deputies from the north, with a regular vote of about 30. The officers appointed were: Vice-Presidents, Selim Jambert (Aleppo) and Mohammed-el-Fatih (Deir ez Zor); secretaries, Latif Ghanimeh (Aleppo) and Mohamed-el-Joreb (Alexandretta); "Questeurs" (internal administration of Parliament), Aref Jazzar (Jebel Sam'an), Mousser Kaloustian (Antioch), and Minan Niaz (Izaz).

10. The Nationalist Deputies then asked for an adjournment, as it was clear that their candidate for the Presidency of the Republic could not hope for success. Shaker Nimat Shabani (Aleppo) opposed the motion, but Soubhi Barakat suspended the session for half an hour, and when it was resumed Shaker Nimat Shabani withdrew his objections, and it was decided to postpone the election of the President of the Syrian Republic to the 11th April. The President announced this decision and expressed his desire that Deputies should no longer be present in the Chamber.

11. It is quite impossible to forecast the result.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Baghdad and Jerusalem, the British Resident at Aleppo, His Majesty's consul general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE

CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

E 35/36/93]

No. 130.

Mr. Morgan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 4, 1932.)

(No. 447)

Sir,

Angora, December 30, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 430 of the 22nd December, regarding the visit to Turkey of Nuri Pasha, Prime Minister of Iraq, I have the honour to report that he arrived at Angora on the 28th instant, and was met at the station by Ismet Pasha. He was accompanied by a number of local officials, of commercial, residence and extradition treaties, and in discussion of problems relating to the Turco-Iraqi frontier.

2. He has informed me that the negotiations are proceeding smoothly. He had expected that the Turkish Government would accept his proposal that Iraqi shepherds should be allowed access with their flocks to Turkish pasture, but he has found that the Turkish Government has not yet decided whether the proposal is correct. While not flatly rejecting his proposal, the Turkish negotiators do so in effect, by objecting to the shepherds being either Assyrians or tribesmen.

3. With regard to the security of the frontier, the Turks seem willing to delegate authority to a Turkish gendarmerie officer, to be stationed close to the frontier to act promptly in case of frontier raids in concert with a specially appointed Iraqi frontier officer. Nuri Pasha's suggestion that Turkish troops should be sent to the frontier to close it to followers of Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan, who has recently been disturbing the peace in Iraq, was met by the statement that it was impracticable, as no troop movements would be possible in the district concerned until June.

4. The Turkish attitude towards Assyrians is interesting. Although unwilling to allow Assyrian shepherds to enter Turkey, the Turkish Government some years ago raised no objection to the return of about 500 Assyrians from Iraq to their native mountains in Turkey, where they still are, and now urge Nuri Pasha to do what he can to prevent the Assyrians now settled in Iraq near the Turkish frontier from emigrating to Syria, firstly, because they can be used in Iraq to keep their Kurdish neighbours in check, and secondly, because Turkey does not wish that Assyrians should go to swell the non-Moslem minorities already established in Syria close to the Turkish frontier.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Baghdad.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN

E 237 35 93

No. 131

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 14)

(No. 15.)

Sir,

Constantinople, January 8, 1932

WITH reference to Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 447 of the 30th December, 1931, regarding the Turco-Iraq negotiations at Angora for the conclusion of commercial, residence and extradition treaties, I have the honour to report that Nuri Pasha hopes to reach agreement with the Turkish Government within a day or two.

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2. According to Nuri Pasha the final form of the commercial and residence treaties will call for little comment. As for the Extradition Treaty, he has admitted that the murder of a Prime Minister of Turkey or Iraq shall not be considered a political offence, and has resisted Turkish pressure on him to agree that Iraq should deliver up non-Iraqis—other than Turks—accused or convicted of offences committed in Turkey. He was, however, as far as to promise that Iraq would be willing to deliver up to Turkey Persians or Syrians accused or convicted of offences committed in Turkey, but declined to give this promise in writing, either in the treaty or as an annex to the treaty. With regard to Europeans guilty of offences in Turkey, the Turkish negotiators grumbled at Nuri Pasha's refusal to agree that Iraq should deliver them up to Turkey, and their annoyance found vent in the remark that his refusal was, no doubt, forced on him by Europeans, who, they said, were still unwilling to trust Turkish justice. Coming to the question of expenses incurred in extraditing wanted persons, the two parties would agree that each would abstain from claiming a refund from the other.

3. Other matters treated during the negotiations were—

- (a) Co-operation on the Turco-Iraq frontier, with regard to which it was agreed that special frontier officers should be appointed by both sides to keep in close touch in order to deal promptly with frontier incidents.
- (b) Access of Iraq flocks to Turkish grazing grounds. This question was still unsettled.
- (c) Entry of Iraq dates into Turkey. Turkey had agreed to allow dates to the value of £1 100,000 to enter annually, with a 12 per cent preferential reduction of customs duty.
- (d) Turkish participation in Iraq oil royalties, with regard to which I am sending a separate despatch.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

E 369 93

No. 132

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 18)

(No. 1 Saving,
Telegraphic) En clair.

Angora, 11, 1932

RESIDENCE Convention and Treaties of Commerce and Extradition between Turkey and Iraq were signed at Angora yesterday. Press states that first two agreements are based on most favoured treatment and that ratifications will be exchanged at Bagdad.

Texts will be forwarded as soon as possible
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 1, Saving)

E 369 93

No. 132

IRAQ: PROPOSED RELEASE FROM MANDATORY RÉGIME

(Confidential.)

Memorandum for British Representative on the Council of the League.

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I — HISTORICAL

(a) Historical and Explanatory

FROM the time when His Majesty's Government, at the San Remo Conference on April 1920, accepted the terms of the Principal Allied Powers to assume the post of Mandatory for Iraq, there has been to secure the establishment of a new State, and to secure the well-being of the State of Iraq, it has been the policy of the League of Nations. This is indeed a measure which has been taken into account in the Covenant of the League, in which it was stated that the Mandatory system was to be established in Iraq, and that the Mandatory system was to be established in Iraq, and that the Mandatory system was to be established in Iraq.

2. There exists in fact no real basis for the Iraq National consciousness in the country was a long time ago to the effect that direct foreign administration was quickly shown to be unsuitable to the circumstances. An attempt to apply the League method of direct administration was a great responsibility for the widespread rejection of 1920 and when this had been suppressed, His Majesty's Government decided to embody their relations with the Iraqis in the form of a treaty, and this was embodied in the form of a treaty. This treaty, signed in October 1922, was accepted by the Council of the League in 1924 in place of a mandate in the usual form, as giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant.

3. Under article 6 of this treaty His Britannic Majesty undertook to use his good offices for the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations as soon as possible; and by a subsequent protocol it was agreed that the treaty should terminate upon Iraq becoming a member of the League, and, in any case, not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey.

4. In 1925 a League Commission was sent out to examine the position of the boundary between Iraq and Turkey. The point at issue was the fate of the Mosul vilayet. The commission, in its report, was somewhat guarded. It held that, for a considerable period, the Mosul vilayet ought to go to Iraq, but that it was preferable that it should remain under Turkish administration until it was found that it was capable of being administered by Iraq. This conclusion was always open to serious question. On this point, see also Appendix V below.

5. The Council of the League, on the basis of this report, decided to award the entire Mosul vilayet to Iraq, but simultaneously invited His Majesty's Government to conclude a new treaty with Iraq, ensuring the continuance for twenty-five years of the existing mandatory régime, unless Iraq should be admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of that period.

6. The result of this was the conclusion of a new treaty between Great Britain and Iraq in January 1926, extending the period of validity of the 1922 treaty for twenty-five years from December 1925, unless, before the expiration of that period, Iraq should have become a member of the League. This treaty recalled the undertaking in the 1922 treaty to recommend Iraq for admission to the League as soon as possible, and provided that the possibility of making this recommendation should be examined at successive intervals of four years (dating from August 1924).

7. A further stage in the progress of Iraq was marked by the unratified treaty of 1927, by article 8 of which His Majesty's Government undertook to support the candidature of Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in 1932 (one of the quadrennial dates contemplated in the 1926 treaty). It was intended that the present rate of progress in Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the future. This provision created much suspicion in Iraq as to the real intention of His Majesty's Government. In 1929, when the High Commissioner for Iraq, Lord Curzon, was in London, the necessity for its retention was re-examined. The conclusion reached was that Iraq had made such marked and real progress that, in the absence of some really serious and wholly unlooked-for set-back, she would in 1932, judged by the criteria of internal security, sound public finance and enlightened administration, be fit in every way for admission to the League. The High Commissioner was accordingly authorised to inform the Iraq Government, without proviso or qualification, that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to support its candidature for admission to the League in 1932 and on the 4th November, 1929, the Secretary-General of the League was requested to inform the Council that His Majesty's Government proposed to recommend Iraq for admission to the League. It may be added that, in the opinion of the High Commissioner, who was then High Commissioner for Iraq, unless this unqualified and binding guarantee on the part of His Majesty's Government had been given, it would have been impossible to find any Iraqi Minister who would have been able to carry out the administration of the country.

(b) Present Position.

8. The decision of His Majesty's Government to recommend Iraq for admission to the League does not mean that in their view Iraq has attained an ideal standard of administrative efficiency and stability. His Majesty's Government have aimed at setting up within fixed frontiers a self-governing State enjoying friendly relations with neighbouring States and equipped with stable legislative, judicial and administrative systems and all the working machinery of a civilised Government. They believe this aim to have been achieved and consider that Iraq is now capable of conducting her own affairs without international control and advice.

(c) Importance of securing Admission of Iraq to the League in 1932.

9. It will be seen from the foregoing that our relations with the Iraqi Government for many years have been conditioned by our promise to recommend Iraq for admission to the League of Nations at an early date. The recent

increasingly satisfactory development of our relations with Iraq has been conditioned by our promise to recommend Iraq for admission to the League in 1932. If the Iraqi Government and people were now to be disappointed in their hopes of release from the mandatory régime and admission to the League in the present year, and were to come to the conclusion that His Majesty's Government had failed adequately to implement their undertaking, the whole basis of our relationship with the Iraqi Government and of the present régime in Iraq would be placed in danger of collapse. It is extremely doubtful whether any Iraqi Government could be found willing to continue to administer the country, while the British personnel in Iraq, which has been reduced to very small proportions and has mainly advisory functions, would be quite insufficient to take over the administration. His Majesty's Government might thus be faced with the alternatives either of informing the League that they were no longer able to carry out the responsibilities in regard to Iraq with which they had been entrusted, or of themselves taking over direct administration of the country. For the latter purpose new machinery would have to be improvised at great cost and it would almost certainly be impossible to set it in motion without the support of a strong military force. Even so it might be difficult to avoid a repetition of the events of the 1920 rebellion and the chaotic reaction from the British Mandate.

II.—LEAGUE ACTION BETWEEN 1929 AND 1931.

10. At its meeting in January 1930 the Council of the League considered the notification which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had made on the 4th November 1929, recommending Iraq for admission to membership of the League in 1932. At that meeting it was pointed out that the matter fell into two parts, since Iraq could not be admitted to membership of the League without involving the termination of the mandatory régime. These two parts were:—

- (a) The question whether the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant should cease to be applicable to Iraq, which was a matter for the Council to decide; and
- (b) The question whether Iraq should be admitted to the League, which was a matter for the Assembly.

11. In order to enable it to deal with the first of these questions, the Council requested the Permanent Mandates Commission to submit any suggestions that might assist the Council in coming to a conclusion regarding "the general conditions which must be fulfilled before the mandatory régime could be brought to an end in respect of a country placed under that régime."

12. The Permanent Mandates Commission duly submitted a report on this question, which was considered by the Council in September 1931. The commission's recommendations may be said to fall under two main heads:—

- (a) The *de facto* conditions which should exist in the country concerned in order to justify the presumption that it is able, in the words of article 22 of the Covenant, "to stand by itself under the strenuous conditions of the modern world";
- (b) Certain guarantees which the country concerned should be called upon to give before being released from the mandatory régime.

13. After considerable discussion the Council in a resolution of the 4th September, 1931, adopted the recommendations of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and requested the commission in the light of that resolution "to submit its opinion on the proposal of the British Government for the emancipation of Iraq."

14. The Permanent Mandates Commission, at its November session, gave effect to the Council's request and reported the result of its consideration of the proposed release of Iraq from the mandatory régime, in the light of the Council's resolution of the 4th September. At its June session it had already examined in great detail a special comprehensive report on the progress of Iraq during the period 1920-31,

which His Majesty's Government had prepared for the commission's assistance, in pursuance of an undertaking given by Mr. Henderson to the Council in January 1931.

III—REPORT OF PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION

(a) General Character of Report

15. The Permanent Mandates Commission, in its report which is to come before the Council at its impending meeting. A copy of the report is attached (Appendix II⁽¹⁾) but it is still liable to modification.

16. The report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the proposed emancipation of Iraq is as a whole fairly satisfactory. It was the intention of His Majesty's Government that the detailed arrangements for Iraq's release from the mandatory régime, and the precise conditions governing that release, should, so far as possible, be left for settlement by the League Council in negotiation with representatives of this country and Iraq. For this reason it was desirable that the Mandates Commission, in its report to the Council, should confine itself to a general statement of the facts and, in the event, the Mandates Commission has to a large extent adopted this course. The report, however, contains certain less satisfactory features which are capable of being exploited at the forthcoming Council meeting by any Government represented on the Council which, for one reason or another, may desire to be obstructive. Moreover, although it may be said that the commission's conclusions justify the assumption that, in general, Iraq satisfies the *de facto* conditions required for the termination of a mandate—and M. Marinkovitch clearly takes this view in his draft report to the Council—these conclusions are framed in the most guarded terms, and are made subject to several reservations and qualifications.

(b) Report of the British Representative

17. In the first place, the report states that the commission would have been unable to contemplate the termination of the mandatory régime had it not been for a declaration made by the British accredited representative at the 20th session of the Mandates Commission, to the effect that "His Majesty's Government fully realise its responsibility in recommending that Iraq should be admitted to the League, which is, in its view, the only legal way of terminating the mandate." The moral responsibility must rest with His Majesty's Government.

18. In the second place, the report states that the British representative should emphasise the point brought out by certain members of the Permanent Mandates Commission during its 20th session, that any suggestion of responsibility on the part of His Majesty's Government for the acts of Iraq after her release from the mandatory régime would clearly be incompatible with the independence of Iraq, but that His Majesty's Government naturally accept full responsibility for recommending Iraq for release from the mandatory régime and admission to the League, on their knowledge of her present condition, and have no doubt that she will justify their confidence.

(c) Italian Attitude

19. So far as can be foreseen, the quarter from which difficulties are most likely to arise is the Italian Government, and it may be useful here to explain their attitude.

(1) Not printed.

20. The Italian Government are particularly anxious to prevent the French Government from establishing a protectorate over Syria in place of the existing mandatory régime, and thus liberating French action in Syria from League control. They are anxious to prevent the French Government from making any release which would, by establishing a precedent, prevent them from eventually coming up, from ensuring either that the mandate in Syria (and the treatment in that territory) shall continue as long as possible, or, alternatively, that, when the mandate ceases, the French shall retain no special privileges and no special position in the country. It is not unfair to add that, apart from their perhaps legitimate anxieties about Syria, the Italians have clearly seen an opportunity of exacting some economic advantage for themselves as the price of not making difficulties about the release of Iraq.

21. When the question of the general conditions for the termination of a mandate was discussed at the meeting of the League Council last September, the Italian representative stressed the need for a direct and searching enquiry by the League into the question of the fitness of a territory for emancipation, and implied that the Council, in reaching a decision in any individual case, should not rely solely on the views of the Mandates Commission, but should avail itself of independent sources of information and other methods of investigation. It is known that the Italian representative had in mind the despatch of a League Commission to conduct an enquiry on the spot, if only in order to create a precedent for subsequent application to the case of Syria. His views were to some extent reflected in the revised resolution finally adopted by the Council, which stipulated that the Council's decision as to the fitness of a territory for emancipation should only be reached after "a searching investigation of each particular case."

22. On the 23rd September last the Italian Government caused a memorandum to be presented to the Council to the effect that the attitude adopted by the Italian Government at the last Council meeting should not be taken as an indication of Italian opposition to the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq. The memorandum stated that no substantial difficulty would be raised by Italy to the cessation of the mandate over Iraq, "et opla aussi en considération des assurances déjà fournies pour ce qui concerne un accueil favorable aux demandes présentées par certains groupes en vue d'une participation italienne au sujet de la question des pétroles." The sentence quoted no doubt refers to the negotiations now going on in Iraq for an oil concession to a company in which there is an Italian interest.

(d) Possible Proposal for League Commission of Enquiry

23. In view of the Italian attitude at the September Council meeting, and of the emphasis already placed on the necessity for a searching investigation of each particular case, it is not surprising that the Mandates Commission is anxious to Iraq the *de facto* conditions should have been met, but that the Italian Government have not yet agreed to the proposal. The proposal is, however, particularly if the second and third paragraphs of section 1 of the Commission's Report will however provide an opening for members of the Council to exercise the power of sending out a special League Commission to enquire into the situation in Iraq. It is possible that the Italian representative, if not some other member of the Council, will take advantage of this opening.

24. The proposal for a League Commission to Iraq at this juncture would be open to the strongest possible objections. Apart from the obvious objection of intruding a new and serious element of uncertainty, it would render almost inevitable a postponement of the admission of Iraq to the League until next year, and the inevitable serious results of Iraq's consequent delay in a proposal brought forward at the Council meeting in 1932. It is suggested that the British representative should take the following line: His Majesty's Government would be the last to question the right of the League to have any information which it may require in order to come to a decision, or to seek that information in whatever way

it may think fit. But the information which they have themselves supplied in their special report on the progress of Iraq, in the evidence of their accredited representative before the Permanent Mandates Commission, and in their observations on petitions submitted to the League of Nations, is as complete and accurate as possible. The Permanent Mandates Commission itself recognised in its report which was adopted by the Council at its meeting in September last, that the question whether a people had become fit to stand alone, could only be settled by careful observation of the political, social and economic development of the territory concerned over a sufficient period. It can hardly be supposed that a commission of enquiry would, in the space of a comparatively short visit, be able to produce more complete or more accurate information than the Government of the mandatory Power, with every resource at their disposal. The despatch of such a commission would, in fact, only tend to create the impression that the League felt itself unable to rely on the evidence officially submitted by the responsible authority—the mandatory Power.

25. Moreover, there are serious practical objections to the despatch of a commission, to which His Majesty's Government would feel it their duty to invite the attention of the Council before it comes to a decision. It will be appreciated that the arrival of a commission might become the focus of discontented elements, and how difficult it might, therefore, find it to form a just view of the situation. Its arrival might serve only to rouse political feelings, and to awaken differences which it is hoped are in process of being healed, and local unrest might even result. It might serve to encourage false hopes of autonomy or separation on the part of certain elements in the population. For these reasons His Majesty's Government would view the despatch of a League Commission to Iraq with misgiving, and in all the circumstances they feel that if the League decided to despatch such a commission, it would be assuming a grave responsibility.

26. It would, however, clearly be preferable, if possible, to dissuade the Iraqis from putting forward the request for the despatch of a League Commission to Iraq, or at all events from pressing it. It seems possible that the Iraqi Government would be content to withdraw any demand for a commission of enquiry in the case of Iraq provided that this could be done without the Council passing any resolution which would render it more difficult for them to revive the proposal in the case of Syria later. Any grounds which might be advanced for differentiating between the cases of Iraq and Syria might, therefore, be most useful. With this object in view it has been suggested that reference might possibly be made to the following two facts—

- (i) Practically from the beginning, the termination of the mandate in Iraq has been the goal for which both the Iraqi Government and the Mandatory Powers have been working. Moreover, Iraq, for practical purposes, been self-administered for a number of years under her own King and Constitution and her fitness for independence has thus already been demonstrated. Her independent status has, indeed, already been formally recognised by a number of States. The fact that the Iraqi Government has a special character was brought out by several members of the Permanent Mandates Commission during the commission's November session, and though the idea was opposed by others, the report of the commission itself referred to the mandatory régime in Iraq as being "a régime which, from its inception, has possessed certain special features."
- (ii) Iraq (unlike Syria) is a unitary State (one Government, one Parliament and one system of administration), and consequently the complicating factors present in the case of the Syrian mandate are absent in that of Iraq.

It has been suggested that such arguments might make it easier for the Italians to refrain from putting forward, or at all events pressing the proposal for a commission of enquiry in the special case of Iraq while preserving the general principle unimpaired for later use in connexion with Syria.

27. The foregoing arguments are, however, admittedly not wholly satisfactory. They are not in themselves conclusive since similar considerations

might conceivably apply in the case of Syria when the release of that territory—or part of it—eventually comes before the Council; and moreover, the second argument at all events would have to be used with the utmost caution in order to avoid alienating the French Government, as being too obviously designed to help the Italians in the matter of Syria. The first argument is not, however, open to this objection in quite the same degree, and, it is suggested, could be employed if the occasion demanded. It might also be made of the argument that it would be unreasonable at this late date to demand the despatch of a commission of enquiry, in view of the fact that it has been quite clear since 1921, and even earlier, that His Majesty's Government intended to recommend Iraq for admission to the League in 1932.

28. From the foregoing it will be apparent that if the proposal for the despatch of a commission of enquiry to Iraq is seriously pressed at the Council meeting it will be a most difficult and delicate matter to oppose it without either taking account of the fact that the Italian Government have expressed their opinion that it is in the highest degree desirable that the Italians should be dissuaded in every way from pressing forward the request for the despatch of a League Commission to Iraq, or at all events from pressing it. Appendix II gives little prominence to this aspect of the commission's report and consequently if the Italian Government should persist in pressing forward the request for a commission of enquiry, it is unlikely that any other Member of the Council would

(c) Proposed Guarantees

29. The commission's recommendations regarding the guarantees to be given by Iraq on release from mandatory control fall into two divisions—

- (a) Those relating to the protection of racial and religious minorities in Iraq, and
- (b) Supplementary guarantees concerning other matters (e.g. judicial safeguards, commercial equality, &c.)

Two draft declarations to give effect to the Mandates Commission's recommendations have been prepared and communicated to the Iraqi Government for their concurrence. Copies of these draft declarations will be found in Appendix III.

(i) Minorities

30. The commission's proposals regarding minorities are, generally speaking, similar to the Declaration made by Albania in 1921 which, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, the British accredited representative recommended to the commission in November as a suitable model for adoption. In one passage of this section of their report, however, the commission suggest the possible need for additional guarantees in the special circumstances of Iraq, that is to say, guarantees which find no place in the existing minority treaties and declarations and for which there is thus no precedent. The Iraqi Government have, however, upon them unprecedented guarantees or specially contrived safeguards. They are willing to subscribe to any guarantees that may have already been accepted by free and independent States in the past, further than that they are not prepared to go.

31. From a reading of the minutes of the November session of the Mandates Commission it is clear that the majority of the commission were not satisfied that guarantees such as those already given by European States in the past would afford adequate protection for the racial and religious minorities in Iraq, and in the course of their discussions a number of suggestions for reinforcing these guarantees were put forward. The most important of these were—

- (1) That a special League commissioner should be appointed to reside in Iraq and watch over the interests of the racial and religious minorities, or
- (2) That the British Ambassador at Bagdad himself should be made responsible to the League for the treatment of the Iraqi minorities.

40. In connexion with the guarantees to be given by Iraq on the subject of racial and religious minorities, the commission suggest that Iraq should agree that any difference of opinion arising out of those guarantees between Iraq and a member of the Council should be held to be a dispute of international character under article 14 of the convention and should, at the demand of the other party, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. This recommendation is based upon a provision which is common to all the existing treaties relating to minorities and which has been accepted by the League of Nations. It states that any dispute which may arise between a member of the League and a party to a minority treaty, relating to the interpretation or execution of these supplementary guarantees shall similarly be submittable to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The suggestion is not unreasonable in itself. Parties to the optional clause of the statute of the Permanent Court, which has been accepted by a majority of the members of the League, recognise as compulsory the jurisdiction of the court in all disputes relating to (a) the interpretation of a treaty, (b) any question of international law, and (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation. The commission's proposal is, therefore, based upon a well-established precedent, and the Iraqi Government have been recommended to accept it. There is, however, an element of inconsistency between this proposal and that relating to the minority guarantees. In

41. In his draft report (Appendix II) the Council's *rapporteur* suggests that the Council should be entrusted to a small committee consisting of the *rapporteur* for minority questions, the *rapporteur* for human rights, the *rapporteur* for mandates question and the *rapporteur* for the Middle East. This committee would be responsible for the preparation of the Council's draft resolutions on the Middle East. The *rapporteur* for the Middle East would be responsible for the preparation of the Council's draft resolutions on the Middle East. This suggestion would seem worthy of support. It is most desirable that the Council should be able to deal with the Middle East question in its next meeting. This suggestion would seem worthy of support. It is most desirable that the Council should be able to deal with the Middle East question in its next meeting. This suggestion would seem worthy of support. It is most desirable that the Council should be able to deal with the Middle East question in its next meeting.

42 The Council's resolution of June 4, September last contained the following text: "The Council will continue to examine with the utmost care the situation in Syria by the competent international bodies and to find a way between the conflicting views and that they are compatible with the status of all concerned States and peoples. At the present time, and especially in the light of the situation with respect to the Government and the Executive Council of the Mandatory Commission, this resolution was largely inspired by the fact that the Government was pressing for a more or less unilateral examination of the situation, and that the Council had to take into account the views of the parties as understood to have been French policy in Syria prior to the war. There is some reason to believe that the French Government contemplates ultimately following our example in Iraq and concluding a treaty with Syria before release from the mandate which will give her the right to retain French forces in that territory after its admission to the League, and it is understood that the Italian Government would be strongly opposed to the conclusion of a similar arrangement between France and Syria."

43. In accordance with the Council's resolution referred to above, the Mandates Commission at their meeting in last November subjected the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 to a careful and detailed examination. They have now reported to the Council that it is their opinion that the provisions of the treaty are somewhat unsatisfactory and that the conditions entered into by Iraq towards Great Britain do not appear to support the view that the new State is "free to develop its national life and to exercise its rights of self-determination". They would therefore recommend that their refusal to the treaty should perhaps be made conditional on its being carefully re-examined by His Majesty's Government and that they should advise at the following meeting of the Council that only with probable regard to the above points could their assent as a sufficient validation of the treaty to justify its acceptance without detailed scrutiny and

particularly so in view of the very close examination to which the treaty was submitted by the Mandates Commission. The Commission will provide the Italian representative with an opportunity to express his views on the treaty which the Italian Government would not wish to see reproduced in any settlement between France and Syria. It is not anticipated, however, that he will do more than point out that these provisions could only be justified in the special circumstances of Iraq.

(c) *Suggested Attitude of British Representative*

44 If, contrary to expectation, the treaty should come under serious criticism at the Council meeting, use might be made of arguments founded upon the following considerations. The main criticism advanced against the treaty appears to be based upon the contention that its object is to obtain for the United Kingdom a particularly privileged position in Iraq. In so far as economic or commercial matters are concerned, it will be seen that the 1930 treaty contains no provision on this subject at all, and His Majesty's Government have no intention of concluding with Iraq any economic or commercial agreement before the termination of the mandate. Their position in such matters after the termination of the mandatory régime will, therefore, be the same as that of any other Power. The military and political provisions to the treaty are to be explained by the community of interests existing between the two countries, which is recognised in terms in article 5 of the treaty, and the fact that the Iraqi Government themselves sought a defensive alliance primarily in order to safeguard their future independence. His Majesty's Government were prepared to accept such an alliance the advantage of which to Iraq is admitted by implication in section 3 (b) of the commission's report—but only on the understanding that it could be brought within the framework of the Covenant of the League. This requirement was secured by articles 3, 4 and 9 of the treaty. Such an alliance, which must obviously entail obligations as well as privileges for both parties, need not imply, and will not be found to imply, any derogation from the complete future independence of Iraq. The subsidiary provisions of the treaty will, upon examination, be found to be the natural corollary of the foregoing considerations. As regards the provision in article 5 for the stationing of British troops in Iraq (which came under especially critical examination by the Mandates Commission), it should be remembered that the forces in question will not be regular forces, but will consist of air forces, together with a few auxiliaries, and if it is admitted to be the interest of Iraq to have an alliance with this country, and the Iraqi Government themselves have asked for such an alliance, it is scarcely to be wondered at that they should be asked to provide the means of the alliance. The retention of a skeleton air force in Iraq, which is practically landlocked, the retention of a skeleton air force in the country, in order to enable His Majesty's Government to discharge the obligations of the alliance in case of need. Air reinforcements could not be sent to Iraq unless there was some means of a British air force and aerodrome on the spot to receive them. Stores, spare parts, repairing workshops must be maintained, and apart from this it would be impossible for air reinforcements to set out for Iraq without the assurance that they could land at aerodromes there in safety. Reinforcements could not reach Iraq by sea—that is to say, by the Persian Gulf and Basra—in time to be effective.

V.—*PRESENCE AT GENEVA OF SIR F. HUMPHREY AND OF IRAQI PRIME MINISTER*

45 The Iraqi Prime Minister, Mr. Pasha Sid, and Sir Francis Humphreys, the British representative for Iraq, will be invited to Geneva for the meeting of the Council, and will be available for consultation.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
January 25, 1932*

APPENDIX I

Special Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission to the Council of the League of Nations regarding the Release of Iraq from the Mandatory Régime

(Not printed.)

APPENDIX II

Draft Report to the Council of the League, by the Rapporteur for Mandates, on the Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission regarding the Release of Iraq from the Mandatory Régime.

(Not printed.)

APPENDIX III

(A.)—*Draft Declaration on the Subject of Minorities to be made by the Iraqi Government to the Council of the League of Nations*

ARTICLE 1.

The stipulations of this declaration shall be recognised as fundamental laws of Iraq, and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action now or in the future prevail over them.

ARTICLE 2.

Full and complete protection of life and liberty will be assured to all inhabitants of Iraq, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Iraq will be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any religion or sect, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals. They will have the right to change their religion.

Suitable provision will be made in the case of non-Moslems for regulating family law and personal status in accordance with the usage of their creed.

ARTICLE 3.

All Iraqi nationals shall be equal before the law, and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to language or religion.

The electoral system of Iraq shall give due consideration to the rights of racial, religious and linguistic minorities.

Indifference to race, colour, creed or confession will not prejudice any Iraqi national in respect of his political or civil rights, as, for instance, in the matter of employment, remuneration, honours, or the exercise of professional activities.

No restriction will be imposed on the free use by any Iraqi national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in public affairs.

Also the facilities will be given to Iraqi nationals of non Arab speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing before the courts.

ARTICLE 4.

Iraqi nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities will enjoy the same treatment and security in law and, in fact, as other Iraqi nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and control at their own expense or to establish in the future charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

Within six months from the date of the present declaration, detailed information will be presented to the Council of the League of Nations with regard to the legal status of the religious communities, churches, convents, schools, voluntary establishments and associations of racial, religious and linguistic minorities. The Iraqi Government will receive from the League of Nations with regard to this question.

ARTICLE 5.

Provision will be made in the public educational system in towns and districts in which the official language is not the official language, for ensuring that in the primary schools instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals through the medium of their own language, it being understood that this provision does not prevent the teaching of the official language being made obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities will be assured an equitable part in the enjoyment and application of sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

ARTICLE 6

The stipulations in the foregoing articles of this declaration, so far as they affect the rights of the minorities, are declared to constitute obligations of international concern, and will be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. No modification will be made in them without the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

Any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these articles between the Iraqi Government and any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under article 13 of the Covenant.

(B.)—*Draft Declaration of Supplementary Guarantees to be made by the Iraqi Government on the occasion of the Release of Iraq from Mandatory Control*

ARTICLE 1

The Iraqi Government will recognise and honour any financial obligations regularly assumed on behalf of Iraq by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and any rights of whatever kind legally acquired in Iraq during the currency of the mandatory régime.

ARTICLE 2

The Iraqi Government will maintain in force for their respective duration all international conventions, both general and special, which have been acceded to either directly by Iraq or by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on behalf of Iraq during the mandatory régime, subject always to such right of denunciation as the parties concerned may be provided in these instruments.

ARTICLE 3

The judicial system and organisation set up under the Judicial Agreement between the United Kingdom and Iraq signed on the 4th March, 1932 and described in articles 2, 3 and 4 of that agreement, shall continue in force for a

period of ten years from the date of the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations.

[In the event, however, of any vacancies occurring during the said period of ten years in the staff of foreign legal experts provided for in article 2 of the Judicial Agreement, the selection by the Iraqi Government of experts for appointment to such vacancies shall not be restricted to candidates of British nationality, but shall extend to all candidates, of whatever nationality, possessing the necessary qualifications.]

ARTICLE 4

Regulations shall be made by the Iraqi Government for the maintenance of public order, morality and effective administration.

ARTICLE 5

For a period of two years from the date of the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations, the subjects of the League of Nations shall enjoy in Iraq the most favoured-nation treatment on condition of reciprocity, provided, however, that such treatment shall not be regarded as including—

- (a) Any special favours which are or may in the future be accorded by Iraq to persons in matters of goods, trade, industry or commerce or of the countries in Asia which were detached from the Ottoman Empire by the Treaty of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923; or
- (b) Favours granted to any colominous countries to facilitate traffic for certain frontier districts not exceeding 15 kilom. on each side of the frontier.

APPENDIX IV

Statement made by Sir F. Humphrys to the Permanent Mandates Commission at its XXth Session in June 1931 (p. 140 of printed minutes of 18th meeting).

Suggested appointment of a resident representative of the League of Nations in Iraq for the purpose of supervising the guarantees afforded to the minorities.

THE suggestion has been made in certain quarters that a representative of the League of Nations should reside in Iraq who would be charged with the duty of supervising the guarantees afforded to the minorities. In case there is any prospect of this proposal being seriously considered, I should be glad of an opportunity of expressing my views on the subject.

In the first place there is little doubt that such action would be regarded by the Iraqi Government as a derogation of sovereignty, and as an indication that it was not trusted to implement whatever guarantees it might have given. The Iraqi Government would, I think, ask—and in my own opinion it would be perfectly justified in asking—why should a Mandatory Government be required to do this? The suggestion that a representative of the League of Nations should reside in Iraq for the purpose of supervising the guarantees afforded to the minorities is a suggestion which would appear to the Iraqi Government as a direct challenge to its sovereignty. It would serve to perpetuate and intensify the feeling of alienation which has sprung up during the past year between certain of the minorities in Iraq and their Mandatory Government. It would tend to preserve existing suspicions and might even promote new animosities. The Mandatory Government feels that the proposal would defeat its own policy of keeping a neutral spirit and that the Iraqi Government might be tempted to take advantage of the separation from Iraq of certain minorities and to use it as a pretext for their removal. The presence of a representative of the League would encourage the minorities to go to him with every complaint and to demand that he should bring it to the Iraqi authorities a practice which is open to the objections which have been pointed

out in the special report. The representative of the League would be dependent upon local interpreters for his information, which would necessarily be unreliable and incomplete; his movements, if he moved, would give rise to continual speculation and apprehension among the ignorant, while, if he remained in one place, his presence could not possibly serve any useful purpose.

These are the reasons which lead His Majesty's Government to deprecate this proposal being put forward and I earnestly trust that they will be taken into consideration by the Council. It is the opinion of His Majesty's Government that it would be more unfortunate than to take any step which might have a tendency to prevent the settlement of the Mosul frontier question, which is of great importance to the Copts in Egypt, as true citizens of their native State, in which lies the only certain hope of their future welfare.

APPENDIX V

Recommendation of Mosul Frontier Commission that Mosul Vilayet should only be awarded to Iraq on condition that Mandatory Régime should continue for Twenty five years from 1924.

THE League of Nations Commission, which in 1924 and 1925 investigated the question of the Turco-Iraqi frontier and the fate of the Mosul Vilayet, recommended that the vilayet should be awarded to Iraq provided the mandatory régime should continue for a further twenty-five years, but that if the mandatory régime were to expire, it would be preferable that the vilayet should go to Turkey. As this recommendation, although not ultimately adopted by the Council may be quoted as an argument against the release of Iraq from mandatory control during the present year, it may be desirable to offer some comments on it.

It is first to be noted that this recommendation was based on two main grounds. The first was that the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet were to be regarded as a separate people, and not as a part of the Turkish people, and that the Kurds were to be regarded as a separate people, and not as a part of the Turkish people. A second ground was that the Kurds were to be regarded as a separate people, and not as a part of the Turkish people. As this recommendation, although not ultimately adopted by the Council may be quoted as an argument against the release of Iraq from mandatory control during the present year, it may be desirable to offer some comments on it.

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That the League Council regarded the League commissioners' recommendation as based largely on the foregoing consideration is clear from the proviso which the Council itself attached thereto, i.e., that the mandatory régime should only be extended for twenty-five years, as recommended by the commission, if Iraq should not be admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of that period. The Council in attaching this proviso to the recommendation, clearly intended that Iraq might develop more rapidly than the commission anticipated, and that with the support which would be afforded her by membership of the League she might be able to hold the Mosul Vilayet securely, notwithstanding the risks which appeared so serious at the time of the commission's investigations.

A further protection to Iraq against unprovoked aggression is now also afforded by the fact that Iraq is now a member of the League of Nations, and as soon as Iraq is admitted to membership of the League.

It is submitted that in view of the remarkable progress of Iraq during the last few years, and still more of the even more remarkable improvement in Turco-Iraqi relations, the recommendation of the Mosul frontier commission on this point is entirely inapplicable to the present situation.

E 441 155 93]

No. 124.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 29)

(No. 27. Confidential.)

Sir,

Angora, January 18, 1932

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1, Saring, of the 11th instant, regarding the Turco-Iraqi Commercial Treaty, I am sending you a copy of the text of the Turco-Iraqi Commercial Treaty, signed at Angora, on the 10th January 1932.

2. The treaty provides that each country shall in general grant the other most-favoured-nation treatment, except in regard to advantages accorded by either country to produce of other territories detached in 1923 from the Ottoman Empire, and in regard to border trade conducted within a zone 15 kilom. wide on each side of the frontier. It also stipulates that negotiable bills of exchange to be opened between Turkey and Iraq with a view to the application of a special tariff on imports from one country into the other.

3. On the signature of the treaty, letters, of which the text has not been supplied to me, were exchanged providing for a reduction by one-third of Turkish customs duty on imported Iraqi dates, and a corresponding one-third reduction of Iraqi customs duty on imported Turkish galls and trevans. Turkish authorities agreed also to fix the value of the quota for Iraqi dates during the next season at ET 100,000. According to officials of the Iraqi Legation, the loss to Iraqi revenue by the reduction of dues on imported Turkish galls and trevans will be about 3,500 rupees a year. Agreement was also reached outside the treaty as to the opening of certain transit and other trade routes for customs purposes.

4. The mutual concessions stipulated in the treaty cannot be claimed by other nations, for it has been usual for Turkey to obtain in commercial treaties with other Powers the insertion (e.g. in article 34 of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of the 1st March, 1930) of clauses exempting from the application of most-favoured-nation treatment any special advantages accorded between Turkey and any country detached from the Ottoman Empire under the Lausanne Treaty of the 24th July, 1923.

5. The Iraqi chargé d'affaires who kindly communicated to me the attached text of the treaty, begs that it may be regarded as confidential until it enters into force.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

Enclosure in No. 134.

Traité de Commerce entre le Royaume de l'Irak et la République turque.

SA Majesté le Roi d'Irak, d'une part, et le Président de la République turque, d'autre part, désireux de conserver et de développer leurs relations commerciales et de déterminer le traitement à accorder dans leurs territoires respectifs au commerce de l'autre partie, ont décidé de conclure un Traité de Commerce et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Irak

Son Excellence le Général Nuri Essaid Pachia, Président du Conseil des Ministres d'Irak, deuxième Classe de l'Ordre de Ralidein.

Le Président de la République turque

Son Excellence Mustafa Şeref Bey, Ministre de l'Economie nationale, Député de Burdur.

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes

ARTICLE 1^{er}

En ce qui concerne les droits d'importation et d'exportation, y compris les surtaxes et coefficients de majoration, et tous autres droits et charges ayant trait au commerce et à la douane, ainsi qu'en matière de transit, d'entrepôtage, des formalités douanières et du régime des échantillons de commis voyageurs, l'Irak accordera à la Turquie et la Turquie accordera à l'Irak le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

Il ne sera donc prélevé sur l'importation ou l'écoulement en Irak de n'importe quels produits naturels ou industriels de la Turquie des droits plus élevés ou autres que ceux qui sont ou seront perçus sur des produits naturels ou industriels de n'importe quel autre pays étranger.

De même, il ne sera pas prélevé sur l'importation ou l'écoulement en Turquie de n'importe quels produits naturels ou industriels de l'Irak des droits plus élevés ou autres que ceux qui sont ou seront perçus sur des produits naturels ou industriels de n'importe quel autre pays étranger.

Egalement, il ne sera pas perçu en Irak ou en Turquie sur l'exportation de n'importe quels articles destinés à l'autre partie des droits plus élevés ou autres que ceux prélevés sur l'exportation des articles similaires à destination de n'importe quel autre pays étranger.

Tout avantage, quel qu'il soit, que l'une des deux hautes parties contractantes pourra accorder à un article quelconque, produit naturel ou industriel de tout autre pays étranger, s'appliquera simultanément et sans que la demande en soit formulée, au même article, produit naturel ou fabriqué, de l'autre haute partie contractante.

Les stipulations de cet article ne s'étendent pas

- (a) Aux avantages et faveurs spéciales que l'Irak et la Turquie accordent ou qu'ils accorderaient à l'avenir en matière de tarif douanier à des produits provenant de territoires sous la suzeraineté de l'Empire ottoman en 1923.
- (b) Au traitement que l'Irak ou la Turquie accorderait au commerce frontalier dans une zone ne dépassant pas 15 kilom. en largeur de chaque côté de leur frontière douanière.

ARTICLE 2.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à appliquer le traité de Commerce entre les deux pays en vue d'arriver à un accord destiné à assurer l'application d'un tarif spécial à l'importation des produits naturels ou industriels de l'autre partie.

Toutefois, les deux parties, sans être tenues d'accorder le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée se réservent la liberté d'imposer des prohibitions ou des restrictions d'un caractère sanitaire destinées à protéger la vie humaine, animale ou végétale.

ARTICLE 3

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engage à entamer, dans le plus bref délai possible, des négociations en vue d'arriver à un accord destiné à assurer l'application d'un tarif spécial à l'importation des produits naturels ou industriels de l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 4.

Le présent traité, rédigé en langues arabe, turque et française, sera ratifié et les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Bagdad, aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Il entrera en vigueur quinze jours après la date de l'échange des instruments de ratification et restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'il soit dénoncé, cette dénonciation ne pouvant produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration d'un délai de trois mois à partir de la date à laquelle elle aurait été notifiée par l'une des hautes parties contractantes.

S'il s'élève un différend quelconque relatif à l'interprétation ou à l'application du présent traité, le texte français fera foi.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Ankara, le 10 janvier 1932

NURI ESSAID

MUSTAFA ŞEREF

[T 1193/146 374]

No. 135.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon. — (Received January 28)

(No 28 Confidential)

Sir,

Angora, January 18, 1932

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1, Saving, of the 11th instant regarding the signature of certain treaties between Turkey and Iraq, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of the text of the Turco-Iraqi Extradition Treaty signed at Angora on the 9th January, 1932. The Iraqi Legation, to whom I owe the text of the treaty, beg that it may be regarded as confidential until it enters into force.

It will be seen that article 1 of the treaty provides that the extradition of persons who are neither Turkish nor Iraqi nationals is subject to the discretion of the State from which extradition is demanded. Article 4, too, is of interest in that it excludes from the class of persons against whom extradition may be demanded the head of the State or against those of members of his family and also the assassination or attempted assassination of the head of the Government. In article 19 it will be observed that each party assumes liability for expenses incurred on its own territory as a result of extradition proceedings.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c

GEORGE B. CLERK

Traité d'Extradition entre le Royaume d'Irak et la République turque

SA Majesté le Roi d'Irak, d'une part, et le Président de la République turque, d'autre part, désirant conclure un traité à l'effet de régler l'extradition des délinquants, ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Irak

Son Excellence le Général Nuri Essad Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres d'Irak, II^{me} Classe de l'Ordre de Rafidein,

et

Le Président de la République turque

Son Excellence Mustafa Şeraf Beyfendi, Ministre de l'Economie nationale, Député de Burdur,

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes

ARTICLE 1^{er}

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent, conformément aux dispositions du présent traité, à se livrer réciproquement les individus poursuivis ou capturés par les autorités judiciaires de l'un des deux Etats sur le territoire de l'autre.

Il n'est pas exclu que les hautes parties contractantes soient exemptées d'extradition et d'extrajudicialité de poursuites et de juges est sujette à la discrétion de l'Etat auquel elle est demandée.

L'extradition n'aura lieu qu'en cas de poursuite ou de condamnation pour une infraction commise hors du territoire de l'Etat auquel l'extradition est demandée.

ARTICLE 2

En cas de demande concernant une personne qui est l'objet de poursuites, ou contre laquelle un jugement a été prononcé, l'extradition ne sera accordée que si l'acte dont cette personne est inculpée est puni, d'après la législation des deux pays, d'une peine d'au moins un an d'emprisonnement ou d'une peine plus grave.

Lorsque l'extradition est demandée en vue de l'exécution d'un jugement devenu définitif, elle ne sera accordée que si le délinquant a été condamné définitivement à une peine supérieure à six mois d'emprisonnement, pour un fait punissable, d'après la législation des deux pays, d'une peine d'au moins un an d'emprisonnement, ou d'une peine plus grave.

ARTICLE 3

L'extradition sera accordée également en cas de tentative ou de participation, sous n'importe quelle forme, et de n'importe quelle nature, au cas où la tentative ou la participation seraient, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 2, passibles de peines dans les législations de l'Etat requérant et de l'Etat requis.

ARTICLE 4

L'extradition ne sera pas accordée dans les cas suivants

- (a) Pour les infractions politiques et les faits connexes,
- (b) Pour les infractions militaires et les faits connexes,
- (c) Pour les infractions de presse;
- (d) Pour les infractions qui ne peuvent être poursuivies que sur la plainte de la personne lésée et dont la poursuite doit être arrêtée par le destinataire de celle-ci.
- (e) Si l'individu requis est poursuivi par l'Etat requérant pour une infraction prescrite par ses lois, celles de l'Etat requis ou celles de l'Etat sur le territoire duquel l'infraction a été commise,

(f) Si l'individu réclamé est poursuivi pour le même fait dans le pays requis, ainsi que s'il y a déjà été définitivement mis hors de cause.

(g) Si les autorités de l'Etat requis sont, d'après les lois de celui-ci, compétentes pour juger l'infraction.

(h) Si, le fait étant commis sur le territoire d'un Etat tiers, les lois de la partie requise n'admettent pas la poursuite pour un tel fait commis à l'étranger.

Cependant, ne seront pas considérées comme une infraction politique ni comme fait connexe à une semblable infraction

(1) Tout délit commis contre la personne du chef d'Etat et contre celles des membres de sa famille,

(2) L'assassinat commis sur la personne du chef de Gouvernement ou tentative d'assassinat ou complicité à ce fait.

(3) Les actes de vengeance de famille et de vengeance personnelle quel que soit le but pour lequel ces actes ont été commis.

ARTICLE 5

La demande d'extradition devra toujours être faite par la voie diplomatique.

ARTICLE 6

Dans les cas qui ne comportent pas l'extradition du délinquant et qui sont prévus et énumérés dans l'article 4, l'appréciation de la nature des actes est exclusivement réservée à l'Etat auquel l'extradition est demandée.

La partie contractante qui reçoit une demande d'extradition pour une infraction politique ne pourra être prononcée que par le tribunal compétent désigné par l'Etat requis.

ARTICLE 7

1. La demande d'extradition pour un prévenu ou un accusé doit être accompagnée des documents suivants

- (a) Un mandat d'arrêt ou un acte d'arrestation émanant d'une autorité judiciaire compétente,
- (b) Un acte indiquant la nature du délit et le texte de la loi applicable à l'infraction dont il s'agit,
- (c) Une déclaration ou une carte d'identité aussi détaillée que possible, indiquant l'identité et le signalement du prévenu ou de l'accusé,
- (d) Les actes de déposition, s'il y en a, certifiés conformes par le juge qui a procédé à l'enquête.

2. Si la demande d'extradition concerne une personne qui a été l'objet d'un jugement par défaut, la demande d'extradition sera accompagnée, en sus des pièces indiquées dans le paragraphe précédent, d'un résumé du jugement et du texte de la loi sur laquelle ce jugement se base.

3. Si la demande d'extradition concerne une personne condamnée par jugement définitif, les pièces suivantes doivent être annexées à la demande

- (a) Une expédition du jugement,
- (b) Une déclaration ou une carte d'identité indiquant d'une façon suffisamment détaillée l'identité de la personne condamnée,
- (c) Une copie du texte de la loi sur laquelle le jugement se base,
- (d) Un document émanant d'une autorité compétente et déclarant le jugement exécutoire.

4. Lorsqu'il s'agit d'infractions contre la propriété, le montant approximatif du dommage réel ou tenté sera toujours indiqué.

5. Les pièces à produire seront dressées dans la forme prescrite par les lois de l'Etat requérant et expédiées en original ou en copie certifiée conforme par le

7. Dans le cas où il y aurait doute sur la question de savoir si l'infraction, dans le présent traité comme comportant l'extradition, des explications seront demandées au Gouvernement requérant, et l'extradition ne sera pas accordée tant que les explications fournies ne seront pas de nature à écarter ce doute. L'individu arrêté pourra être élargi, ou les mesures prises à son égard pourront être rapportées, si les explications n'ont pas été données à l'Etat requis dans le délai de deux mois à partir du jour où la demande en a été transmise au représentant diplomatique de l'Etat requérant.

La haute partie contractante à laquelle l'extradition est demandée ordonnera l'arrestation du délinquant et fera procéder à l'examen nécessaire de l'affaire, si elle ne trouve convaincue que l'infraction comporte l'extradition aux termes du présent traité. Elle ordonnera l'extradition si, à l'issue de l'examen, elle acquiert la conviction que le dossier est satisfaisant et que la personne fait l'objet d'une extradition, car de l'avis est basé sur la loi de son pays comme procédure judiciaire, et qu'il est en accord avec les principes de la justice internationale. Elle est de ce cas qui comportent l'extradition, si elle est jugée satisfaisante et rendue

Dans le cas où, en attendant la présentation à la partie requise de la demande d'extradition du délinquant et des pièces mentionnées dans le présent traité comme devant accompagner cette demande, l'évasion du délinquant apparaît comme probable, l'Etat auquel l'extradition est demandée, sans attendre l'avis de son Gouvernement et si la loi l'exige, peut adresser par la voie postale ou télégraphique au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de l'Etat requérant, une démarche à faire par le représentant diplomatique de l'Etat requérant, pour empêcher l'évasion en procédant à l'arrestation provisoire du délinquant ou à l'adoption de toute autre mesure.

Néanmoins, dans ce cas, avis devra être donné concernant le genre et la nature du délit, le degré de gravité de la peine, et notification devra être faite qu'un mandat d'arrêt a été lancé contre le délinquant par l'autorité compétente.

Si la loi pénale étrangère ou les lois des pays rapportant concernant la personne ainsi arrêtée p[er]sistent ou à l'endroit de laquelle toute autre mesure est adoptée, n'ont pas été transmis à l'Etat requis dans le délai d'un mois à partir du jour de l'arrestation ou de l'adoption de toute autre mesure, la personne arrêtée sera libérée ou la mesure adoptée à son égard sera rapportée.

Les objets dans la possession duquel une personne réclamée est entrée par suite de l'attraction exercée par elle sur des objets saisis, et qui ont servi à commettre l'infraction, ainsi que toute autre pièce à conviction, seront, sous réserve des droits des tiers, et suivant l'application de l'autorité compétente, remis, en même temps que la personne réclamée, au Gouvernement réclamant l'extradition, et cela même dans le cas où l'extradition déjà accordée n'a pu être effectuée par suite du décès ou de l'évasion du coupable.

Cette remise comprendra également tous les objets de même nature, cachés ou déposés par la personne réclamée dans le pays accordant l'extradition, et qui seraient découverts ultérieurement.

Si l'individu réclamé est poursuivi ou condamné sur le territoire de l'Etat requis pour une infraction autre que celle qui a motivé la demande d'extradition, son extradition pourra être différée jusqu'à ce que les poursuites aient pris fin ou que l'individu réclamé ait subi sa peine ou enfin qu'il en ait obtenu la remise.

De même, dans le cas de procédure en cours devant les autorités de la partie requise pour un motif autre que l'infraction aux lois pénales et entraînant la computation forcée ou la détention de l'individu réclamé, l'extradition ne sera être différée jusqu'à ce que les poursuites ou la détention aient pris fin.

Néanmoins, si d'après les lois du pays qui demande l'extradition, cet ajournement est susceptible d'entraîner la prescription ou d'autres difficultés importantes en ce qui concerne la poursuite de l'accusé, sa remise temporaire sera accordée, à moins de considérations spéciales qui s'y opposent, sous l'engagement de renvoyer l'extradé aussitôt que les poursuites dans le pays requérant auront pris fin.

Dans le cas où l'individu réclamé serait impuissant, par suite de l'extradition, à remplir les obligations contractées par lui envers des particuliers, son extradition aura quand même lieu, sauf à ces derniers à faire valoir leurs droits par-devant l'autorité compétente.

Si l'extradition est accordée, l'individu réclamé sera mis à la disposition de l'Etat requérant à la station frontalière ou au port d'embarquement de l'Etat requis.

Ledit individu pourra être mis en liberté si, dans le délai d'un mois à partir de la notification de la décision d'extradition, l'Etat requérant n'en a pas pris livraison.

La personne livrée ne peut être jugée que pour le délit ou les délits qui ont motivé sa livraison. L'individu peut cependant être poursuivi et jugé pour un autre que celui ou ceux qui ont motivé sa livraison, dans le cas où le consentement de l'Etat requis y est acquis, ou encore dans celui où cet individu, ayant eu la possibilité de rentrer dans le pays qui l'avait livré, n'a pas profité de cette possibilité.

L'extradition, à un Etat tiers, d'un individu livré ne pourra également avoir lieu que dans les conditions ci haut indiquées. Toutefois, si l'individu livré consent à être jugé, le consentement de l'Etat qui l'a livré n'est plus nécessaire, il lui en est seulement donné avis.

Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas aux infractions commises après la fin de la procédure de l'Etat qui a demandé l'extradition.

Si plus d'un dont l'extradition est demandée par une des parties contractantes est réclamé également par un ou plusieurs autres Etats, en raison d'autres infractions, l'Etat auquel l'individu est le plus gravement responsable de l'infraction la plus grave, et, dans le cas où les infractions seraient de gravité égale, à l'Etat dont il est ressortissant.

Lorsque l'individu réclamé ne ressortit à aucun des États requérants, et que les infractions sont de gravité égale, il sera livré à l'État dont la demande est arrivée la première. La gravité de l'infraction sera déterminée d'après les lois de l'État requérant.

Si l'extradition d'un délinquant a lieu entre l'une des parties contractantes et une tierce Puissance, et à condition que l'infraction motivant l'extradition ne soit pas comprise parmi les faits prévus par la loi de l'autre partie contractante le passage du délinquant à l'étranger sera libre et ne donnera lieu à aucune poursuite de la part de la première Puissance, si ce n'est en vertu de sa législation nationale.

La demande de transit devra être faite par voie diplomatique, avec production en original ou en copie dûment certifiée conforme des actes mentionnés dans l'article 7.

ARTICLE 16

Les parties contractantes renoncent réciproquement à toute réclamation ayant pour objet le remboursement des frais occasionnés sur leur territoire respectif, par l'arrestation, l'entretien et le transport du délinquant, et par la remise temporaire mentionnée à l'article 11.

Les frais de transit, sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes, d'un individu extradé ou remis temporairement à l'autre partie par une tierce Puissance, seront à la charge de l'Etat requérant.

ARTICLE 17

Les dispositions en général, et plus particulièrement celles de l'article 9 du Traité de Bon-Voisinage signé entre l'Irak, la Grande-Bretagne et la Turquie à Ankara le 1920, et par conséquent les rapports des autres traités avec objet du présent traité, continueront d'être en vigueur.

ARTICLE 18

Le présent traité sera ratifié par les deux hautes parties contractantes et les ratifications seront échangées à Bagdad dans le plus bref délai possible.

Le traité entrera en vigueur quinze jours après l'échange des ratifications, il sera exécutoire pendant un an, et ne cessera de produire effet que six mois après la date à laquelle l'une des hautes parties contractantes exprimera à l'autre son désir de le dénoncer.

En cas de divergence entre les textes de ce traité, rédigé en arabe, en turc et en français, c'est le texte français qui fera foi.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Ankara, le 9 janvier 1932

NURI ESSAID
MUSTAFA SHERIF

Σ 442 36 93]

No. 136.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 29)

(No. 29. Confidential)

Sir,

Angora, January 18, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1, Saving, of the 11th instant, regarding the signature of certain treaties between Turkey and Iraq, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of the text of the Turco-Iraqi Residence Convention, signed at Angora on the 9th January, 1932.

2. Points of interest in the convention are (1) that most-favoured-nation treatment is without prejudice to the immigration laws of each country, (2) that Turkey can share only on condition of reciprocity in special passport and visa favours accorded by Iraq to neighbouring Arab States, and (3) that Turks in Iraq are accorded most favoured-nation treatment in judicial matters.

3. In communicating this convention to me, the Iraqi Legation begged that the text may be regarded as confidential until it enters into force.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c

GEORGE R. CLERK

Enclosure in No. 136

Convention d'Etablissement entre l'Irak et la Turquie.

SA Majesté le Roi d'Irak, d'une part, et le Président de la République turque, d'autre part, également animés du désir de resserrer les liens d'amitié si heureusement existant entre les deux pays et de fixer les conditions dans lesquelles les ressortissants et les sociétés de chacune des deux hautes parties contractantes pourraient s'établir et exercer le commerce dans le territoire de l'autre partie au sein de la région des deux pays, ont décidé de conclure à cet effet une Convention d'Etablissement et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Irak

Son Excellence le Général Nuri Essaid Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres de l'Irak, deuxième Classe de l'Ordre de Rafidein

Le Président de la République turque

Son Excellence Mustafa Seref Bayfendi, Ministre de l'Economie nationale, Député de Burdur.

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes

ARTICLE 1^{er}

En ce qui concerne les conditions d'établissement et de séjour qui seront applicables aux ressortissants et sociétés de chacun des deux pays sur le territoire de l'autre, ainsi qu'en matière des charges fiscales et des questions judiciaires, y compris celle de la compétence, l'Irak et la Turquie accordera à l'Irak le même traitement que celui qui est accordé ou pourrait être accordé au pays tiers le plus favorisé.

Aucune disposition de cette convention ne saurait être interprétée comme ayant pour objet de régler les questions relatives aux droits de chacun des deux pays concernant l'immigration des étrangers ou sur le droit de chacun des deux pays d'édicter des lois et règlements de cette nature.

Quant aux avantages spéciaux accordés ou qui seront accordés par l'Irak aux pays arabes limitrophes, en ce qui concerne les passeports et les visas, la Turquie ne pourra en demander le bénéfice, en invoquant la clause de la nation la plus favorisée, qu'à condition de réciprocité.

En ce qui concerne le droit de propriété immobilière, les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes jouiront sur les territoires de l'autre du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée, sous réserve des dispositions des lois en vigueur dans les deux pays.

L'application de cette disposition est subordonnée à la condition de parfaite réciprocité.

ARTICLE 2

La présente convention, rédigée en langue arabe, turque et française, sera ratifiée et les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Bagdad aussitôt qu'il sera possible.

Elle entrera en vigueur quinze jours après l'échange des instruments de ratification et demeurera obligatoire pendant un an, avec tacite reconduction aussi longtemps qu'elle n'aura pas été dénoncée par l'une des hautes parties contractantes.

En cas de dénonciation, elle demeurera encore en vigueur trois mois à partir du jour où l'une des hautes parties contractantes aura notifié à l'autre son intention d'en faire cesser les effets.

Si un différend quelconque relatif à l'interprétation ou à l'application de la présente convention le texte français fera foi.

En foi de quoi, les plénipotentiaires ont signé la présente convention et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Ankara le 9 janvier 1932

NURI ESSAID
MUSTAFA SHERIF

[E 443 35/93]

No. 137

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 29)

(No. 30. Confidential)

Sir,

Angora, January 18, 1932

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1, Saving, of the 11th instant, regarding the signature of certain treaties between Turkey and Iraq, I have the honour to report that I have been confidentially informed by Nuri Pasha that the position of certain matters raised during the course of the treaty negotiations is as follows —

- (a) The Turkish Government accepted his suggestions for the execution of certain preliminary measures to put a stop to brigandage on the Turco-Iraqi frontier. It postponed the settlement of the question of allowing Iraqi flocks to enter Turkish pastures until Iraq entered the League of Nations. It agreed to instruct its officials to arrest the Sheikh of Barzan if found in Turkey, and to deliver him to the Iraqi Government. It also raised no objection to the settlement of Assyrians in the Baradost area.
- (b) Letters were exchanged between Nuri Pasha and the Turkish authorities regarding a readaptation or reinterpretation of article 14 of the Anglo-Turco-Iraqi Treaty concluded at Angora on the 5th June, 1926. This article refers to the Turkish share of royalties received by the Iraqi Government from the (then) Turkish Petroleum Company. The letters exchanged provide that His Majesty's Government (in the United Kingdom) are to be consulted in respect of the negotiations which are shortly to take place with a view to amend article 14.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Bagdad.

I have, &c

GEORGE R. CLERK.

E 1444/35/93]

No. 138

The Council of Ministers, Bagdad, to the High Commission for Iraq—
(Communicated by Council Office, March 2)

(Strictly Secret)

Bagdad, February 20, 1932.

I AM directed to forward to you herewith, for the information of His Excellency the High Commissioner, the letters exchanged between His Excellency Nuri Pasha and the Turkish Government regarding certain matters which were discussed at Angora last January.

ABDUL QADIR RASHID

Secretary to the Council of Ministers

Enclosure 1 in No. 138

Nuri Pasha to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Translation)

(Secret)

Wazir Beg Effendi,

Angora, January 10, 1932.

WITH reference to the conversation we have had together on the subject of the grant of reductions of customs duty on certain products of Turkish origin, I beg to inform your Excellency that my Government will arrange for the necessary legal measures to be adopted for the reduction by one-third of the customs duty at present leviable on furs (gallants) and furs (gallants) from Turkey, and also for the reduction by one-third of the customs duty on sheep and goats

provided that "that" (1) the duty after such reduction, or the reduction of one-third) shall not be less than the "count tax" (per capita tax) leviable within Iraq.

I have, &c

Prime Minister of Iraq,
NURI AS SAID

Enclosure 2 in No. 138

Turkish Minister of Economics to Nuri Pasha

(Translation)

(Secret)

His Excellency Beg

Angora, January 10, 1932

With reference to the conversation we have had together on the subject of Iraq —

I have the honour to inform you that my Government will take into consideration the proposals of the Iraqi Government regarding the extension of the date, and (1 to state) the date of the commencement of the quota for the date import season of 1932 being —

Please accept, &c

Minister of Economics,
M. SHARAF

Enclosure 3 in No. 138

Turkish Minister of Economics to Nuri Pasha.

(Translation)

Wazir Beg Effendi

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 6th January, 1932, and to state as follows in regard to the matters dealt with therein —

1. I confirm with gratification that we are agreed that the 10 per cent. share payable to the Turkish Government under article 14 of the treaty of 1926 is considered by the Iraqi Government (1 to be payable) with effect from the year 1931 for a period of twenty five years, that it shall be payable to the Turkish Government, but that it shall cover the share of the Turkish Government in the profits of the Turkish Petroleum Company (Limited) and that if for any reason the share of the Turkish Government in the profits of the Turkish Petroleum Company (Limited) shall be paid separately.

2. Agreement having been reached to accept the year 1931 for the commencement of payment, naturally the extension period of one year, four months and eight days, previously dealt with, is no longer to be taken account of.

3. The year 1931 having been fixed as the commencement of the (period of) twenty-five years under discussion, the fixation of a (date of) commencement subsequent to that date (1 1931) for any share payable by Iraq to Turkey becomes out of question.

4. It is agreed that, apart from all the receipts dealt with in the letter dated the 24th March, 1931, addressed by the Iraqi Government to the Iraqi Petroleum Company (Limited), the contents of which were accepted by the said company, and apart from the amounts receivable by the Iraqi Government on account of income tax and of the local fee known in Iraq by the name of "nukus" (i.e., excise fees) and of municipal fees on sales within the frontiers of Iraq by the new company or companies to be formed, the right of Turkey, i.e., its share of 10 per cent. of other receipts, shall be reserved.

5. I suggest that the two Governments should take in hand, at the earliest possible date, the necessary legal steps for the amendment of article 14 of the treaty of 1926.

6. I beg to submit that the question dealt with in your letter has been settled (in agreement) between us by means of a separate exchange of notes.

Minister of Economics,
M. SHARAF

January 10, 1932

Enclosure 4 in No. 138.

Nuri Pasha to Turkish Minister of Economics.

(Translation)

Wazir Beg Effendi,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 10th January, 1932, and to state as follows in regard to the matters dealt with therein —

1. I confirm with gratification that we are agreed that the 10 per cent share payable by the Iraqi Government to the Government of the Turkish Republic under article 14 of the treaty of 1926 is considered by the Iraqi Government (to be payable) with effect from the year 1931 for a period of twenty-five years, that it shall be paid on the "condition" (I understand) that payment shall be made in full by the end of the year 1931, and that if, for any reason, one or more years shall lapse without payment being made, the share in respect of such years shall be paid separately.

2. Agreement having been reached to accept the year 1931 for the commencement of payment, naturally the extension period of one year, four months and eight days provided for in the treaty of 1926 is not applicable.

3. The year 1931 has been fixed as the year of commencement of the period of twenty-five years under discussion, the fixation of a (date of) commencement subsequent to that date (1931) for any share payable by Iraq to Turkey becomes out of question.

4. It is agreed that, apart from all the receipts dealt with in the letter dated the 24th March, 1931, addressed by the Iraqi Government to the Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), the contents of which were accepted by the said company, and apart from the amounts receivable by the Iraqi Government on account of income tax and of the local fee known in Iraq by the name of "nukn" (i.e., excise tax) which is paid by the companies operating in Iraq by the new company or companies to be formed, the right of Turkey, i.e., its share of 10 per cent of other receipts, shall be reserved.

5. It is, however, natural that the British Government, who is concerned in this question and who is a signatory of the Treaty of Angora of 1926, should be consulted and that the British Government should take part in the discussions which are to take place between us. Upon the receipt of a reply from the said Government, representatives of the two parties will meet at a place to be determined and submit to their respective Governments and Parliaments, as early as possible, the amendments to be introduced into the relevant article of the treaty of 1926 with the amendments suggested.

6. I have to state that the question dealt with in your letter has been settled (in agreement) between us by means of a separate exchange of notes.

Prime Minister of Iraq.
NURI AS SAID

January 10, 1932

Enclosure 5 in No. 138.

Turkish Minister of the Interior to Nuri Pasha

(Translation)

Hazrat Prime Minister,

Angora, January 10, 1932

IN connection with the conversation which took place between us your Excellency suggested for the purpose of facilitating the maintenance of security and order in the frontier zone that the two parties should set up at the points where the Zab and Khabour came in contact with the frontier and at suitable seasons of the year a number of detachments of equal strength of the strength of each of which and the place to be occupied by it to be determined on the spot by the frontier commanders and the nearest administrative officials of the two parties, and that these "detachments" should be provided with quick and sure means of communication in order to notify one another and the (public) security and "intizar" (reserve) forces behind them of such events as are likely to occur.

I have the honour to inform his Hazrat the Pasha that the Ministry of Interior has instructed the officials concerned to adopt the necessary measures for cooperation in the frontier zone between the two parties for the purpose of ensuring the maintenance of security and order on the frontiers.

Minister of Interior,
H QAYA

Enclosure 6 in No. 138.

Turkish Minister of Economics to Nuri Pasha

(Translation)

A PROPOS of the signature to-day of the treaty of commerce by representatives of Turkey and Iraq, I have the honour to make the following statements to your Excellency:—

1. Customs formalities relating to the entry into and exit from Turkey of goods of Iraqi origin passing in transit to the territories of another country, or to goods of foreign origin passing through Iraq in transit to Turkey, will be carried out only in the Nisibin customs-house in Turkey.

It should, however, be pointed out, in addition to the above, that the confining of transit formalities to the Nisibin customs-house shall not preclude import and export formalities and formalities agreed upon provisionally with Iraq being carried out at the said customs house.

2. The three under-mentioned customs "administrations" (I houses, have been assigned for (the carrying out of) formalities of importation and exportation of goods and formalities provisionally agreed upon with Iraq:—

(a) Jazrah customs-house for the inland water route Mosul Faishkhabour-Diarrakir.

(b) Ashuta customs-house (with Kurur as headquarters) or the Sharkizal (with Jal as headquarters) for the Mosul Dobuk Amadiyah Julemark route.

(c) Jazrah customs-house for the Mosul Zakho-Sanat-Sa'irt or Diarbakir route.

3. The change of the above customs post as may be necessary, the affixation of customs seal and signature on transit certificates at the respective customs-houses and other matters provided for in the customs laws and regulations of the two parties, will be determined in direct communication between the most senior official of the Turkish customs-house and the most senior official of the Iraqi customs house.

Please accept &c
Minister of Economics,
M. SHARAF

January 10, 1932

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Enclosure 7 in No. 138.

Nuri Pasha to the Chief Turkish Plenipotentiary.

(Translation)

IN connexion with the signature to-day of the treaty of commerce "between" (Iraq and Turkey) I have the honour to make the following statements to your Excellency:—

(1) Customs formalities concerning the entry and exit in transit of goods of Turkish origin passing through Iraq to the territories of another country, or of goods of foreign origin passing through Iraq in transit to Turkey, will be carried out in Iraq at the Mosul customs-house only.

To the above should, however, be added that the confining of transit formalities to the Mosul customs-house shall not preclude import and export formalities and (I other) formalities temporarily admissible with Turkey being in the meantime carried out at the said customs house.

(2) The ~~importation and exportation of goods and formalities (1 transactions)~~ temporarily admissible with Turkey:

- (a) Feishkhabour customs-house: for the inland water route Mosul-Feishkhabour-Diarrbakir.
- (b) Amadiyah customs-house: for the route Mosul-Dohuk-Amadiyah-Julemark.
- (c) Zakho customs-house: for the route Mosul-Zakho-Sanat-Sairt or Diarrbakir.

(3) Any change, as may be necessary, in the customs posts mentioned above and the grant (or exchange; Arabic not clear) of seals and signatures on transit ~~certificates and other documents~~ (1 provided for) in the customs laws and regulations of the respective parties will ~~be determined by the respective authorities~~ be determined by the Iraqi Customs Administration and the most senior officer of the Turkish Customs Administration.

Please accept, &c

NURI AS SAID

Chief Iraqi Delegate

January 10, 1932.

Enclosure B in No. 136

Memorandum

(Translation)

IN the course of discussion of the extradition treaty between Iraq and Turkey, the question what are the States whose nationals will be extraditable under the said treaty was considered. After agreement had been reached that no national of either high contracting party may be delivered to the other high contracting party, Nuri Pasha, the plenipotentiary of the Iraqi Government, expressed a desire that the extradition of foreigners under the treaty should be optional for the two parties; and, although the treaty was drafted accordingly, he did not affirm that the Iraq Government would exercise and apply the right of optional extradition. It was further suggested that extradition of foreigners unless the same be contrary to its higher interests, and that, in particular, it would adhere to the course of optional extradition in the case of nationals of the States of Syria and Persia as far as such course might be compatible with the general provisions of extradition treaties.

The Turkish plenipotentiary accepted the point of view of Nuri Pasha, taking the Pasha's statement as a pledge, and in his turn stated that Turkey would exercise the right of option to be obtained by it in this behalf in a positive way. It would ~~exercise the right of extradition of foreigners unless the same~~ be contrary to its higher interests, and that, in particular, it would adhere to the course of grant of extradition in the case of nationals of the States of Syria and Persia as far as such course might be compatible with the general provisions of extradition treaties.

Consequently, a clause was inserted in article 1 of the extradition treaty providing that extradition will be optional.

M. SHARAF.

NURI AS SAID

Angora, January 9, 1932.

[E 1783, 9 93]

No. 189

Sir P. Condliffe-Lister to Sir F. Humphrys.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, April 9)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Downing Street, April 7, 1932

I HAVE the honour to address you on the subject of the article entitled "Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations," in the draft declaration of guarantees to be made by Iraq on the termination of the mandatory regime. In the second paragraph of that article Iraq will undertake "to respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on Iraq's behalf by the mandatory Power during the period of the mandate." This clause has now formed the subject of examination, and, in accordance with the request in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 10 of the 11th January last, I enclose herewith, for communication to the Iraqi Government, a list of major financial obligations assumed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on Iraq's behalf.

2. In the preparation of this list, regard was naturally had to the List of International Instruments referred to in the second paragraph of article 8 of the A. M. S. S. Convention of 1920, and it may be of assistance to you to know why certain of the items in the latter list have been omitted, whereas others have been retained in the accompanying list of financial obligations.

3. The undertakings given to the Sherika of Kowest and Mohammar in respect of their date gardens in Iraq, which was the first item on the List of International Instruments, were entered into in 1914, consequently, they cannot be held to be covered by paragraph 2 of the draft guarantee as being financial obligations assumed during the period of the mandate. This item has, therefore, been omitted from the enclosed list of financial obligations.

4. Of the following two items on the List of International Instruments, the San Remo Oil Agreement of the 24th April, 1920, and the Anglo-French Boundary Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, although the latter was concluded after the assignment of Iraq, it was in fact in force at the time of the assignment, and preceded the assignment by one day. Whether or not, however, these instruments fall under the draft guarantee in point of time, it is questionable whether they can legitimately be regarded as financial obligations. Articles 2 and 3 of the Boundary Convention provide for the appointment of commissions which might, it is true, give rise to certain expenses, and although the oil agreement contains no specific financial obligations, it may perhaps be premature to assume that all question of obligation to the French Government under clause 7 of that agreement has lapsed, and it is possible that failure to fulfil it might involve a liability to make financial compensation, a result, however, which might follow upon failure to fulfil a financial obligation.

5. On the other hand, the San Remo Oil Agreement might in certain circumstances give rise to financial obligations, they cannot themselves justly be described as such, and in all the circumstances His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the San Remo Oil Agreement can properly be regarded as suitable for inclusion in the list to be communicated to the Iraqi Government. It has been thought well to include reference to them in a footnote appended to the list.

6. The treaty settlement of Lausanne, which forms the fourth item in the List of International Instruments, has been included in the accompanying list, and a property ~~is included in the list of financial obligations~~ of which apply to Iraq. His Majesty's Government regard mention of the Lausanne settlement as covering any liability arising out of the claim of the Ottoman Tobacco Regie that may be applicable to Iraq in accordance with the arrangement proposed in your note to the Iraqi Prime Minister of the 12th August, 1930, and accepted in his note of the 19th August, 1930. It would be well to make this point clear to the Iraqi Government when communicating the list of financial obligations.

7. The Treaty of Angora of the 5th June, 1920, has also been retained, since, although it was a tripartite agreement, with Iraq as one party, the participation of His Majesty's Government was in the nature of a guarantee of

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the fulfilment of the obligations assumed in virtue of the exchange of notes appended thereto.

His Majesty's Government believe that the accompanying list is complete so far as financial obligations arising from international agreements with third parties are concerned, but there may well be other financial obligations of a less formal character not arising from international agreements, but connected with, for example, the engagement of officials on behalf of the Iraqi Government, the appointment of commissions, miscellaneous claims, pensions, &c., which have been assumed by His Majesty's Government in virtue of their responsibilities under the treaties and agreements mentioned in article 7 of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930 which devolve on the Iraqi Government under clause 1 of article 8 of that treaty. No attempt has been made to draw up a list of these obligations, most of which are doubtless of a relatively minor character, since the preparation of such a list would involve difficult and prolonged research, and any list produced would not in all probability be exhaustive. Moreover, the majority of the obligations in question would probably be found to be covered by the first paragraph (acquired rights) of the draft guarantee rather than the second paragraph. In communicating the accompanying list to the Iraqi Government, you should, however, make it clear that miscellaneous obligations of this character have purposely been omitted.

8. In paragraph 3 of this despatch I have explained why mention of the undertakings given to the Sheikhs of Kuwait and Mohammerah in 1914 has been omitted from the accompanying list. Although, however, these undertakings are not held to be covered by paragraph 2 (financial obligations) of the draft guarantee, if the view of His Majesty's Government as to the legal effect of the undertakings, the rights of the two sheikhs would seem to be covered by the first paragraph (acquired rights) of the draft guarantee. While His Majesty's Government have no desire themselves to take advantage of the first paragraph of the draft guarantee to press the claims of the two sheikhs, since they are content that this matter should be left for settlement under article 8 of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930, there is a remote possibility that the sheikhs themselves may of their own accord seek support for their case against the Iraqi Government from this paragraph of the draft guarantee. I am content to leave it to your discretion whether or not to raise this aspect of the case with the Iraqi Government.

I have &c.
P. CUNLIFFE LISTER

Enclosure in No. 139

List of Financial Obligations assumed on Iraq's behalf by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom during the Period of Mandate, referred to in paragraph 2 of the Draft Guarantee entitled "Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations," adopted by the Committee of the League Council on February 10, 1932.

1. Treaty of Commerce of Lausanne July 24, 1923.
2. Treaty of Angora, June 5, 1926.

NOTE.—The San Remo Oil Agreement of the 25th April, 1930, and the Anglo-French Boundary Convention, the 23rd December, 1920, have not been included, since, although they may indirectly give rise to financial obligations, they are not considered to be strictly covered by the words of paragraph 2 of the draft guarantee.

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Sir F. Humphrys to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, May 5.)

Secret
Sir,

Bagdad, April 21, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, for your information, copy of a letter to the Prime Minister, Bagdad, with enclosure, dated the 10th April, 1932, the subject of the declarations to be made by the Iraqi Government to the League of Nations.

I have &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS

Enclosure 1 in No. 140.

Sir F. Humphrys to the Prime Minister, Bagdad.

My dear Prime Minister,

Bagdad, April 19, 1932.

PLEASE refer to my letter dated the 18th March, 1932, enclosing an English translation of the draft declaration which it is proposed should be submitted by the Iraqi Government to the League of Nations.

The draft declaration is entitled "Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations," and is intended to fulfil all financial obligations assumed on Iraq's behalf by the mandatory Power during the period of the mandate. I have now received from the Secretary of State a list of major financial obligations assumed by His Majesty's Government on Iraq's behalf, which I enclose for the information of your Government.

The Treaty of Commerce of Lausanne is included in the list in view of its various provisions which apply to Iraq. His Majesty's Government regard mention of the Lausanne settlement as covering any liability arising out of the claim of the Ottoman Tobacco Regie that may be applicable to Iraq in accordance with the arrangement proposed in my note dated the 12th August, 1930, and accepted by your Excellency in your note of the 19th August, 1930.

The Treaty of Angora of the 5th June, 1926, has also been retained, since, although it was a tripartite agreement, with Iraq as one party, the participation of His Majesty's Government was in the nature of a guarantee of the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by Iraq in virtue of the exchange of notes appended thereto.

His Majesty's Government believe that the accompanying list is complete so far as financial obligations arising from international agreements with third parties are concerned, but there may well be other financial obligations of a less formal character, not arising from international agreements, but connected with, for example, the engagement of officials on behalf of the Iraqi Government, the appointment of commissions, miscellaneous claims, pensions, &c., which have been assumed by His Majesty's Government in virtue of their responsibilities under the treaties and agreements mentioned in article 7 of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930, which devolve on the Iraqi Government under clause 1 of article 8 of that treaty. No attempt has been made to draw up a list of these obligations, most of which are doubtless of a relatively minor character, since the preparation of such a list would involve difficult and prolonged research, and any list produced would not in all probability be exhaustive. Moreover, the majority of the obligations in question would probably be found to be covered by the first paragraph (acquired rights) of the draft guarantee, rather than the second paragraph. In communicating the accompanying list to the Iraqi Government, therefore, I wish to make it clear that miscellaneous obligations of this character have purposely been omitted.

Yours sincerely
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

and obligations assumed on Iraq's behalf by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom during the Period of Vandalia, referred to in Paragraph 2 of the Draft Guarantee entitled "Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations adopted by the Committee of the League Council on the 10th February, 1932."

1. The Treaty Settlement of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923.
2. The Treaty of Angora of the 6th June, 1926.

Note.—The San Remo Oil Agreement of the 26th April, 1920, and the Anglo-French Boundary Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, have not been included, since, although they may indirectly give rise to financial obligations, they are not considered to be strictly covered by the words of paragraph 2 of the draft guarantee.

E 2475 617 93,

No 141

Sir b Humphrys to Sir P Cunliffe-Lister. (Communicated by the Colonial Office, May 17)

(Secret. A.)
Sir,

Bagdad, April 28, 1932

I HAVE the honour to submit the following brief report on the progress of the operations against Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan.

2. The object of the operations is to bring the Shirwan and Barzan areas under control, and to establish in those areas the machinery of Government to which depredations of Sheikh Ahmad's followers may be brought to an end. Operations were not, therefore, undertaken with punitive intent. Every effort has been made to induce Sheikh Ahmad himself not to oppose the force and orders of the Government, but, while professing obedience and endeavouring thereby to gain time, the Sheikh has continued to incite his followers to active opposition of the Iraqi army columns.

3. On the 14th March, while negotiations were still in progress between Sheikh Ahmad and the Mosul authorities, a composite column, including two battalions of infantry, a company of machine-guns, and 200 police, moved out from Dianna into the Shirwan country, which, according to reports, was being used as a base for operations. An attempt was made to deal with Sheikh Ahmad's headquarters. Aircraft of the Royal Air Force co-operated with the column for reconnaissance purposes, their instructions being to take air action only against hostile tribesmen who were actually engaging and holding up the advance of the Iraqi column. Opposition was first encountered at Merga Sor, on the 19th, where the column was attacked before day break by a force of Shirwan tribesmen estimated at 300. Though the attacking force succeeded in penetrating the picket line, it was eventually driven off, the Iraqi army losing six killed and ten wounded.

4. A number of local tribal leaders came in to make their submission to the Iraqi political officer accompanying the column. During the days that followed, however, this effect was more than counterbalanced by a series of retaliatory raids, in which Sheikh Ahmad's men attacked the villages of those who had surrendered and carried off their families. In order to restore the Government's prestige, it was decided, at the suggestion of the Iraqi Government, and with the concurrence of the Air Officer Commanding and myself, to take punitive air action against the village of Barzan, which was known to be the headquarters of a Barzan force. It was anticipated that this would convince any doubters among the tribes that the Iraqi troops could count on the assistance of the Royal Air Force, who, except for one occasion on the 23rd March, when aircraft which were fired on by hostile tribesmen returned their fire, had not hitherto taken an active part in the operations. The bombing of Barzan, which was delayed by bad weather, was carried out on the 2nd and 3rd April.

5. On the morning of the 3rd April, the column met with a serious reverse. I have not yet received a detailed report of the action, but it appears that the

main body, which was then approaching Barisia, had moved too far in advance of its supply train, which was protected by a relatively small escort, and had only reached Wazhi—some 2 miles to the south. The tribesmen launched an attack on the transport, stampeding the mules and throwing the whole train into confusion. The main body turned back to repel the attack, but was unable to prevent almost the entire train, including rations, kit and ammunition, from being looted. As soon as the situation was observed from the air, every available aircraft was summoned and the rebels were vigorously engaged from the air throughout the day. I regret that in the course of the action Sergeant Hudson of the Royal Air Force was killed. There is no doubt that had it not been for the prompt and effective action taken by the Royal Air Force on this occasion, the position of the Iraqi column, without supplies and its line of communications cut, would have been extremely critical. As it was, the Royal Air Force succeeded in beating off the attack, and supplies of rations, ammunition and blankets were subsequently dropped on the column from the air.

6. This disaster had a demoralising effect on the Iraqi column, particularly on the senior officers, whose behaviour on this occasion suggests that merit is not the sole, nor even perhaps the chief, criterion in the filling of appointments. I have already drawn King Faisal's attention to this.

7. Three days later, while proceeding to Zhazhok to meet a relief convoy, the column was again attacked near Wazhi by a force of rebel tribesmen, who were at once engaged by the escorting aircraft. During the fighting a well placed bomb caused a panic among the rebels, who broke cover and fled, suffering a most serious defeat. The Iraqi troops, who pressed the retreating army with energy, greatly heartened the Iraqi troops, who pressed the retreating army with energy. 100 killed. The Iraqi column, which has remained at Zhazhok, has since been unmolested by the rebels, except for occasional sniping.

8. In the meantime, it had been decided, in order to strengthen the Government's control in the Bira Kapra district, and to weaken the pressure on the Shirwan column by threatening Barzan, to reinforce the Billeh garrison from Aqrab. An infantry battalion and one machine gun battery accordingly

further reinforced a week later by two companies of infantry. This column (known as Barzan), after carrying out reconnaissance as far as Barzan and meeting with no opposition, occupied Barzan village on the 18th April.

9. By this time, however, it had become evident that it would be impossible to complete the programme of bringing under control not only the Shirwan district south of the Rukuchuk River but the Barzan and Shirwan in Mazin districts to the north of it, during the present summer, without intensive operations by the Royal Air Force, and an urgent request for intensive air action was now made by the Iraqi Government. After full consideration, the Air Officer Commanding and I agreed that it would be most unsatisfactory to leave these operations unfinished till the end of the summer, particularly in view of the fact that the services of the Royal Air Force may not subsequently be available for such purposes. It was therefore decided to accede to the Iraqi Government's request. As a first step proclamations have been dropped warning the insurgents that air action will be intensified and extended, and will continue until opposition has ceased and the leaders have surrendered. In the meantime, all who submit, except those guilty of specified crimes against individuals, will be pardoned and permitted to return in safety to their villages with their rifles on the conclusion of the operations. These proclamations were dropped on the 26th, and bombing is to begin on the 29th April. The objective is not to cause casualties or a visible destruction of property, but to interrupt the normal life of the inhabitants continuously over a considerable period, until they consent to accept the terms offered them. There is every reason to believe that, except for an immediate following of about 300 devotees, Sheikh Ahmad's supporters are bound to him not by any bonds of sympathy, but merely by intimidation, and it is hoped that the threat of air bombardment will suffice to detach many of the insurgents from their allegiance.

10. On the 25th April I flew over the Greater Zab River and paid a visit to Diana. Conversations with leading Kurds and with officers of the Royal Air Force and Levies convinced me that the handling of the political side of the

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operations, which was entrusted to an Iraqi political officer, left much to be desired. The indiscriminate burning of villages might not only discourage further surrenders, but force loyal tribesmen into the Barzan camp. In view of the fact that the chief burden of the operations is now to be borne by the Royal Air Force I considered myself fully justified in demanding that political control should be placed in the hands of a British officer. The Acting Prime Minister has now agreed to the appointment of Captain Lyon, Administrative Inspector, Arbil and Kirkuk, as political officer in the area of operations against Sheikh Ahmad in the Arbil Liwa, with full executive and administrative authority to direct, under the orders of the adviser to the Ministry of Interior, the policy of the Government towards its inhabitants. Captain Lyon's reports will be repeated to the Air Officer Commanding and myself.

The surrender of the rebel leaders, and will put an end to the tyranny of Sheikh Ahmad, who makes no pretence to be a leader of a Kurdish national movement, and who, in fact, represents no one but his immediate followers. The country will benefit already being constructed as the troops advance, and the majority of the inhabitants realise it, and will, I am convinced, welcome the advantages of orderly government as soon as the fear of Sheikh Ahmad and his men is removed.

I have &c

F H HUMPHREYS
High Commissioner for Iraq

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No 142

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations (Secret)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 27, 1932

IN your letter of the 20th May you enclosed a communication addressed to the Prime Minister of Iraq relative to the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations at its session on the 19th May in regard to the termination of the mandatory régime in that country. This letter was duly forwarded to its destination.

I am now directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you herewith, in original, a letter addressed to you by Nuri Pasha, together with the original enclosures therein, being the Iraqi Declaration of Guarantee signed by the Prime Minister of Iraq, and the instrument of ratification of that declaration signed by His Majesty King Faisal I &c

G W RENDEL

Enclosure I in No 142

Nuri Pasha to Secretary-General, League of Nations

Sir,

Bagdad, May 30, 1932

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 20th May, 1932, transmitting to me, duly prepared for signature, the text of the declaration approved by the resolution adopted on the 19th May, 1932, by the Council of the League of Nations, in regard to the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq together with the original enclosures therein, being the Iraqi Declaration of Guarantee signed by the Prime Minister of Iraq, and the instrument of ratification of that declaration signed by His Majesty King Faisal I &c

I have the honour to return to you herewith the declaration signed by me as the duly authorised representative of Iraq. I enclose also the instrument of ratification of the declaration.

I beg to request that you will be good enough to forward the declaration to the knowledge of the Council and the members of the League of Nations.

I have, &c

NURI SAID
Prime Minister of Iraq

Enclosure 2 in No 142

Formal King of Iraq

WHEREAS a declaration on behalf of the Kingdom of Iraq was signed at Bagdad on the thirtieth day of May in the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty-two by Our Plenipotentiary duly authorised for that purpose, whose declaration is, word for word as follows:

Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq
made on the Occasion of the Termination
of the Mandatory Regime in
Iraq

Declaration du Royaume de l'Irak
faite à l'Occasion de l'Extinction du
Régime mandataire en Irak

CHAPTER I

ARTICLE 1

Protection of Minorities

The stipulations contained in the present chapter are recognised as fundamental laws of Iraq, and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action now or in the future prevail over them.

ARTICLE 2

1 Full and complete protection of life and liberty will be assured to all inhabitants of Iraq without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

2 All inhabitants of Iraq will be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

ARTICLE 3

Ottoman subjects habitually resident in the territory of Iraq on the 30th April 1924 shall be deemed to have at date Iraqi nationality in lieu of Ottoman nationality.

Lausanne Peace Treaty and under the conditions laid down in the Iraqi Nationality Law of the 9th October 1924.

ARTICLE 4

1 All Iraqi nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

2 The electoral system shall guarantee equitable representation to racial, religious and linguistic minorities in Iraq.

3 Differences of race, language or religion shall not prejudice any Iraqi national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public

CHAPTER I

ARTICLE 1

Protection of Minorities

Les stipulations contenues dans le présent chapitre seront reconnues comme lois fondamentales en Irak. Aucune loi, aucun règlement, ni aucune action officielle ne seront en contradiction ou en opposition avec ces stipulations et aucune loi, aucun règlement, ni aucune action officielle ne prévaudront contre elles, ni maintenant ni à l'avenir.

ARTICLE 2

1 Il sera accordé à tous les habitants de l'Irak pleine et entière protection de leur vie et de leur liberté, sans distinction de naissance, de nationalité, de langage, de race ou de religion.

2 Tous les habitants de l'Irak auront droit au libre exercice, tant public que privé, de toute foi, religion ou croyance, dont la pratique ne sera pas incompatible avec l'ordre public et les bonnes mœurs.

ARTICLE 3

Les ressortissants ottomans établis sur le territoire de l'Irak à la date du 30 août 1924 seront considérés comme ayant acquis, à cette date, la nationalité irakienne, à l'exclusion de la nationalité ottomane, sur la base de l'article 30 du Traité de Paix de Lausanne, et dans les conditions prévues dans la loi irakienne du 9 octobre 1924 sur la nationalité.

ARTICLE 4

1 Tous les ressortissants irakiens seront égaux devant la loi et jouiront des mêmes droits civils et politiques sans distinction de race, de langue ou de religion.

2 Le système électoral assurera une représentation équitable aux minorités de race, de religion ou de langue en Irak.

3 La différence de race, de langue ou de religion ne devra nuire à aucun ressortissant irakien en ce qui concerne la jouissance des droits civils et politiques, notamment pour l'admission à l'emploi public.

employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions or industries.

4. No restriction will be imposed on the free use by any Iraqi national of any language, in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

5. Notwithstanding the establishment by the Iraqi Government of Arabic as the official language, and notwithstanding the special arrangements to be made by the Iraqi Government, under article 9 of the present declaration, regarding the use of the Kurdish and Turkish languages, adequate facilities will be given to all Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language, for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

ARTICLE 5

Iraqi nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities will enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Iraqi nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and control at their own expense, or to establish in the future, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

ARTICLE 6

The Iraqi Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family and personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs and usage of the communities to which these minorities belong.

The Iraqi Government will communicate to the Council of the League of Nations information regarding the manner in which these measures have been executed.

ARTICLE 7

1. The Iraqi Government undertakes to grant full protection, facilities and authorisation to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries and other religious institutions of the various religious communities.

aux emplois publics, fonctions et honneurs, et pour l'exercice des différentes professions et industries.

4. Il ne sera édicté aucune restriction au libre usage par tous les ressortissants irakiens d'une langue quelconque, soit dans les relations privées ou de commerce, soit en matière de religion, de presse ou de publications de toute nature, soit dans les réunions publiques.

5. Nonobstant l'établissement du Gouvernement irakien de la langue arabe comme langue officielle, et nonobstant les dispositions spéciales que le Gouvernement irakien prendra en ce qui concerne l'emploi des langues kurde et turque, dispositions prévues à l'article 9 de la présente déclaration, des facilités appropriées seront données à tous les ressortissants irakiens de langue autre que la langue officielle, pour l'usage de leur langue, soit oralement, soit par écrit, devant les tribunaux.

ARTICLE 5

Les ressortissants irakiens appartenant à des minorités de race, de religion ou de langue, jouiront du même traitement et des mêmes garanties en droit et en fait que les autres ressortissants irakiens. Ils auront notamment un droit égal à maintenir, diriger et contrôler à leurs frais ou à créer à l'avenir des institutions charitables, religieuses ou sociales, des écoles et autres établissements d'éducation, avec le droit d'y faire librement usage de leur propre langue et d'y exercer librement leur religion.

ARTICLE 6

Le Gouvernement irakien agréé de prendre à l'égard des minorités non-musulmanes, en ce qui concerne les statuts familial et personnel, toutes dispositions permettant de régler ces questions en conformité avec les coutumes et usages de ces communautés auxquelles ces minorités appartiennent.

Le Gouvernement irakien enverra au Conseil de la Société des Nations des renseignements sur la façon dont ont été exécutées ces dispositions.

ARTICLE 7

1. Le Gouvernement irakien s'engage à protéger, à faciliter et à autoriser les églises, les synagogues, les cimetières et autres institutions religieuses, œuvres charitables et fondations pieuses des communautés religieuses minoritaires existant en Irak.

2. Each of these communities shall have the right of establishing councils in important administrative districts competent to administer pious foundations and charitable bequests. These councils shall be competent to deal with the collection of income derived therefrom, and the expenditure thereof in accordance with the wishes of the donor or with the custom in use among the community. These communities shall also undertake the supervision of the property of orphans, in accordance with law. The councils referred to above shall be under the supervision of the Government.

3. The Iraqi Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious or charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which may be guaranteed to existing institutions of that nature.

ARTICLE 8

1. In the public educational system in towns and districts in which are resident a considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language, the Iraqi Government will make provision for adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals through the medium of their own language, it being understood that this provision does not prevent the Iraqi Government from making the teaching of Arabic obligatory in the said schools.

2. In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be enabled to participate in the enjoyment and application of sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, Municipal or other budgets for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

ARTICLE 9

1. Iraq undertakes that in the liwas of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be Kurdish in the qadhas in which the population is predominantly of Kurdish race.

In the qadhas of Kifri and Kirkuk, however, in the liwa of Kirkuk, where a considerable part of the population is of Turcoman race, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be either Kurdish or Turkish.

2. Toutes ces communautés auront le droit de constituer, dans les divisions administratives importantes, des conseils qui auront qualité pour administrer les fondations pieuses ainsi que les legs charitables. Ces conseils auront qualité pour percevoir les revenus produits par ces biens, pour les utiliser conformément aux vœux du donateur ou à l'usage établi dans la communauté. Ces communautés devront également veiller sur les biens des orphelins, conformément à la loi. Les conseils susmentionnés seront placés sous le contrôle du Gouvernement.

3. Le Gouvernement irakien ne refusera, pour la création de nouveaux établissements religieux ou charitables, aucune des facilités nécessaires qui seront garanties aux établissements de cette nature déjà existants.

ARTICLE 8

1. En matière d'éducation, le Gouvernement irakien s'engage à prendre, dans les villes et districts où résident une proportion considérable de ressortissants irakiens de langue autre que la langue officielle, des facilités appropriées pour assurer que dans les écoles primaires l'instruction sera donnée dans la langue maternelle de ces enfants. Cette stipulation n'empêchera pas le Gouvernement irakien de rendre obligatoire l'enseignement de la langue arabe dans les dites écoles.

2. Dans les villes et districts où réside une proportion considérable de ressortissants irakiens appartenant à des minorités de race, de religion ou de langue, ces minorités se verront assurer une part équitable dans la bénéfice et l'affectation des sommes qui pourraient être attribuées sur les fonds publics par le budget de l'Etat, les budgets municipaux ou autres, dans un but d'éducation, de religion ou de charité.

ARTICLE 9

1. L'Irak agréé en ce qui concerne les Liwas de Mossoul, Arbil, Kirkuk et Souleimanié que la langue officielle, à côté de l'arabe, sera le kurde dans les qadhas où la population prédominante est de race kurde.

Toutefois, dans les qadhas de Kifri et de Kirkuk du Liwa de Kirkuk, où une partie considérable de la population est de race turcomane, la langue officielle sera, à côté de l'arabe, soit le kurde, soit le turc.

2. Iraq undertakes that in the said qadhas the officials shall, subject to justifiable exceptions, have a competent knowledge of Kurdish or Turkish as the case may be.

3. Although in these qadhas the criterion for the choice of officials will be, as in the rest of Iraq, efficiency and knowledge of the language, rather than race, Iraq undertakes that the officials shall as hitherto be selected, so far as possible, from among Iraqis from one or other of these qadhas.

ARTICLE 10

The stipulations of the foregoing articles of this Declaration, in far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, are declared to constitute obligations of international concern and will be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. No modification will be made to them without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Any member of the League represented on the Council shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the Council may thereupon take such measures and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these articles between Iraq and any member of the League represented on the Council shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under article 13 of the Covenant.

CHAPTER II

ARTICLE 11

Most Favoured Nation Clause

1. Subject to reciprocity, Iraq undertakes to grant to members of the League most favoured-nation treatment for a period of ten years from the date of its

2. L'Irak agréé que dans lesdits qadhas les fonctionnaires devront, sauf exception justifiée, posséder la langue kurde ou, le cas échéant, la langue turque.

3. Bien que dans ces qadhas le critère pour le choix des fonctionnaires sera, comme dans le reste de l'Irak, l'efficacité et la connaissance de la langue, plutôt que la race, l'Irak s'engage à sélectionner, dans la mesure du possible, les fonctionnaires parmi les Irakiens d'une ou l'autre de ces qadhas.

ARTICLE 10

Dans la mesure où les stipulations des articles précédents de la présente déclaration affectent des personnes appartenant à des minorités de race, de religion ou de langue, ces stipulations constituent des obligations d'intérêt international et seront placées sous la garantie de la Société des Nations. Elles ne pourront être modifiées sans l'assentiment de la majorité du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Tout membre de la Société représenté au Conseil aura le droit de signaler à l'attention du Conseil toute infraction ou danger d'infraction à l'une quelconque de ces obligations, et le Conseil pourra prendre telles mesures et donner telles instructions qui paraîtront appropriées et efficaces dans la circonstance.

En cas de divergence d'opinion sur des questions de droit ou de fait concernant ces articles, entre l'Irak et l'un quelconque des membres de la Société représentés au Conseil, cette divergence sera considérée comme un différend ayant un caractère international selon les termes de l'article 14 du Pacte de la Société des Nations. Tout différend de ce genre sera soumis à la Cour de Justice internationale.

La décision de la Cour permanente sera sans appel et aura la même force et valeur qu'une décision rendue en vertu de l'article 13 du Pacte.

CHAPTER II

ARTICLE 11

Clause de la Nation la plus favorisée

1. L'Irak s'engage à accorder, sous réserve de réciprocité, aux États membres de la Société, le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée, pendant une

admission to membership of the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, should measures taken by any member of the League of Nations within three months from its request, Iraq declares that it will consider itself as freed, *vis-à-vis* of the member of the League in question, from the obligation laid down in the first sub-paragraph above.

Should an agreement not be reached within three months from its request, Iraq declares that it will consider itself as freed, *vis-à-vis* of the member of the League in question, from the obligation laid down in the first sub-paragraph above.

2. L'Irak s'engage à accorder, sous réserve de réciprocité, aux États membres de la Société, le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée, pendant une période de dix ans à compter de la date de son admission comme membre de la Société des Nations.

ARTICLE 12

Judicial Organization

A uniform system of justice shall be applicable to all, Iraqis and foreigners alike. It shall be such as effectively to ensure the protection and full exercise of their rights both to foreigners and to nationals.

The judicial system at present in force, and based on articles 2, 3 and 4 of the agreement between the mandatory Power and Iraq, signed on the 4th March, 1931, shall be maintained for a period of ten years from the date of the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations.

periode de dix ans à compter de la date du jour de son admission comme membre de la Société des Nations.

Toutefois, si les mesures prises par l'un quelconque des membres de la Société des Nations, qu'elles soient en vigueur à cette date susmentionnée ou qu'elles soient prises au cours de la période visée à l'alinéa ci-dessus, étaient de nature à compromettre, au détriment de l'Irak, l'équilibre des échanges entre ce dernier et le membre de la Société des Nations en question, en affectant sérieusement les principales exportations de l'Irak, ce dernier, en considération de sa situation après la guerre, se réserve la faculté de demander, au membre de la Société des Nations dont il s'agit, l'ouverture immédiate de négociations en vue de rétablir l'équilibre ainsi rompu.

Au cas où, dans un délai de trois mois à dater de la demande de l'Irak, les négociations n'auraient pas abouti à un accord, l'Irak déclare qu'il pourra se considérer comme libéré, *vis-à-vis* du membre de la Société en question, de l'obligation stipulée au premier alinéa ci-dessus.

2. Sont exceptés de l'engagement formulé au premier alinéa ci-dessus les avantages accordés ou qui pourraient être accordés ultérieurement par l'Irak à un pays limitrophe pour faciliter le trafic frontière, ainsi que ceux résultant d'une union douanière qui pourrait être conclue par l'Irak. Il en sera de même en ce qui concerne les avantages spéciaux qu'en matière douanière l'Irak pourrait consentir aux produits naturels ou fabriqués, originaires de la Turquie ou d'un pays quelconque dont le territoire en 1914, faisait intégralement partie de l'Empire ottoman en Asie Mineure.

ARTICLE 12

Organization judiciaire

Un système de justice uniforme sera applicable également à tous les ressortissants d'Irak et à tous les étrangers. Ce système sera de nature à assurer efficacement tant aux étrangers qu'aux nationaux la sauvegarde et le plein exercice de leurs droits.

Le système judiciaire en vigueur et résultant des articles 2, 3 et 4 de l'accord entre la Puissance mandataire et l'Irak, signé le 4 mars 1931, sera maintenu pour une période de dix années, à compter de l'admission de l'Irak comme membre de la Société des Nations.

Appointments to the posts reserved for foreign jurists by article 2 of the said agreement shall be made by the Iraqi Government. Their holders shall be foreigners, but selected without distinction of nationality, they must be fully qualified.

ARTICLE 13

International Conventions

Iraq considers itself bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which it has become a party, whether by its own action or by that of the mandatory Power acting on its behalf. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by Iraq throughout the period for which they were concluded.

ARTICLE 14

Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations

Iraq, taking note of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of the 16th September, 1925—

- 1 Declares that all rights of whatever nature acquired before the termination of the mandatory regime by individuals, associations or juridical persons, shall be respected.
- 2 Undertakes to respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on Iraq's behalf by the mandatory Power during the period of the mandate.

ARTICLE 15

Freedom of Conscience

Subject to such measures as may be essential for the maintenance of public order and morality, Iraq undertakes to ensure and guarantee throughout its territory freedom of conscience and worship and the free exercise of the religious, educational and medical activities of religious missions of all denominations, whatever the nationality of those missions or of their members.

ARTICLE 16

Final Clause

The provisions of the present chapter constitute obligations of international concern. Any member of the League of

Les postes réservés à des juristes étrangers en vertu de l'article 2 dudit accord seront nommés par le Gouvernement irakien. Leurs titulaires seront des étrangers, mais choisis sans distinction de nationalité, et ils devront être pleinement qualifiés.

ARTICLE 13

Conventions Internationales

L'Irak se considère comme lié par tous les accords et conventions internationaux, tant généraux que spéciaux, auxquels il est devenu partie, soit qu'il ait agi lui-même directement, soit que la Puissance mandataire ait agi pour son compte. Sous réserve du droit de dénonciation qu'ils pourraient prévoir, ces accords et conventions seront respectés par l'Irak pendant toute la durée pour laquelle ils ont été conclus.

ARTICLE 14

Droits acquis et Obligations financières

En prenant acte de la résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations du 16 septembre 1925, l'Irak

- 1 Déclare que les droits de toute nature acquis avant l'extinction du régime mandataire par des particuliers, des sociétés ou des personnes juridiques, seront respectés.
- 2 S'engage à respecter et à exécuter les obligations financières de toute nature assumées pour son compte par la Puissance mandataire pendant la durée du mandat.

ARTICLE 15

Liberté de Conscience

Sous réserve des mesures indispensables au maintien des bonnes mœurs et de l'ordre public, l'Irak s'engage à assurer et à garantir, sur toute l'étendue de son territoire, la liberté de conscience et le libre exercice des cultes, ainsi que les activités des missions religieuses de toutes les confessions en matière religieuse, scolaire et d'assistance médicale, quelle que soit la nationalité de ces missions ou de leurs membres.

ARTICLE 16

Clause finale

Les dispositions contenues dans le présent chapitre constituent des obligations d'intérêt international. Tout

Nations may call the attention of the Council to any infraction of these provisions. They may not be modified except by agreement between Iraq and the Council of the League of Nations acting by a majority vote.

Any difference of opinion which may arise between Iraq and any member of the League of Nations represented on the Council, with regard to the interpretation or the execution of the said provisions, shall by an application by such member, be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The undersigned, duly authorised, accepts on behalf of Iraq, subject to ratification, the above provisions, being the declaration provided for by the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of the 16th May, 1932.

Done at Bagdad on this thirtieth day of May, 1932, in a single copy, which shall be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

Le membre de la Société des Nations pourra signaler à l'attention du Conseil les infractions à ces dispositions. Ces dernières ne pourront être modifiées que par accord entre l'Irak et le Conseil de la Société des Nations, statuant à la majorité des voix.

Toute divergence d'opinion qui viendrait à s'élever entre l'Irak et l'un quelconque des membres de la Société des Nations représentés au Conseil, au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'exécution desdites dispositions, sera, à la requête de ce membre, soumise pour décision à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.

Le soussigné, dûment autorisé, accepte, au nom de l'Irak et sous réserve de ratification, les dispositions ci-dessus, qui constituent la déclaration prévue par la résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations en date du 16 mai 1932.

Fait à Bagdad, le en un seul exemplaire, qui sera déposé dans les archives du Secrétariat de la Société des Nations.

NOT RI SAID

Prime Minister of Iraq

WE, having seen and considered the declaration aforesaid, have approved, accepted, and confirmed the same in all and every one of its articles and clauses, as We do by these presents approve, accept, confirm, and ratify for Ourselves, Our Heirs and Successors, the said declaration. We will sincerely and faithfully perform and observe all and singular the things which are contained and expressed in the declaration aforesaid, and that We will never suffer the same to be violated by anyone, or transgressed in any manner, as far as it lies in Our power. For the better testimony and validity of all which, We have caused Our Great Seal to be affixed to these presents, which We have signed with Our Royal Hand.

Given at Our Court at Bagdad the thirtieth day of May in the Year one thousand nine hundred and thirty two and in the eleventh year of Our Reign.

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the Draft Declaration to be made before the Council by the Iraqi Government upon the termination of the Mandatory Regime in Iraq

Report to the Council

General May 7, 1932

ON the 28th January, 1932, the Council adopted the following resolution:—

"The Council.

⁴ Having to consider the special case of the termination of the mandate for Iran.

* Notes the opinion formulated, at its request, by the Permanent Mandates Commission on the proposal of the British Government.

2. Considers that the information available is sufficient to show that Iraq satisfies, generally speaking, the *de facto* conditions enumerated in the annex to the Council resolution of the 4th September, 1981.

1. Declares itself prepared, in principle, to pronounce the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq when that State shall have entered into undertakings before the Council in conformity with the suggestions contained in the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, it being understood that the right to apply to the Permanent Court of International Justice may only be exercised by members of the League represented on the Council.

4. Accordingly requests its supporters for minorities questions, questions of international law and mandates, and the representative of Great Britain on the Council, to prepare, in consultation with the representative of the United States, a draft declaration covering the various guarantees recommended in the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and to submit that draft to the Council at its next session.

"5. Decides that, should the Council, after examining the undertaking which would be entered into by the Iraqi Government, pronounce the termination of the mandatory regime over that territory, such decision shall become effective only as from the date on which Iraq has been admitted to the League of Nations."

The committee held meetings, all private, from the 30th January to the 10th February, and from the 25th April to the 7th May, 1932. The first stage of the work was devoted to the preparation of the draft declaration, and the second to the framing of the committee's report.

In accordance with the indication given in the Council resolution, the Prime Minister of Iraq, his Excellency Nuri Pasha, and his Excellency M. Pierre Orts, President of the Council, acted in the capacity of the chairman of the commission, co-operated with the committee in an advisory capacity.

In performing its task the committee constantly endeavoured, in accordance with the principles clearly laid down in the Council's discussions, to draw up a sufficiently precise and complete draft declaration while remaining strictly within the limits indicated and without imposing on Iraq any obligations likely to hinder her free development as an independent nation.

The committee wishes to express its appreciation of the help afforded to it in its work by the representative of the Iraqi Government and by the representative of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

In submitting to the Council the draft declaration which is the outcome of its deliberations, the committee has thought it well to add certain explanations defining the meaning of certain provisions, and indicating in other cases the reasons for the omission of stipulations which at first sight had been thought advisable.

According to the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the conclusions of which were adopted by the Council, the Iraqi Government's declaration must provide guarantees on the following points:

1. The effective protection of racial, linguistic and religious minorities
2. Safeguard of the interests of foreigners in the judicial sphere,
3. Freedom of conscience and the safeguard of the activities of religious
bodies,
4. Rights acquired and financial obligations contracted by the mandatory
Power before the termination of the mandate,
5. Respect for international conventions,
6. Concession to the States members of the League of Nations, under certain
conditions, of most favoured nation treatment subject to reciprocity.

Lastly Iraq's declaration must contain a provision giving the members of the League of Nations represented on the Council the right to lay before the Permanent Court of International Justice any difference of opinion arising out of the interpretation of any of the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant.

The draft declaration divides the above-mentioned subjects into two chapters.

The first chapter is exclusively devoted to the general principles of international law governing the acquisition of rights and the financial obligations of countries and the role of international organizations.

CHAPTER I

Protection of Minorities

1. In conformity with the principles laid down by the Mandates Committee for the insertion in the draft declaration concerning the protection of minorities of the provisions of a general character:

2. Furthermore, the Mandates Commission had envisaged that Iraq should agree with the Iraqi Government, might think it necessary to lay down as a temporary or permanent measure to ensure the effective protection of racial, linguistic or religious minorities in Iraq.

3. As regards the guarantee system to be adopted, the committee decided that it was sufficient to insert in article 10 of the draft declaration the general guarantee clause contained in the existing minorities treaties, which is sufficiently elastic to be adjusted in practice to the special circumstances of Iraq.

(1) See § 4, letter (a), para. (1) of the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, approved by the Council on January 28, 1932 (Documents 12, 830, 22, 412, 1931, VI, p. 223).

The exception regarding frontier traffic, as contained in article 11 of the declaration, is to be found in nearly all commercial treaties. As it has been consecrated by long-standing practice, its interpretation does not seem likely to give rise to any difficulties.

Furthermore, the committee considered that the undertaking entered into by Iraq should not apply to any special advantages that Iraq might grant to goods and produce or manufacture of Turkey, or of any other country whose territory was in 1914 wholly included in the Ottoman Empire in Asia.

Judicial Organisation. (Article 12)

The text drawn up by the committee with a view to guaranteeing the interests of foreigners in judicial matters calls for certain comments and explanations.

The solution recommended consists, in accordance with a suggestion put forward both by the mandatory Power and by the Mandates Commission, in maintaining in force for a period of ten years a uniform judicial system applicable to all Iraqi nationals and to all foreigners. This system is based on the essential provisions of the Anglo Iraqi Agreement of the 4th March, 1931, which has received the approval of the Council and of the Powers whose nationals enjoyed capitulation rights in the former Ottoman Empire.

Nevertheless, as the acquiescence given at the time by the fourteen Powers concerned was only valid for the duration of the mandatory régime in Iraq, the capitulation system would automatically come into force again on the expiration of the mandatory régime, unless explicitly renounced by the Powers in question.

Hence, the committee first of all considered referring expressly in the draft declaration to the rights of those Powers. It refrained from doing so, however, in order to avoid any misunderstanding. The decision putting an end to the mandate for Iraq becomes effective.

In order to facilitate the mandatory Power's task in this connexion, the committee has recommended the Council to ask the Powers in question to renounce the former jurisdictional privileges which would no longer be justified under the judicial system proposed for Iraq. It hopes that the Council will introduce a recommendation to this effect in the resolution it adopts with regard to Iraq and will instruct the Secretary General to communicate it to the Governments of States to which the mandatory Power may have applied with the object mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present report.

The judicial system incorporated in the agreement of the 4th March, 1931, the maintenance of which is suggested by the committee, provides for the presence of nine foreign jurists in the Iraqi magistrature. The draft declaration prepared by the committee takes into account the Permanent Mandates Commission's recommendation that the holders of these posts, who are appointed by Iraq, should be selected without distinction of nationality. It will be remembered that under article 2 of the agreement of the 4th March, 1931, the nine jurists in question were to be of British nationality. As a result of an exchange of views on this question, the committee found that while in theory the judges of British nationality might, in virtue of their contracts, remain in office until 1941, in practice, according to the statements made by the Iraqi Prime Minister and the British representative, vacancies would occur long before that date, so that foreign judges other than British will be able to present themselves as candidates for appointment by the Iraqi Government.

The committee has every reason to believe that the terms offered to the new judges will not be inferior to those applicable to the present judges, whose contracts are governed by the Anglo Iraqi Agreement of the 25th March, 1924 concerning British officials.^(*)

International Conventions. (Article 13)

As regards international conventions, the committee has confined itself to introducing into the draft declaration a provision whose terms are in conformity with the recommendations of the Permanent Mandates Commission approved by the Council on the 28th January 1932.

(*) See Document C. 216, M. 27, 1926, VI, pp. 12 and following.

Acquired Rights and Financial Obligations. (Article 14.)

The provision introduced into the draft declaration with regard to acquired rights and the respect of financial obligations assumed by the mandatory Power on behalf of Iraq is taken from the Council resolution of the 15th September 1925, which the Permanent Mandates Commission thought it necessary to recall in the conclusions of its report to the Council. This provision does not call for any special comment on the part of the committee.

Freedom of Conscience and Safeguard of the Activities of Religious Missions. (Article 15)

The committee considered whether the passage in the draft declaration covering the same ground as the provision contained in paragraph 2 of article 2 of the first chapter relating to the protection of minorities.

After a thorough study of the question, the committee came to the conclusion that the passage should be retained, since it embodies a recommendation which figures in the Permanent Mandates Commission's conclusions and which covers a considerably wider field than article 2 of chapter I of the declaration concerning the protection of minorities. Furthermore, it appeared to the committee that

the provision can only be applied in so far as article 2 of the same chapter affects minorities.

On the other hand, the insertion in chapter II of the declaration, of a special provision on freedom of conscience and the activities of religious missions, placing this provision under the guarantee of the Council of the League of Nations.

Final Clause. (Article 16)

In its report, the Council of the League of Nations Mandates Commission recommended that, in order to ensure the protection of minorities, for which it had recommended that the principle should be adopted, Iraq "should be requested to accept that any dispute which may arise between Iraq and any member of the League of Nations, relating to the execution of the obligations assumed by the undertakings assumed before the Council may, by an agreement, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice." In its resolution of the 28th January, 1932, the Council diverged from the commission's conclusions on this point, it considered that the right of laying before the Permanent Court of International Justice any differences of opinion that might arise with regard to the execution of obligations, the majority of which should be reserved to the members of the League represented on the Council.

The representative of the Permanent Mandates Commission explained to the committee that it had been the commission's desire to enable the members of the League without distinction to lay before the court any disputes that might arise in connexion with the execution of obligations, the majority of which operated in their favour.

The committee found that the effect of the Council's resolution was not to deprive the States members of the League of all right of recourse. Those States will always be able to avail themselves of the relevant provisions of the Covenant to refer to the Council disputes which might arise between them and Iraq. Moreover, the fact that the Council has decided to refer any dispute which arises to the Permanent Court of International Justice arises out of the fact that the provisions contained in Iraq's declaration will be placed under the guarantee of the Council. It is further evident that if a member of the League represented on the Council decides to refer a question to the court, the differences of opinion which it desires to submit to the latter need not necessarily arise out of a difference of interpretation between it and Iraq, but may well arise between Iraq and a member of the League not represented on the Council.

CONSTANTIN FOTITCH
MASSIMO PILOTTI
S. SAWADA
E. H. CARR

Geneva, May 7, 1932

ANNEX B

47TH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL, LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

*Extract from Final Minutes of the 4th Meeting, Public and Private, held on
May 19, 1932, Geneva*

3081 *Mandates Proposal of the United Kingdom Government for the
Emancipation of Iraq. Report by the Committee instructed by the
Council to prepare the Draft Declaration to be made by the Iraqi Govern-
ment on the Termination of the Mandatory Regime in Iraq.*

M. Kotich presented the following report and draft resolution (1)

resolution of the 24th January,
rapporteurs for minorities questions, questions of
dom has drawn up, in accordance with that resolution, a draft declaration
covering the various guarantees recommended in the report of the Permanent
Mandates Commission.

The general form and the various provisions of this draft declaration
are contained in a report by the committee which has been communicated
to the members of the Council. I shall, therefore, not attempt to analyse
these texts.

In my opinion, once it has been accepted by Iraq in a manner con-
stitutionally effective, the draft declaration before us will afford, in accord-
ance with the Council's decision, the guarantees to which the latter decided
that the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq should be subject.

The passage in the report dealing with judicial organisation is, I
think, deserving of special mention here. The committee was in favour of
the maintenance of a uniform judicial system applicable to all Iraqi nationals
and to all foreigners.

It also proposed that the judicial system at present in force under
articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of the 4th March, 1931,
which has received the approval of the Council and of the so-called
Capitulatory Powers, should remain in force for a period of ten years from the
admission of Iraq to membership of the League. The committee requests the

the consent of Powers whose nationals enjoyed capitulation rights in the
former Ottoman Empire to renounce those rights for the future.

I do not think that the Council will have any objection to acceding to
its committee's recommendation. The new statute contemplated for Iraq
renders superfluous the jurisdictional privileges which, in theory, should be
revived in favour of the nationals of the so-called Capitulatory Powers as a
result of the termination of the mandate.

It takes account of the peculiar position of Iraq, and at the same time
respects its status as an independent State.

As my colleagues will remember, the Council resolution of the
24th January 1932 indicates that the Council intended to make the termina-
tion of the mandate for Iraq subject to two conditions, namely—

- (1) The formal acceptance by Iraq, in conformity with its Constitution,
of the proposed declaration.
- (2) The admission of Iraq to the League of Nations.

Consequently, the termination of the mandatory régime in that
territory will not be effected until Iraq has formally ratified the declaration
and has also been admitted to the League in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Covenant.

(1) Document C. 441, 1932, VI.

"I have accordingly the honour to propose to the Council the adoption
of the following resolution

"The Council,

"Approves the draft declaration and report submitted to it by its
committee in accordance with paragraph 4 of its resolution of the
24th January, 1932,

"Approves the report submitted this day by the representative of
Yugoslavia, its rapporteur,

"Accordingly recommends that the Powers concerned, whose
nationals enjoyed capitulation rights in the former Ottoman Empire,
renounce, before the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, the
maintenance of these former jurisdictional privileges in favour of their
nationals in future.

"Requests the Secretary General to communicate this recom-
mendation to the Governments of the States which the British Govern-
ment, in accordance with the present resolution, will approach with a
view to the proposed renunciation."

Mr Eden was sure his colleagues would agree that the Council owed a great
debt of gratitude to the Yugoslav representative and to the committee over
whose deliberations he had so ably presided for the valuable report before the
Council. In inviting the committee to frame the guarantees to be given by Iraq
the Council had entrusted it with a delicate and a difficult task, one calling for
wide sympathy and tact. The committee had accomplished its task with marked
success. In the first place, it had avoided all the pitfalls of controversy and had
achieved unanimity, in itself no mean accomplishment. But it had done much
more—it had produced a set of guarantees which, while giving the Council all the
readily accepted and scrupulously observed by the young State of Iraq.

M. Paul Boncour associated himself with the thanks which the representa-
tive of the United Kingdom had just addressed to the members of the committee
and the Yugoslav representative. He desired at the same time to make several
observations without, however, reopening the discussion on principle.

The French Government's point of view with regard to the undertakings to
be entered into by Iraq before its entry into the League of Nations had been
placed before the Council by the French representative at the meetings held on
the 4th September, 1931, and the 24th January, 1932. M. Paul Boncour would
therefore simply refer to these statements. He merely desired to indicate, in
connection with the drafts before the Council, the points which seemed to him to
require special attention.

In the draft declaration, the Council Committee had rightly given first place
to the protection of minorities, the special importance of which several members
of the Council, including M. Paul Boncour himself, had emphasised in January.
I allowed to express regret that the Council Committee had hesitated to avail itself
of all the opportunities offered it in the report prepared by the Mandates
Commission at its twenty-first session.

As Iraq was one of those Near Eastern countries where autonomy was based
on traditional ideas, the French representative wondered whether it would not
have been possible in the case where the living conditions of the populations
permitted it, to institute the minority system in the form of an administrative
autonomy, such a system, which was better calculated than any other to ensure
the exercise of the rights of the minorities in this country, was not without
precedent in the minorities treaties themselves. In making this observation
regarding the report before the Council, M. Paul Boncour had in mind both the
very clear recommendations of the Mandates Commission and the good relations
between minority and majority populations, as well as the very difficult duty of
supervision which would devolve upon the League Council, and which such a
system would have facilitated.

With regard to supervision, the Council Committee had confined itself to
embedding in its text the general guarantee clause laid down in the minority
treaties; but it had stated in the report containing its comments on the decla-
ration that it had not gone further, as invited by the Mandates Commission, because

this clause was "sufficiently elastic to be adjusted in practice to the special circumstances of Iraq."

M. Paul-Boncour desired note to be taken of this observation, which made clear the meaning of article 10 of the declaration drawn up for Iraq. The Council could not fail to observe that the various general terms of the declaration were not intended to be applied in a mechanical way to every case. They must, on the contrary, vary in accordance with the concrete problems to be solved. Obviously the Council would take a very different view of the matter in the case of a well known State where the traditions were such that the minority clauses met the need for adapting circumstances to territorial changes, and a State which had not been so long trained for political freedom. It was therefore legitimate, and even essential, to indicate clearly that the Council had special responsibilities in the latter case that it must avail itself of every means of fulfilling its obligations, and that any decision should be based on the soundness of the protection of minorities in its application to the State in question.

Subject to this observation, the French representative accepted the declaration proposed for Iraq.

With regard to article 11, application of the most favoured-nation clause, M. Paul-Boncour pointed out that paragraph 1 laid down as a general rule that the most favoured-nation clause should be applied subject to certain reservations contained in the following paragraphs—

Paragraph 2 said that, should the measures taken by any member of the League of Nations be such as to require the opening of negotiations with a State which had not entered the League of Nations, the member of the League concerned to open negotiations immediately for the purpose of restoring the balance. Paragraph 3 added that, should an agreement not be reached in negotiations with such a State, the member of the League in question should itself as from the date of the opening of negotiations, from the obligation laid down above.

The French representative pointed out that the Council could not question of imposing obligations upon a State which had newly entered the League of Nations without corresponding advantages. This provision might, however, lead to the conclusion that the Council should not be bound by the most favoured-nation clause in such cases. He pointed out that paragraph 2 and 3 of the declaration provided that the Council should not be bound by the most favoured-nation clause in such cases.

M. Paul Boncour thought the *rapporteur* could easily give him satisfaction in this respect.

M. Scialoja thought the Council should receive with great satisfaction the resolution submitted by the *rapporteur* and should congratulate itself on the conclusions reached by the committee.

The draft declaration contained appropriate safeguards on all the points which the Council had had in mind in its resolution of the 28th January, 1932.

M. Scialoja drew attention to the fact that the draft declaration provided for the protection of minorities in Iraq, and that it was essential to ensure that the rights of minorities were protected in the new State.

The most favoured-nation clause as provided for in the draft declaration guaranteed the equality of treatment. The restrictions were such as fairly to protect the interests of Iraq. There was a precedent, moreover, for such restrictions in several commercial treaties, and in particular the exception relating to frontier trade was sanctioned by long tradition and could not give rise to difficulties. As was well known, it was applied to goods traffic in frontier zones intended for the domestic purposes of the inhabitants of the zone, or for their rural enterprises.

The Italian representative was therefore glad to accept the *rapporteur's* proposal and availed himself of the opportunity of welcoming most

sympathetically the new State, whose co-operation the members of the League hoped soon to have in their great work of civilisation and peace.

M. Zaleski said he had examined very carefully the report of the Council Committee. He had also listened with great interest to the French representative's statement. He supported the latter's observations with regard to the declaration submitted to the Council, could have at once taken into account the experience already acquired in the protection of minorities and established a system to prevent the minority clauses from being used for purposes not in accordance with their real object.

Subject to this observation, he was prepared to accept the Yugoslav representative's resolution, and was glad to associate himself in so important a step towards the independence of Iraq.

Count Hleczek accepted the report and congratulated the committee on its work.

He also wished to lay emphasis on the regulations proposed for the protection of minorities. That was a matter of the utmost importance from the point of view of the League, which had a special function to fulfil in this sphere. By these regulations, which were the outcome of very careful reflection, the League had again recognised the principle of the protection of minorities as embodied in the relevant treaties and declarations. The German representative therefore felt particular satisfaction that the Powers represented on the Council were given, by adopting these regulations, a guarantee of the effective protection of minorities.

M. Andriod desired most emphatically to endorse the French representative's observations concerning the protection of minorities in Iraq—one of the subjects of the draft declaration the Council had before it.

The Norwegian Government regarded the rôle of the Council in minorities questions as one of its most important attributes and as the late lamented M. Briand had said to the Council on several occasions—a sacred duty of the League, a duty which must be fulfilled without ambiguity or compromise. The Norwegian Government regretted, therefore, that it had not been possible to use this opportunity to lighten the Council's task by improving the procedure for dealing with these minority problems.

Since the present régime in Iraq, the high moral tone and dignified bearing of the Council, the fact that the League of Nations was the Iraq Government was animated, provided the League with a guarantee that the rights of minorities would be respected most scrupulously, he thought he could accept the report, while expressing the ardent hope that the arrangement would be such as to give the very best results.

Mr. Lester, speaking for one of the members of the Council, took a special interest in the question of minorities in Iraq, thanked the *rapporteur* and the committee for their work. His Government would most enthusiastically welcome this ancient people into the circle of modern States.

M. Fotitch asked permission to reply to one or two observations, in particular those made by the French representative.

M. Paul Boncour had expressed regret that the Council Committee had been unable to consider the question of autonomy for certain minorities in Iraq. That matter had not escaped the committee's attention. The committee had noted that its mandate was determined by the Council resolution of the 28th January, 1932, which specified that, as the Council approved the Mandates Commission's report, it was essential to ensure the effective protection of the racial, linguistic and religious minorities. That was the task to which the committee had confined itself.

The committee's work had been greatly facilitated by the provisions of Iraqi law in this matter, and more especially by the unreserved assistance it had received from the Iraqi Prime Minister.

The committee had considered that it was bound by the Council's resolution of the 22nd January, 1931, whereby the Council approved the Mandates Commission's report rejecting a petition from a minority in Iraq in so far as it related to the granting to that minority of its own Government.

For these reasons, the committee had limited itself to drawing up the minorities guarantee clauses based on a declaration that was already in force. If it had not thought it necessary to introduce exceptional new provisions for Iraq, it was because the guarantee clause was, as M. Paul Boncour had said, sufficiently elastic to enable the Council to exercise its rights and carry out its duties.

In drafting article 11, which referred to the most-favoured nation clause, the committee had had two aims in view—first, that all members of the League should by the operation of that clause enjoy equality of treatment in their economic relations with Iraq, and, secondly, that Iraq should be safeguarded against an unduly hard and fast formula which might have placed that country in a difficult situation from the point of view of its economic development.

The committee had therefore inserted a reservation which enabled Iraq, in the conditions specified in article 11, to release itself from the obligation to grant the most-favoured-nation clause to a member of the League which might take certain measures and so disturb, to the detriment of Iraq, the economic equilibrium by seriously affecting Iraq's principal exports, and M. Fotitch was glad

to see the preoccupation of the committee as just and well founded. Any divergence as to the interpretation or application of that article between Iraq and a member of the League represented on the Council would of course be covered by article 16, which provided a general guarantee, and would enable such member to bring the dispute before the Permanent Court of International Justice. Hence, owing to the general clause inserted in article 16, the new State of Iraq would be unable to exercise this power arbitrarily.

In conclusion, he expressed his gratification at the happy conclusion of this very important stage on the road to the emancipation of Iraq, and he hoped that that country, whose economic expansion and political consolidation had been followed by the Council with keen interest and warm sympathy, would become a member of the League at the next Assembly and consequently a free State.

M. Paul Boncour thanked the rapporteur for his explanations, which made it possible for him to associate himself unreservedly with the approval of the documents under discussion.

He expressed his satisfaction at the happy event which the work in question had made possible and his great appreciation of the United Kingdom Government's action, which testified to so proper a conception of the duties incumbent on the mandatory Powers. He congratulated likewise the Council Committee and the rapporteur, who had made it possible for the initiative of the United Kingdom Government to have its full effect. Finally, he would be failing to discharge a very pleasant duty if, at the time when Iraq's admission to the League might be decided, he did not express the sincere wishes of the French Government that the new State should be able to develop its economic life and to enjoy the benefits of the League.

Mr. Fern expressed his appreciation of the French representative's references to the part played by the United Kingdom Government in this matter. He assured his colleagues that his Government shared the Council's satisfaction at the outcome of the work, and desired to express its sincere goodwill and good wishes towards the new State which it was hoped would shortly become a member of the League.

The draft resolution was adopted.

The President expressed the conviction that the members of the League would feel at seeing a representative of the independent State of Iraq take his place among them as a colleague at no very remote date.

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No 143

From Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 20.)

(Secret B)

Sir,

The Residency, Bagdad, June 8, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 195 of the 7th June, 1932, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of the marginally noted despatch from the Air Officer Commanding to the Air Ministry on the subject of the Assyrian situation.

2. The Air Officer Commanding has been in receipt of reports of the incidents arising from the presentation of the Assyrian officers' manifesto on the 1st June, and both these and the steps which he has taken to deal with what is up to the present principally a military situation are described fully in his despatch.

3. I have sent for the Mar Shimun and the chief Assyrian leaders to come to see me, and should prefer to reserve a detailed appreciation of future possibilities until I have seen and talked with them.

4. In the meanwhile I trust that the Air Officer Commanding's despatch will supply you with all the information as to facts which you require, and will, I hope, provide a background for the comments and reports which I shall telegraph to you as the situation becomes clearer.

I have, &c

F. H. HUMPHREYS

Enclosure in No. 143

Air Officer Commanding, Iraq Command, to Air Ministry

Sir,

Hinadi, June 8, 1932

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on the Assyrian situation, giving the events and circumstances which have led up to the present position—

Recent Events

2. On the 31st May I received reliable information to the effect that the Assyrian officers in the Iraq Levies were planning to terminate their contracts. This was the first direct evidence I received of such a movement. The next day the Officer Commanding, Assyrian Levies, received a manifesto, signed by all the Assyrian officers, to the effect that, as the British Government had not safeguarded the interests of the Assyrians, the whole levy force would disband within one month from the 1st June, 1932.

3. It soon appeared that the affair was organised by the tribal leaders and that the Assyrian officers were acting on instructions from outside. I therefore instructed Brigadier J. G. Browne, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., Commanding the Iraq Levies, to find out at once the intentions of the leaders and, in particular, the arrangements made for the reception and maintenance of so great a number of unemployed men. After interviewing David Mar Shimun, he left Hinadi by air on the 3rd June to interview the Mar Shimun himself, whom he eventually found at Zuweita on the road to Amadia. He lunched with Surma Khanim, Mar Shimun's sister-in-law, and then proceeded to Amadia. I presented him with the British flag. The Mar Shimun himself was more friendly, but professed to have little knowledge of the manifesto. Brigadier Browne's report of this interview is attached.

The Immediate Causes of the Movement

4. From these interviews and from other reliable sources the following information was obtained. It appears that early in April whilst Mar Shimun and Surma Khanim were staying in Bagdad, all the Assyrian officers in the cantonment were called to a meeting, where they were addressed by Surma Khanim; Mar Shimun was absent through illness. The officers were told that

they must be prepared to resign from the levies when told by their leaders to do so, and that they and their families would then assemble on a date and at a place in Northern Iraq, both of which would be notified later. At this assembly a decision would be made concerning their future movements. My information shows that the manifesto was prepared by Officer Shahim and passed amongst the levy officers in Hinaidi for signature. Some were unwilling to sign but pressure was brought to bear upon them. The manifesto was then sent for signature to Sulaimani and Diana by hand of Officer Maxherd, and thence to Mosul with a levy convoy. From Mosul it was sent back to Sulaimani because several of the officers there had been unwilling to sign before; a covering letter from the Rub Khalia persuaded them to add their signatures. The manifesto was then sent back to Hinaidi. This officer is of Russian origin, and is regarded as unreliable and a British agent.

5. The movement in the levies centres chiefly amongst the Upper Tiar and Lower Tiar tribes. The remaining tribes may or may not join the movement, but there is a considerable probability that a good percentage of those will prefer to remain in the service of the British. Appendix C shows that roughly half the levies are Tiar and T Khuma men and that they are divided between the two battalions.⁽¹⁾

6. It is understood that the movement was initiated by the large number of destitute Assyrians in the country. These numbers of unemployed men have been increased recently by discharges from the Iraq Levies and from the Iraqi Petroleum Company (owing to reductions in staff). These people have been for a long time constantly agitating for some drastic action on their behalf.

The Immediate Future

7. Brigadier Browne, on returning from his mission on the 6th June, presented to the High Commissioner by the 20th June. Brigadier Browne reported that the levies were being disbanded, and that the Assyrians would willingly leave Iraq if they could remain as a united body.

8. During Brigadier Browne's visit David Mar Shimun asked that the discharges from the levies might be held up, but at a subsequent meeting on the 20th June it was decided that the officers were to abide by the original manifesto.

The Situation on June 8, 1932

9. The disbandment of the levies will start on the 18th June and will be completed by the end of this month. Measures are being taken to minimise the possibility of trouble arising during the actual disbandment. There is no reason at present to anticipate any particular difficulty in carrying out these discharges, and there is even some hope that many Assyrians will re-enlist in the Air Defence Force.

10. Beyond the fact that the Assyrians intend to concentrate in the north, I have been unable to discover anything of their future plans, and I believe that the only way in which the concentration period cannot be gauged at present.

The Temper of the Assyrians and Likelihood of Disorder.

11. At present there is no sign of any trouble, and judgment is that the Assyrians are not likely to make trouble but there are signs that the Assyrians are angry and that some trouble may occur. It is necessary, therefore, to take every precaution.

12. Rumours are circulating to the effect that men who do not join in the movement will be treated as traitors. At the same time it is stated that any Assyrians in the Iraq army will be given the opportunity to join the movement.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

movements of levies from Sulaimani or Diana will lead to disorders. I attribute these rumours to hot-heads, and I hope that such threats, except possibly the withdrawals from the Iraq army and police, will be met by a timely warning to the Mar Shimun and the maliks that they will be held personally responsible for any lawless acts or coercion of any kind.

Loyalty of the Levy Personnel.

13. Up to the presentation of the manifesto, Brigadier Browne and the British officers were prepared to say that under all conditions the levies would remain loyal to their duty, but this view must now be modified. The Assyrian officers and men in the levies have, during the whole of their service, served two masters, and their loyalty has been given both to the British Government and to the Mar Shimun. So far, the aims of both their masters have not diverged to an extent, but now the officers are faced with disloyalty either to the British Government or to their own patriarch and religious head, under pressure from their people they have chosen to follow their patriarch. It seems to them that they stood to lose everything if they did not sign with their own people, whilst loyalty to the British Government promised only a doubtful future in Iraq. Their aim has always been to keep together.

14. Out of consideration for their commanding officers the Assyrian officers signed the manifesto without asking for permission to do so, and the case with them is a difficult one. They argue that they had to sign the document, and that, if they had consulted the British officers in the first place they would have received orders not to sign. They say that they were not given the opportunity to do so, and that they committed the additional offence of disobeying a definite order, and, as they say themselves, "blackening the face" of the British officers responsible for it. The problem confronting the Assyrian officers has been a serious one for them, and in the circumstances it is difficult to see how they could have arrived at any other decision.

The Underlying Causes of the Movement

15. The present action of the Assyrians is absolutely consistent with the views and statements they have expressed ever since they heard that Great Britain intended to give up the mandate of Iraq. Nothing we can say or do, short of giving them our protection, can eradicate their fears for the future, if they continue to live in scattered and isolated groups, the instinct of self preservation urges them to concentrate, and up to the very last they have never really thought that Great Britain would leave them dispersed among Mahometans under a Moslem Government.

16. The Mar Shimun is the direct successor of the line of Nestorian patriarchs whose seat was at Ctesiphon until the Mahometan conquest. These patriarchs had ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the whole of this country, over a large part of Persia, and over a large part of the Caucasus. They were driven into retreat until they finally took refuge in the Hakkari Mountains. The present remnant represents a great past, and they fear that, if they are left under a purely Islamic Government they will lose that which they have held so steadfastly for nearly 2,000 years, for they claim that their Church was founded in the 1st century.

17. The fact that the present situation has been created by the poverty stricken and discontented unemployed must not be allowed to obscure the real importance of the movement in the eyes of the more fanatical tribesmen. They are adamant in their determination to preserve the unity and integrity of their nation and of their religion, and they intend now to stake everything in one last throw.

18. I have visited Hakkari territory, which was reported to be at least partly annexed by the decision given by the Council of the League of Nations in December 1925 in the face of the strongest opposition on the part of Great Britain, who represented the Assyrians. The necessity for providing this territory in Iraq as the Assyrians' place to

achieve a satisfactory settlement of the Assyrian question. As a result of this decision of the Council, Great Britain has been faced with a problem that has, so far, proved insoluble, and has now led the Assyrian people, in desperation, to seek their own salvation.

I have &c

E R LUDLOW HEWITT, Air Vice Marshal,
Commanding Iraq Command

*Notes on the Interview with Lady Surma D'Beit Mar Shimun and the
Mar Shimun on Friday, June 3, 1932*

FOUND Lady Surma at Dohuk. Told her of the decision of all the Assyrian officers to resign. She said she knew of it. Went on and gave a long list of what Assyrians had done and failure of Great Britain to do anything for them. She said many were destitute, and that these had forced the rest, including officers and the Mar Shimun, to take some action.

I asked what they would do. She said she did not know. "Possibly some join the Sheikh of Barzan." This I regarded as a flash of temper, as it is unlikely for several reasons. Went on to Zawita and found the Mar Shimun at a picnic with the Kaimakam Medi Beg, the Bishop Mar Ablahad, Malik Khoshaba and Dr. Baber. The Agha of Zawita was also there. The Mar Shimun went off with me and we had about an hour's talk. A good deal of what the Assyrians had done was repeated.

He explained that the Assyrian officers had not resigned their commissions in any mutinous spirit. They had decided that, now that Iraq was about to become independent, and that nothing more would be done for the Assyrians, the time was come to throw in their lot altogether.

I told him that the Air Defence Force was to be formed, and that there would be this detachment of 600 Assyrians there for many years as a link with the British and to provide pay for themselves and dependents. He asked what we would do if we did not get Assyrians, and I said we should then get other people.

He finally asked: "What do you want me to do?" and I told him I wanted him to use his influence as Mar Shimun to get the officers to withdraw their resignations.

After some questions he then said: "Well, I will tell them the truth. I told him that, as he could not possibly get round in time, I wanted him to authorize his father to speak to the officers for him, and that he should meet as many as he could. I told him I should send his father up to him for this purpose."

J G BROWNE, Brigadier,
Commanding Iraq Levies

CHAPTER IV. PALESTINE

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No. 144.

Sir John Simon to M. Mamiani

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 23, 1932.

SIGNOR BORDONARO put forward in his note No. 4135 of the 20th September last the views of the Italian Government on several questions concerning the administration of Palestine. The various issues raised have necessitated consultation with the Government of Palestine, and although I am not yet in a position to send a reply on every subject raised by his Excellency, the necessary material now available in regard to a number of the points raised therein enables me to deal with them without further delay in the present note.

2. In section 3 of his note Signor Bordonaro drew attention to the fact that no reply had been returned to the observations which he had put forward in his note of the 5th September, 1928, regarding two draft ordinances, published in the "Palestine Official Gazette," of the 1st July, 1928, namely, "The Exemption from Taxation (Religious and Charitable Institutions and Government Departments) Ordinance, 1928," and "The Charities, Exemption from Customs Ordinance, 1928."

3. I regret that his Excellency's note of the 5th September, 1928, on this point was not received until some time ago. The complexity of the questions at issue. As you are no doubt aware, the two ordinances have not been put into force, and the complaints which were made to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in consultation with the Government of Palestine, with a desire to ensure that nothing in the ordinances, as eventually passed into law, shall "prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" or "obstruct or interfere with the exercise of the rights of religious or ecclesiastical bodies" in Palestine more than is essential for the purpose of "exercising such supervision . . . as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government" without any discrimination on grounds of religion or nationality.

4. As a result of this further examination of the question, it has now been decided to modify the draft ordinances in certain important respects. The textual amendments required to give effect to the decision are still under consideration in Palestine and it is therefore not possible for me at present to furnish you with detailed information regarding them. I shall not, however, fail to acquaint you with the amendments ultimately decided upon, and I feel sure that you will find them in accordance with the objects of the previous drafts raised by Signor Bordonaro in his notes of the 5th September, 1928, and the 26th September last.

5. In section 3 of his note his Excellency also referred to the question of the compatibility with the Palestine mandate of certain draft legislation relating to education in that territory.

6. This question was first raised by the Italian Embassy in a memorandum dated the 28th December, 1927, in which Count Rogeri put forward the objections of the Italian Government to those provisions of the draft Education Ordinance, as published in the "Palestine Official Gazette" of the 15th October, 1927, which concerned the degree of Government control over teachers in foreign schools. I am informed by Sir Austen Chamberlain in his note that it had been decided to amend the draft ordinance in a manner which, it was hoped, would meet the objections raised in the above-mentioned memorandum.

7. The amendments were embodied in the revised version of the draft ordinance published in the "Palestine Official Gazette" of the 15th July, 1928, and I am informed by Sir Austen Chamberlain in his note of the 26th September that they were regarded as satisfactory by the Italian Government. In that note, however, further objections were raised by his Excellency to the draft ordinance in connexion with a different section, namely, 7 (1), which read

as follows: "The Director, a District Commissioner, any Inspector of the Department of Education, and any other officer authorised in writing by the Director, may at all times enter and inspect any school, and the manager, or the person for the time being in charge of the school, shall furnish any information which the inspecting officer may demand with regard to the care and tuition of the teachers."

8. I have the honour to inform you that, with a view to meeting the criticisms which have been put forward in regard to the modified draft ordinance, as published on the 10th July, 1928, it is proposed to revise it still further on a number of points. The proposed revision is not yet passed into law, but I am happy to be able to inform you that one of the modifications proposed concerns the section quoted above, and that the general effect of the new text will be (subject, of course, to the retention of such powers of supervision as the High Commissioner may be compelled to exercise for the maintenance of public order and good government) to replace the power of entry and inspection, in the case of non-assisted schools established or maintained by a religious association, by a power of visit only. Visits will only be made by the Director and the Deputy Director of Education, and after reasonable notice has been given to the manager. It will still be the duty of the manager or the person for the time being in charge of the school to furnish at the visit, or at other times, any information which the Director or Deputy Director may require, with regard to the care and tuition of pupils, the general management of the school and the names and qualifications of the teachers. But any apprehension felt by your Government about the type of information which the Director shall not be entitled to demand any change in the curriculum or internal administration of a school of this category.

9. I shall be grateful if you will communicate the above information to the Italian Government with an expression of the hope of His Majesty's Government that they will be satisfied with the revised ordinance, and that it will be regarded as the mandatory and to the administrative responsibilities of the Government of Palestine under the Palestine mandate, and more particularly under article 15 of that instrument, in accordance with which the Government of Palestine have the right and duty to require that these schools shall conform to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Government of Palestine may impose, and to take steps to see that they do so.

10. At the meeting of the Council of the 28th September, 1931, Signor Bordonaro reverted to that of the immunities and privileges of consular officers in Palestine, which formed the subject of my predecessor's note of the 8th September last.

11. In that note the Marquess of Reading explained the inability of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to grant the requests put forward by the Italian Embassy had first put forward in 1920 and 1930 respectively and which were reiterated in your memorandum of the 25th June last. These requests were that a higher position in the table of precedence should be accorded to the Italian consul general in Palestine and that consular officers in Palestine should be granted exemption from the payment of motor car licence duty.

12. In his note of the 26th September Signor Bordonaro advanced certain considerations in the light of which he suggested that the question of consular immunities and privileges in Palestine might be reconsidered.

13. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have studied his Excellency's observations in connexion with the provisions of the Palestine mandate, but have been unable to discover anything in the mandate entitling consular officers in Palestine to receive any privileges or immunities greater than, or different from, those which are accorded to consular officers in other territories. The regime of the mandate, as it stands, does not appear to contain any provision which would entitle consular officers in Palestine to receive any privileges or immunities greater than, or different from, those which are accorded to consular officers in other territories.

"The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine."

"Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on the 1st August, 1914, shall have previously

renounced the right to their re-establishment or shall have agreed to their re-establishment, they shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned."

It is true that this article contemplates the re-establishment in certain circumstances of privileges and immunities enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the former Ottoman Empire, but it expressly provides that, during the continuance of the mandate, these privileges and immunities "shall not be applicable in Palestine." It is clear therefore that so long as the mandate for Palestine continues in operation no argument can be founded on article 6 in favour of the view that there is any obligation to grant any immunity or privilege to consular officers in Palestine in excess of the immunities and privileges normally granted to consular officers in other territories under the jurisdiction of His Majesty's Government. The situation which may arise regarding these matters in the future, if and when the mandate comes to an end, is, in the view of His Majesty's Government, a consideration irrelevant to the present situation when the mandate is in force.

14. Nevertheless, while unable to admit that consular officers in Palestine are entitled to the special position which is accorded to them in the régime of the Capitulations, and of the political advantages of maintaining their position in Palestine, His Majesty's Government are, in fact, considerably greater, especially in British colonies. It is possible that the Italian Government may not be fully aware of the extent of these immunities and privileges, and I therefore take leave to send an explanatory memorandum on the subject.

I have already made it known to the Italian Government that His Majesty's Government are unable to grant the requests put forward by the Italian Embassy for additional privileges put forward in your memorandum of the 25th June and reiterated by implication in Signor Bordonaro's note of the 26th September.

15. As regards the question of the precedence assigned to the Italian consul general in Palestine, you will observe, from the enclosed memorandum, that an enhanced precedence was granted in 1930 to all consular officers *de carrière*. Re-examination of the matter has shown that it is impracticable still further to raise their position, and I regret therefore that on this point it is impossible for me to add anything to the notes addressed to Signor Bordonaro on the 6th March, 1930, and the 8th September, 1931.

16. As regards the question of the exemption of consular officers from motor car licence and registration fees, as a matter of courtesy, to the local privileges already enjoyed by foreign consular officers *de carrière* in Palestine, this concession will take effect as from the 1st January, 1932.

17. I shall not fail to address you further regarding the other questions raised in your memorandum of the 25th June and reiterated by implication in Signor Bordonaro's note of the 26th September, in consultation with the Government of Palestine, has been completed.

I have, &c.
JOHN SIMON

Enclosure in No 144

Memorandum respecting Privileges and Immunities of Foreign Consular Officers in Palestine

THE following immunities are enjoyed by consuls-general, consuls, vice-consuls and other foreign consular officers *de carrière* in Palestine

(A)—Exemption from Certain Personal and Financial Charges.

1 Customs

Under section IV of the Customs Duties Exemption Ordinance, 1923, a very complete measure of exemption is allowed to foreign consular officers. Exemption is granted in respect of—

- (i) Any articles and effects intended for the personal use of consular officers appointed in Palestine who belong to the regular consular service and are not engaged in any other business or profession
- (ii) Uniforms of consular officers, including the necessary arms, badges and equipment appertaining thereto.
- (iii) Articles for the use of the public service of the consulate

It should be noted that these exemptions are granted at any time during the consul's residence in Palestine, and not only during a certain period after his first arrival, as is the practice in many countries. The Palestine authorities have, however, been instructed to ensure that articles for the personal use of a consul's family are also immune from duty.

A further privilege is assured to foreign consular officers by the instructions which have been issued to the local authorities to refrain from opening sealed mail bags addressed to consular officers. Other parcels or packages are also, as a general rule, released without examination, on the strength of a declaration by the consular officer.

2 Immigration Fees

Consular officers and their wives and children are exempt from the payment of fees under the Immigration Ordinance of 1925.

3 House and Land Tax and Municipal Rates and Taxes.

Although there is no legal right to exemption, it has been customary not to enforce collection from consular officers.

(B)—Judicial Immunities

The immunity of consular officers is fully recognised in Palestine. While foreign consular officers in Palestine have no immunity as such from process or proceedings, care is taken to show to consular officers every reasonable consideration that is not inconsistent with the due course of justice, and to avoid any unnecessary disturbance to them in the exercise of their official duties.

Further, as regards the liability of consuls in Palestine in respect of matters coming within the scope of their official duties, it would not appear possible that a foreign consul could be liable in the courts of Palestine in respect of any omission of any part of his consular duties, in view of the fact that Palestinian law does not command the fulfilment by foreign consuls of the duties entrusted to them by their Governments. On the other hand it need not be supposed that any act done by a consul in the exercise of his official duties would be held to be contrary to Palestinian law, as it is the practice of Governments not to impose duties on their consular officers which would be inconsistent with the law of the country where they reside and to frame their instructions accordingly.

Precedence

In 1930 it was decided to raise the precedence of consuls-general and consuls *de carrière* from the fifteenth to the tenth place. It may be noted that foreign consular officers in the United Kingdom are granted no precedence, and it is considered that the relatively high position which consuls-general and consuls *de carrière* now occupy is a not inconsiderable contribution to the prestige of the consular body, especially as, owing to the peculiar circumstances of the country, and, in particular, the large number of high ecclesiastical dignitaries residing there, the table of precedence in Palestine is unusually long.

Foreign Office, January 28, 1932

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No 145.

Sir John Simon to M. Hordondrea

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, March 23, 1932

IN my note of the 24th January to M. Mameli I dealt with a number of the questions raised by the administration of Palestine, and I now have the honour to acquaint you with the replies of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the remaining questions.

2. I will first take that of the execution of public works in Palestine. In a memorandum which M. Mameli left at the Foreign Office on the 25th June last doubt was expressed whether the manner in which public works were carried out in Palestine was in accordance with the provisions of the mandate.

3. In your note of the 26th September your Excellency made special mention of the cases of the Haifa Harbour Works, the projected Haifa Bagdad Railway, and the Haifa-Hamra el-Faraj Railway. It was pointed out in the procedure which the Italian Government understood had been followed in these cases, even if in conformity with the letter of the assurances given in the memorandum enclosed in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 20th April, 1926, to the Marquis della Torretta, was in accordance with the spirit of those assurances or of the Palestine mandate. The contention was also advanced that, according to the principles which governed the grant of the mandates, all works of a certain importance must be thrown open to competitive offers by public tender. It was stated that the manner in which the Haifa Harbour Works was carried out was contrary to the spirit of the international agreements on the subject and detrimental to Italian interests.

4. I have the honour to inform you that the Italian Government have been informed that the British Government have no objection to the Italian Government proceeding with the Haifa Harbour Works, provided that the Italian Government are satisfied that the manner in which the works are carried out is in accordance with the spirit of the international agreements on the subject and that the works are carried out in accordance with the provisions of the mandate. It is also pointed out that the Italian Government have been informed that the British Government have no objection to the Italian Government proceeding with the Haifa Bagdad Railway, provided that the Italian Government are satisfied that the manner in which the works are carried out is in accordance with the spirit of the international agreements on the subject and that the works are carried out in accordance with the provisions of the mandate.

5. The question of the Haifa Harbour Works was also raised in the memorandum of the 25th June last. It was pointed out that the Italian Government have been informed that the British Government have no objection to the Italian Government proceeding with the Haifa Harbour Works, provided that the Italian Government are satisfied that the manner in which the works are carried out is in accordance with the spirit of the international agreements on the subject and that the works are carried out in accordance with the provisions of the mandate. It is also pointed out that the Italian Government have been informed that the British Government have no objection to the Italian Government proceeding with the Haifa Bagdad Railway, provided that the Italian Government are satisfied that the manner in which the works are carried out is in accordance with the spirit of the international agreements on the subject and that the works are carried out in accordance with the provisions of the mandate.

Construction staff are connected with the firm of Messrs. Reudel, Palmer and Tritton. In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom cannot admit that there is anything in this arrangement which contravenes either the letter or the spirit of the mandate, or of the assurances contained in the memorandum enclosed in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 29th April, 1926.

6. On the point of principle raised by your Excellency, His Majesty's Government much regret to find themselves in disagreement with the Italian Government. They cannot, however, share the opinion that the principle of the departmental execution of public works in Palestine is contrary to any of their international obligations in respect of that territory, or that either the spirit or the letter of the mandate or of the assurances contained in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 29th April, 1926, requires that all works of a certain importance shall be thrown open to competitive offers by public tender. It is impossible for His Majesty's Government to admit that either the mandate or the assurances in question have had the effect of depriving the Administration of the right to decide whether particular public works should be carried out by the Government.

7. Article 11 of the mandate is clearly consistent with the right of the Government to decide whether particular public works should be carried out by the Government or otherwise. I need scarcely say, however, that where it is decided that work shall be carried out departmentally, it is still the intention of His Majesty's Government, as was explained in the case of the Haifa Harbour Works, in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 31st January, 1929, that there shall be no discrimination between suitable British and foreign firms in the allocation of such contracts as may be let out locally for the supply of materials or the execution of sections of the work.

8. Another complaint put forward by your Excellency concerned the treatment of Italian employees of the Palestine Administration.

9. In the third paragraph of section 4 of your note you alluded to a representation made by the Italian Embassy, the result of which, in the words of your note, "was merely the transmission by the Foreign Office on the 12th November, 1930, by way of information, of circular No. 41, the very document against the provisions of which the objections had been raised." I assume that your Excellency had in mind the oral representations which the counsellor to the Italian Embassy made in June 1930, but, if so, there appears to be some misunderstanding both as to the nature of those representations and as to the sequence of events in the matter. According to the records of the Foreign Office, M. Mameli's representations were not taken into consideration until the 17th July, 1929.

10. M. Mameli's representations were not taken into consideration until the 17th July, 1929. At that time the Italian Government were not entitled to pensions. M. Mameli enquired whether such a state of affairs would not constitute discrimination within the meaning of article 18 of the mandate, and he was informed that there appeared to be nothing in the terms of that article which would entitle a foreign employee of the Palestine Government to claim treatment identical with that accorded to British or Palestinian employees. No specific regulation of the Palestine Government was in force at that time. A few days later he confirmed by telephone that the Italian Government had no concrete case in mind, but were anxious to know the position.

11. A few days later he confirmed by telephone that the Italian Government had no concrete case in mind, but were anxious to know the position. His Majesty's Government was asked to supply copies of the regulations governing the pension rights of Government employees in Palestine, and on the 21st August a copy of the Palestine Pensions Ordinance, 1925, with the regulations scheduled thereto, was forwarded to M. Mameli, with an expression of the hope that these documents would give all the information which the Italian Government required. Some little time afterwards, and independently of the Italian Embassy's enquiry, it was brought to the notice of Mr. Arthur Henderson that the Administration of Palestine had issued a circular (Circular No. 41) bearing on this subject, on the 17th July, 1929, and a copy of it was immediately and spontaneously sent to

M. Mameli on the 12th November, 1930, with the object of ensuring that the information, for which the Italian Embassy had asked, might be complete.

12. From the above account the Italian Government will appreciate the fact that, in spontaneously sending to your Embassy a copy of Circular No. 41, my Government were actuated purely by a desire to supply the Italian Government with the full information which, they understood, it had been the sole object of M. Mameli's visit to seek. Indeed they remained unaware that the Italian

Government had received the document which M. Mameli left here on the 20th June last. That document was, in accordance with the usual procedure, referred for observations to the High Commissioner for Palestine, but before Sir J. Chancellor's report arrived your Excellency's note of the 26th September reached me.

13. Although it is not the intention of the Government of Palestine to discriminate against any particular nationality, it is not possible to make any distinction between members of the same grade of the public service on the ground of nationality from becoming eligible for pension. There is in fact no distinction as regards pensionability and there is no intention of making such distinction between members of the same grade of the public service.

14. In regard to the specific case of an Italian subject, Luigi di Belia, I understand that this officer applied in February 1931 to be allowed to exercise his right of option under article 14 of the schedule to the Palestine Pensions Ordinance, 1925. This application was refused on two grounds, firstly, that there was as yet no pensionable cadre for the Junior Service in the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, and secondly, that the officer was not eligible for pensionable employment.

15. The first of these grounds was valid, and remains so, but the second was based on a misapprehension of the position, and it has since been decided that the officer should be allowed to exercise his right of option. The Government would be debarred upon the ground of his nationality from becoming eligible for pension, and that there is no objection to noting the desire to opt for British pension and gratuity on the part of an officer who, though not yet

16. The first of these grounds was valid, and remains so, but the second was based on a misapprehension of the position, and it has since been decided that the officer should be allowed to exercise his right of option.

17. The first of these grounds was valid, and remains so, but the second was based on a misapprehension of the position, and it has since been decided that the officer should be allowed to exercise his right of option.

18. The first of these grounds was valid, and remains so, but the second was based on a misapprehension of the position, and it has since been decided that the officer should be allowed to exercise his right of option.

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23. The first of these grounds was valid, and remains so, but the second was based on a misapprehension of the position, and it has since been decided that the officer should be allowed to exercise his right of option.

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25. The first of these grounds was valid, and remains so, but the second was based on a misapprehension of the position, and it has since been decided that the officer should be allowed to exercise his right of option.

26. The first of these grounds was valid, and remains so, but the second was based on a misapprehension of the position, and it has since been decided that the officer should be allowed to exercise his right of option.

27. The first of these grounds was valid, and remains so, but the second was based on a misapprehension of the position, and it has since been decided that the officer should be allowed to exercise his right of option.

(1) Not printed

2. The responsibilities of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland arising out of the acceptance by His Majesty of a mandate for Transjordan are as follows—

- (1) The duty of developing self-governing institutions and the safeguarding of the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants, irrespective of race and religion.
- (2) The duty of encouraging local autonomy.
- (3) The duty of securing freedom of conscience, free exercise of worship subject to the maintenance of public order and morals, and of preventing discrimination of any kind between the inhabitants of the country on the ground of race, religion or language, and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Transjordan.
- (4) The duty of securing for all persons, whether natives or foreigners, the same rights and privileges in judicial matters, and the same treatment as nationals of any State to which by treaty or otherwise they are entitled.
- (5) The duty of securing respect for the personal status of the various communities, and the administration of Awqaf, in accordance with the religious law and the dispositions of the founders.
- (6) The duty of safeguarding international rights in Transjordan, of adhering on behalf of Transjordan to certain international conventions approved by the League of Nations and of securing the performance of international obligations by Transjordan, of which the following are included among those specifically mentioned—

Freedom of transit across Transjordan territory
Non interference with the enterprise of religious, or charitable bodies of all faiths, subject to the measures required for the maintenance of public order and good government
The enactment and execution of a Law of Antiquities
Co-operation in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, and for the control of diseases of plants and animals

It is the duty of the High Commissioner, subject to the direction of His Majesty's Government, to secure the performance of all the obligations of Transjordan which are undertaken by His Majesty's Government towards the League of Nations and nationals of other States.

Moreover, it is the duty of His Majesty's Government to make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate, and to communicate with the report copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year.

The High Commissioner then must cause such annual report to be prepared in such form and containing such information and material as the Council may from time to time properly require, and must ensure that copies of all laws and subordinate legislation are furnished with the report.

3. His Majesty is also responsible for ensuring—

- (1) That the interests of foreigners are adequately protected.
- (2) That the financial interests of His Majesty's Government are safeguarded.
- (3) That a prudent use is made of the resources of the country.
- (4) That within the financial limits available the administration of the country conforms generally to the traditions and principles of progressive and enlightened government.

4. His Majesty by means of an agreement concluded with His Highness the Amir of Transjordan on the 20th February, 1924, has recognised the existence in Transjordan of an independent Government under the rule of His Highness

the Amir of Transjordan, such Government being constitutional and placing His Majesty in a position to fulfil his international obligations in respect of the territory.

5. At the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations held on the 1st September, 1925, in the course of a discussion on the Transjordan Agreement, the representative of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom pointed out that His Majesty's Government still remained responsible to the Council for the proper application in Transjordan of the mandate for Palestine, except in so far as certain of its provisions were, under article 25 and in virtue of the operation in Transjordan of the Transjordan Agreement, 1922, excluded from operation in Transjordan. The Council, on the same day, adopted a resolution taking note of this declaration and acknowledging that the Transjordan Agreement was in conformity with the principles of the mandate, which remained fully in force.

6. The High Commissioner for Transjordan is the representative of His Majesty in Transjordan, and His Majesty's Government will look to him as their principal officer for securing the due fulfilment of all the obligations which they have undertaken.

7. The powers of legislation and of administration entrusted to His Majesty as mandatory are to be exercised in Transjordan by His Highness the Amir through the Constitutional Government defined and determined in the Transjordan Organic Law. It being an obligation on the mandatory to ensure that legislation is adapted to the needs of the country under progressive and enlightened government, and that the administration is conducted to give due effect to such legislation, it is for the High Commissioner to exercise control over the legislation of the Transjordan Government. This control is to be exercised in two ways, first, by seeing that the positive responsibilities and obligations are carried into effect at all times, and secondly by preventing the adoption or making of laws and rules that may hinder the full discharge of international responsibilities and obligations.

8. Since His Highness the Amir has undertaken to be guided by the advice of His Majesty's Government in all matters affecting the international and financial obligations of His Majesty, it is the duty of His Majesty's Government to ensure that His Highness the Amir follows such an administrative, financial and fiscal policy in Transjordan as will ensure the stability and good organisation of the Transjordan Government and its finances. For that purpose the High Commissioner must keep himself informed of the measures proposed to achieve those objects, and must ensure that the measures adopted do, in fact, tend towards those objects. The manner in which revenue is raised and collected, and the authorities for the expenditure of the public revenues are, therefore, matters in which the High Commissioner must arrange to keep himself fully informed.

Moreover the High Commissioner must be satisfied that the revenues of Transjordan are sufficient to meet the needs of the country, and that the system of control over the finances of the Transjordan Government shall be made unless the prior consent of His Majesty's Government has been obtained.

With regard to expenditure required for the defence of Transjordan, the Amir of Transjordan has recognised the principle that such expenditure is a charge on the revenues of the country.

From the 1st April 1930, the charge is as follows—

- (a) In respect of the Transjordan Frontier Force, one-sixth of the total cost.
- (b) In respect of the excess cost of the Royal Air Force stationed in Transjordan over the cost of such force if stationed in Great Britain one-half of the excess cost of the Royal Air Force together with the capital cost of works services in Transjordan.

Having regard to the fact that the revenues of the country are insufficient to meet the cost of the Royal Air Force and of the Frontier Force, His Majesty's Government

with Transjordan with a view to the cancellation of the proposal or to reference of it to His Majesty's Government for consideration.

19. The High Commissioner must see that the salaries and expenses of his representative in Transjordan, the British Resident and his staff, are voted for by the Legislative Council. He must also see that the British Resident is provided for the accommodation of the British members of the Resident's staff. He must refer to the Secretary of State any proposal to employ any officer of European nationality in the service of the Transjordan Government, and must also ensure that British officers serving under the Transjordan Government are adequately remunerated, and that their service is regulated by lawful agreement.

20. His Majesty may maintain armed forces in Transjordan, and may raise or employ such forces for the defence of the country and to assist His Highness the Amir in the reservation of peace and order. On the other hand, His Highness the Amir must not maintain any military forces without the consent of His Majesty. With regard to armed forces which His Majesty may raise in Transjordan, the High Commissioner must ensure that the command of such forces shall vest in His Majesty, and that they shall be subject to the control of His Majesty's Government.

With regard to armed forces which His Majesty may raise in Transjordan, the High Commissioner must ensure that the command of such forces shall vest in His Majesty, and that they shall be subject to the control of His Majesty's Government. He must also ensure that the arms and ammunition of such forces are stored in such places as may be determined by His Majesty's Government.

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The High Commissioner must ensure that the arms and ammunition of such forces are stored in such places as may be determined by His Majesty's Government. He must also ensure that the arms and ammunition of such forces are stored in such places as may be determined by His Majesty's Government.

21. In the event of disaffection or grave threat to public order and peace in Transjordan the High Commissioner must decide if the circumstances are such as to require the proclamation of martial law in all or any part of Transjordan, and if martial law be proclaimed then he must provisionally nominate and cause His Highness the Amir to appoint an officer or officers of His Majesty's forces to administer Transjordan or parts thereof under martial law. If any person so appointed must be submitted forthwith to the Secretary of State with a full report on the circumstances in which the appointment was made. The High Commissioner must further ensure that on the re-establishment of civil government laws are enacted indemnifying all or any of the forces maintained by His Majesty for all acts done or omissions and defaults made under martial law.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

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No. 147

Consul Monck Mason to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 14)

N. 10

Sir,

Aleppo, March 31, 1932

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9 of the 28th instant relative to a proposed more rapid train service between London and Tehran, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the new train and motor time-table which, as from the 22nd May next, will much shorten passenger and mail connexions with Iraq. I enclose also a copy of a circular issued by the Compagnie des Wagons Lités, the manager of the company, with no mention of their being confidential.

2. It is to be observed that provision is made for reaching Haifa on the same day as that on which Aleppo is left, and there would seem to be no reason why the overland service to Cairo should not be shortened still further eventually by the introduction of a direct service.

3. I enclose also a copy of the Internationale des Wagons Lits that the motor service between Khankin and Tehran has been assured by Graham Page four-seater cars. Between Kirkuk and Khankin there is a "voiture-couche".

4. The motor service between Kirkuk and Khankin are to be suspended during the hot months of July and August and also in December, January and February, when roads are impassable.

5. I am told that the Soviets are straining every nerve to obtain the favour of the public for their own alternative route to Persia via Baku and Enzeli. The price of the journey via Russia is cheaper, though the time taken is longer.

6. The Bozanti Alep-Nisabim and Prolongements and the Damas-Hama and Prolongements have acquired a controlling interest in the Compagnie automobile, which after a good deal of delay, has now begun to operate. Owing to the number of claims made against the company for damage caused by reckless driving, new auto-roulottes services are to be developed, notably a daily one to Alexandretta via Antioch.

7. During the past year much work has been done on the Aleppo-Deir ez-Zor road, but it cannot yet be considered proof against a really rainy season. This road will probably be developed in the near future.

8. Since the completion of the bridge over the Euphrates at Deir ez-Zor, the Bozanti Alep-Nisabim and Prolongements has suffered much from the competition of trucks which transport goods from Deir ez-Zor, Hama and Hassetché at rates unapproachable by the railway company. The acquisition of an interest in the Auto Routière Company by the Bozanti Alep-Nisabim and Prolongements should enable the latter to compete in some measure with road traffic in the Euphrates region.

9. I am sending copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus and to the British vice-consul at Alexandretta.

I have, &c

G. MONCK MASON

(4) Not printed

Sir John Simon to Mr. R. H. Campbell (Paris).

(No. 970.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 6, 1932.

IN my despatch No. 373 of the 16th February was enclosed an extract from the minutes of a meeting on the 30th January last of the Council of the League of Nations during its 64th session, at which the Anglo-French Agreement of the 31st October, 1931, concerning the frontier between Transjordan and Syria and the Jebel Druze was discussed. You will have observed from these minutes that, at the close of the discussion, the delegate of the United Kingdom stated that he had just been told that the formal approval of the Council had never been sought for the frontier dividing Palestine from Syria and the Lebanon, which was delimited in 1922-23. Lord Cecil added that His Majesty's Government would lose no time in examining this question in consultation with the French Government, and that if any necessary measures had been overlooked, the appropriate action would be taken in agreement with the French Government to remedy the omission at a future session of the Council. The President of the Council, as representative of France, associated himself with Lord Cecil's statement.

2. Just prior to the 60th session of the Council, M. Catastini, an Italian member of the League Secretariat, had pointed out privately that, according to the preambles to the mandates for Palestine and Syria, the principal Allied Powers (i.e., Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) appeared to be the competent authorities for the definition of the boundaries of the respective mandated territories. In subsequent conversations at Geneva, M. Catastini implied that as the principal Allied Powers had ceased to exist as a body, the Council of the League might now be regarded for this purpose as succeeding them. He suggested that as the line laid down in the 1920 convention had not been specifically approved by the principal Allied Powers, it ought to be formally approved by the Council, and he urged that the section between the Mediterranean and El Hanane, as well as the Syria-Transjordan sector, should be submitted to the Council for approval. In these circumstances, Lord Cecil, after consultation with the French delegate, as well as with M. Catastini, agreed to make the statement referred to in the preceding paragraph.

3. For your confidential information, the status of the principal Allied Powers and of the Council of the League in this matter is, in the view of His Majesty's Government, as follows:—

4. At the San Remo Conference in 1920, at which the "A" mandated territories were allotted, it was decided that the principal Allied Powers should not only select the mandatories, but should also determine the boundaries of the territories concerned. This principle was subsequently embodied in section VII of the unratified Treaty of Sévres, and at a still later date was reproduced in the first recital in the preamble to the Palestine mandate, and in the corresponding section of the preamble to the Syrian mandate, these mandates being confirmed by the Council of the League, and entering into force, before the Treaty of Sévres had been abandoned. The Treaty of Lausanne, which eventually superseded that treaty, was silent on the subject of the mandated territories. It provided (article 3) for the determination of the frontiers between Syria and Turkey, and between Iraq and Turkey, but otherwise the only relevant provisions regarding the territories lying beyond these frontiers is contained in article 16 of the treaty, which states that "Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present treaty . . . the future of these territories . . . being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned." The effect of article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne on the question of the determination of the boundaries of the "A" mandated territories is not entirely clear. It might be argued perhaps that the phrase "parties concerned" means the parties directly concerned in a particular frontier, and that the task of determining the frontiers was thus removed from the principal Allied Powers. But it is doubtful whether so important a change can be assumed from the employment of such ambiguous and general words in a general article, applicable to all the territories detached from Turkey, and in strict law the principal Allied Powers probably remained, after

the Treaty of Lausanne, the competent authorities for the determination of the boundaries. Whether this is true in the case of Iraq, as well as in that of Syria and Palestine (including Transjordan), is perhaps more uncertain. There is nothing in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 corresponding to the relevant passages in the preambles to the mandates for Syria and Palestine. Nevertheless, in view of the San Remo decision, the legal position in regard to Iraq is possibly the same as in regard to Syria and Palestine.

5. In practice, however, in the case of all the mandated territories, the various boundaries have been fixed, after considerable difficulty and delay in some cases, by direct negotiation between the parties immediately concerned, without reference to the principal Allied Powers, the part assigned to the latter having come to be regarded, with the lapse of time and in changed circumstances, as a dead letter. The principal Allied Powers have long ceased to act as a body, and no individual member has ever claimed to intervene.

6. There were special reasons for approaching the Council of the League in connexion with the Iraq-Syria and the Transjordan-Syria sectors of the frontier laid down in the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920. In the case of the Iraq-Syria sector, His Majesty's Government and the French Government were unable to reach agreement on the exact delimitation of the frontier, and the Franco-British Convention of 1920 stipulated that in such an event recourse should be had to the Council of the League. Reference to the Council in the case of the Transjordan-Syria sector was necessary, because the Anglo-French Agreement of the 31st October, 1931, involved a definite modification of the frontier laid down in 1920, and therefore the mandatories clearly required covering sanction in view of article 5 of the Palestine mandate and article 4 of the Syrian mandate, under which the mandatories are responsible for seeing that no part of the respective territories is ceded to, or placed under the control of, a foreign Power. The same considerations do not apply in the case of the Palestine-Syria sector. That frontier was demarcated on the basis laid down by article 1 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, by the commission provided for in article 2 of the same convention. The report of the commission was formally accepted by His Majesty's Government and the French Government in an exchange of notes, dated the 7th March, 1923, and, in accordance with paragraph 3 of article 2 of the 1920 convention, a copy of the report was deposited, with copies of the notes exchanged, in the archives of the League of Nations on the 6th February, 1924. His Majesty's Government therefore consider that no further action, *vis-à-vis* of the League, is called for in this case. The Council of the League, as such, is not responsible for the original determination of the frontiers of mandated territories, and the substance of the exchange of notes of the 7th March, 1923, no more appears to require their formal approval, therefore, than any other international instrument which the mandatories, vested by the mandates with control over the foreign relations of the respective territories, may conclude on their behalf, except on the assumption that the Council has succeeded to the rights of the principal Allied Powers. His Majesty's Government, for their part, do not regard this assumption as legally sound, and would prefer not to commit themselves to it.

7. It will, however, be best to deal with the somewhat complicated situation described in the preceding paragraphs in the light of common sense and good tactics, rather than on a strictly legal basis. The question of approval has so far only been raised in regard to the Palestine-Syria frontier, but the danger of admitting the necessity of obtaining approval for this frontier lies in the possible creation of a precedent applicable to all the frontiers of the "A" mandated territories (other than those with Turkey, which were definitely provided for in the Treaty of Lausanne). An element of uncertainty would thus be introduced in regard to frontiers hitherto regarded as fixed, and the intervention of third parties might complicate relations with the foreign neighbours of the mandated territories. Moreover, an opportunity would be given to the Powers whose approval was sought to create difficulties and to extract advantages for themselves as the price of approval. A further consideration in the case of Iraq is the time factor, in view of the possible connexion of the question with that of Iraq's admission to membership of the League in September next.

8. For all these reasons His Majesty's Government would prefer not to have to seek the approval of the Council for the Palestine-Syria frontier. But they

do not wish, by denying the Council's competence, to raise the question of that of the principal Allied Powers. They propose, therefore, to take no action unless pressed to submit the matter to the Council, and in that event the best course seems to be to acquiesce without prejudice, and to seek the approval of the Council in such a manner as to commit themselves as little as possible to any principle of general application regarding the necessity of doing so.

9. In these circumstances I request that you will inform the French Government, in such a manner as you think best, that His Majesty's Government have examined the question of the frontier dividing Syria and the Lebanon from Palestine as promised by Lord Cecil, and have come to the conclusion that no necessary measures have been overlooked. His Majesty's Government would, therefore, propose to take no further action unless and until the point is again raised by some member of the Council or by the League Secretariat. In the event of it being so raised they would propose to state that in their view no submission to the Council is necessary. Nevertheless they would naturally be prepared, always without prejudice to that view, to seek the formal approval of the Council for that frontier should any member of that body press them to do so.

10. I shall be glad to learn whether the French Government concur in the procedure proposed.

11. The considerations which have influenced His Majesty's Government in this matter and which are set out in paragraphs 4 to 7 of this despatch should, as I have stated, be regarded as confidential and are primarily for your own information. I am content, however, to leave it to your discretion to make such use of the material contained therein as you think fit in discussing the question with the French Government, should they display any reluctance to agree to the course which His Majesty's Government wish to follow. I recognise that the question may not have the same importance for them as it has for His Majesty's Government, since no question of the approval of the frontiers between Syria and Turkey and between Syria and Iraq arises, while that of the frontier between Syria and Transjordan has already been disposed of, so the submission of the Palestine-Syria frontier to the Council or to the principal Allied Powers would not, therefore, have the same inconveniences as a precedent. It seems possible, however, that the French Government will agree with His Majesty's Government that there is no legal foundation for regarding the Council of the League as taking the place of the principal Allied Powers for the purpose of determining the frontiers of the "A" mandated territories.

I am, &c.
JOHN SIMON.

[E 2372/9/93]

No. 149.

Sir John Simon to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 1023.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 12, 1932.

AS you are aware, the Council of the League is at present considering the question of the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq, and has before it the report presented by the committee set up in virtue of the Council's resolution of the 28th January last for the purpose of preparing a declaration on the subject of the engagements to which Iraq should subscribe as a condition of her release from that régime. This committee has now proposed to the Council the adoption of the draft resolution, a copy of which is enclosed herein.

2. As a result of preliminary discussions regarding this resolution, it has been ascertained that the French Government will only be willing to accept it, and thus commit themselves to the renunciation, in respect of Iraq, of the capitulatory rights which were enjoyed by French citizens in the former Ottoman Empire, on condition that His Majesty's Government for their part undertake to adopt the same attitude in regard to the question of capitulatory rights, if and when the question of the admission into the League of Nations of the States of the Levant under French mandate arises in conditions analogous in particular in so far as the judicial régime is concerned.

3. Sir Francis Humphrys has now succeeded in obtaining from the French delegation an assurance that the French Government will accept the resolution,

provided an exchange of notes first takes place giving the French Government the assurance they desire, and has obtained from the French delegation the enclosed draft⁽¹⁾ of the note which the French Government would propose to address to His Majesty's Embassy.

4. After due consideration I have decided that an assurance in the terms of the attached draft may safely be given to the French Government in reply to their note.⁽²⁾ Your Lordship will appreciate that it is essential that this assurance should only be given on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. I shall be glad if you will approach the Quai d'Orsay accordingly, and arrange with them for the desired exchange of notes to take place at the earliest possible moment. It is of the utmost importance that the agreement of the French Government in the draft Council resolution should be secured by Tuesday, the 17th May, as the discussion of the Iraq question is to be concluded at Geneva by the 18th or 19th May, and that the proposed exchange of notes should therefore be completed not later than the 16th May. As soon as the exchange has been completed your Lordship should inform the British delegation at Geneva direct by telegram.

I am, &c.
JOHN SIMON.

Enclosure in No. 149.

Draft Resolution.

L'E. Conseil,

Approuve le projet de déclaration et le rapport qui lui ont été présentés par son comité conformément au paragraphe 4 de sa résolution du 28 janvier 1932;

Approuve le rapport que le représentant de la Yougoslavie, son rapporteur, lui a soumis ce jour;

Exprime, en conséquence, le vœu que les Puissances intéressées, dont les ressortissants jouissaient de droits capitulaires dans l'ancien Empire ottoman, renoncent, avant l'admission de l'Irak dans la Société des Nations, à ce que ces anciens privilèges de juridiction soient maintenus à l'avenir en faveur de leurs ressortissants;

Invite le Secrétaire général à faire part de ce vœu aux Gouvernements des Etats auxquels le Gouvernement britannique, conformément à la présente résolution, se sera adressé en vue de la renonciation envisagée.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 2437/2436/93]

No. 150.

Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon. — (Received May 20.)

(No. 686.)

Sir,

Paris, May 19, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I yesterday exchanged notes with the French Government, in obedience to the instructions contained in your despatch No. 1023 of the 12th instant. Under the terms of these notes, which follow the wording of the drafts with which you were so good as to furnish me, the French Government agree to renounce the maintenance of their capitulatory rights in Iraq in advance of the admission of that State to membership of the League of Nations, but ask in return for an assurance that His Majesty's Government will adopt the same attitude as regards their capitulatory rights if and when the question arises in similar conditions of the admission to the League of Near Eastern States at present under French mandate; His Majesty's Government, on their side, give the desired assurance.

2. The French note is enclosed herein in original, together with a certified copy of my reply to it. Owing to the absence from Paris of the competent officials, it was not possible to effect the exchange by the 16th, as directed, but the 18th was time enough, since it was not till the 19th, so I ascertained, that the Council was due to consider the resolution relating to the engagements to be undertaken by Iraq before admission to the League, the French assent to which was conditional on the receipt of the assurance contained in my note. As soon

as the exchange had been effected, the British delegation at Geneva was so informed by telephone.

3. After we had carried out the formality, the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs said that the French Government would be grateful to receive an assurance that, if and when the French Government desired to promote the emancipation from the mandatory system of any of the Near Eastern territories under French mandate, His Majesty's Government would adopt the same benevolent attitude as the French Government had adopted towards the emancipation of Iraq. I replied that the French Government need have no fear that we should make unnecessary difficulties, but that I doubted whether the assurance which they sought, and which could necessarily only be very general in character, was such as any Government could put into writing. M. Berthelot said that he fully realised that, and that his Government would be content with an oral assurance in quite general terms. The request appears to me in the circumstances to be a reasonable one, and I beg leave to recommend that I be authorised to give the desired assurance.

4. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the British delegation at Geneva.

I have, &c.
TYRRELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 150.

M. Berthelot to Lord Tyrrell.

Paris, le 18 mai 1932.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

J'AI pris connaissance du projet de résolution destiné à être soumis au Conseil de la Société des Nations au cours de sa présente session en vue de régler la question de l'extinction du régime mandataire en Irak. Ce projet exprime en particulier le vœu que les Puissances intéressées, dont les ressortissants jouissent de droits capitulaires dans l'ancien Empire ottoman, veuillent bien, avant l'admission de l'Irak dans la Société des Nations, renoncer à ce que ces anciens privilèges de juridiction soient maintenus, à l'avenir, dans cet Etat, en faveur de leurs ressortissants.

J'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence, en me référant à la note qu'elle a bien voulu adresser à mon Département le 14 janvier 1931, que le Gouvernement de la République est, pour sa part, disposé à renoncer, avant l'admission de l'Irak dans la Société des Nations, au maintien des droits susvisés, mais qu'il souhaiterait recevoir dès maintenant du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'assurance que celui-ci adoptera la même attitude dans la question des capitulations le jour où la question de l'admission dans la Société des Nations des Etats du Levant sous mandat français se posera dans des conditions analogues, notamment en ce qui concerne le régime judiciaire.

Veuillez, &c.

Pour le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires
étrangères, et par délégation, l'Ambassadeur
de France, Secrétaire général,
BERTHELOT.

Enclosure 2 in No. 150.

Lord Tyrrell to M. Tardieu.

Paris, May 18, 1932.

M. le Président,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 18th May relating to the renunciation by the Government of the Republic of its capitulatory rights in Iraq, and, upon the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to give you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the assurance referred to in the second paragraph of your note.

I have, &c.
TYRRELL OF AVON.

[E 2575/1814/65]

No. 151.

Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 714.)

Sir,

Paris, May 24, 1932.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 970 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs agree to the line which you propose should be adopted by the two Governments in the matter of the claim raised during the 86th Session of the Council of the League of Nations that the boundary dividing Palestine from Syria and the Lebanon, as delimited in 1922-23, should have been submitted to the Council for approval. The Ministry think it probable, however, that the matter will be referred to again, and that the two Governments will be obliged sooner or later to explain the reasons why they consider that no necessary formality has been neglected.

2. I regret the delay in replying to your despatch, which was due to the absence from Paris of the competent official at the Ministry.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador).

R. H. CAMPBELL.

[E 2437/2436/93]

No. 152.

Sir John Simon to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 1200. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 6, 1932.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 886 of the 19th May, in which your Lordship reported the desire of the French Government to receive an oral assurance in regard to the attitude which His Majesty's Government would adopt in the event of the French Government wishing to promote the emancipation from the mandatory system of any of the States of the Levant under French mandate.

2. I approve the reply which you returned to M. Berthelot's enquiry on this subject, as reported in paragraph 3 of your despatch. For your confidential information, I may explain that His Majesty's Government would be most reluctant to give to the French Government any assurance on the subject more positive than that which you yourself have already given to them in that reply, more particularly as His Majesty's Government cannot accept the French Government's apparent assumption that they have placed His Majesty's Government under an obligation in connexion with the question of the emancipation of Iraq from the mandatory régime, and have thus a claim to some corresponding concession on the part of His Majesty's Government in return. Indeed, I am unaware of any instance in which the French Government have rendered positive assistance to His Majesty's Government in regard to the question of the emancipation of Iraq. None the less, in the wider interests of Franco-British relations, I am anxious to go as far as possible towards meeting the desiderata of the French Government.

3. You are therefore authorised to inform the French Government in writing that the terms of your reply, as reported in paragraph 3 of your despatch, to the effect that the French Government need have no fear that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will make unnecessary difficulties if and when the French Government desire to promote the emancipation from the mandatory system of any of the Near Eastern territories under French mandate, have been approved by His Majesty's Government. I shall be glad to receive in due course a copy of such communication as you may address to the French Government on this subject.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 2345/2436/93]

No. 153.

Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 823.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of his note to M. Herriot respecting the emancipation of Near Eastern territories from the mandatory system.

Paris, June 9, 1932.

Enclosure in No. 153.

*Lord Tyrrell to M. Herriot.**June 9, 1932.*

M. le Président,

WHEN on the 18th May last notes were exchanged with your Excellency's predecessor relating to the renunciation by the Government of the Republic of its capitulatory rights in Iraq previous to the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, it was intimated to me that the French Government would welcome an assurance that, if and when the French Government desired to promote the emancipation from the mandatory system of any of the Near Eastern territories under French mandate, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would adopt the same benevolent attitude as the French Government had adopted towards the emancipation of Iraq.

2. I duly acquainted His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with the desire of the French Government, and I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that I am instructed to acquaint you that the terms of the reply which I then gave, to the effect that the French Government need have no fear that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will make unnecessary difficulties if and when the French Government desire to promote the emancipation from the mandatory system of any of the Near Eastern territories under French mandate, have received the approval of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

TYRRELL.

END

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